paulrward wrote:Hello All ;
To Mr. Takao :
The Battle of Midway is generally accepted as being from June 4 to June 6 1942. ( the USN was still bombing and sinking IJN ships on June 6 ) So, at the height of the battle, ( June 5 ) with little or no information as to the course the battle was taking at that moment, Pye sortied with his battleships to be ready to defend the West Coast, and had the Long Island in his task force to provide ASW and CAP, this carrier having run at it's maximum sustained speed to get to the West Coast in time.
June 5th was a "lull in the battle", not it's height. Both sides had recoiled to lick their wounds and reassess their plans.
Pye "jumped the gun," if Nimitz felt he was needed, Nimitz would have called for him.
paulrward wrote: The reason that the Charger did not accompany the Long Island was that she had, as you stated, somewhat balky engines, and they could not assemble an air group in time. ( Charger had been training RAF/RN aircrews ) Long Island was carrying the only aircraft the USN had available, which was a half dozen F2As and some SO3s. Not exactly the most formidable air group in WW2.
If the USN was as "desperate" as you and alecsandros loudly proclaim, then, balky engines or not, the Charger would have gone. The balky engines would not have prevented Charger from making the journey, nor would they have prevented her from arriving on time.
The Charger had an Air Group...VGS-30, composed of 1 SNJ-3, 6 F4F-4s, and 9 SOCs.
The Long Island was carrying the "only aircraft the USN had"? Sorry, Paul, but you are talking out of your arse on this...
You see the USN keeps records on things such as this, and they were done several times a year. history.navy.mil has these records online for everyone's viewing pleasure...Go check it out to see how epic your fail is.
https://www.history.navy.mil/research/h ... ar-ii.html
The USS Long Island was not carrying F2As, but F4F-4s, and there is ample photographic & documentary evidence backing this up.
paulrward wrote: Mr. Takao, 'commisioned' does NOT mean ready for service, and certainly does not mean ready for action. A ship generally needs 1-2 months for shakedown, and then you have to train the air crew and the deck handling crews. figure 4 months to total, especially considering the shortages of aircraft and aircrew in 1942. Yes, the factories were working overtime, and the trainees were eager and willing, but the USN was still scraping the bottom of the barrel in late 1942 just to do the things they did historically.
ARE YOU JUST BEING AN ARSE ON PURPOSE OR DID YOU FORGET WHAT YOU POSTED EARLIER?
Because...you know that is not true...You, yourself, said so!
paulrward wrote:the total USN carrier force available for the rest of 1942 would have been, essentially, Saratoga, with her damaged hull and shaky turboalternators, the slender Ranger, and the Wasp, which, historically, proved unable to withstand battle damage, along with the four Sangamons which would have been available starting in August.
Along with the four Sangamons which would have been available starting in August...Well, for starters, the USS Santee would commission on August 24th, and the USS Sangamon on August 25th. Thus, you have them "being available" IMMEDIATELY upon commissioning...Not months later. Therefore, you DID forget about the many CVEs THAT WOULD BE AVAILABLE BEGINNING IN JUNE.
So, which is it Paul...Are you forgetful or just being an arse?
Just to clue you in...Remember what you have posted, that way you won't look so much like an arse when called out on it.
paulrward wrote: And, despite your casual dismissal of the U-boat war in 1942, the Germans were still sinking tankers in sight of the New Jersey shore in the summer of 1942. The USN / US Army was using PIPER CUBS to patrol off the coast looking for U-boats, and was commisioning yacht owners with SAILBOATS to carry out surface patrols ! Go back and read Morison's The Battle of the Atlantic, September 1939 - May 1943. It will give you some idea of the situation at the time.
Please name them...Name the tankers sunk within sight of the New Jersey shore during the summer of '42. I bet you it is going to be a really really short list.
Not just the USN & Army were using Piper Cubs, but also the Civil Air Patrol's Coastal Patrol(of course all of these also operated larger aircraft). The Coastal Patrol operated between March 5, 1942 to August 31, 1943, during which they flew 86,865 sorties which logged some 244.600 flight hours.
The Hooligan Navy is fairly well known, especially to fans of Ernest Hemingway. Nor is the Navy's reaction surprising...They did the same thing during the Civil War, buying up vessels left and right, because they were so woefully equipped.
Read Morison's The Battle of the Atlantic, September 1939 - May 1943? Read it... As well as Michael Gannon's two books "Black May" and "Operation Drumbeat", "Torpedo Junction" by Homer Hickam, "Uboats Offshore" by Edwin P. Hoyt, "Torpedoes in the Gulf" by Melanie Wiggins, and "Uboats in the Bahamas" by Eric Wiberg. And those are just those books specifically on the topic.
paulrward wrote: And, just to clue you in, when you spoke to retired USN officers about ' Operation Drumbeat ' , they understood it to mean the entire U-boat offensive that started right after Pearl Harbor, and persisted until the end of Autumn in 1942. It was one of the darkest times in U.S. history, and you can go on the internet and find a photo taken in the summer of 1942, showing tourists on the beach at Coney Island staring out to sea at the pillers of smoke from the sinking oil tankers.
