Nagumo with 7 carriers at Midway

[glenn239]

That's not the problem, the problem is what state they were in as of June 4th.

Akagi's embarked 6th Ku pilots appear to have spontaneously joined the battle, so I conclude the fighters were operational, and unless you have primary evidence proof they were not, your continued speculation to the contrary is not changing anything.

Yes - and...<snip>

The 1st division had 9 fighters landed from Midway and ready in 20-30 minutes, so had a launch gone forward around 0930, 9 fighters would have been ready aboard 1st Division for launch.

Compare situation of D3A Val attack - 18 bombers used, 13 lost (72% loss rate), 7 got to release position (39% of strike size), of which 3 got hits - with the situation of the B5N2 attack - 10 bombers used, 5 lost (50% loss rate), 4 got to release position, of which 2 scored hits.

F4F's attempted the intercept of torpedo armed B5N2's on three occasions in 1942. Not including AA and only counting those shot down prior to release, 4 were shot down (out of 18) at Coral Sea with about 40 F4F's and SBD's assigned to CAP, (SBD's got the bulk of the kills, so they're in). 3 were shot down (out of 10) at Midway against 14 F4F's, (not 6). 4 out of 36 were shot down at Santa Cruz with 37 F4F's on CAP.

So, that's 11 Kates shot down before reaching attack position against 91 Wildcats and SBD's participating in the defense. That's 1 shoot down per 8 planes on defense, on average. So no, your arguments about CAP defenses at Midway are not compelling in comparison to the actual known performance. Escorted B5N2's were a very dangerous quarry, and pretty fast for a 1942 torpedo bomber - not nearly as easy to actually shoot down in real life as you can type in an internet post 75 years after the fact. In order to hold their own against Zeros, F4F's had to stay high and fast, but torpedo bombers attacked low. Low and slow is where F4F's get killed by escorting Zeros.

What you do not understand is that a massed strike would encounter NOT 6 Wildcats , but ~ 40, of which probably 25 would obtain effective interceptions, thereby: a) reducing the numbers of bombers in existence to launch attack; b) damaging or forcing an early release of some of the bombers that were not shot down.

The numbers say that in 1942 with Wildcats and SBD's, Kates with Zero escorts were a dangerous target, fast and hard to bring down prior to release. It was USN AA at Santa Cruz that finally checkmated the Kates, not the F4F's. Not until the F6F was in service did the USN have a carrier fighter that could reliably do what you can type.

[glenn239]

Yes, and that happened many hours after the deadly attack by USN SBDs , that ravaged 3 out of 4 fleet carriers.

That's irrelevant. The fact Yamamoto relieved Nagumo - the most humiliating action imaginable given the circumstances - confirms that Yamamoto was in charge of the battle and would not hesitate to override Nagumo when deemed necessary.

As of 9:00, there was no reason for Yamamoto to relive Nagumo of command - on the contrary - he was apparently winning the battle... .

Irrelevant followed by strawman; Yamamoto did not need to relieve Nagumo of command to order 1st Air Fleet to attack immediately. Only if Nagumo refused to do so would that be an issue.

[alecsandros]

Akagi's embarked 6th Ku pilots appear to have spontaneously joined the battle, so I conclude the fighters were operational, and unless you have primary evidence proof they were not, your continued speculation to the contrary is not changing anything.

Problem is not with the 5 that are documented to have been engaged,
problem is with the other 16.

The 1st division had 9 fighters landed from Midway and ready in 20-30 minutes, so had a launch gone forward around 0930, 9 fighters would have been ready aboard 1st Division for launch.

No, you are mixing facts again. Those fighters were possibly landed at 8:20-30.

4 were shot down (out of 18) at Coral Sea with about 40 F4F's and SBD's assigned to CAP

According to USS Yorktown official action report, there were a total of 17 F4F and 8 SBDs in combat air patrol (Lexington+Yorktown) at the time of the attack.
According to Japanese sources, there were 15 A6M2s escorting the strike above the carriers - that is 2 Zeroes less then Wildcats.

