Nagumo with 7 carriers at Midway

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Takao
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Re: Nagumo with 7 carriers at Midway

Post by Takao » 30 Aug 2017 03:21

paulrward wrote:
To Mr. Takao:

According to Morrison, Coral Sea, Midway, and Submarine Actions, pp 82-83, footnote 22, on May 31, 1942, Admiral Pye, on his own initiative, sent Maryland, Colorado, and three DDs, under the command of Rear Adm. Walter S. Anderson, on patrol 650 miles out on a bearing of 300 degrees, to search for a reported IJN carrier. Pye sortied on June 5th with the other four BBs, five DDs, and the Long Island, carrying 20 aircraft, rendezvoused with Anderson appx 260 miles off the coast, and then returned to San Francisco.

So, it can be seen that, while the Battle for Midway was underway, the 'Market Street Sailors' were at sea, patrolling the Pacific Coast.
Well, if the majority of the BBs did not sortie until the 5th, then, for most of the battle, the only patrolling that they were doing would have been on Market Street...

paulrward wrote:A very good analysis, Mr Takao. And it shows exactly how desperate the situation for the USN was on June 4, 1942. The three carriers sent to Midway were the last chance for the USN to salvage the situation. Had they been lost to the IJN as catastrophically as the IJN's four carriers were lost at Midway, the total USN carrier force available for the rest of 1942 would have been, essentially, Saratoga, with her damaged hull and shaky turboalternators, the slender Ranger, and the Wasp, which, historically, proved unable to withstand battle damage, along with the four Sangamons which would have been available starting in August.
If the situation was as desperate as you and alecsandros claim, then why was the USS Charger still on the East Coast? With her balky power plant, she could only make 14 knots...But, if the US Navy is so desperate, a flight deck is a flight deck.

Historically, the USS Lexington and USS Princeton proved unable to withstand battle damage...Not that that kept them from going into harm's way.

The Saratoga, Ranger, Wasp, and 4 Sangamons are the only carriers for 42? Well, there was the USS Charger, that you forgot to mention. Several Bogue class CVEs would also be commissioning...Copahee in June, Nassau in August, 3 more in September, 2 in November, and 2 in December.

paulrward wrote:Finally, I am sitting here with Admiral Layton's book, ' And I Was There..' . Mr. Alexandros' description of the order of events corresponds to Layton's, along with other accounts. Layton had been feeding Nimitz with Rochefort's summaries, and when Nimitz when to Midway on May 2, it was with a firm idea that Midway was 'AF'. Rochefort and his staff developed a way to absolutely confirm it with the phony desalinator message in late May, and this convinced to Nimitz to send the carriers.
Midway had been under attack warnings since the beginning of March, 1942. As I had said earlier, the clincher for Rochefort did not come until May 13th, when he decrypted the Goshu Maru intercept.

paulrward wrote:An interesting note: The two Redmond brothers, who had taken over the signals group in Washington, were not convinced that AF was Midway, or that the IJN was coming in early June, and their constant carping to Admirals King and Turner that Layton and Rochefort were wrong led to a lot of friction and wasted effort as the Hypo Staff had to spend a lot of time proving to Admiral King that the world was indeed round.......

It culminated in Rochefort getting canned, and Layton almost getting the boot as well ( He was only saved because Nimitz felt he was too valuble.) And the Redmond brothers continued to screw up all through the war....
The Redman brothers knew how to play the political game, whereas Rochefort was happiest in his "cave" with his ciphers and decrypts. Rochefort's first meeting woth Nimitz did not go very well, because Rochefort was to busy with his decrypts.

It was not just Rochefort that got canned, Captain Laurence F. Safford did too. I have my doubts that Layton was ever that close to getting the boot...

paulrward wrote:As for Midway being a 'geographical designator' instead of a 'destination', one of the IJN messages that was decoded requested that, after a certain date, all mail to that unit be forwarded to ' AF '. Thus, to the IJN, 'AF' was not just a 'geographical designator', but a 'destination' as well. It just happened to be one they never managed to arrive at.......
When did it change...

paulrward wrote:Finally, Mr. Takao, I recomend you read Morison's ' Battle of the Atlantic, September 1939-May 1943 '. It will give you some idea of what was going on off the coast of New Jersey in the summer of 1942. Admiral Doenitz called it, 'Operation Drumbeat'. For the USN, it was one of the darkest chapters in our history.
???

Operation Paukenschlag ended in early February, 1942...It was only the code name for the first wave of U-Boats to arrive off the US East Coast, not for said US coastal operations in their entirety.

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Takao
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Re: Nagumo with 7 carriers at Midway

Post by Takao » 30 Aug 2017 04:01

alecsandros wrote: USS Wasp was built with the 1922 limitations in place, ending up at 14700 tons.
That was hopelessly insufficient to provide torpedo bulkheads or any type of armor for the carrier.

From her loss in action report:

"Design Characteristics of WASP
57. WASP was designed during 1934 and 1935. The displacement
of WASP was limited to 14,700 tons by the restrictions
on total tonnage of aircraft carriers imposed by the Limitation
of Naval Armament treaties then in force. It is not
possible to provide in a vessel of this size a fully-developed
system of underwater protection."
Nice Cherry picking. You neglected too mention...
Section I Summary

...
2. With the exception of the forward diesel generators and the No. 1 main generator in the forward engine room, the engineering plant was intact and engineering personnel remained at their stations until Wasp was abandoned. These circumstances, plus the fact that it was necessary for the
U. S. forces to complete Wasp's destruction, are clear indications that structural damage and loss of buoyancy and stability were not fatal. The loss of Wasp thus must be attributed to the fires which resulted from the ignition of gasoline.
and
I. Conclusions

