Nagumo with 7 carriers at Midway

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Rob Stuart
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Re: Nagumo with 7 carriers at Midway

#211

Post by Rob Stuart » 15 Oct 2017, 11:54

paulrward wrote:Hello All ;

I am going to butt in again. I do NOT believe that the messages that were sent to aircraft in the air were enciphered, especially those sent to single engine aircraft with small crews. The labor of receiving the message, writing out the message, getting out that humungous JN 25 codebook, deciphering the message, and then writing it out for the pilot would be overwhelming in a small floatplane.

I believe that all the messages sent from the Kido Butai to their scoutplanes were sent in ' clear ' . I may be wrong, but in the USN during the war, all the ship to air and aircraft to ship radio messages were in straight Morse.
You are wrong on almost every count.

Midway Inquest's Appendix B is a copy of the traffic to and from KdB, as logged on 4 June by US eavesdroppers. They did not intercept every message to or from the Japanese aircraft, but it is very clear that some of it was in plain language and some of it was encrypted. For instance, the message sent by Tone 4 at 0555 (Midway time), "15 enemy planes heading towards you", was not itself intercepted, by its retransmission by Tokyo was picked up and the log notes that "It is believed to be reporting 15 American planes (dive bombers?)". Clearly this message was in plain language, but due to garbling, lack of familiarity with Japanese message proforma or some other reason, it was not fully understood by the eavesdroppers. The next entry in the log, at 0635, is from HAMI4 (the call sign for Chikuma 4) and it reads "HAMI4 sends to MARI the controlling or senior station a four kana despatch". This certainly appears to have been sent in a code the US could not read at the time. The messages to and from MEKU 4 (Tone 4) and MARI (KdB) are likewise sometimes encrypted and sometimes in plain language.

The code or cipher used for ship-plane messages would certainly not have been JN-25. Undoubtedly a much simpler system was used, and not only for practical reasons. It would have been very stupid to have put a copy of one's most important operational code on every search plane, given the risk that a copy might be retrieved by the enemy from a downed aircraft.

Other navies also supplied their aircraft with a simplified code. The First Team, page 192, tells us that at 0815 on 7 May 1942 Yorktown copied a message from a scout that placed two carriers and four heavy cruisers about 200 miles northwest of TF 17. However, four pages later we learn that when the SBD landed back on Yorktown the pilot stated that he had spotted two heavy cruisers and two destroyers, and "a quick check revealed a coding error on the pilot's cipher pad".

So it is clear that in June 1942 both IJN and USN scouts carried codes or ciphers and used them, resorting to plain language in emergencies or when encryption was not required.

alecsandros
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Re: Nagumo with 7 carriers at Midway

#212

Post by alecsandros » 15 Oct 2017, 17:14

Rob Stuart wrote: I’d also observe that this hypothetical message is way too long. Officers are trained to be concise, and Yamaguchi would never compose as verbose a message as this. It would have to be cut down to something like this:

KdB has ordered full attack at 1030. Consider it advisable you order immediate CarDiv2 attack with carrier bombers without CarDiv1 carrier attack aircraft.
Many thanks for a wonderfully detailed reply,

In this light, a shorter - and faster typed - message could be conceived as being sent to Yamamoto.

With this in mind, I browsed through the Bates report today , scanning for situations in which Nagumo , Yamaguchi or others requested replies from their superiors during operation MI, by use of radio-transmitted messages (as opposed to light-transmitted messages, via blinkers, such as the ones that cruiser Tone sent to Akagi and vice-versa).

I found no instance in which Yamamoto actualy replied to any report that his officers made to him. Yamamoto did transmit several messages, but they are not pin-point replies to pin-point reports or enquiries, but rather general orders transmitted after (probably) receiving and compiling multiple front-line reports.