3 were shot down (out of 10) at Midway against 14 F4F's, (not 6).

Again, USS Yorktown official action report at Midway mentions 6 F4F on combat air patrol during the second strike... Exactly the same as the number of Zeroes...
You should be doing some reading instead of posting absurd claims.

4 out of 36 were shot down at Santa Cruz with 37 F4F's on CAP.

I don't know where you are getting 4 out of 36, as 4 were shot down before striking Hornet... and 9 were shot down during the attack on Enterprise , which didn't score any hits...

The "37 F4F4s" were actualy 39 + 6 SBDs, according to USS Enterprise official action report... The number of escorting Zeroes was 29 machines, but of those, 9 machines tangled with USS Enterprise's inbound strike wave, and consumed their ammo. Therefore, the number of Zeroes above enemy carriers was 20 machines, 19 less then the defending Wildcats.

===
In this scenario, the Japanese strike wave would have a minimal escort of maybe 10-12 Zeroes, facing ~ 40 Wildcats. That is a difference of ~ 30 fighters, enough to exterminate a big part of the inboud strike.

The numbers say that in 1942 with Wildcats and SBD's, Kates with Zero escorts were a dangerous target, fast and hard to bring down prior to release. It was USN AA at Santa Cruz that finally checkmated the Kates, not the F4F's. Not until the F6F was in service did the USN have a carrier fighter that could reliably do what you can type.

Pure fantasy and nonsense.
I'll stop here, you don't have any grip of historical documents whatsoever.

[glenn239]

Problem is not with the 5 that are documented to have been engaged,
problem is with the other 16.

I conclude all 21 6th Ku fighters were operational because they were being sent into combat. Your theory is what? That Nagumo was going to ferry 21 inoperational fighters to the Midway air base to fight a naval battle?

Those fighters were possibly landed at 8:20-30.

The 9 fighter pilots I just listed were Kaga and Akagi escorts that flew to Midway, and all were landed back on their carriers between 0840-0910, and all were ready for takeoff 0920-0932. It's all in the fighter operations tables of Shattered Sword. Page 512. First guy listed for the Akagi Midway strike is Lt. Shirane Ayao launched 0430, shows in same listing as recovered aboard Akagi again at 0900-0910. Now flip to the bottom of page 500 for CAP patrol A7A and there is Shirane Ayao launching at 0932, recovered aboard Hiryu. At the same time as Ayao's plane was being rearmed, Akagi's crew was also rearming, repairing and refueling its recovered dive bombers squadron and rearming the torpedo bombers.

By the way, for historical purposes the most important Akagi CAP sortie of the whole battle is 2 lines below Ayao, the A7A CAP pilot listed as Kimura "Tadao". Why? Because that's actually Kimura Koreo of CAP sortie A9 fame. Why? Because if he hadn't flown that sortie then it would be virtually certain his 1025 takeoff was as a strike escort, given that Kusaka said 3 pilots from Midway were held back and the only 3 Midway fighter pilots aboard the Akagi at 1025 were Koreo, Sakae and Yozo, which between the three on page 512 form a plane number 1, 2, 3 formation, with Sakae being Koreo's no. 2 man and Yozo being a number 3 from another shotai. Was Koreo a strike escort that launched at 0932 for a temp assignment because Ayao's 3rd fighter (Sheiji) was not ready, or was he a designated CAP pilot? One curious thing about Koreo's 0932 sortie - it's the shortest CAP flight in the whole battle.

4 were shot down (out of 18) at Coral Sea with about 40 F4F's and SBD's assigned to CAP
According to USS Yorktown official action report, there were a total of 17 F4F and 8 SBDs in combat air patrol (Lexington+Yorktown) at the time of the attack.
According to Japanese sources, there were 15 A6M2s escorting the strike above the carriers - that is 2 Zeroes less then Wildcats.