59. WASP, in spite of her small size, would have survived the damage to the hull had there been no fires. Watertight subdivision, stability characteristics and reserve buoyancy were all adequate to absorb the damage from two torpedoes, located as they were, without fatal consequences. It is noted that for some time after the attack WASP was still in condition to proceed from the scene of action under her own power if the fires had been controlled. After she was abandoned she was struck by three additional torpedoes. Even after this, she did not sink immediately, although by then she was completely gutted by fire, Considering the durability of WASP, it was unfortunate that fire caused her loss.
alecsandros wrote: "The new CVL1s, converted in 1941 and 1942 from cruisers
of the CL55 class, are somewhat smaller than WASP. Their
underwater layout is much the same as for WASP except that a
blister was added. This will give a deeper liquid layer.
However, in the event of torpedo attack, it can be expected
that rupture of the gasoline tanks will occur if the torpedo
strikes in way of them. The improvements in gasoline stowage and handling discussed in part P, however, will result in
much better resistance to gasoline vapor fires and explosion"
The "blister" was added for stability purposes, not as any underwater protection...
Nor did it seem to have that munch effect, possibly even less than the Wasp. When the USS Reno torpedoed the Princeton to scuttle her. One of the Reno's torpedoes hit, and detonated, not only the forward gas tanks, but also the nearby bomb magazines.
G. Explosion of Forward Magazines

76. The two torpedoes fired from RENO at 1746 were estimated to have hit at frame 38, near the after end of the forward gasoline tank. A tremendous explosion immediately occurred. By the time the smoke from the explosion cleared away about a minute later, PRINCETON had sunk. In reference (d) it was reported that the forward section of the ship was not seen after the explosion, but the after section appeared momentarily in the lower part of the smoke, screws up. The photograph of this final explosion has the characteristics of both a magazine and a gasoline vapor explosion. The streaks of black smoke along the path of flying fragments are usually seen in photographs of mass detonation of munitions, but are seldom seen in photographs of other types of explosions, while the mushroom of incandescent gases is typical of gasoline vapor explosions. It appears definite that the forward bomb magazines, which were located just abaft the gasoline tank, detonated. A-511M (frames 39 to 45) contained the following:

59 500-pound general purpose bombs
10 2000-pound general purpose bombs
36 1000-pound armor-piercing bombs
39 1000-pound semi-armor-piercing bombs

A-512M (frames 45 to 49) contained the following:

85 500-pound general purpose bombs
51 1000-pound general purpose bombs
33 350-pound aircraft depth bombs

The mass detonation of these magazines along with the torpedo detonation undoubtedly atomized large quantities of the gasoline in the tank just forward of the magazine which mixed with air and exploded practically simultaneously with the magazine. An explosion of this magnitude would be expected to sink immediately a ship of PRINCETON's size and construction.

77. The Damage Control Book required the tanks outboard of the magazines on PRINCETON to be filled with fresh water giving a liquid layer about thirty-nine (39) inches deep at an assumed point of impact of the torpedo 12 feet below the waterline. Reference (a) does not state that these tanks were filled. It is generally held that a liquid layer at least four feet deep is required to protect magazines from mass detonation initiated by fragment attack from a torpedo hit. When the importance of a liquid layer to protect magazines from torpedo fragment attack was discovered during the past war, instructions were issued to fill the existing outboard voids with fresh water to give as much protection as possible. It is possible that in this case the liquid layer was not sufficiently deep to protect the magazine from fragment attack. However, there is a route by which fragments from the torpedo detonation could have entered the bomb magazines without passing through a liquid layer. The space outboard of the gasoline tank was void. Therefore, if the torpedo hit forward of bulkhead 39, and it was estimated to have hit at frame 38, the fragments could have penetrated the shell and this bulkhead without passing through a liquid layer. This latter possibility is believed to be the more probable.
http://ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/WarDama ... CVL23.html

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Re: Nagumo with 7 carriers at Midway

Post by Eugen Pinak » 30 Aug 2017 11:42

glenn239 wrote:
Eugen Pinak wrote:
Catchphrase here is "decisive battle". Nimiz committed his carriers and land-based aviation for an ambush against numerically inferior enemy. Neither Fletcher nor Spruance were ordered to "win or die" there.
True, 29-42 in its letter of instruction stated that in carrying out the attack the TF commanders would avoid exposure to attack by superior forces. But, given that Fletcher's escorted striking range was around 180-200nm and Nagumo's was more like 250nm, and given that Nagumo's 4 carriers were sufficient in capability to cripple all three US CV's in one strike if a concentrated blow were landed, Nimitz's suggestion to avoid risk was more inspirational than factual - the act of entering into strike range of 4 IJN fleet carriers was automatically the acceptance of a "win or die" situation.
You "forgot" to mention, that, according to Nimiz:
1) There will be no "Nagumo's 4 carriers", but two independent groups of 2 carriers;
2) By the time US carriers enter Japanese strike range, half IJN carriers will be sunk/damaged/at least heavily engaged by Midway-based aviation;
3) ... that is, if they won't be sunk/damaged by US submarines before;
4) US side has an "unsinkable carrier", called Midway;
5) US side has superiority in both number or aircraft as well as in the range of their aircraft (B-17, PBY).
And even than he decided to play safe.

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Re: Nagumo with 7 carriers at Midway

Post by paulrward » 30 Aug 2017 17:10

Hello All ;

To Mr. Takao :
Well, if the majority of the BBs did not sortie until the 5th, then, for most of the battle, the only patrolling that they were doing would have been on Market Street..
The Battle of Midway is generally accepted as being from June 4 to June 6 1942. ( the USN was still bombing and sinking IJN ships on June 6 ) So, at the height of the battle, ( June 5 ) with little or no information as to the course the battle was taking at that moment, Pye sortied with his battleships to be ready to defend the West Coast, and had the Long Island in his task force to provide ASW and CAP, this carrier having run at it's maximum sustained speed to get to the West Coast in time.