My impression is that Yamamoto wouldn't have replied to any request by Yamaguchi, and that Nagumo wouldn't have sent such a request, as he was entitled to use his forces in whatever manner he saw fit...


glenn239
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Re: Nagumo with 7 carriers at Midway

#213

Post by glenn239 » 16 Oct 2017, 18:54

paulrward wrote: Perhaps, but lets look at a good example: At Leyte, Adm. Kinkaid sent a message to Halsey asking if he was still guarding the San Bernardino Strait. The message was dispatched at 04:12. It was received, decrypted, and given to Halsey at 06:48. Halsey did not get off a reply until 07:45. From this we can see that it took 2 1/2 hours to get a message from one admiral to another, and then another hour to send the message back.
2 1/2 hours would be pretty much useless. For the case in question, a compressed version would be,

(Torpedo bombers) rearmed with bombs 0715 and unavailable before 1030. Enemy attacking constantly. (2nd Division) can attack immediately with 36 (dive bombers) if (Combined Fleet) orders.

JN25b used 5-digit codes for each word, with the ones in brackets presumably being single code words.
Last edited by glenn239 on 16 Oct 2017, 19:25, edited 2 times in total.

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Re: Nagumo with 7 carriers at Midway

#214

Post by glenn239 » 16 Oct 2017, 19:06

alecsandros wrote: And therefore I think it's more prudent to not consider them in the discussion.
The 6th Ku fighters were likely being used during the battle, but few of the pilots. Maybe one by Hiryu for strike escort, probably 3 on Kaga for strike escort. As fighters were damaged, or even as the battle heated up and rearming became more frequent, probably more of the 6th Ku spare fighters were tapped.

What you are proposing - prepare some returning-Midway Zeroes for escort - takes time and manpower, and that was not existing at the given hours.
The carrier fighter squadrons had 18 aircraft each, with ground crews of perhaps 5 men for each plane. That's something like 90 men available at all times for servicing fighters. With Akagi at 0900 (for example), all the carrier's fighters were aloft, so all 90 ground crew were available.
The Midway Kates attacked a 20kts target defended by 6 Wildcats, while themselves had a 6 Zero escort (equaling the number of Wildcats).
I believe 24 Kates should score about 4 hits, on the basis of the Hiryu's performance, assuming a decent escort and USN June 1942 AA performance. Whether you wish to conclude otherwise is up to you but either way, there is no use talking about it.
Nagumo's staff asked Tone 4 seaplane if there was an enemy carrier in the task force. The message was transmitted to the plane at 7:15, and the answer came to Nagumo's bridge at 8:00 (relayed from TOne were it was received at 7:45).
The Akagi's message to "advise ship types" was in response to the Tone 4 0728 message, received at 0800. Tone 4's response was logged at 0809. (The Akagi's 0747 message to Tone 4 was probably in response to a follow-up message sent from Tone 4 about weather conditions near the enemy fleet, because the 0728 message had not yet been received on the Akagi when this was sent.)
Last edited by glenn239 on 16 Oct 2017, 19:25, edited 2 times in total.

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Re: Nagumo with 7 carriers at Midway

#215

Post by glenn239 » 16 Oct 2017, 19:22

alecsandros wrote: My impression is that Yamamoto wouldn't have replied to any request by Yamaguchi, and that Nagumo wouldn't have sent such a request, as he was entitled to use his forces in whatever manner he saw fit...
Yamamoto does not reply if he decides to wait for Nagumo's 1030 attack. If he decides the situation is trouble, then he breaks radio silence with something like,

"Attack the enemy immediately."

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Re: Nagumo with 7 carriers at Midway

#216

Post by alecsandros » 16 Oct 2017, 20:45

glenn239 wrote:The 6th Ku fighters were likely being used during the battle, but few of the pilots. Maybe one by Hiryu for strike escort, probably 3 on Kaga for strike escort. As fighters were damaged, or even as the battle heated up and rearming became more frequent, probably more of the 6th Ku spare fighters were tapped.
I would think the same way, BUT we do NOT know that at all.

all the carrier's fighters were aloft, so all 90 ground crew were available.
That is highly questionable , as all those men would be hurrying to help rearming the bombers.
I believe 24 Kates should score about 4 hits, on the basis of the Hiryu's performance, assuming a decent escort and USN June 1942 AA performance. Whether you wish to conclude otherwise is up to you but either way, there is no use talking about it.
Hiryu's performance against 6 Wildcats and a 20kts carrier is not relevant to a force of ~ 25 Wildcats and 30kts carriers.