See Lundstrom page 192 Black Shoe Carrier Admiral for the list of the actual totals of US planes that defended TF-17 at Coral Sea; 20 fighters (3 VF-2 escorts that returned early you overlooked) and 23 SBD's, and that's still only 4 Kates shot down before release.

You should be doing some reading instead of posting absurd claims.

Tomonaga's Kate was shot down by Thach during the attack on Yorktown. Funny how you managed to count Tomonaga's B5N2 in your 'shot down' totals, but omitted Thach's Wildcat that did it from your CAP totals. What should I make of that? Of the 8 Yorktown F4F's that were launched to reinforce the 6 on patrol, 1 shot down Tomonaga, one (Tootle) was shot down while trying to shoot down a Kate, and a third (Hopper) was shot down by an escorting Zero. Yet you didn't count any of them, but you did manage to include the Kates they shot down. Oh, and the 8 Enterprise F4F's you didn't count? They shot down one Kate (that you also counted while omitting the F4F's that did it) and were engaged in dogfights with escorting Zeros. So it was 22 F4F's in the defense accounting for 6 or 7 IJN aircraft shot down. The 6 original patrollers you listed shot down only 1 Kate, plus 2 Zeros.

I don't know where you are getting 4 out of 36, as 4 were shot down before striking Hornet... and 9 were shot down during the attack on Enterprise , which didn't score any hits...

Here,

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of ... st_strikes

0 out of 20 Kates shot down by fighters, but once within AA range,

"At the same time that the dive bombers were attacking, the 20 torpedo bombers were also approaching Hornet from two different directions. Despite suffering heavy losses from anti-aircraft fire..."

Your earlier statement that AA at Santa Cruz was a myth? That was something the attacking IJN pilots were too busy being shot down by AA to have noticed. Improved AA fire is what decided Santa Cruz, not F4F's. In terms of the Enterprise torpedo attack, all were either misses or duds.

In this scenario, the Japanese strike wave would have a minimal escort of maybe 10-12 Zeroes, facing ~ 40 Wildcats. That is a difference of ~ 30 fighters, enough to exterminate a big part of the inboud strike.

The 1942 pattern from the three battles was that most of the Kates would get to release range. If you think otherwise, be my guest.

Pure fantasy and nonsense.
I'll stop here, you don't have any grip of historical documents whatsoever.

You had me at, "I'll stop here..."

[glenn239]

One more thing. You wrote that Yorktown was doing 20kt while it would be doing 30kt if not previously damaged. True, but as per Lundsrom BSCA pg 270, at Midway the IJN torpedo bomber crews - being elite - were dropping much closer to the target than the 5th Division at Coral Sea. The close drops did not allow for much, if any, evasive action while the distant drops did. By Santa Cruz, that "mythical" AA was getting murderous the closer the planes got to the ships.

[alecsandros]

According to the official action reports, the drops were done from 1000 down to 800meters at Coral Sea, Midway, and Santa Cruz. At Santa Cruz at least 2 torps passed within 12 meters (40ft) and 9 meters (30ft) from Enterprise's stern.

But Enterprise was doing 30kts or more - had she been doing 20kts, she would have received at least 2 torps (but is unknown if duds or not). That is because contemporary IJN aerial torps were doing ~ 43kts or so, meaning 22 meters/second. With drop distance 800meters, travel time assuming immediate arming and perfect acceleration (ideal), would be 36 seconds.

In 36 seconds, a 20kts ship would travel 370meters in way of her direction of movement (or less if she would be turning as she would be losing speed in the turn). In 36 seconds, a 30kts ship would travel 555 meters in way of her direction of movement.
That's 185meters more, and 185 meters further away from a potential torpedo passing point. Hence more difficulty for the pilot to produce a torpedo hit.

[glenn239]

That is because contemporary IJN aerial torps were doing ~ 43kts or so, meaning 22 meters/second. With drop distance 800meters, travel time assuming immediate arming and perfect acceleration (ideal), would be 36 seconds.