The reason that the Charger did not accompany the Long Island was that she had, as you stated, somewhat balky engines, and they could not assemble an air group in time. ( Charger had been training RAF/RN aircrews ) Long Island was carrying the only aircraft the USN had available, which was a half dozen F2As and some SO3s. Not exactly the most formidable air group in WW2.
Several Bogue class CVEs would also be commissioning...Copahee in June, Nassau in August, 3 more in September, 2 in November, and 2 in December.
Mr. Takao, 'commisioned' does NOT mean ready for service, and certainly does not mean ready for action. A ship generally needs 1-2 months for shakedown, and then you have to train the air crew and the deck handling crews. figure 4 months to total, especially considering the shortages of aircraft and aircrew in 1942. Yes, the factories were working overtime, and the trainees were eager and willing, but the USN was still scraping the bottom of the barrel in late 1942 just to do the things they did historically.

And, despite your casual dismissal of the U-boat war in 1942, the Germans were still sinking tankers in sight of the New Jersey shore in the summer of 1942. The USN / US Army was using PIPER CUBS to patrol off the coast looking for U-boats, and was commisioning yacht owners with SAILBOATS to carry out surface patrols ! Go back and read Morison's The Battle of the Atlantic, September 1939 - May 1943. It will give you some idea of the situation at the time.

And, just to clue you in, when you spoke to retired USN officers about ' Operation Drumbeat ' , they understood it to mean the entire U-boat offensive that started right after Pearl Harbor, and persisted until the end of Autumn in 1942. It was one of the darkest times in U.S. history, and you can go on the internet and find a photo taken in the summer of 1942, showing tourists on the beach at Coney Island staring out to sea at the pillers of smoke from the sinking oil tankers.

For the American people, the war had finally come to our shores in a way that Pearl Harbor had not.


The Redman brothers knew how to play the political game, whereas Rochefort was happiest in his "cave" with his ciphers and decrypts. Rochefort's first meeting woth Nimitz did not go very well, because Rochefort was to busy with his decrypts.

It was not just Rochefort that got canned, Captain Laurence F. Safford did too. I have my doubts that Layton was ever that close to getting the boot...

An interesting summary. I guess you feel that political skills are more important for a naval officer than actual competence or intelligence. This tells me a lot......

Historically, the Redman brothers were wrong on every thing they ever did. They severely impacted the flow of information to Nimitz, on several occasions mis-allocated decryption efforts to increase their own political influence, and, by refusing to accept that Midway was AF, and having the ear of King, they damned near managed to lose the Battle of Midway for the USN. A major portion of the effort by Rochefort and Layton was NOT to convince Nimitz that Midway as AF, but to convince KING the Midway was AF, and that the attack was going to happen in early June.

After the Redmans were proved hopelessly wrong, they retaliated by canning Rochefort and Safford, and then went after Layton. In fact, Nimitz showed Layton the coded message sent him by King saying, in effect, " Well, I've gotten rid of Rochefort, now you can get rid of Layton ! " Layton was stunned when he read this, but he states that Nimitz told him not to worry, that Nimitz had full confidence in him. ( This was proven by the fact than Nimitz had Layton with him on the deck of the Missouri in Tokyo Bay in 1945 )

As for Nimitz not liking or respecting Rochefort, Layton had several times emphasized to Nimitz that the men in the 'bunker' were a special breed of officer or enlisted man, that they were geniuses of the most high strung and unstable type, and that, while they needed special treatment, that if they were handled correctly, they could produce results of 'MAGIC' that would tip the balance of the war in our favor.

The famous Midway Memo, describing the composition of the Nagumo force in detail, and the knowledge of the time and location of their arrival, gave Nimitz the edge. In fact, the morning of June 4, when the PBY located Nagumo's carriers, Nimitz called Layton in, showed him the map, and told him that, based on what Layton had told Nimitz, Layton had been only 5 degrees in bearing and 5 minutes off in time in terms of where the IJN were to be found, a remarkable feat.

Layton also took Nimitz on a tour of the codebreaker's ' lair ', and Nimitz got a chance to see one officer's collection of pornography, the huge stacks of IBM cards, the piles of partial decrypts that were constantly being dug through to find tiny clues in the great puzzle that was the IJN code structure, and the sign on the wall that said, " You don't have to be crazy to work here, but it sure helps !"




As for when AF changed from being a ' Destination ' to being a ' Geographical Designator ' , I would say it was sometime about 9:30 AM, right when an IJN lookout on the Akagi yelled, " HELLDIVERS !"


Respectfully ;

Paul R. Ward
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Re: Nagumo with 7 carriers at Midway

Post by glenn239 » 30 Aug 2017 17:24

Eugen Pinak wrote: ...<snip>...
1) There will be no "Nagumo's 4 carriers", but two independent groups of 2 carriers;
2) By the time US carriers enter Japanese strike range, half IJN carriers will be sunk/damaged/at least heavily engaged by Midway-based aviation;
3) ... that is, if they won't be sunk/damaged by US submarines before;
4) US side has an "unsinkable carrier", called Midway;
5) US side has superiority in both number or aircraft as well as in the range of their aircraft (B-17, PBY).
And even than he decided to play safe.
The act of entering into the strike radius of four IJN carriers was the act of Nimitz accepting a do or die battle situation. He did so because he calculated the element of surprise would weigh the outcome towards "do" and away from "die". Whether the Japanese carriers were in one group or two groups, Nimitz had no cause to believe that one group would be in range and the other would not. That's why Fletcher maintained a reserve of dive bombers - because he anticipated the "missing" two carriers to also be in strike range. The notion that Fletcher could somehow have "played safe" if Tone 4 had reported "two YORKTOWN CLASS" carriers at 0730 and Nagumo therefore got off his reserve strike is simply not correct. Once that strike were in the air, no submarine, no aircraft from Midway, was going to alter the outcome of the attack.