The Akagi's message to "advise ship types" was in response to the Tone 4 0728 message, received at 0800. Tone 4's response was logged at 0809. (The Akagi's 0747 message to Tone 4 was probably in response to a follow-up message sent from Tone 4 about weather conditions near the enemy fleet, because the 0728 message had not yet been received on the Akagi when this was sent.)
You are mixing up the times. Those are not the logged times, check them again.

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Re: Nagumo with 7 carriers at Midway

#217

Post by alecsandros » 16 Oct 2017, 20:47

glenn239 wrote:
alecsandros wrote: My impression is that Yamamoto wouldn't have replied to any request by Yamaguchi, and that Nagumo wouldn't have sent such a request, as he was entitled to use his forces in whatever manner he saw fit...
Yamamoto does not reply if he decides to wait for Nagumo's 1030 attack. If he decides the situation is trouble, then he breaks radio silence with something like,

"Attack the enemy immediately."
Yamamoto wouldn't reply anything to anybody,
Nagumo had operational command of the carrier fleet, and all the freedom to act agaisnt the enemy as he saw fit. He already informed Yamamoto that he was "heading towards the enemy" at 9:00, and that was a clear offensive move.

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Re: Nagumo with 7 carriers at Midway

#218

Post by glenn239 » 17 Oct 2017, 18:27

alecsandros wrote: I would think the same way, BUT we do NOT know that at all.
I seem to recall in Beyond Pearl Harbor one fighter pilot account where he was given a replacement Zero that was 'found' on Hiryu, I believe. Would have to double check the recollection but that would almost certainly be a 6th Ku. In terms of the overall point, I can't think of a situation where any carrier would permit carrier fighter pilots to sit around doing nothing because their aircraft was damaged, while replacement spares were sitting operational in the hanger.
That is highly questionable , as all those men would be hurrying to help rearming the bombers.
I'm getting an impression you're inventing reasons why Akagi and Kaga with over 1,600 men aboard each, can't find 15 men to rearm 3 fighters for a strike. Anyways, each bomber also had its own dedicated ground crew of about 4-5 men. In addition to that, each plane crew (2 for dive, 3 for torpedo) would pitch in to help in fast-service situations. So no, the fighter crews servicing their own birds won't be diverted to servicing bombers as each one of those would have 6-8 men already on the job. Now, if the fighter has already been shot down, or is in the air so the crew is spare, maybe.


Hiryu's performance against 6 Wildcats and a 20kts carrier is not relevant to a force of ~ 25 Wildcats and 30kts carriers.
As already discussed, you conclusion that 24 torpedo bombers with 12 fighters as escort is expected to do no better than 10 with 6 is of insufficient interest to merit further discussion.
You are mixing up the times....<snip>
Tone 4 sent more than 1 message after 0728. The Akagi's 0747 message to Tone 4 to ascertain ship types will not have been in response to Tone 4's 0728 message, but one sent later describing weather conditions at the point of contact. The 0728 message arrived on the bridge at 0800 and promoted another call to advise ship types.
Last edited by glenn239 on 17 Oct 2017, 18:44, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: Nagumo with 7 carriers at Midway

#219

Post by glenn239 » 17 Oct 2017, 18:42

alecsandros wrote: Yamamoto wouldn't reply anything to anybody,
Nagumo had operational command of the carrier fleet, and all the freedom to act agaisnt the enemy as he saw fit. He already informed Yamamoto that he was "heading towards the enemy" at 9:00, and that was a clear offensive move.
Yamamoto relieved Nagumo of his command during the battle so I see no reason to suppose he would hesistate to send a direct order if he deemed it necessary. Nagumo's message to Yamamoto at 0855 was deceptive on three counts. First, it did not emphasise that the Nagumo Force was already under near constant air attack and that the enemy carrier could easily have the drop on him. Second, it did not state that the attack wave could not take off for another 90 minutes, exacerbating the danger of the enemy's successful ambush. Third, it did not clarify that 1st Division torpedo bombers had been unreadied and were at that moment in the hanger, some with bombs, some with no armament. The second two pieces of information would have shocked Combined Fleet, as they were under the impression the reserve attack wave may have already been launched, or was doing so momentarily.

