Nagumo with 7 carriers at Midway

Discussions on alternate history, including events up to 20 years before today. Hosted by Terry Duncan.
Post Reply
User avatar
Takao
Member
Posts: 3776
Joined: 10 Mar 2002, 20:27
Location: Reading, Pa

Re: Nagumo with 7 carriers at Midway

#76

Post by Takao » 07 Sep 2017, 02:42

alecsandros wrote:After Coral Sea, USS Yorktown's airgroup was replenished by taking away 50% of USS Saratoga's airgroup...
Actually, it was 75%(VF-3, VB-3, and VT-3). Ok, perhaps 66%, since the bulk of Yorktown's current VF, VF-42, pilots were transferred to Sara's VF-3 to bring them up to full strength - VF-3 had only 11 pilots at the time.

alecsandros wrote:had there been OTHER airgroups available (such as the ones that you imply being on the CVEs), it would have been more logical to use them, and leave Saratoga's airgroup intact, more so as she was the only fleet carrier not committed immediately to the battle of Midway (though plans for her being sent there existed).
Sigh...THERE WERE NO OTHER AIR GROUPS AVAILABLE AT PEARL HARBOR! All of the those that were available, training, or forming up were stateside. Further, the CVE air groups are not aboard the CVEs(the CVEs have not even been completed yet), but are in the process of forming up and training at the various NAS. There were also a few VFs working up, and not to mention the Carrier Replacement Group.

Besides, alecsandros, If it were that simple...Would not the MOST LOGICAL SOLUTION been to return the Yorktown's original VF(VF-5) to her? But they were in Alameda, California...Not Pearl Harbor, although when the Sara returned to Pearl, she would be bringing them along.

alecsandros wrote:USN was fighting a 2-front war - Atlantic and Pacific - and the Atlantic was given priority because of the "Germany first" policy.
The Atlantic was given priority in 1940 & 1940, the ship transfers bear that out. Then comes December 7th, 1941, and everything changes for the US Navy.

The problem that you and Paul seem to be continuously forgetting is that the US Navy was, during 1942 and most of 1943, fighting a two-ocean war with a one-ocean Navy. Everyone was screaming for more ships when there were far too few to go around.

Let's look at destroyers, the obvious choice to do escort duty, as of December, 1941, there are 103 in the Atlantic and 95 in the Pacific. By January, 1942, that has changed...with 94 destroyers in the Atlantic and 112 in the Pacific. By March, 1942, it is 84 in the Atlantic and 114 in the Pacific. The Pacific will see a slight gain in June 1942 - 83 in the Atlantic and 122 in the Pacific. The severe losses during the Solomons/Guadalcanal campaign will have the two theaters having roughly parity by December, 1942 with 103 in the Atlantic and 100 in the Pacific. By the new year, the Pacific would once again regain ascendancy with 97 in the Atlantic and 124 in the Pacific. The Atlantic would again take the lead during the build up for Operation Husky, before losing it again in August, 1943. After August, 1943, the Pacific would always have the larger number of destroyers, and by the beginning of 1944, the Pacific would have a 2 to one advantage in destroyers.

As such, the number of destroyers does not bear out any "Germany First policy".

alecsandros wrote:In the first semester of 1942, USN was in a dire situation in terms of available ships for doing escort, with a reported strength of approx 68 units as of Jan 1942 (to cover the entire coastline + transatlantic convoys) , growing to a reported 270 by July 1942 (both by local production as well as by receiving reinforcements from the Royal Navy and Royal Canadian Navy), which was the month in which Uboat sinkings on the east coast finally decreased.
My friend, during all of 1942 the US was in a dire situation concerning the availability of all ships, not just escorts. There were never enough to go around.