At the point of Midway, Nimitz had a data point from Coral Sea - that 1 squadron of IJN torpedo bombers could cripple 1 US carrier. He was facing 4 squadrons with 3 carriers, so the known math said that Nimitz could lose all three carriers, (crippled by torpedoes then run down and sunk by IJN battle cruisers).

Nimitz also had a data point from the Indian Ocean Raid - on two out of two occasions there, the IJN carriers did not commit all their aircraft to the land attack. So, the evidence was there that a reserve could be maintained, which undercut the calculated risk strategy, especially if Nagumo had sent his dive bombers to Midway and held all four torpedo bomber squadrons in reserve, (or 3/1 and 1/3, a more logical reserve arrangement for a naval action).

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Re: Nagumo with 7 carriers at Midway

Post by paulrward » 30 Aug 2017 17:40

Hello All ;

to Mr. Pinak :
You "forgot" to mention, that, according to Nimiz:
1) There will be no "Nagumo's 4 carriers", but two independent groups of 2 carriers;
2) By the time US carriers enter Japanese strike range, half IJN carriers will be sunk/damaged/at least heavily engaged by Midway-based aviation;
3) ... that is, if they won't be sunk/damaged by US submarines before;
4) US side has an "unsinkable carrier", called Midway;
5) US side has superiority in both number or aircraft as well as in the range of their aircraft (B-17, PBY).
And even than he decided to play safe.

Okay, let's dismantle this one line item at a time:

1. Not according to Nimitz's message, 31 / 221, dated May 31, 1942, which describes that IJN task force as, " STRIKING FORCE 4 CARRIERS ( AKAGI KAGA HIRYU SORYU, 2 KIRISHIMAS 2 TONE CLASS CRUISERS 12 DESTROYERS SCREEN AND PLANE GUARD X SUPPORT FORCE 1 CV OR XCV 2 KIRISHIMAS 4 MOGAMIS 1 ATAGO 12 DD SCREEN XX OCCUPATION FORCE 1 TAKAO 1-2 MYOKOS ( QUESTION ) 1 CHITOSE 1 CHIYODA 2-1 KAMIKAWA MARU 4-6 AK 8 - 12 AP 12 DESTROYERS X APPROXIMATELY 16 SS ON RECONNAISANCE AND SCOUTING MISSION MID PACIFIC-HAWAIIAN ISLAND AREA "

No mentionof two carrier groups there...


2. Yeah. Sure. Nimitz assumed that a scratch force of mixed squadron of SB2Us and SBDs with untrained crews, a few unescorted B-26s and TBFs launching torpedoes, and the B-17s dropping bombs from 10,000 feet were going to sink or damage half the IJN carriers....

Do you have any sort of documentation for this alleged fantasy by Nimitz ? If so, let's see it.


3. Yeah, sure. With six months of reports of the negative results of the USN submariners and their worthless torpedoes, Nimitz is going to assume that at Midway they will work miracles ? Compare this to history, where only two subs found the IJN forces, and scored ZERO torpedo hits. ( if you discount the dud that bounced off the Kaga, and broke up, providing a rescue float for some of the Kaga's crewmen ! )


4. The unsinkable Midway, which, unfortunately, has a VERY SLOW top speed, and a somewhat vulnerable aircraft refueling system. When Nimitz heard that the USN had accidently blown up half their fuel supply before the IJN even arrived, and then, when he learned that the first IJN raid had knocked out the rest of the Midway aircraft refueling system, suddenly the Midway would look just as vulnerable as those other two unsinkable carriers, the Wake and the Corregeidor.....


5. The US aircraft on Midway were either obsolete, ( SB2Us, F2As,) or effectively unarmed ( PBYs ) or effectively impotent ( B-17s ) and all were flown by green crews ( all of the above plus the TBFS, B-26s )

The IJN aircraft were the best the IJN had, flown by the cream of their aircrews.

If you doubt that, look at what happened on the first IJN raid on Midway, and the island response. The Midway fighter CAP was massacred, the fuel system was knocked out, and the island suffered heavy damage to hangers and other structures. The SB2Us, SBDS, TBFs, and B-26s were also wiped out, scoring at most one minor hit. The B-17s paraded around at 10,000 feet, and returned to Midway to discover that they could not be refueled until late on the following day. ( one 55 gallon drum at a time, hand pumped into their tanks ! )

A second IJN raid on Midway would have put it out of business. Just like Wake....


Respectfully ;

Paul R. Ward
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Re: Nagumo with 7 carriers at Midway

Post by glenn239 » 31 Aug 2017 17:18

paulrward wrote:
1. Not according to Nimitz's message, 31 / 221, dated May 31, 1942, which describes that IJN task force as, " STRIKING FORCE 4 CARRIERS ( AKAGI KAGA HIRYU SORYU, 2 KIRISHIMAS 2 TONE CLASS CRUISERS 12 DESTROYERS SCREEN AND PLANE GUARD X SUPPORT FORCE 1 CV OR XCV 2 KIRISHIMAS 4 MOGAMIS 1 ATAGO 12 DD SCREEN XX OCCUPATION FORCE 1 TAKAO 1-2 MYOKOS ( QUESTION ) 1 CHITOSE 1 CHIYODA 2-1 KAMIKAWA MARU 4-6 AK 8 - 12 AP 12 DESTROYERS X APPROXIMATELY 16 SS ON RECONNAISANCE AND SCOUTING MISSION MID PACIFIC-HAWAIIAN ISLAND AREA "

No mentionof two carrier groups there...
:^) And how could there be? Nimitz intel data was based in the main part on IJN decrypts, and the Japanese themselves certainly had no intention of operating their carriers in two groups of two! And given that even if they did, their intention would obviously be to be mutually supporting. I certainly never had the idea that 2 IJN carriers would somehow be out of range and 2 carriers in range of Fletcher's forces. I've always seen it that if Fletcher had been spotted early, and Nagumo got his reserve strike off, he loses 2-3 carriers.