The overall impression Nagumo was trying to convey by withholding all of this, and which an unsolicited 2nd Division message would shatter, was that Nagumo was in control of the situation when he clearly was not. Nor should it be assumed that Nagumo's HQ would be entirely annoyed at the intrusion, as this would transfer responsibility for the decision up the chain of command, such that if Yamamoto had ruled in favor of the 1030 launch, or had ordered an immediate attack, Nagumo would be off the hook for the consequences of either.

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Re: Nagumo with 7 carriers at Midway

#220

Post by alecsandros » 17 Oct 2017, 20:53

glenn239 wrote:while replacement spares were sitting operational in the hanger.
We do not know that.
Anyways, each bomber also had its own dedicated ground crew of about 4-5 men. In addition to that, each plane crew (2 for dive, 3 for torpedo) would pitch in to help in fast-service situations. So no, the fighter crews servicing their own birds won't be diverted to servicing bombers as each one of those would have 6-8 men already on the job. Now, if the fighter has already been shot down, or is in the air so the crew is spare, maybe.
You seem to pass over the fact that the carriers were avoiding bomb attacks, thus making sharp movements which would not permit landings of the Zeroes you mention. Those that would manage to land in between the minuts of no bombing attacks (not many), would require time to be taxied on the elevators and transported down below, where they would wait for being refueled and rearmed.
The fact that pilots were helping arming the torp bombers and dive bombers shows clearly that there weren't any spare technicians to do "something else".

As already discussed, you conclusion that 24 torpedo bombers with 12 fighters as escort is expected to do no better than 10 with 6 is of insufficient interest to merit further discussion.
I think you do not understand the mechanics of a air battle and you should read more.

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Re: Nagumo with 7 carriers at Midway

#221

Post by alecsandros » 17 Oct 2017, 21:10

glenn239 wrote:
The overall impression Nagumo was trying to convey by withholding all of this, and which an unsolicited 2nd Division message would shatter, was that Nagumo was in control of the situation when he clearly was not. Nor should it be assumed that Nagumo's HQ would be entirely annoyed at the intrusion, as this would transfer responsibility for the decision up the chain of command, such that if Yamamoto had ruled in favor of the 1030 launch, or had ordered an immediate attack, Nagumo would be off the hook for the consequences of either.
Again you are mixing up facts and not accutely remembering the phases of the battle, or contemporary hierarchy.

Nagumo was in control of the battle area as of 9:00 - all the enemy bomber waves had been repulsed , with very heavy losses for the US airgroups. On the other hand, Japanese losses up to 9:00 were small - 11 aircraft in the Midway attack and about 3 lost above the fleet in combat air patrol , for a total of 14. The US had lost about 45 machines in the same time frame, a ratio of 1:3.

Yamaguchi had no way of knowing what was coming their way, and Yamamoto had no way of knowing what exactly was the situation of Nagumo's fleet regardless of what Yamaguchi would have transmitted.

There is also the aspect of the length of time required to Yamamoto to actualy reply , which you haven't explained in any way whatsoever.

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Re: Nagumo with 7 carriers at Midway

#222

Post by glenn239 » 17 Oct 2017, 22:55

alecsandros wrote: We do not know that.
The plan was to send the twenty-one 6th Ku planes to Midway for immediate combat operations at that base. So they must have been embarked aboard carrier operational. How many of the 6th Ku pilots were carrier qualified is the question.
You seem to pass over the fact that the carriers were avoiding bomb attacks, thus making sharp movements which would not permit landings of the Zeroes you mention.
All the Zeros back from Midway recovered around the 0900 timeframe except the ones from Soryu, which sped off on their own accord in pursuit of enemy aircraft. I simply assume that what was actually done could be done. Kaga landed the fighters of Masao, Kiyonobu, Yoshikazu, Yoshiho, Ei-ichi between 0840 and 0850 and these took off at 0920. Akagi landed the fighters of Ayao, Tetsuo, Tadao (sic, Koreo), Shigetaka, at 0900-0910 and these took off at 0932. That's 9 fighters back from Midway recovered, replenished, and launched on another mission, in about 30 minutes each.
The fact that pilots were helping arming the torp bombers and dive bombers shows clearly that there weren't any spare technicians to do "something else".
The above 9 fighters that landed and relaunched 0920-0932 - are you saying all these fighter planes rearmed themselves?
I think you do not understand the mechanics of an air battle and you should read more.
Your conclusion that 24 Kates with 12 Zeroes in escort would not be expected to do better than 9 with 6 escorts remains uncompelling. Had Tomonaga not done what he actually did, no doubt you'd insist 9 Zeroes with 6 escorts would get 0-1 hits, not 2.
Last edited by glenn239 on 18 Oct 2017, 14:41, edited 2 times in total.

