Nagumo with 7 carriers at Midway

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alecsandros
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Re: Nagumo with 7 carriers at Midway

Post by alecsandros » 23 Aug 2017 18:52

Hard to say,
Pye was Kimmel's second in command in Dec 1941 on Oahu, and the sacking of his superior could have brought an early career end for Pye as well. He was never well viewed afterwards either, being rapidly replaced by Ghormley in Jan 1942 as commander of the Hawaiian battleship force.

It is unknown who ordered and who authorised the west coast patrols starting May 31st 1942, but I find it hard to believe a second-rate Admiral acted on it's own initiative. If he would have been doing it on his own thoughts, the patrol would have been recalled rapidly by Nimitz or King. However, that particular patrol lasted until June 17th 1942. Abit of a stretch to consider 2 weeks of battleship patrols as decided by a single person.

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Re: Nagumo with 7 carriers at Midway

Post by Takao » 23 Aug 2017 21:29

alecsandros wrote: That is speculative.
Hardly...This is not the captain of the Enterprise going "make it so." A ship is not going to leave port without fuel, provision, etc. So, the decision for her to sail was obviously made advance of her actual sailing date.
alecsandros wrote:Rochefort strongly believed in "target AF " as being Midway, and told Nimitz as such. Nimitz visited Midway on May 2nd, and promised to make all necessary arrangements to significantly strengthen all defenses.
Odd...You have the order reversed...Nimitz visits Midway on May 2, and then Rochefort first begins passing his findings about Affirm Fox to Layton and McCormick(Nimitz's Staff, not yet Nimitz himself) on May 13th.

These two items are not related, yet some how you think they are...Please explain your logic.
alecsandros wrote:That is false, read OEG51/1946
Soon as I get a chance to download it.

Still, given the all but total lack of ASW aircraft patrolling the Eastern seaboard...I cannot agree with your "false" conclusion.

Further, WRT a lack of ships on the east coast, for the month of April, 1942, there were 23 destroyers that spent a combined total of 140 days on patrol in the Eastern Sea Frontier. The main complaint is that these destroyers were not permanently assigned, but on temporary duty - understandable, given that the US, at the time, lacked a two-ocean navy.
alecsandros wrote: while you also disregard the fact that USS Long Island was assigned to Task Force 1, under Pye's command.
I disagree with your conclusion that the USS Long Island was rushed to the Pacific to screen the Task Force 1 battleships.
alecsandros wrote: ... And escorting convoys to Newfoundland...
Which convoys did the USS Ranger escort? Name them...
alecsandros wrote: Let's see, Wasp wasn't fit for Pacific combat either , but she was sent anyway...
I believe that was the USS Ranger that was not seen as fit for combat duty in the Pacific...And she never did see combat in the Pacific, although towards the end, she did serve in the Pacific as a training carrier.
alecsandros wrote:Where ?
viewtopic.php?p=2093747#p2093747
Not knowing the ultimate intentions of the Japanese fleet, USN command went as far as to set up a "last bastion", in the form of 5 old battleships and 1 escort carrier (USS Long Island), to patrol along the western coastline, in the eventuality that the USN fleet at Midway gets destroyed and that the Japanese were actualy pushing towards the West coast (in retaliation against the Doollittle raid).
and
Naturaly it would have been more prudent,
but probably not allowed by Adm. King. Japanese ultimate goal was not known, and fears mounted on a possible raid (or worse) on the west coast.
That's why Admiral Pye was tasked with covering the west coast: "During the Battle of Midway, Pye received orders for the seven old battleships (Colorado, Idaho, Maryland, Mississippi, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee), the escort carrier USS Long Island, and eight destroyers of TF 1 to sortie to patrol off of the West Coast against possible Japanese attack there should the carrier forces at Midway be defeated" https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_S._Pye
alecsandros wrote: The battleship patrols continued until September (including patrols based on Oahu), Long ISland was reassigned on June 17th.
You seem to have mistaken training cruises for combat patrols...The exception with the training cruises is that they never expected, or saw, combat.
alecsandros wrote:In any case, the presence of 7 BBs with 1 CVE and 8 DDs "burning alot of fuel" along the coastline shows that the threat was taken seriously, and not otherwise.
Actually, it does show that the threat was not taken seriously...The OBBs and 8 destroyers do not stand a chance against Japanese aircraft carriers, nor do they pose any viable threat to Kido Butai's aircraft carriers or any other Japanese carriers.
Note: there was no CVE with Task Force 1...Long Island was an AVG(Aircraft Tender General Purpose). Still, the Long Island's air group of a handful of F4Fs and SOC-3As represent no offensive threat to Kido Butai.