Hopefully these clueless retired USN officers now have a better clue as to what actually constituted Operation Paukenschlag, and they will not make such a mistake in the future. Don't make me get out the trusty Clue By Four...
One of the "darkest times in US history"...Hahahaha! paulward made a funny! Quite the contrary, my friend...It was one of the "brightest." It took forever, well April 27th, anyway, to institute more than a "local" blackout on the Eastern Seaboard. They kept the lights onshore burning bright for quite sometime...Don't want to disappoint the locals, tourists and vacationers.
paulrward wrote: For the American people, the war had finally come to our shores in a way that Pearl Harbor had not.
Hardly...See above. Further, your only talking about the East Coast(and it took them quite some time to appreciate what was happening), and to a lesser extent the Gulf Coast...Not the West Coast, MidWest, etc. America is quite big my friend, and to make such a generalization is quite foolish. Finally, the Uboats off the East Coast pale in comparison to Pearl Harbor...Show me New York City's equivalent of the "Battle of Los Angeles" or the massed forced relocation of German-Americans(German-Americans were arrested and relocated, but not on near the scale the the Japanese were).
paulrward wrote:An interesting summary. I guess you feel that political skills are more important for a naval officer than actual competence or intelligence. This tells me a lot......
Your response tells me a lot...You don't know shite from shinola.
One, it is an observation, not a summation. Or are you planning to tell me that Rocherfort was quite adept at political infighting, and the Redman brothers were rank amateurs?
Two, it tells you nothing about how I feel concerning the merits of naval officers...It is your own prejudices that are doing that.
paulrward wrote:Historically, the Redman brothers were wrong on every thing they ever did.
Historically, that would be an incorrect assessment...
paulrward wrote: After the Redmans were proved hopelessly wrong, they retaliated by canning Rochefort and Safford, and then went after Layton. In fact, Nimitz showed Layton the coded message sent him by King saying, in effect, " Well, I've gotten rid of Rochefort, now you can get rid of Layton ! " Layton was stunned when he read this, but he states that Nimitz told him not to worry, that Nimitz had full confidence in him. ( This was proven by the fact than Nimitz had Layton with him on the deck of the Missouri in Tokyo Bay in 1945 )
Another incorrect assessment. Rochefort, as the head of the new ICPOA, was "canned" because he declared his independence of OP-20-G. Had Rochefort, shall we say, "come to heel," he would have remained in his position at Pearl Harbor. As a side note, after his relief as the head of ICPOA and on his return to Washington, he was offered a position in OP-20-G(Not exactly the thing to do if you are trying to get rid of somebody), however, he flatly refused said position and applied for sea duty. Coming to heel, was not in Rochefort's nature.
paulrward wrote:As for Nimitz not liking or respecting Rochefort, Layton had several times emphasized to Nimitz that the men in the 'bunker' were a special breed of officer or enlisted man, that they were geniuses of the most high strung and unstable type, and that, while they needed special treatment, that if they were handled correctly, they could produce results of 'MAGIC' that would tip the balance of the war in our favor.
This was Nimitz's first meeting with Rochefort, not long after Nimitz had arrived to take over command from Kimmel...Layton was not with Nimitz, Bloch was. So, there were no repeated warnings from Layton. Despite Rochefort's miserable first meeting with Nimitz, Nimitz would become quite impressed with the quality of work that Rochefort and HYPO put out.
paulrward wrote: The famous Midway Memo, describing the composition of the Nagumo force in detail, and the knowledge of the time and location of their arrival, gave Nimitz the edge. In fact, the morning of June 4, when the PBY located Nagumo's carriers, Nimitz called Layton in, showed him the map, and told him that, based on what Layton had told Nimitz, Layton had been only 5 degrees in bearing and 5 minutes off in time in terms of where the IJN were to be found, a remarkable feat.
Actually, it was 5 miles, 5 degrees, 5 minutes off...You forgot that Layton also gave the distance at which Nagumo would be spotted.
Now, if Layton had only been so precise with his response given to Kimmel at Pearl Harbor...
paulrward wrote: As for when AF changed from being a ' Destination ' to being a ' Geographical Designator ' , I would say it was sometime about 9:30 AM, right when an IJN lookout on the Akagi yelled, " HELLDIVERS !"
Ummm...It was a Geographic Designator long before it became a Destination, and it would remain a Destination later than 9:30AM July 4th.