User avatar
Takao
Member
Posts: 3776
Joined: 10 Mar 2002, 20:27
Location: Reading, Pa

Re: Nagumo with 7 carriers at Midway

#77

Post by Takao » 07 Sep 2017, 03:53

alecsandros wrote: That would not be an insurmountable problem. Historically Junyo (rated at 26kts) steamed with Ryujo (rated at 29kts) to attack Dutch Harbor. They were required to do refueling at sea, and that's what they did a few times.
Junyo was rated at 25.5 knots, but because of mechanical problems with her engines, she never made more than 22-23 knots, and that would be after a yard period and a clean bottom.

alecsandros wrote:That would be different depending on the location of Junyo in the Japanese carrier formation. In any case, her slower speed would make re-forming (after the attack) of the formation more slow, but again, not impossible
Less so than you think it would...Look at how widely seperate Kido Butai became at Midway. Now, you throw the plodding Junyo to the mix of carriers...

alecsandros wrote:Certainly, but there weren't enough floatplanes readily available to conduct complete search of the horizon. THat's because they only sent 2 cruisers to help Nagumo... Had they sent 2 seaplane carriers with Nagumo, things could have been much much different. BUt they didn't.
They did not with good reason...The seaplane carriers only carried one more Aichi E13A than the Tones did(4 vs 3). The rest of the aircraft they carried were the much shorter legged Mitsubishi F1Ms, which, range wise, is not an improvement over the Nakajima E8Ns also carried by the Tones and the two fast battleships of Kido Butai.

alecsandros wrote:On the morning of June 4th, Nagumo was so low on available fighters that he used several D3As as combat air patrol. I'm sure he would have prefered some Claudes in their stead.
Not by my read, although several D3As of the returning Midway strike did mix it up with retreating American carrier aircraft. Not sure as to why you would include Claudes in the Midway strike package.

alecsandros wrote:That is what the latest published research shows us - that Nagumo's combat air patrol ultimately failed, catastrophically, to stop enemy air attacks.
However, we should take notice of the details published (in "Shattered Sword" and "Why did the Japanese lose the battle of Midway"): the combat air patrol was fighting non-stop for 3 hours before the dive bomber attack. The combat air patrol attempted to land for refueling/rearming, but either there wasn't enough deck space (because the 4 decks were busy retrieving the return flight from Midway first strike), OR there wasn't any stable deck to land upon (for a lot of time, the 4 carrieres were doing eavasive manouvres to avoid bombs and torps). Even so, the combat air patrol successfully destroyed at least 60 incoming planes, while losing 18 machines to all causes. AFAIK, Nagumo launched several combat air patrols, of 3 to 6 machines from each carrier. He couldn't retrieve them for the above stated reasons, and they expeneded their fuel and ammo, starting to hover around the carriers.

In this proposed scenario, some (let's say 2) carriers would be tasked with mantaining continous combat air patrol. That means no more time wasted in retrieving the MIdway strike. That means no more space and time wasted with arming the 2nd strike. Only CAP. In that way, when the SBD arive, there would be a good chance that some fighters would be in the air at medium altitude, and, allthough a total block of the attack is extremely unlikely, some deflection can be anticipated, and the ultimate result (8 to 10 bomb hits from 54 bombs launched) may be less then the historical one.
Conversely, The CAP now has more decks to protect, and an increase in the number of dissimilar carriers, that will become increasingly strung out as the day goes along. You have increased the number of CAP, but you have also increased their workload...I would hazard a guess that one cancels out the other. Not to mention that the much slower Junyo might catch a torpedo or three.


alecsandros
Member
Posts: 298
Joined: 23 Jun 2010, 09:37

Re: Nagumo with 7 carriers at Midway

#78

Post by alecsandros » 07 Sep 2017, 11:49

Takao wrote:
The problem that you and Paul seem to be continuously forgetting is that the US Navy was, during 1942 and most of 1943, fighting a two-ocean war with a one-ocean Navy. Everyone was screaming for more ships when there were far too few to go around.
Paul makes a wonderfull presentation of facts as they were in 1941/2, and I respect his opinion.

US Navy Atlantic command was different from Pacific command from way before Dec 1941.
As such, the number of destroyers does not bear out any "Germany First policy".
Germany first is reflected in the transport of fuel, raw materials , ammo, food, trucks, etc, sent to Great Britain and / or to USSR/Iran/etc, via Atlantic convoys (robbing Hawaii and Australia from immediate material support, mostly felt in fuel supply ships).