Citation for the closer drops at Midway was given from BSCA. Lundstrom is over on Combined Fleet if you want to ask him about it. USN AA at Santa Cruz included more 20mm and 40mm, so was finally reaching out beyond the "revenge" range. At Midway perhaps 2 or 3 IJN planes were shot down by AA. At Santa Cruz, more like 30 - probably more than the fighters accounted for, and an order of magnitude increase.

Any explanation for why you included the kills scored by 16 reinforcing Enterprise and Yorktown fighters during the 2nd Hiryu strike, but did not include the fighters themselves?

[alecsandros]

Citation for the closer drops at Midway was given from BSCA.

USS Lexington action report off Coral Sea describes drops down to 500yards (450meters).
https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/sh ... Coral.html

USN AA at Santa Cruz included more 20mm and 40mm, so was finally reaching out beyond the "revenge" range.

Despite that, 9 out of 16 attacking Kates successfully dropped their torps against USS Enterprise, a (a 10th Kate also made a "drop" of some sort, as it crashed onto USS Smith, with torpedo attached. The plane exploded, and seconds later the torpedo warhead exploded as well, producing crippling damage and fires on the little ship). The reason is simple - poor fighter direction, coupled with a previous attempted interception over USS Hornet, coupled with most F4Fs being drawn above , to combat the incoming D3A Vals.

USS Hornet was "dropped" by 16 Kates out of 20 (Santa Cruz); USS Yorktown (Midway) by 7 out of 10; USS Lexington (Coral Sea) by 10 out of 14; USS Yorktown (Coral Sea) by 4 out of 4.
Therefore, "drop rate" = 77%.
Hit rate = 12.5% (of torp hits from total number of attackers), or 16% (of torp hits from total number of attackers making drops).
[I left out the attack on USS Enterprise at Santa Cruz, as the presence of USS South Dakota and AAA cruiser San Juan , plus a few heavily armed AAA destroyers was not applicable in any way to a hypothetical Midway scenario]

Any explanation for why you included the kills scored by 16 reinforcing Enterprise and Yorktown fighters during the 2nd Hiryu strike, but did not include the fighters themselves?

It's a problem there,
USS Yorktown's action report off Midway describes the second attack as being intercepted by 4+2 (own) Wildcats, on own fighter direction. The same A.R. describes Hornet Wildcats as taking over combat air patrol, in between the 2 attacks, but that combat air patrol is described as returned to Hornet/Enterprise, and relieved by Yorktown's own Wildcats before the torp bombers arived. The initial 4 Wildcats missed the targets, only the following 2 made contact with the Kates before torpedo release*.

* 8 more own Wildcats were hurriedly launched off the deck of Yorktown, moments before the torpedo bombers started their final runs. Those own Wildcats had very few gas inside their tanks, they had been launched not to combat the enemy, but to reduce teh fire hazard on board, and preserve them for further use (i.e. not being destroyed while sitting idle on the deck). They didn't make interceptions AFAIK.

https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/sh ... idway.html

[alecsandros]

At Midway perhaps 2 or 3 IJN planes were shot down by AA. At Santa Cruz, more like 30 - probably more than the fighters accounted for, and an order of magnitude increase.

It's not as easy as it looks,
AAA gunfire worked as a barrage of fire, therefore the more numerous the targets, the more numerous the chances for hits.
At Midway, only 37 IJN machines entered AAA gunfire range, of which 9 were Zeroes, and unlikely to enter 40mm or 20mm effective range. So only 28 bombers count as "targets".

At Santa Cruz, the combined force of the 4 IJN carriers attacked the 2 USN task forces with a strength of ~ 160 machines (400% more then at Midway), of which ~ 130 bomber sorties (nearly 500% more then at Midway).

Also, at Santa Cruz, there were 2 distinct USN task forces - and both were attacked. At Midway, only 1 task force was attacked, therefore less AAA guns entered in action.