Now, if the threat had been taken seriously, then there would have been patrolling ships that actually stood a chance of damaging Kido Butai.

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Re: Nagumo with 7 carriers at Midway

Post by Takao » 23 Aug 2017 21:42

alecsandros wrote:Hard to say,
Pye was Kimmel's second in command in Dec 1941 on Oahu, and the sacking of his superior could have brought an early career end for Pye as well. He was never well viewed afterwards either, being rapidly replaced by Ghormley in Jan 1942 as commander of the Hawaiian battleship force.
Pye was not "in the doghouse" for anything relating to December 7th...He was in the doghouse for his abandonment of Wake Island and timidity since the Japanese attack. He needed something big to get back into COMINCH's good graces.

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Re: Nagumo with 7 carriers at Midway

Post by alecsandros » 24 Aug 2017 06:38

Takao wrote: Odd...You have the order reversed...Nimitz visits Midway on May 2, and then Rochefort first begins passing his findings about Affirm Fox to Layton and McCormick(Nimitz's Staff, not yet Nimitz himself) on May 13th.

These two items are not related, yet some how you think they are...Please explain your logic.
"Rochefort also noticed that the code reference "AF" was increasingly appearing in Japanese Navy signal traffic as a destination. Rochefort and his team of code-breakers began to concentrate their efforts on identifying the location of AF. It was recalled that two Japanese flying boats had made an abortive attack on Pearl Harbor in March 1942. The flying boats had refuelled from a submarine at French Frigate Shoals, a tiny atoll lying between Pearl Harbor and Japanese-occupied Wake Island and south-east of Midway. An intercepted signal from the flying boats mentioned that they had passed near AF. The only significant land feature in that area was Midway Atoll, and Rochefort was now convinced that AF referred to Midway. He was also convinced that Midway was the target of the impending Japanese naval offensive.

The Commander in Chief of the United States Pacific Fleet (CINCPAC), Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, was persuaded by Rochefort that Midway was the probable target of the next Japanese naval offensive. On 2 May 1942, Admiral Nimitz flew from Pearl Harbor to Midway and spent several hours examining its defences. Nimitz did not mention any specific threat to Midway but he asked the senior Navy and Marine officers, Commander Cyril T. Simard and Lieutenant Colonel Harold Shannon, what they would need to defend Midway against a major Japanese attack. When Simard and Shannon told Admiral Nimitz what they needed, he promised to provide it. "


http://www.pacificwar.org.au/Midway/Preparations.html
Further, WRT a lack of ships on the east coast, for the month of April, 1942, there were 23 destroyers that spent a combined total of 140 days on patrol in the Eastern Sea Frontier. The main complaint is that these destroyers were not permanently assigned, but on temporary duty - understandable, given that the US, at the time, lacked a two-ocean navy.
OEG 51 gives 68 ASW ships in April 1942, on the east coast. Those were required to cover a few thousand miles of coastline. Thus USN was forced to ask the Royal Navy to provide additional escorts , which the British provided in the form of 36 corvettes, ASW trawlers and minesweepers. Those were still inadequate to successfully combat Donitz's Uboats (sinkings caused by Uboats peaked in May 1942 and June 1942, and only decreased in July 1942, when the number of escort ships was increased to approx 270)
alecsandros wrote: I believe that was the USS Ranger that was not seen as fit for combat duty in the Pacific...And she never did see combat in the Pacific, although towards the end, she did serve in the Pacific as a training carrier.
USS Wasp didn't have anti-torpedo bulkheads. http://www.nww2m.com/2012/09/the-uss-wasp-sunk/

"During the Battle of Midway, Pye received orders for the seven old battleships (Colorado, Idaho, Maryland, Mississippi, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee), the escort carrier USS Long Island, and eight destroyers of TF 1 to sortie to patrol off of the West Coast against possible Japanese attack there should the carrier forces at Midway be defeated" https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_S._Pye
Exactly, thus he patrolled starting May 31st...

alecsandros wrote:Actually, it does show that the threat was not taken seriously...The OBBs and 8 destroyers do not stand a chance against Japanese aircraft carriers, nor do they pose any viable threat to Kido Butai's aircraft carriers or any other Japanese carriers.
There were no other "viable threats to Kido Butai's carriers"... That was all it was left for the USN Pacific Fleet. If the threat wasn't considered as serious, all those ships would have remained in the harbor.
Note: there was no CVE with Task Force 1...Long Island was an AVG(Aircraft Tender General Purpose). Still, the Long Island's air group of a handful of F4Fs and SOC-3As represent no offensive threat to Kido Butai.
It's a matter of designation. In 1943, Long ISland was redesignated CVE-1, IIRC, and received 19 warplanes - TBFs and F4F4s.