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Re: Nagumo with 7 carriers at Midway

#223

Post by glenn239 » 17 Oct 2017, 23:05

alecsandros wrote: Again you are mixing up facts and not accutely remembering the phases of the battle, or contemporary hierarchy.
Yamamoto relieved Nagumo of command during the battle - that demonstrated the command hierarchy. One month prior at Coral Sea Inoue had advised he was calling off the battle and Yamamoto overruled him, "requesting" that Zuikaku turn around and sink the remaining US carrier. This was also a far greater intrusion than merely ordering an air strike, yet that was also Yamamoto's job and prerogative as CinC. (Yamamoto was in command of the battle, not Nagumo's secretary)
Yamaguchi had no way of knowing what was coming their way, and Yamamoto had no way of knowing what exactly was the situation of Nagumo's fleet regardless of what Yamaguchi would have transmitted.
I doubt Yamamoto would be happy at the prospect of a 1030 launch, but who knows.
There is also the aspect of the length of time required to Yamamoto to actualy reply , which you haven't explained in any way whatsoever.
Your estimate of a timeframe I found uncompelling unless Yamato were to miss the message. Possible, but Yamato had the best radio gear in the fleet and wasn't missing much.

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Re: Nagumo with 7 carriers at Midway

#224

Post by alecsandros » 18 Oct 2017, 15:40

glenn239 wrote:So they must have been embarked aboard carrier operational.
That's not the problem, the problem is what state they were in as of June 4th.
That's 9 fighters back from Midway recovered, replenished, and launched on another mission, in about 30 minutes each.
Yes - and that happened while there was NO order to "attack immediately". if such an order existed as you say, the entire chain of activities on board the carriers would have been altered - and priority would be given to spotting and launching the attack planes.
Your conclusion that 24 Kates with 12 Zeroes in escort would not be expected to do better than 9 with 6 escorts remains uncompelling. Had Tomonaga not done what he actually did, no doubt you'd insist 9 Zeroes with 6 escorts would get 0-1 hits, not 2.
You go back in circles, while not adressing the issues: Yorktown was doing 20kts, not 30kts, she had a small , not a large escort, etc. Had the Kates run into a gauntlet of 12 Wildcats , of which 8 actualy intercepting (as in the Aichi Val strike), the losses for torp bombers would have been far higher, and probably no hits would have been scored.

Compare situation of D3A Val attack - 18 bombers used, 13 lost (72% loss rate), 7 got to release position (39% of strike size), of which 3 got hits - with the situation of the B5N2 attack - 10 bombers used, 5 lost (50% loss rate), 4 got to release position, of which 2 scored hits.

Wildcat CAP during first attack outnumbered Zeroes 12 to 3; CAP during second attack was 6 to 6.

What you do not understand is that a massed strike would encounter NOT 6 Wildcats , but ~ 40, of which probably 25 would obtain effective interceptions, thereby: a) reducing the numbers of bombers in existence to launch attack; b) damaging or forcing an early release of some of the bombers that were not shot down.

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Re: Nagumo with 7 carriers at Midway

#225

Post by alecsandros » 18 Oct 2017, 15:42

glenn239 wrote: Yamamoto relieved Nagumo of command during the battle - that demonstrated the command hierarchy.
Yes, and that happened many hours after the deadly attack by USN SBDs , that ravaged 3 out of 4 fleet carriers.

As of 9:00, there was no reason for Yamamoto to relive Nagumo of command - on the contrary - he was apparently winning the battle... Had victories-to-loss ratio remained the same, the IJN would have consumed all US aircraft during a single day of combat, while keeping own losses between 100-120 machines.

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