As a side note, the number of destroyers that you mention doesn't appear to be matched by the actual division strength. You seem to have ~ 200 DDs for both oceans, while the total for Dec 1941 was more like 150.
Last edited by alecsandros on 07 Sep 2017, 12:04, edited 1 time in total.

alecsandros
Member
Posts: 298
Joined: 23 Jun 2010, 09:37

Re: Nagumo with 7 carriers at Midway

#79

Post by alecsandros » 07 Sep 2017, 11:55

Takao wrote: Junyo was rated at 25.5 knots, but because of mechanical problems with her engines, she never made more than 22-23 knots, and that would be after a yard period and a clean bottom.
... But she was still "mixed up" with a 29kts ship... (Ryujo)...
alecsandros wrote:Less so than you think it would...Look at how widely seperate Kido Butai became at Midway. Now, you throw the plodding Junyo to the mix of carriers...
If you look carefully, all IJN carrier classes were quite different from the others.

alecsandros wrote:They did not with good reason...The seaplane carriers only carried one more Aichi E13A than the Tones did(4 vs 3). The rest of the aircraft they carried were the much shorter legged Mitsubishi F1Ms, which, range wise, is not an improvement over the Nakajima E8Ns also carried by the Tones and the two fast battleships of Kido Butai.
There was no "good reason" in place, just arrogance and blindness to the enemy power. The seaplane carriers should have supplemented the attack group, and not replace the cruisers. Thus the total available number of longrange recon would be 14 (4+4+3+3), and not 6 (3+3).

Sending 6 recon seaplanes + 2 D4Y Judy's in support, for a total of 8 machines, is simply ridiculous for Pacific warfare. For instance, WHAT PLANES would be doing recon after 12:00AM (the maximum hour at which the seaplanes could be at their designated coordinates) ?

alecsandros wrote: Not sure as to why you would include Claudes in the Midway strike package.
I wouldn't , but they would be usefull as combat air patrol.
alecsandros wrote:Conversely, The CAP now has more decks to protect, and an increase in the number of dissimilar carriers, that will become increasingly strung out as the day goes along. You have increased the number of CAP, but you have also increased their workload...I would hazard a guess that one cancels out the other. Not to mention that the much slower Junyo might catch a torpedo or three.
As long as the 7 decks work as a unit, it won't be hard for the combat air patrol to protect them. It becomes hard when they separate.

As for Junyo catching a torpedo or three, all the better, at least she would be an effective "bait"...

glenn239
Member
Posts: 5862
Joined: 29 Apr 2005, 02:20
Location: Ontario, Canada

Re: Nagumo with 7 carriers at Midway

#80

Post by glenn239 » 07 Sep 2017, 15:48

T. A. Gardner wrote:
Of course they didn't go all out. Ships rarely do and when they do it's difficult on the crew and the ship, not to mention expensive on fuel. So, a 30 to 33 knot carrier will generally operate at 20 to 25 knots. A 25 knot carrier will operate at 15 to 20 knots.
I know this very well having spent 27 years in the US Navy in engineering and being on ships, including carriers operating at sea.
John Lundstrom wrote a book called Black Shoe Carrier Admiral. In it, he detailed the problems the US Navy faced in having carriers commanded by non-aviators. These tended not to understand that aviation doctrine, not ship handling, were of paramount importance. So, for random example, an aviator might conclude that a 24kt carrier has to operate with a 33kt carrier for reasons of doctrine related to mass of strike, but an engineer with 27 years in the service might conclude from their experience that the aviators can get shot down - the two ships did not belong together. Lundstrom indicates the USN's solution ultimately was to ruthlessly purge the non-aviators from command of carriers so that their tertiary objections related to ship handling could be swept aside and the carriers could be operated as they were meant to be - serving the needs of aerial doctrine and not vice versa. The IJN had come to a similar conclusion with 1st Air Fleet, putting aviators in key positions (Genda, Fuchida) and ensuring that non-aviators in command of carrier divisions (Yamaguchi, Kusaka) had years of experience commanding carriers. This 'weight' to aviation allowed Genda the freedom to design 1st Air Fleet's tactics around aviation doctrine, with other considerations (such as ship handling) being secondary. Aviation doctrine is why 34kt carriers operated with 28kt carriers in Kido Butai - if Genda had thought speed and aircraft handling characteristics were the primary consideration, then I suspect he'd have split 1st and 2nd Divisions into two formations operating 50 - 75nm miles part, as per well established pre-1st Air Fleet doctrine to keep the carriers separated.
For the Junyo to operate with the rest of the big Japanese carriers means either they go slower or the Junyo tries to push as hard as it can to keep up. The problem there is going to be fuel. The Junyo will run dry much sooner trying to keep up at 20 to 25 knots.
The other problem comes when the US shows up for an air attack. The Junyo will fall behind the rest of the group as the other ships crank up to top speed to avoid being torpedoed and bombed.
In 1942 Combined Fleet was examining the problem of attacking Oahu, but this time they could not expect surprise. Genda and Kusaka, in looking at the problem of Hawaii, had to pick between separating the carriers based on various factors, or integrating the 'inferior' carriers (Junyo, Zuiho, etc.) into Kido Butai in favor of mass of air strike. The preference was mass of strike, suggesting that the fact that the less capable carriers had not operated with the fleet carriers was not due to some insurmountable doctrine, but rather, the more mundane coincidence that until looking at Hawaii, Part II, no mission had been examined in which Kido Butai's 6 carriers were thought to be of insufficient strength.

