Any battles America could of lost during WW2?

[Phaing]

...
It is absolutely absurd and wrong to chalk up victory against Germany to the Soviets alone. Yes, they paid in blood and did a big share of the fighting to defeat Germany, but they weren't pulling that load anywhere close to by themselves.

I will have to agree with that. The only real talents the leadership of the USSR ever displayed was in keeping their subject peoples fully oppressed, and feeding vast numbers of them into a meat-grinding war of attrition. If there was no campaign in France in 1944, there would have been a million more Germans in the east in 1944.

It is also worth noting that half the Germans killed in that war died in the final year of the war.

The US Army General Staff was (and still is) depressingly conservative, displaying a lack of daring and dread of casualties that apparently rubbed off on them from the British. The Navy and Air Corps were very different, which makes the army's behavior all the more curious.


You want to talk about one where we almost got our heads handed to us? How about Anzio?
Just got lucky after getting really dumb that time, I guess...

[Robert F. Rojas]

Greetings to both citizen Yoda's Grand Dad and the community as a whole. Well sir, in light of your introductory posting of Tuesday - August 08, 2017 - 7:25am, old yours truly is of the layman's opinion that the United States of America could very well have been the recipient of twin military catastrophes during the course of the Italian Campaign. In terms of specificity, the landings and subsequent actions that were fought in the vicinity of SALERNO and ANZIO immediately come to mind. Along a similar train of thought, I would also like to nominate OMAHA beach during the course of the Normandy landings in France for honorable mention. Finally, how could anyone possibly forget the passion play that was the HURTGEN FOREST in Germany? Now, on an purely incidental note, I would like to impart a wee bit of knowledge as it pertains to American military losses after the events of December 07, 1941. Unbeknownst to you, in the month of April in year 1942, the Imperial Japanese Empire inflicted the WORST extraterritorial defeat upon American Arms in its history. This catastrophe played itself out when roughly 76,000 trapped American and Filipino combatants were compelled to capitulate to the Imperial Japanese Army after three months of siege on the Bataan Peninsula in the Commonwealth of the Philippines. I will forego commenting on the subsequent BATAAN DEATH MARCH which transpired after this ignominious disaster. I hope this little blurb has provided an insight or two with your chosen topic of interest. In any case, I would like to bid you a copacetic day over in your corner of the British Isles. GOD SAVE THE QUEEN - not to mention everybody else.

Best Regards,
Uncle Bob

[maltesefalcon]

Greetings right back to you Mr. Rojas. Post #1? I don't think so. Where you been anyway? Always enjoyed reading your posts.

[T. A. Gardner]

Salerno. Possibly, but the Germans simply didn't have enough air power to overcome Allied air and seapower. I doubt that can be changed.
Anzio? The Germans built up for a large offensive there, one of the few times where they really had an offensive advantage with good troops and support and tried to eliminate the beachhead. They took serious casualties and made next to zero headway before calling off the offensive as their units became depleted and incapable of further offensive action.
Hurtgen Forest? That was a holding action on the German's part and an offensive blunder on the US's part. The Germans had zero hope of launching an offensive there.
The Philippines was a lost cause and the US knew it. Their leadership wisely followed the old military maxim, Never reinforce defeat.
Omaha beach was a worst case scenario for the Normandy landings and the Germans still lost. US casualties were heavy, but not prohibitive by any measure.

In fact, with one exception of the 106th Infantry Division in the Ardennes, there isn't one case of German infantry divisions beating Western Allied divisions on the offensive after mid 1940... Not one. In other words, roughly 80% of the Wehrmacht was worthless offensively against the Western Allies. All it was good for was holding ground and defending it and even then, most of the time only marginally so.

[South]

Good morning Uncle Bob,

Welcome to AHF.

Let's not forget the post-war question that became famous: "Who lost China ?"

A technical point; Many of the Filipino combatants were US Army combatants. Illustrative: The Philippine Scouts were soldiers sworn in before a US Army Captain, enrolled on US Army Morning Reports (DA Form 1) and dealt with all the other stuff indicative of our fraternity.

~ Bob
eastern Virginia, USA

[Carl Schwamberger]

Not technically a 'loss' but the fall of Cherbourg could have been delayed a lot longer. The first thing to go wrong there for the Germans was the death of the local corps commander the morning of 6th June. Returning from the canceled exercise in Rennes he was ambushed and shot by some scattered missdropped US airborne. That left the defense of the Cotientin peninsula slow to respond most of the 6th June. the corps never really got off its hind foot for the next two weeks. The US corps attacking managed to cut the peninsula in a week & execute a fast siege of Chebourg, capturing it inside three weeks. A number of other fortified ports, like Brest, held out for months. Cherbourg had raw numbers of men, and supplies,to hang on at least 30, if not 60 days like Brest. OTL theCherbourg port was operational above peacetime levels in August. Lacking that the Allied 12 Army Group would still be dependent on the beach/Mulberry supply head and not had the wherewithal to advance across France in August.