In May 1942, Long Island carried 7 F4F3s and 12 Curtiss SOC-3As reconnaissance planes.

Hardly a threat to Nagumo , BUT it was the only existing carrier in the Pacific... [because Enterprise/Yorktown/Hornet were sent to battle Nagumo, Saratoga was trying to get there as well, and Lexington had been lost at Coral Sea]

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Re: Nagumo with 7 carriers at Midway

Post by Takao » 25 Aug 2017 00:41

alecsandros wrote:
"Rochefort also noticed that the code reference "AF" was increasingly appearing in Japanese Navy signal traffic as a destination. Rochefort and his team of code-breakers began to concentrate their efforts on identifying the location of AF. It was recalled that two Japanese flying boats had made an abortive attack on Pearl Harbor in March 1942. The flying boats had refuelled from a submarine at French Frigate Shoals, a tiny atoll lying between Pearl Harbor and Japanese-occupied Wake Island and south-east of Midway. An intercepted signal from the flying boats mentioned that they had passed near AF. The only significant land feature in that area was Midway Atoll, and Rochefort was now convinced that AF referred to Midway. He was also convinced that Midway was the target of the impending Japanese naval offensive.

The Commander in Chief of the United States Pacific Fleet (CINCPAC), Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, was persuaded by Rochefort that Midway was the probable target of the next Japanese naval offensive. On 2 May 1942, Admiral Nimitz flew from Pearl Harbor to Midway and spent several hours examining its defences. Nimitz did not mention any specific threat to Midway but he asked the senior Navy and Marine officers, Commander Cyril T. Simard and Lieutenant Colonel Harold Shannon, what they would need to defend Midway against a major Japanese attack. When Simard and Shannon told Admiral Nimitz what they needed, he promised to provide it. "
Ahhh, so your source is in error...

Actually, it was Station Cast, in early March, 1942, that had first picked up on Affirm Fox, and has tentatively, but not positively, identified it as being Midway. This was disseminated to via their intelligence briefings.

"AF" was a geographic designator, not a "destination."

On May 2nd, When Nimitz visited Midway, a major Japanese offensive in that area was being suspected, and this is without any cryptographer input - simple traffic analysis was telling CINCPAC that. However, at that time, It was just a suspicion, much like the Midway invasion scare of March, 1942(Not that this had ever really been lifted by May, 1942). So Rochefort, really had nothing to do with the prepartions being made that early. Nothing had been confirmed or would be confirmed until May 13, 1942, when Rochefort decrypted the Goshu Maru intercept. This is when things began moving fast and quick, not May 2nd.

Read any of the published books on the matter for confirmation...
alecsandros wrote:USS Wasp didn't have anti-torpedo bulkheads. http://www.nww2m.com/2012/09/the-uss-wasp-sunk/
Odd, then why was she in the Atlantic with all those U-Boats and their torpedoes...Also odd, the light carriers(CVLs) did not have them either, nor all of those cruisers and destroyers that did so much fighting in the Pacific.
alecsandros wrote:Exactly, thus he patrolled starting May 31st...
Quoting yourself to prove your point???? It's been done before...
alecsandros wrote:There were no other "viable threats to Kido Butai's carriers"... That was all it was left for the USN Pacific Fleet. If the threat wasn't considered as serious, all those ships would have remained in the harbor.
And they likely would have, had not a certain officer been trying to get himself out of the "doghouse." Nimitz did not order Pye out, King did not order Pye out, so, from whom did these "orders" originate?
alecsandros wrote:In May 1942, Long Island carried 7 F4F3s and 12 Curtiss SOC-3As reconnaissance planes.