After Midway Junyo and Hiyo operated as a separate division, but this was not primarily due to ship handling. It was because IJN carrier tactics themselves had learned the 'lesson' that Genda's massed formation with everything in one basket was too dangerous to employ operationally, and 3rd Fleet reverted to the pre-1st Fleet tactics of separated (but mutually supporting) formations. At Santa Cruz when Shokaku was damaged, Nagumo without hesitation ordered Junyo to join with Zuikaku, because replacing Shokaku in air fighting tactics was more important than Junyo's inferior handling characteristics.
Historically IJN carriers performed scouting with their B5N torpedo bombers, in several occasions (Dec 8th 1941 after Pearl, May 7th 1942 before Coral Sea). The floatplanes were augmented by carrier strike planes when it was required. At Midway, the cruiser floatplanes were augmented by 2 dive bombers of the new type - D4Y "Judy".
At Midway Nagumo used 2 x B5N2 for scouting, one from Akagi, one from Kaga. The D4Y's were not employed in the morning search pattern.
Sending the E13A floatplanes made more sense.
8th Cruiser Division had 4 E13A floatplanes. The floatplane resources of Kido Butai at Midway were capable of handling 4 scouting lines out to 300nm, with either a 30nm or 60nm dogleg, depending on search 'density', plus the additional separation between 'lines'. If Kusaka had decided that KB required a 360 degree search to 300nm, then he'd have assigned about 12 planes to the mission (if a light density search) or 24 planes (if heavy density). Given that KB only had 4 E13's and 2 D4Y's, the other 6-18 aircraft would have been B5N2's.

So, no, using the seaplanes didn't "make more sense" in any tactical situation in which the requirements called for more than a handful of planes or where speed didn't matter.
And the cycle time is an issue.
Slowest carrier cycle time was Kaga with 27 torpedo bombers. Kusaka could either pair Junyo's 18 bombers with Kaga's 27 to keep the cycle time close, or reduce Junyo's contribution to 9 or 12 aircraft per wave.

glenn239
Member
Posts: 5862
Joined: 29 Apr 2005, 02:20
Location: Ontario, Canada

Re: Nagumo with 7 carriers at Midway

#81

Post by glenn239 » 07 Sep 2017, 16:32

Takao wrote: Less so than you think it would...Look at how widely seperate Kido Butai became at Midway. Now, you throw the plodding Junyo to the mix of carriers...
I see where there's been a long discussion on the problems of various speeds of carriers operating together, and I just posted on it myself. But, only at Midway did the IJN employ one carrier group. At Coral Sea, Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz the IJN had two groups. Furthermore, in the morass of movements that was Yamamoto's plan at Midway, the Aleutians carrier group and the Midway groups could move in different directions in response to certain contingencies.

The gist of all this is that the 'plodding' Junyo and Ryujo, if employed against Midway instead Dutch Harbor, would in all likelihood have appeared as a flanking carrier group to Kido Butai, perhaps 50-75nm distant to the northeast, or perhaps the same distance to the southwest.
In this proposed scenario, some (let's say 2) carriers would be tasked with mantaining continous combat air patrol. That means no more time wasted in retrieving the MIdway strike. That means no more space and time wasted with arming the 2nd strike. Only CAP. In that way, when the SBD arive, there would be a good chance that some fighters would be in the air at medium altitude, and, allthough a total block of the attack is extremely unlikely, some deflection can be anticipated, and the ultimate result (8 to 10 bomb hits from 54 bombs launched) may be less then the historical one.

