alecsandros wrote:It's curious that an Admiral often times mentioned as "overly-cautious" actualy took a terrific gamble at 7:25, by ordering the comittment of his reserve anti-shipping force to be re-equipped with land attack weapons, in effect robbing him of any chance of potential counterattack up until at least 12:00 (earliest time when the 1st strike planes against Midway would have been ready for spotting on the flight decks of the 4 Kido Butai carriers). Hence Nagumo took a big risk by constientiously opting for remaining without an anti-shipping force for at least 4h30m hours (7:25 - 12:00).
There was nothing risky in Nagumo's decision. All he could
reasonably expect to encounter, were submarines and some surface ships - nothing too dangerous for his force.
As for Nagumo's "caution", I know about two contemporary sources, claiming him to be over-cautions: Combined Fleet HQ (that liked to put his force in harm's way and than complained, that he could do better - universal complaint
) and admiral Yamaguchi (who obviously aimed at Nagumo's place so he never hesitated to voice some slander about his boss).
alecsandros wrote:This is even more curious, IMHO, because Nagumo broke radio silence on June 2nd 10:30 in the morning, to rally his fleet.
He mentions this in his post-action report. He also mentions that that may have been the moment when the enemy "discovered" him.
That's what Narumo really sates on this matter: "We were not discovered until early in the morning of the 5th at the earliest."
glenn239 wrote:Interestingly, Genda answered a question after the war on what he'd have done if Ryujo and Junyo had been assigned to Midway. He said,
...the task force should have been reserved for a decisive battle with the American main force. In order to do so, however, the Aleutians operation should have been called off, so that the 2nd task force might be used to attack Midway."
That seems to imply that Nagumo's main striking force would not have attacked Midway at all, instead Ryujo and Junyo would have while Nagumo lurked in the shadows. That plan might have been trouble...
After the war Genda could tell anything he want - hindsight is always 20/20
Of course, during the battle there was a question of sending Kakuta to support Nagumo after one Japanese force was, in the eyes of Combined Fleet HQ, discovered by US submarine before the battle. Ugaki in his diary laments about not following this idea.
glenn239 wrote:Furuta's (dive bomber squadron leader, Akagi) has his account in Beyond Pearl Harbor. He says that when Kaga was dive bombed his Val was already on the flight deck, (he said taken to the deck' from the hanger after completing rearmament and refuelling). He ran to the head to relieve himself because he figured, at 1022, that he would be taking off within minutes.
The problem with Furuta's account is, that there were no dive-bombers from "Kaga" included in this attack force.