The part in 29-42 about calculated risk had no bearing on the ambush phase itself - it was all on the line at that moment. One can try to pretend that Nimitz wasn't rolling the dice, but he was and he knew it. He realised that the attack on Midway would give him his best carrier vs. carrier chance, and he took it.

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Takao
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Re: Nagumo with 7 carriers at Midway

Post by Takao » 02 Sep 2017 01:10

paulrward wrote:Hello All ;

To Mr. Takao :

The Battle of Midway is generally accepted as being from June 4 to June 6 1942. ( the USN was still bombing and sinking IJN ships on June 6 ) So, at the height of the battle, ( June 5 ) with little or no information as to the course the battle was taking at that moment, Pye sortied with his battleships to be ready to defend the West Coast, and had the Long Island in his task force to provide ASW and CAP, this carrier having run at it's maximum sustained speed to get to the West Coast in time.
June 5th was a "lull in the battle", not it's height. Both sides had recoiled to lick their wounds and reassess their plans.

Pye "jumped the gun," if Nimitz felt he was needed, Nimitz would have called for him.


paulrward wrote: The reason that the Charger did not accompany the Long Island was that she had, as you stated, somewhat balky engines, and they could not assemble an air group in time. ( Charger had been training RAF/RN aircrews ) Long Island was carrying the only aircraft the USN had available, which was a half dozen F2As and some SO3s. Not exactly the most formidable air group in WW2.
If the USN was as "desperate" as you and alecsandros loudly proclaim, then, balky engines or not, the Charger would have gone. The balky engines would not have prevented Charger from making the journey, nor would they have prevented her from arriving on time.

The Charger had an Air Group...VGS-30, composed of 1 SNJ-3, 6 F4F-4s, and 9 SOCs.

The Long Island was carrying the "only aircraft the USN had"? Sorry, Paul, but you are talking out of your arse on this...
You see the USN keeps records on things such as this, and they were done several times a year. history.navy.mil has these records online for everyone's viewing pleasure...Go check it out to see how epic your fail is.
https://www.history.navy.mil/research/h ... ar-ii.html

The USS Long Island was not carrying F2As, but F4F-4s, and there is ample photographic & documentary evidence backing this up.


paulrward wrote: Mr. Takao, 'commisioned' does NOT mean ready for service, and certainly does not mean ready for action. A ship generally needs 1-2 months for shakedown, and then you have to train the air crew and the deck handling crews. figure 4 months to total, especially considering the shortages of aircraft and aircrew in 1942. Yes, the factories were working overtime, and the trainees were eager and willing, but the USN was still scraping the bottom of the barrel in late 1942 just to do the things they did historically.
.
ARE YOU JUST BEING AN ARSE ON PURPOSE OR DID YOU FORGET WHAT YOU POSTED EARLIER?
Because...you know that is not true...You, yourself, said so!
paulrward wrote:the total USN carrier force available for the rest of 1942 would have been, essentially, Saratoga, with her damaged hull and shaky turboalternators, the slender Ranger, and the Wasp, which, historically, proved unable to withstand battle damage, along with the four Sangamons which would have been available starting in August.
Along with the four Sangamons which would have been available starting in August...Well, for starters, the USS Santee would commission on August 24th, and the USS Sangamon on August 25th. Thus, you have them "being available" IMMEDIATELY upon commissioning...Not months later. Therefore, you DID forget about the many CVEs THAT WOULD BE AVAILABLE BEGINNING IN JUNE.

So, which is it Paul...Are you forgetful or just being an arse?

Just to clue you in...Remember what you have posted, that way you won't look so much like an arse when called out on it.

paulrward wrote: And, despite your casual dismissal of the U-boat war in 1942, the Germans were still sinking tankers in sight of the New Jersey shore in the summer of 1942. The USN / US Army was using PIPER CUBS to patrol off the coast looking for U-boats, and was commisioning yacht owners with SAILBOATS to carry out surface patrols ! Go back and read Morison's The Battle of the Atlantic, September 1939 - May 1943. It will give you some idea of the situation at the time.
Please name them...Name the tankers sunk within sight of the New Jersey shore during the summer of '42. I bet you it is going to be a really really short list.

Not just the USN & Army were using Piper Cubs, but also the Civil Air Patrol's Coastal Patrol(of course all of these also operated larger aircraft). The Coastal Patrol operated between March 5, 1942 to August 31, 1943, during which they flew 86,865 sorties which logged some 244.600 flight hours.

The Hooligan Navy is fairly well known, especially to fans of Ernest Hemingway. Nor is the Navy's reaction surprising...They did the same thing during the Civil War, buying up vessels left and right, because they were so woefully equipped.

Read Morison's The Battle of the Atlantic, September 1939 - May 1943? Read it... As well as Michael Gannon's two books "Black May" and "Operation Drumbeat", "Torpedo Junction" by Homer Hickam, "Uboats Offshore" by Edwin P. Hoyt, "Torpedoes in the Gulf" by Melanie Wiggins, and "Uboats in the Bahamas" by Eric Wiberg. And those are just those books specifically on the topic.


paulrward wrote: And, just to clue you in, when you spoke to retired USN officers about ' Operation Drumbeat ' , they understood it to mean the entire U-boat offensive that started right after Pearl Harbor, and persisted until the end of Autumn in 1942. It was one of the darkest times in U.S. history, and you can go on the internet and find a photo taken in the summer of 1942, showing tourists on the beach at Coney Island staring out to sea at the pillers of smoke from the sinking oil tankers.
Hopefully these clueless retired USN officers now have a better clue as to what actually constituted Operation Paukenschlag, and they will not make such a mistake in the future. Don't make me get out the trusty Clue By Four...