My estimation for USS Yorktown (TF17) off Midway is approx 150 AAA guns, and USS Hornet (TF17) off Santa Cruz approx 200 AAA guns. USS Enterprise (TF16) off Santa Cruz probably concentrated 350 AAA guns. It shows in the effectiveness, but not nearly as much as most people think. Most IJN attackers that went over Hornet actualy returned back to their carriers (allthough many were damaged). In fact, total IJN losses in the attacks on USS Hornet were essentialy the same as the losses in the attacks on USS Yorktown (24 lost over Hornet vs 23 over Yorktown). The big losses happened above Enterprise, thanks to her 2x combat air patrol (25 Wildcats and 6 SBDs vs 14 Wildcats off Hornet), and almost 2x AAA gun batteries installed.

[glenn239]

USS Hornet was "dropped" by 16 Kates out of 20 (Santa Cruz); USS Yorktown (Midway) by 7 out of 10; USS Lexington (Coral Sea) by 10 out of 14; USS Yorktown (Coral Sea) by 4 out of 4.

At Coral Sea USN AA stopped 0 out of 14 Kates which survived the CAP from dropping their torpedoes. At Midway USN AA stopped 0 out of 7 that survived the fighters from dropping their torpedoes. So, the early war USN AA was consistent - completely ineffective against torpedo attack. For Santa Cruz I'll review.

It's a problem there,
USS Yorktown's action report off Midway describes the second attack as being intercepted by 4+2 (own) Wildcats, on own fighter direction. The same A.R. describes Hornet Wildcats as taking over combat air patrol, in between the 2 attacks, but that combat air patrol is described as returned to Hornet/Enterprise, and relieved by Yorktown's own Wildcats before the torp bombers arived. The initial 4 Wildcats missed the targets, only the following 2 made contact with the Kates before torpedo release*.

I'd asked you why you counted the planes the 8 Yorktown and 8 Enterprise reinforcements shot down in your 'kill' totals, but omitted the fighters themselves from your CAP totals. You answer by saying you somehow didn't know 2 of the 8 Yorktown fighters were shot down and didn't know they accounted for Tomonaga, as if you don't have access to, literally, any book written on the battle. Well, now you know. So that's 14 Yorktown fighters participating. Next, you talk of Action Reports, but not for Enterprise. Well, here's the Enterprises VF-6 Action Report,

http://www.midway42.org/ShowPDF.aspx?Pa ... R/vf-6.pdf

Say on page 2 and 3 that the 8 fighters of the Enterprise's 4th patrol engaged the torpedo bomber strike on Yorktown. So now you have the 8 Enterprise fighters in too. So, 22 fighters, 6 or 7 IJN aircraft shot down.

[glenn239]

It's not as easy as it looks,
AAA gunfire worked as a barrage of fire, therefore the more numerous the targets, the more numerous the chances for hits.

At Midway, only 37 IJN machines entered AAA gunfire range, of which 9 were Zeroes, and unlikely to enter 40mm or 20mm effective range. So only 28 bombers count as "targets". At Santa Cruz, the combined force of the 4 IJN carriers attacked the 2 USN task forces with a strength of ~ 160 machines (400% more then at Midway), of which ~ 130 bomber sorties (nearly 500% more then at Midway).

The order of magnitude increase in AA kills at Santa Cruz was due to superior USN weapons and equipment, not the number of planes being shot at.

[alecsandros]

The order of magnitude increase in AA kills at Santa Cruz was due to superior USN weapons and equipment, not the number of planes being shot at.

There is no order of magnitude increase,
As written above, TF Hornet destroyed at Santa Cruz the same number of attackers as TF Yorktown did at Midway.

The difference comes from TF Enterprise - which had 1 BB and 1 AAA cruiser in it, plus approx 30 fighters on own CAP (from Enterprise), which is a huge difference in mass then in either of the previous carrier battles.