Hardly a threat to Nagumo , BUT it was the only existing carrier in the Pacific... [because Enterprise/Yorktown/Hornet were sent to battle Nagumo, Saratoga was trying to get there as well, and Lexington had been lost at Coral Sea]
7 F4F-3 is not even a credible CAP...This is not air cover, this is a joke, and a bad one, much like the sacrifice of the USS Langley in the DEI.

The logic likely is that the Japanese will focus on the flattop, and hopefully, the AA guns of the OBBs and destroyers will take a mighty toll on the attackers.

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Re: Nagumo with 7 carriers at Midway

Post by paulrward » 25 Aug 2017 05:16

Hello All ;
alecsandros wrote:
There were no other "viable threats to Kido Butai's carriers"... That was all it was left for the USN Pacific Fleet. If the threat wasn't considered as serious, all those ships would have remained in the harbor.

Takao wrote:
And they likely would have, had not a certain officer been trying to get himself out of the "doghouse." Nimitz did not order Pye out, King did not order Pye out, so, from whom did these "orders" originate?
To Mr. Takao:

According to Morrison, Coral Sea, Midway, and Submarine Actions, pp 82-83, footnote 22, on May 31, 1942, Admiral Pye, on his own initiative, sent Maryland, Colorado, and three DDs, under the command of Rear Adm. Walter S. Anderson, on patrol 650 miles out on a bearing of 300 degrees, to search for a reported IJN carrier. Pye sortied on June 5th with the other four BBs, five DDs, and the Long Island, carrying 20 aircraft, rendezvoused with Anderson appx 260 miles off the coast, and then returned to San Francisco.

So, it can be seen that, while the Battle for Midway was underway, the 'Market Street Sailors' were at sea, patrolling the Pacific Coast.
Takao wrote :

7 F4F-3 is not even a credible CAP...This is not air cover, this is a joke, and a bad one, much like the sacrifice of the USS Langley in the DEI.


A very good analysis, Mr Takao. And it shows exactly how desperate the situation for the USN was on June 4, 1942. The three carriers sent to Midway were the last chance for the USN to salvage the situation. Had they been lost to the IJN as catastrophically as the IJN's four carriers were lost at Midway, the total USN carrier force available for the rest of 1942 would have been, essentially, Saratoga, with her damaged hull and shaky turboalternators, the slender Ranger, and the Wasp, which, historically, proved unable to withstand battle damage, along with the four Sangamons which would have been available starting in August.

Thus, Admiral Pye knew that if the USN lost at Midway, and the IJN struck at the West Coast, he and his men would be expected to sortie out against them and die like Men-o-Warsmen.

Finally, I am sitting here with Admiral Layton's book, ' And I Was There..' . Mr. Alexandros' description of the order of events corresponds to Layton's, along with other accounts. Layton had been feeding Nimitz with Rochefort's summaries, and when Nimitz when to Midway on May 2, it was with a firm idea that Midway was 'AF'. Rochefort and his staff developed a way to absolutely confirm it with the phony desalinator message in late May, and this convinced to Nimitz to send the carriers.

An interesting note: The two Redmond brothers, who had taken over the signals group in Washington, were not convinced that AF was Midway, or that the IJN was coming in early June, and their constant carping to Admirals King and Turner that Layton and Rochefort were wrong led to a lot of friction and wasted effort as the Hypo Staff had to spend a lot of time proving to Admiral King that the world was indeed round.......

It culminated in Rochefort getting canned, and Layton almost getting the boot as well ( He was only saved because Nimitz felt he was too valuble.) And the Redmond brothers continued to screw up all through the war....


As for Midway being a 'geographical designator' instead of a 'destination', one of the IJN messages that was decoded requested that, after a certain date, all mail to that unit be forwarded to ' AF '. Thus, to the IJN, 'AF' was not just a 'geographical designator', but a 'destination' as well. It just happened to be one they never managed to arrive at.......


Finally, Mr. Takao, I recomend you read Morison's ' Battle of the Atlantic, September 1939-May 1943 '. It will give you some idea of what was going on off the coast of New Jersey in the summer of 1942. Admiral Doenitz called it, 'Operation Drumbeat'. For the USN, it was one of the darkest chapters in our history.



Respectfully ;

Paul R. Ward
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Re: Nagumo with 7 carriers at Midway

Post by alecsandros » 25 Aug 2017 16:15

Takao wrote:
Odd, then why was she in the Atlantic with all those U-Boats and their torpedoes...Also odd, the light carriers(CVLs) did not have them either, nor all of those cruisers and destroyers that did so much fighting in the Pacific.
USS Wasp was built with the 1922 limitations in place, ending up at 14700 tons.
That was hopelessly insufficient to provide torpedo bulkheads or any type of armor for the carrier.