I don't see anything ASB or even deviating far for a extended defense of Cherbourg. A better corps commander in the area, and/or a better fortress commander could extend the defense for many weeks. If a few more battalions of better quality soldiers are trapped there it can make a difference.

[Carl Schwamberger]

One or two other possibilities come to mind. The German counter attack against the US beachead on Sicilly fell apart for several reasons. roadblocks of scattered paratroops slowed the movement to contact and derailed the German schedule. After that the attack axis was known to the local US commanders & the defense solidified enough to repel the late arriving and discoordinated attacks. Perhaps had the airborne drop been all in the correct LZ and the German approach less disrupted the German attack might have actually reached the beach and badly disrupted or destroyed the 45th Inf Divisions landing?

At Salerno the German defense failed mainly because the beach defense was very light. Some motorized or panzer grenadier battalions and reconissance units were occupying the former Italian defenses. The main counter attack force of two divisions was positioned at Naples and when it responded ran into the British corps on the left or north flank of the beachhead. Had one of the armored divisions in Naples been repositioned a day or two earlier, & deployed so it could counter attack the landing of the US corps on the right flank theres a chance of seriously damaging the landing of the single US infantry division operating in that sector. While losses to the Germans might have been heavy, in the first hours there was a chance of significantly disrupting the 5th Army landing.

Anzio. In December there had been a German infantry division defending the sector, & at least one mechanized or armored division in reserve near Rome. Possibilly another within a days march. As it was Kesselring had move the bulk of his reserve south to the Gothic Line to deal with the 5th Army attack there. He was only able to free up portions of several divisions to reform his reserve. Those took 24 hours or better to react to the landing. As it was Lucas was faced with only two infantry battalions & some light artillery. Those were not even in the defense positions at the time of landing, other than a couple of rifle platoons on sentry duty. Lucas corps had some 48 hours to create a defense with some depth, and land critical supplies of ammunition. Were the infantry division in its barks near the beach, vs stuck in the Gothic Line the initial landing force of a British Brigade and US infantry regiment would be fighting just off the beach before dawn & the build up to two divisions not cleared the first couple kilometers inland until afternoon. By afternoon at least one armored division advance force would be defending or counterattacking & by the next morning probably two Pz Grenadier or PzDiv, plus the original InfDiv would be facing two incomplete US and British divisions. The core problem with the SHINGLE operation was the number of landing craft allocated did not allow a rapid build up of the landing force. When Patton met with Lucas and reviewed the operational plan he declared it a "suicide mission" (Atkinson 'Day of Battle'). Patton, like a lot of people assumed the German local defense would still be in place. He also assumed, correctly, Kesselring could build up his reserves in the area faster than the undersized amphibious fleet could reinforce the beachhead. So, had Kesselring deployed fewer reserves to the Gothic Line, or returned a corps to the Rome region coast sooner the Allied SHINGLE operation would have had a much tougher time of it.

[T. A. Gardner]

One that is actually possible is New Guinea. The Japanese came very close to taking the island, and if they'd had a couple of breaks would likely have done so. For example, they get a clear win at Coral Sea. They damage or sink both US carriers for say the loss of Shoho and the IJA takes Port Moresby.

Midway is another. There is a possibility that the Japanese could have pulled off a "reverse" victory and sunk or heavily damaged the three US carriers.

A third is Biak. This one is a bit more questionable, but the Japanese were in the process of sending sufficient naval and land forces they might have won with when things got pulled for the Marians Islands instead.

[Carl Schwamberger]

Several surface naval battles that could have gone the Japanese way in 1942. Tactically the three surface night battles in October/November were draws or near draws. With a bit better decision making on the Japanese side, or worse with the USN any of the three could have been tactical, or even operational wins for Japan.

[T. A. Gardner]

Several surface naval battles that could have gone the Japanese way in 1942. Tactically the three surface night battles in October/November were draws or near draws. With a bit better decision making on the Japanese side, or worse with the USN any of the three could have been tactical, or even operational wins for Japan.

The worst would be First Savo Island. The Japanese wipe out the Allied fleet off Guadalcanal. Then they stay and look for survivors and other targets of opportunity. They find and sink the shipping that remained further East that was still unloading supplies and equipment for the Marines. That goes down. It's a month or more before even a portion of that can be replaced. That would have been a major setback for the US.