One of the "darkest times in US history"...Hahahaha! paulward made a funny! Quite the contrary, my friend...It was one of the "brightest." It took forever, well April 27th, anyway, to institute more than a "local" blackout on the Eastern Seaboard. They kept the lights onshore burning bright for quite sometime...Don't want to disappoint the locals, tourists and vacationers.
paulrward wrote: For the American people, the war had finally come to our shores in a way that Pearl Harbor had not.
Hardly...See above. Further, your only talking about the East Coast(and it took them quite some time to appreciate what was happening), and to a lesser extent the Gulf Coast...Not the West Coast, MidWest, etc. America is quite big my friend, and to make such a generalization is quite foolish. Finally, the Uboats off the East Coast pale in comparison to Pearl Harbor...Show me New York City's equivalent of the "Battle of Los Angeles" or the massed forced relocation of German-Americans(German-Americans were arrested and relocated, but not on near the scale the the Japanese were).

paulrward wrote:An interesting summary. I guess you feel that political skills are more important for a naval officer than actual competence or intelligence. This tells me a lot......
Your response tells me a lot...You don't know shite from shinola.

One, it is an observation, not a summation. Or are you planning to tell me that Rocherfort was quite adept at political infighting, and the Redman brothers were rank amateurs?
Two, it tells you nothing about how I feel concerning the merits of naval officers...It is your own prejudices that are doing that.
paulrward wrote:Historically, the Redman brothers were wrong on every thing they ever did.
Historically, that would be an incorrect assessment...
paulrward wrote: After the Redmans were proved hopelessly wrong, they retaliated by canning Rochefort and Safford, and then went after Layton. In fact, Nimitz showed Layton the coded message sent him by King saying, in effect, " Well, I've gotten rid of Rochefort, now you can get rid of Layton ! " Layton was stunned when he read this, but he states that Nimitz told him not to worry, that Nimitz had full confidence in him. ( This was proven by the fact than Nimitz had Layton with him on the deck of the Missouri in Tokyo Bay in 1945 )
Another incorrect assessment. Rochefort, as the head of the new ICPOA, was "canned" because he declared his independence of OP-20-G. Had Rochefort, shall we say, "come to heel," he would have remained in his position at Pearl Harbor. As a side note, after his relief as the head of ICPOA and on his return to Washington, he was offered a position in OP-20-G(Not exactly the thing to do if you are trying to get rid of somebody), however, he flatly refused said position and applied for sea duty. Coming to heel, was not in Rochefort's nature.


paulrward wrote:As for Nimitz not liking or respecting Rochefort, Layton had several times emphasized to Nimitz that the men in the 'bunker' were a special breed of officer or enlisted man, that they were geniuses of the most high strung and unstable type, and that, while they needed special treatment, that if they were handled correctly, they could produce results of 'MAGIC' that would tip the balance of the war in our favor.
This was Nimitz's first meeting with Rochefort, not long after Nimitz had arrived to take over command from Kimmel...Layton was not with Nimitz, Bloch was. So, there were no repeated warnings from Layton. Despite Rochefort's miserable first meeting with Nimitz, Nimitz would become quite impressed with the quality of work that Rochefort and HYPO put out.
paulrward wrote: The famous Midway Memo, describing the composition of the Nagumo force in detail, and the knowledge of the time and location of their arrival, gave Nimitz the edge. In fact, the morning of June 4, when the PBY located Nagumo's carriers, Nimitz called Layton in, showed him the map, and told him that, based on what Layton had told Nimitz, Layton had been only 5 degrees in bearing and 5 minutes off in time in terms of where the IJN were to be found, a remarkable feat.
Actually, it was 5 miles, 5 degrees, 5 minutes off...You forgot that Layton also gave the distance at which Nagumo would be spotted.
Now, if Layton had only been so precise with his response given to Kimmel at Pearl Harbor...

paulrward wrote: As for when AF changed from being a ' Destination ' to being a ' Geographical Designator ' , I would say it was sometime about 9:30 AM, right when an IJN lookout on the Akagi yelled, " HELLDIVERS !"
Ummm...It was a Geographic Designator long before it became a Destination, and it would remain a Destination later than 9:30AM July 4th.

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Re: Nagumo with 7 carriers at Midway

Post by Eugen Pinak » 02 Sep 2017 16:53

glenn239 wrote:
Eugen Pinak wrote: ...<snip>...
1) There will be no "Nagumo's 4 carriers", but two independent groups of 2 carriers;
2) By the time US carriers enter Japanese strike range, half IJN carriers will be sunk/damaged/at least heavily engaged by Midway-based aviation;
3) ... that is, if they won't be sunk/damaged by US submarines before;
4) US side has an "unsinkable carrier", called Midway;
5) US side has superiority in both number or aircraft as well as in the range of their aircraft (B-17, PBY).
And even than he decided to play safe.
The act of entering into the strike radius of four IJN carriers was the act of Nimitz accepting a do or die battle situation.
...
Nice flight of fancy :) But Nimitz thought differently and gave orders to his subordinates accordingly to his thoughts. Of course, sh...t sometimes happens. But no commander make plans according to the worst possible outcome.