From her loss in action report:

"Design Characteristics of WASP
57. WASP was designed during 1934 and 1935. The displacement
of WASP was limited to 14,700 tons by the restrictions
on total tonnage of aircraft carriers imposed by the Limitation
of Naval Armament treaties then in force. It is not
possible to provide in a vessel of this size a fully-developed
system of underwater protection."


"The new CVL1s, converted in 1941 and 1942 from cruisers
of the CL55 class, are somewhat smaller than WASP. Their
underwater layout is much the same as for WASP except that a
blister was added. This will give a deeper liquid layer.
However, in the event of torpedo attack, it can be expected
that rupture of the gasoline tanks will occur if the torpedo
strikes in way of them. The improvements in gasoline stowage and handling discussed in part P, however, will result in
much better resistance to gasoline vapor fires and explosion"

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Re: Nagumo with 7 carriers at Midway

Post by alecsandros » 25 Aug 2017 16:21

paulrward wrote: According to Morrison, Coral Sea, Midway, and Submarine Actions, pp 82-83, footnote 22, on May 31, 1942, Admiral Pye, on his own initiative, sent Maryland, Colorado, and three DDs, under the command of Rear Adm. Walter S. Anderson, on patrol 650 miles out on a bearing of 300 degrees, to search for a reported IJN carrier. Pye sortied on June 5th with the other four BBs, five DDs, and the Long Island, carrying 20 aircraft, rendezvoused with Anderson appx 260 miles off the coast, and then returned to San Francisco.
[...]
Many thanks for a most interesting reply,

Best,

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Re: Nagumo with 7 carriers at Midway

Post by Eugen Pinak » 26 Aug 2017 12:19

alecsandros wrote:
Eugen Pinak wrote:
Dutch Harbor attack was to be made before final destruction of Midway defences and great battle with US fleet.
That doesn't mean they would be near Midway when the great battle would occur. :lol:
According to Japanese planners, they would be near Midway when the great battle would occur. Read Japanese Monograph No.93.
alecsandros wrote:
Eugen Pinak wrote: "Enterprise", "Yorltown" and "Hornet".
And your point is ?
I don't understand your question.
alecsandros wrote:
Eugen Pinak wrote: Task Force 1 was covered by USS "Long Island" after the Japanese were defeated at Midway. There is no data on her original assignment before the battle. And this cover was possible only because no combat was expected, because "Long Island" was too slow to operate even with the "slow" US battleships.
Are you implying Long Island was rushed from the Atlantic to the Pacific in order for her NOT to cover the battleships ? Odd.
There is nothing odd in this statement. "Long Island" is too slow and too weakly equipped to be the cover of the battleships in real combat. Furthermore, battleships were not part of US order of battle in the coming battle of Midway, so there was no need to "rush" anything to cover them.
alecsandros wrote: USS Wasp was built with the 1922 limitations in place, ending up at 14700 tons.
USS "Wasp" was not built with the 1922 limitations in place, as they introduced top standard displacement for carriers at 27,000 tons. As for restrictions on total CV tonnage, imposed by London naval treaty of 1930, US Navy can only blame itself for ordering this "lame duck" of inadequate displacement.
And she had torpedo defence system, though very thin.

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Re: Nagumo with 7 carriers at Midway

Post by alecsandros » 26 Aug 2017 13:22

Eugen Pinak wrote:
I don't understand your question.
You said Nimitz wasn't willing to commit the remaining available carriers to a decisive battle for Midway,
I asked what remaining available carriers,
you said "Enterprise, Hornet, Yorktown"
I asked "and your point is ?"

because I don't udnerstand what you mean. On one hand you mention Nimitz didn't want to commit the carriers, on the other you name the carriers which were actualy committed to battle.
There is nothing odd in this statement. "Long Island" is too slow and too weakly equipped to be the cover of the battleships in real combat. Furthermore, battleships were not part of US order of battle in the coming battle of Midway, so there was no need to "rush" anything to cover them.
Which actualy highlights the lack of resources available to the USN at the time and their desperation to find available carriers, no matter how small.