Conversely, The CAP now has more decks to protect, and an increase in the number of dissimilar carriers, that will become increasingly strung out as the day goes along. You have increased the number of CAP, but you have also increased their workload...I would hazard a guess that one cancels out the other. Not to mention that the much slower Junyo might catch a torpedo or three.
That might be the proposed scenario, but in actual fact during 1942, in the three cases in which the IJN employed two carrier groups, the USN made the serious tactical error of attacking the wrong group twice. At Coral Sea Fletcher unloaded his full strength on Shoho and didn't pay with the destruction of his task force due to pure luck (a coding error by a scouting crew). At Eastern Solomons Ryujo again was hit and the main force spared.

So, you're talking about SBD's and whatnot. Let's back up. Fletcher is expecting TWO carrier groups. Now Nagumo is operating in TWO carrier groups and Fletcher's batting average in 1942 for attacking the WRONG carrier group was 100%. See where this going yet? The PBY's from Midway will spot Nagumo and report 2 carriers, (missing 2). The PBY's from Midway will spot the Ryujo/Junyo group in its flanking position and report 2 carriers. Fletcher's confirmation bias of 2 groups of 2 carriers will be confirmed, and he will commit all his strike aircraft at the two groups. TF-16 has a 50% chance of being assigned to the wrong group, (ie, the Ryujo). If this happens, Yorktown alone is taking on 4 carriers and may not neutralize more than one while TF-16 pummels Ryujo and Junyo.

If Ryujo and Junyo are east of Nagumo there is a much higher chance Fletcher is spotted earlier, which could be disaster. If they are southwest of Nagumo then TF-16's strike, as it misses Nagumo to the south, attacks Ryujo and Junyo and Nagumo escapes.

Ryujo and Junyo at Midway are a joker in the deck, allowing the potential for Fletcher to make unforced errors due to confirmation bias, causing confusion in targeting assignments that sould see the heavy blow land on the diversionary force, just like at Coral Sea and Eastern Solomons, or lead to Fletcher being discovered much earlier by the secondary group's independent searching. If everything goes like historical, then 3 IJN carriers counterattack at 11am and best case scenario is that 2 of them are light. Worst case scenario is that 3 are heavy.

alecsandros
Member
Posts: 298
Joined: 23 Jun 2010, 09:37

Re: Nagumo with 7 carriers at Midway

#82

Post by alecsandros » 07 Sep 2017, 18:36

glenn239 wrote: If everything goes like historical, then 3 IJN carriers counterattack at 11am and best case scenario is that 2 of them are light. Worst case scenario is that 3 are heavy.
Hello Glenn !

My opinion is that a 3-carrier counterattack at 11:00 would comprise 60 to 70 machines, because Nagumo would be required to retrieve , rearm , refuel and relaunch his combat air patrol at the same time (reducing the deck load available for a strike). I would expect a 12 A6M / 24 D3A / and between 24 to 36 B5N for strike wave composition. If they would target TF17, Yorktown would be crippled and abandoned. If they would target TF16, probably 1 carrier would be crippled and 1 badly damaged, but still able to conduct flight ops (retrieve and relaunch, albeit somewhat slower). In other words, the about same results as per Battle of Coral Sea.

What is important IMHO is that at 11:15AM, when all Japanese machines (80 to 100) would be in the air (meaning own CAP + strike wave), Nagumo would be left with 40 to 60 machines below decks to launch a 2nd anti-shipping wave, with only 6-8 A6Ms and the rest 25/25 D3As and B5Ns. This strike could realistically be launched at 12:00AM, and coudl do more damage on the US fleet - either sinking the damaged carrier, or sinking Yorktown if only attacking TF17.

At the same time, Fletcher wouldn't have any more strikes to perform, as his own SBD waves would be returning for refuel/rearm and try to land at ~ 12:00 - 13:00. Thus with refueling/rearming taking until 15:00, it is probable that Fletcher couldn't launch other strikes before the 2nd Japanese strike hits him, which makes the battle pretty much sealed at that point.