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Re: Nagumo with 7 carriers at Midway

Post by Eugen Pinak » 02 Sep 2017 17:23

paulrward wrote:Hello All ;

to Mr. Pinak :
You "forgot" to mention, that, according to Nimiz:
1) There will be no "Nagumo's 4 carriers", but two independent groups of 2 carriers;
2) By the time US carriers enter Japanese strike range, half IJN carriers will be sunk/damaged/at least heavily engaged by Midway-based aviation;
3) ... that is, if they won't be sunk/damaged by US submarines before;
4) US side has an "unsinkable carrier", called Midway;
5) US side has superiority in both number or aircraft as well as in the range of their aircraft (B-17, PBY).
And even than he decided to play safe.

Okay, let's dismantle this one line item at a time:

1. Not according to Nimitz's message, 31 / 221, dated May 31, 1942, which describes that IJN task force as, " STRIKING FORCE 4 CARRIERS ( AKAGI KAGA HIRYU SORYU, 2 KIRISHIMAS 2 TONE CLASS CRUISERS 12 DESTROYERS SCREEN AND PLANE GUARD X SUPPORT FORCE 1 CV OR XCV 2 KIRISHIMAS 4 MOGAMIS 1 ATAGO 12 DD SCREEN XX OCCUPATION FORCE 1 TAKAO 1-2 MYOKOS ( QUESTION ) 1 CHITOSE 1 CHIYODA 2-1 KAMIKAWA MARU 4-6 AK 8 - 12 AP 12 DESTROYERS X APPROXIMATELY 16 SS ON RECONNAISANCE AND SCOUTING MISSION MID PACIFIC-HAWAIIAN ISLAND AREA "

No mentionof two carrier groups there...
Read CINCPAC Operations Plan 29-42.

paulrward wrote:2. Yeah. Sure. Nimitz assumed that a scratch force of mixed squadron of SB2Us and SBDs with untrained crews, a few unescorted B-26s and TBFs launching torpedoes, and the B-17s dropping bombs from 10,000 feet were going to sink or damage half the IJN carriers....

Do you have any sort of documentation for this alleged fantasy by Nimitz ? If so, let's see it.
Read CINCPAC Operations Plan 29-42 and CINCPAC post-battle report on the results of Midway air group. At least 10 ships, of them 1-2 CV, 1 BB, 2 CA ;)
paulrward wrote: 3. Yeah, sure. With six months of reports of the negative results of the USN submariners and their worthless torpedoes, Nimitz is going to assume that at Midway they will work miracles ? Compare this to history, where only two subs found the IJN forces, and scored ZERO torpedo hits. ( if you discount the dud that bounced off the Kaga, and broke up, providing a rescue float for some of the Kaga's crewmen ! )
Hate to repeat myself, but read CINCPAC Operations Plan 29-42.
As for "their worthless torpedoes" - I advise you to read at least Wikipedia to find out, when US Navy officially established, that Mk.14 torpedoes have flaws instead of shifting blame on some "incompetent submariners".
paulrward wrote: 4. The unsinkable Midway, which, unfortunately, has a VERY SLOW top speed, and a somewhat vulnerable aircraft refueling system. When Nimitz heard that the USN had accidently blown up half their fuel supply before the IJN even arrived, and then, when he learned that the first IJN raid had knocked out the rest of the Midway aircraft refueling system, suddenly the Midway would look just as vulnerable as those other two unsinkable carriers, the Wake and the Corregeidor.....
Each aircraft carrier has their flaws - but their strength as well. By the end of the battle Midway was stil operational despite bombing, that would've sunk any carrier.
paulrward wrote: 5. The US aircraft on Midway were either obsolete, ( SB2Us, F2As,) or effectively unarmed ( PBYs ) or effectively impotent ( B-17s ) and all were flown by green crews ( all of the above plus the TBFS, B-26s )
Nice joke :) In real life some more luck or fighter support on the side of US Midway strike group - and "Akagi" and "Hiryu" could've been hit.

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Re: Nagumo with 7 carriers at Midway

Post by paulrward » 02 Sep 2017 20:50

Hello All :

To Mr. Pinak :

Okay, I went back and re read CINCPAC Operations Plan 29-42. Carefully. Line by line. There is NO MENTION of the IJN attack force carriers being split into two groups. It is described as being a Striking Force, a Support Force, and an Invasion Force, and Nimitz sent his famous radio message to Spruance and Fletcher warning them that the location of the 'Main Body' by the PBYs was NOT the IJN carriers, but nowhere does Nimitz state or imply that Nagumo would be arriving in two, divided forces.

As for the IJN having two carrier strike groups, the closest thing you will find to that is the statement that "... it is thought that one or two carriers may take up close in positions..."

Nimitz was hedging his bets here. He really didn't know.....



You stated:
But Nimitz thought differently and gave orders to his subordinates accordingly to his thoughts. Of course, sh...t sometimes happens. But no commander make plans according to the worst possible outcome.
According to CINCPAC Operations Plan 29-42, if you go to the last ( annex ) page, Nimitz gave instructions that the Task Force Commanders were not to seek out a battle unless they had a 'good prospect ' of inflicting greater losses on the enemy than they themselves suffered. This also applied to a condition where a 'landing phase' was going on. In other words, Nimitz was almost assuming that the IJN would succeed in carrying out a landing. And, in that, case, Spruance and Fletcher were not to carry out a do or die mission to save the Marines on Midway. If they didn't think they could ambush and dry gulch a few IJN carriers, they were to cut and run.


In OP 29-42, Nimitz also gives instructions that the long range planes on Midway, if they face destruction on the ground, are to abandon the island and to retire to Oahu, while the Patrol planes were to go to the French Frigate Shoals to refuel.

In other words, we save the aircraft and the flight crews. The Marines on Midway are now on their own......