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Re: Nagumo with 7 carriers at Midway

Post by alecsandros » 26 Aug 2017 14:53

Eugen Pinak wrote: According to Japanese planners, they would be near Midway when the great battle would occur. Read Japanese Monograph No.93.
Japanese Monograph No 93 mentions Second Mobile Unit to attack Dutch Harbor on June 4th and Kiska on June 6th and Attu on June 8th.

"It was planned that the 2 Mobile Unit start from OMINATO on 26 May, head for the south of DUTCH HARBOR, attack the port on 4 June, and attack KISKA and ADAK on 6 June.

Earlier, the Attu Invasion Force will have launched a sudden attack on strategic points on ADAK and KANAGA* on 28 May with Military units, sent from OMINATO, and Marine corps personnel aboard various ships in order to destroy enemy installations completely. On about the 8th, they will withdraw from the islands in order to capture ATTU."


Please explain what you mean by "they would be near Midway when the great battle would occur", and give the quote for it.

===
At the same time, the same monograph mentions:

"b. Essentials of Operation: Before the landing of the occupation force, air raids will be carried out by KdB on MIDWAY to destroy enemy forces and defense equipment on the island. Occupation forces will capture the island with one stroke. At the same time, the destruction of the enemy fleet, which will counterattack, will be carried out. SaB will be disposed between the HAWAIIAN Islands and MIDWAY to prepare for the counterattack of the powerful enemy units which will come from the vicinity of HAWAII"

===

Why do you say Ryujo/Junyo would join Akagi/Kaga/Hiryu/Soryu by the time of the great battle ?

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Re: Nagumo with 7 carriers at Midway

Post by alecsandros » 26 Aug 2017 15:13

Eugen Pinak wrote:
And she had torpedo defence system, though very thin.
... Negligible to protect against contemporary torpedoes, as the official loss report mentions. See my above quotes from the official loss report of USS Wasp.

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Re: Nagumo with 7 carriers at Midway

Post by Eugen Pinak » 27 Aug 2017 14:31

alecsandros wrote:You said Nimitz wasn't willing to commit the remaining available carriers to a decisive battle for Midway,
I asked what remaining available carriers,
you said "Enterprise, Hornet, Yorktown"
I asked "and your point is ?"

because I don't udnerstand what you mean. On one hand you mention Nimitz didn't want to commit the carriers, on the other you name the carriers which were actualy committed to battle.
Catchphrase here is "decisive battle". Nimiz committed his carriers and land-based aviation for an ambush against numerically inferior enemy. Neither Fletcher nor Spruance were ordered to "win or die" there.

alecsandros wrote:
Eugen Pinak wrote: According to Japanese planners, they would be near Midway when the great battle would occur. Read Japanese Monograph No.93.
Japanese Monograph No 93 mentions Second Mobile Unit to attack Dutch Harbor on June 4th and Kiska on June 6th and Attu on June 8th. ...
Page 25 of this monograph describes actions of _both_ Task forces during the major battle with US fleet.

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Re: Nagumo with 7 carriers at Midway

Post by glenn239 » 28 Aug 2017 17:58

Eugen Pinak wrote:
Catchphrase here is "decisive battle". Nimiz committed his carriers and land-based aviation for an ambush against numerically inferior enemy. Neither Fletcher nor Spruance were ordered to "win or die" there.
True, 29-42 in its letter of instruction stated that in carrying out the attack the TF commanders would avoid exposure to attack by superior forces. But, given that Fletcher's escorted striking range was around 180-200nm and Nagumo's was more like 250nm, and given that Nagumo's 4 carriers were sufficient in capability to cripple all three US CV's in one strike if a concentrated blow were landed, Nimitz's suggestion to avoid risk was more inspirational than factual - the act of entering into strike range of 4 IJN fleet carriers was automatically the acceptance of a "win or die" situation.

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Re: Nagumo with 7 carriers at Midway

Post by T. A. Gardner » 29 Aug 2017 00:25

I still think that the Japanese should have stripped the Shokaku, along with Zuiho, or even Junyo of aircraft to fill out the Zuikaku's air wing and allow her to steam with their force to Midway. Unlike Junyo, the Zuikaku could keep with the other Kido Butai carriers. The Zuiho was marginal and worth sending, while the Junyo was slow and had a longer cycle time for strikes due to elevator speeds and poor hanger arrangements.

It would have been better to send a good, fast, carrier than one of the marginal ones the Japanese had even if this reduces the number sent to 5 or 6.

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