[Robert Rojas]

Greetings to both citizen Yoda's Grand Dad and the community as a whole. Howdy Grandpa! Well sir, in continuing reference to your introductory posting of Tuesday - August 08, 2017 - 6:25am, old yours truly would like to add the Battle for Attu Island to your readership's expanding list of actions that might have ended badly for Uncle Sam and company. The island of Attu is located at the western most terminus of the Aleutian Island chain which, at the time of the Pacific War anyway, was an appendage of the United States Territory of Alaska. The Japanese initially seized the island of Attu in June of year 1942. A combined American and Canadian effort was eventually mounted to retake the island of Attu in May of year 1943. Nearing the completion of the Allied liberation of the island of Attu, the Japanese garrison commander (Colonel Yasuyo Yamasaki) attempted to radically reverse the situation by mounting an all or nothing counterattack on May 29, 1943. The mission was brutally simple. Surprise and push through the Americans and seize their field artillery now positioned on the island of Attu. The Japanese would hold the captured field artillery position in the hopes of a promised relief mission being marshalled back in Japan. Incidentally, the cornerstone of this Japanese relief mission would be the massive battleship Musashi. On May 29, 1943, under the cover of darkness, Colonel Yamasaki turned to his now assembled one thousand men, drew his Samurai Sword, and in the finest tradition of the infantry, he roared FOLLOW ME! The Colonel's audacious thrust initially made good progress, but eventually lost its impetus when the American defenders rallied and subsequently halted the assault - much of the engagement being primordial hand-to-hand combat and small arms fire at near point blank range. In the end, Colonel Yamasaki and most of his command perished. Upon learning of the disaster on the island of Attu, the now marshalling Japanese relief mission was cancelled. One can only speculate what the ultimate outcome would have been if that Japanese relief mission had arrived in a timely fashion. Well, that's my latest two cents worth on this hypothetical topic of interest - for now anyway. In any case, I would like to bid you a copacetic day over in your corner of the United Kingdom. GOD SAVE THE QUEEN - not to mention everybody else.


Best Regards,
Uncle Bob

[Carl Schwamberger]

...
The worst would be First Savo Island. The Japanese wipe out the Allied fleet off Guadalcanal. Then they stay and look for survivors and other targets of opportunity. They find and sink the shipping that remained further East that was still unloading supplies and equipment for the Marines. That goes down. It's a month or more before even a portion of that can be replaced. That would have been a major setback for the US.

This forces Gormley to order up a emergency supply run, or abandon the Marines & get relieved sooner.

A emergency supply effort may not provide much but can force some naval actions earlier than OTL.

[Robert Rojas]

Greetings to brothers T.A. Gardiner, Carl Schwamberger and the community as a whole. Howdy troops! Well gentlemen, In light of your respective installments of Sunday - June 03 2018 - 7:56pm and Thursday - June 07, 2018 - 6:35pm, old yours truly was curious about the potential ramifications and political fallout over yet another significant catastrophe for American Arms in the Pacific Theater of Operations. If I "understand" what is OR what was at stake here, we now apparently have what is tantamount to another PEARL HARBOR for American naval forces and, on a smaller scale, another BATAAN for American ground forces. First of all, I cannot even begin to grasp the sheer magnitude of panic (both literal and figurative) in Australia and second of all, I can only imagine the wholesale stampede in the United States Congress for an immediate reassessment of the so-called EUROPE FIRST POLICY after the disaster in the Solomon archipelago. Now, I freely admit that the Pacific War is not my shtick, but have I misconstrued OR taken something out of its proper context here? Inquiring minds want to know. Well, that's my initial two Yankee cents worth on this hypothetical topic into the Rising Sun victorious - for now anyway. In any case. I would like to bid the both of you an especially copacetic day across the fruited plain.


Best Regards,
Uncle Bob

[T. A. Gardner]

The US in the Guadalcanal situation given, would still have Transport Division 12 with their flush decker APD high speed transports. These ships could reliably deliver as much as say 300 to 500 tons of supplies a week. That's not much, but it certainly would be better than nothing. When the airfield is operational, the US could have flown in some supplies on aircraft too. This would have also allowed for evacuation of wounded and sick troops.

[Carl Schwamberger]

The US in the Guadalcanal situation given, would still have Transport Division 12 with their flush decker APD high speed transports. These ships could reliably deliver as much as say 300 to 500 tons of supplies a week. That's not much, but it certainly would be better than nothing.

Since the combat was relatively low intensity, only eight to ten days full on ground combat for the first 90 days 70 or 80 tons daily might have sufficed for the first month. If you are gong to keep up a air wing as capable as OTL more will be needed.

When the airfield is operational, the US could have flown in some supplies on aircraft too. This would have also allowed for evacuation of wounded and sick troops.

Actually thats what they did. There was a steady stream of Dakotas & other aircraft between Guadalcanal and points east. Not a large volume, but fairly steady.