This sounds a lot like making plans based on the worst possible outcome ( loss of Midway Island )


As for "their worthless torpedoes" - I advise you to read at least Wikipedia to find out, when US Navy officially established, that Mk.14 torpedoes have flaws instead of shifting blame on some "incompetent submariners".
The USN didn't get their thumbs out w/r to their torpedo problems until the summer of 1943, and the problems were not fully eradicated until September, 1943. Up till then, it was assumed that the USN sub captains were incompetent. In fact, the C.O. of the Tambor, who tried to get into position to attack the 4 Mogami's, and failed, was beached by Nimitz ' For timidity ' when he got back to Pearl and reported his failure. ( This failed attack lead to the collision between the Mogami and Mikuma that ultimately cost the IJN another CA )


end of the battle Midway was still operational despite bombing
By the end of the Battle, Midway's fighter squadron was essentially wiped out, the Scout Bomber Squadron was wiped out, the Army bombers were either shot down or could barely be refueled, and the PBYs were also limited in their refueling. In addition, the Midway was dead in the water ( completely motionless ! ) and so could not evade any further enemy bombing attacks.

In real life some more luck or fighter support on the side of US Midway strike group - and "Akagi" and "Hiryu" could've been hit.
In real life, some more luck would have led to Robert E Lee winning at Gettysburg, and I would be sitting on my veranda, sipping a mint julep, watching my slaves picking my broad fields of cotton......


Yeah. Right. The air fighting of the Midway air groups had little to do with luck. They were ALL green pilots, with no combat experience, and little knowledge of their enemy. Major Parks fought like an imbecile, and got his fighter squadron chopped into dogmeat. The Dive Bomber squadron had NO TRAINING in dive bombing, so they went in shallow, making glide bombing attacks. And they got chewed up too. The TBM and B-26 crews had no idea their torpedo attack would meet such skillful CAP and AA fire, and they were massacred. None of the attacks were coordinated, and all were clumsy at best.

Thank God for the B-17s, who came over at 10,000 feet and sank all four IJN carriers using their Norden Bombsights......


Let's just call it a bad day for Captain America......



One of the hardest things for any historian to do is to go back in time, and then look forward without using his knowledge of the future. Nimitz DID NOT know he was going to win. No one did. Midway was a close run thing, like Waterloo, or the Battle of Britain. Could have gone either way.


Respectfully ;

Paul R. Ward
Information not shared, is information lost
Voices that are banned, are voices who cannot share information....
Discussions that are silenced, are discussions that will occur elsewhere !

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Re: Nagumo with 7 carriers at Midway

Post by alecsandros » 03 Sep 2017 11:55

Eugen Pinak wrote:
Page 25 of this monograph describes actions of _both_ Task forces during the major battle with US fleet.
And that implies that Junyo/Ryujo would be required to be in 2 places at the same time (supporting attacks on ATTU and KISKA, as well as cooperating with Akagi/Kaga/Hiryu/Soryu in the "decisive battle")

Only way that the Monograph makes sense is in the interesting eventuality in which "powerfull enemy [carrier] forces" would be located after June 10th (giving thus time to the northern fleet to support attacks on KISKA on June 8th, and then to join Nagumo by June 10th).

This hypothesis, in turn , doesn't make much sense, as it would imply USN counter-reaction to attacks on Midway as slow as 5 days)

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Re: Nagumo with 7 carriers at Midway

Post by alecsandros » 04 Sep 2017 19:23

Takao wrote:
59. WASP, in spite of her small size, would have survived the damage to the hull had there been no fires.
Exactly, "had there be no fires".

The report makes it clear that, on such a small displacement, protection of the magazines and avgas, and most of all sufficient redundancy for critical anti-fire systems is next to impossible.
The "blister" was added for stability purposes, not as any underwater protection...
Nor did it seem to have that munch effect, possibly even less than the Wasp.
Exactly, because the CVLs were smaller, thus the force of the explosion(s) would be distributed amongst a smaller volume.

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Re: Nagumo with 7 carriers at Midway

Post by alecsandros » 04 Sep 2017 19:30

Takao wrote: Midway had been under attack warnings since the beginning of March, 1942. As I had said earlier, the clincher for Rochefort did not come until May 13th, when he decrypted the Goshu Maru intercept.
Fortification of Midway started in earnest in Fev 1942, and accelerated in April/May. That's not an indication of imminent attack, but it is a clear aspect that mentions the US forces expected attacks over there.

Operation Paukenschlag ended in early February, 1942...It was only the code name for the first wave of U-Boats to arrive off the US East Coast, not for said US coastal operations in their entirety.
... Which is irrelevant to the discussion here,
operation Drumbeat lasted 1 month and it was followed by more powerfull offensives (such as Neuland), by German Uboats.

As I mentioned before, the climax of the Uboat sinkings on the East Coast happened in May 1942, and June 1942 had practically the same tonnage sunk.

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Re: Nagumo with 7 carriers at Midway

Post by alecsandros » 04 Sep 2017 19:37

Takao wrote: Along with the four Sangamons which would have been available starting in August...Well, for starters, the USS Santee would commission on August 24th, and the USS Sangamon on August 25th. Thus, you have them "being available" IMMEDIATELY upon commissioning...Not months later. Therefore, you DID forget about the many CVEs THAT WOULD BE AVAILABLE BEGINNING IN JUNE.
Available but without airgroups... Which means exactly nothing...
paulrward wrote:
Please name them...Name the tankers sunk within sight of the New Jersey shore during the summer of '42. I bet you it is going to be a really really short list.
Again irrelevant and misleading,
the UBoat hunting ground changed south, in May they were wrecking havoc in the Gulf of Mexico and along the Venezuelan coastline... Which were protected by the same overstretched US Navy...
Finally, the Uboats off the East Coast pale in comparison to Pearl Harbor...Show me New York City's equivalent of the "Battle of Los Angeles" or the massed forced relocation of German-Americans(German-Americans were arrested and relocated, but not on near the scale the the Japanese were).
Cutting the supply routes between the new and old world was far more dangerous then Pearl Harbor.

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