[alecsandros]

At Coral Sea USN AA stopped 0 out of 14 Kates which survived the CAP from dropping their torpedoes. At Midway USN AA stopped 0 out of 7 that survived the fighters from dropping their torpedoes. So, the early war USN AA was consistent - completely ineffective against torpedo attack.

No, and no, and this is the last reply you'll get from me. You are apparently to stupid to read or if you read, you don't understand much !

[glenn239]

Well timed rage quit. I wondered how you would address the question of how you counted the 3-4 kills made by the 8 Yorktown and 8 Enterprise fighters against the Hiryu's second wave, but you didn't count the fighters themselves. The original 6 fighters gave a good account of themselves and got 3 shoot downs, but only one of those was a Kate.

Lundstrom's 1st Team series sheds light on a number of issues. pg. 393 of the first book states that 6th Ku fighters - probably all three - were used during Hiryu's second attack on the Yorktown. No surprise there to anyone.

Drop ranges listed at Coral Sea 500 to 750 yards, 600 meters at Midway. Santa Cruz one attack group dropped at 300-800 yards, but the bulk were from 1,000-2,000 yards. The net effect of the much heavier AA at Santa Cruz was that torpedo launch ranges were further out and planes tended to drop at poorer angles or switch to other targets under the fire rather than press on to better firing positions against the carriers.

Santa Cruz Zuikaku/Shokaku at Santa Cruz. Not counting the Junyo attack or planes shot down during retreat, and only the first 3 air battles, and up to the point the carriers were attacked -

37 F4F's opposed the first wave with CAP shooting down 5 Vals and 1 Kate before reaching target. AA claimed 4 Vals and 8 Kates, both before and after release. I wrote down that 12 Zeros were on escort, 8 with the dive bombers, 4 with the torpedo bombers.

The second wave had 21 F4F's on defense, 8 high and 13 low against 19 Vals and 5 Zeros. 2 Vals were shot down by CAP before push over and 3 fell to AA.

The third wave saw 11 F4F's plus another 14 low vs. 4 Zeros and 17 Kates. CAP shot down 5 (3 before release and 2 after) and AA shot down 4, I think all after release.

Of the 3 Zuikaku/Shokaku attacks

83 F4F's total on defense
21 Zeros escorting
13 Val and Kates shot down by fighters before or just after weapons release
19 Val and Kate shot down by AA before or just after weapons release.

[glenn239]

Eastern Solomons - 10 Zero, 27 Val vs. 53 F4F's = 4.5 (AA). 4.5 (Ftr) prior to release. (more shot down afterwards)
Santa Cruz (Junyo) - 17 Val, 6 Kate with 5 shot down by AA, (Ftr defense did not engage until after the attack was over).

Totals –
205 F4F/SBD vs. 59 Zero escorts (3.5 to 1)
35.5 IJN bombers shot down before release (5.75 to 1)
2 IJN bombers shot down AA before/just after release (Coral Sea/Midway)
23.5 IJN bombers shot down AA before/just after release (Eastern Solomons/Santa Cruz).

For an attack by the reserve strike group at Midway of 12 Zero, 36 Val, 24 Kate (if available) -

About 53 fighters would be on defense, meaning CAP/Escort ratio of 4.4 to 1 - a bit higher than the average of 3.5 to 1. This battle is closest to Eastern Solomons (10 Zero vs. 53 F4F) where 4.5 bombers were shot down by fighters before release. Expected from the overall average of battles is 53 CAP/5.77 fighters per kill prior to release = 9 bombers shot down. AA will account for 2-4, a total shot down before release should on average fall between 7-13.

After release at least 10-15 more shot down on the way out, for a raid total of about 17-28 aircraft shot down, for about 50 aimed releases of weaponry. Given the loss of 3 flight decks back at the Japanese fleet, some more will ditch and others be too damaged for further use. Perhaps 20-25 returning strike aircraft will be available on Hiryu for an afternoon strike, plus the 10 torpedo bombers.