Japanese air losses would be substantial, with probably 40 machines lost, 10 badly damaged and 30 moderately or lightly damaged from a total of aprox 100 to 130 launched against Fletcher.

paulrward
Member
Posts: 665
Joined: 10 Dec 2008, 21:14

Re: Nagumo with 7 carriers at Midway

#83

Post by paulrward » 07 Sep 2017, 23:38

To Mr. Takao :

For the past several days, you have chosen to address me in a rude and uncivilized manner.
Under the circumstances, I felt there was no point in replying to your churlish behavior.
Conversing with you seems to lead to nothing but insults and invective.
Knowing this, and desiring not to waste my time, I have chosen to not respond.

Yet, it seems that I should have made my feelings known.
On numerous occasions, you have behaved in a childish manner unworthy of an adult.
Ultimately, this has led me to a conclusion:

Apparently, you are not an adult, and have no capability to behave as one.
Seemingly, you are one of those unhappy people who will never grow up.
Sadly, I can think of no way in which I can help you on your path to emotional maturity.

However you chose to go forward, what you are, and become, is your own responsibllity.
Obviously, I find no point in wasting time in a futile endeavor to try to ' grow you up '.
Lacking the ability to educate you, and having better things to do, my choice is clear:
End the discussion with an immature, clownish arse.

!


Paul R. Ward
Information not shared, is information lost
Voices that are banned, are voices who cannot share information....
Discussions that are silenced, are discussions that will occur elsewhere !

Rob Stuart
Member
Posts: 1200
Joined: 18 Apr 2009, 01:41
Location: Ottawa

Re: Nagumo with 7 carriers at Midway

#84

Post by Rob Stuart » 07 Sep 2017, 23:43

But, only at Midway did the IJN employ one carrier group.
Not entirely true. The IJN employed a single carrier group on the following prior occasions:

PH attack - 6 carriers in one group
attack on Darwin - 4 carriers in one group
sweep south of Java in early March - 4 carriers in one group
Indian Ocean raid - 5 carries in one group
At Coral Sea, Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz the IJN had two groups.
Coral Sea doesn't belong on this list. Yes, Shoho operated independently from CarDiv5, but that was because it was given a different mission and it was not under Hara's command. It can be compared with Zuiho at Midway - not with KdB because it had a different mission and was not under Nagumo's command.

User avatar
Takao
Member
Posts: 3776
Joined: 10 Mar 2002, 20:27
Location: Reading, Pa

Re: Nagumo with 7 carriers at Midway

#85

Post by Takao » 08 Sep 2017, 03:08

paulrward wrote:To Mr. Takao :

For the past several days, you have chosen to address me in a rude and uncivilized manner.
Under the circumstances, I felt there was no point in replying to your churlish behavior.
Conversing with you seems to lead to nothing but insults and invective.
Knowing this, and desiring not to waste my time, I have chosen to not respond.

Yet, it seems that I should have made my feelings known.
On numerous occasions, you have behaved in a childish manner unworthy of an adult.
Ultimately, this has led me to a conclusion:

Apparently, you are not an adult, and have no capability to behave as one.
Seemingly, you are one of those unhappy people who will never grow up.
Sadly, I can think of no way in which I can help you on your path to emotional maturity.

However you chose to go forward, what you are, and become, is your own responsibllity.
Obviously, I find no point in wasting time in a futile endeavor to try to ' grow you up '.
Lacking the ability to educate you, and having better things to do, my choice is clear:
End the discussion with an immature, clownish arse.



Paul R. Ward
Right back at you Paul...

You have made some rather outlandish claims, and when I ask you to back them up, I am treated with "proof" that has no bearing on your claim whatsoever. For instance, your claim on the sinkings of the Jersey coast during the simmer of 1942...You offered up "proof" of sinkings in the winter of 1942, not summer. then you offered up a sinking during the summer of 1942, but it is off Virginia, not New Jersey.

Then you flub with the commissioning of the Sangamon carriers and CVEs. Apparently, only you are allowed to include recently commissioned carriers, but when I pointed out the CVEs that you had forgotten...Then suddenly it is no, no, no...'commisioned' does NOT mean ready for service.

Also, your bit about the Long Island carrying "the only aircraft the USN had available," which is patently untrue, and easily proven otherwise by anyone wishing to do one iota of research.

The list goes on, but you get the point...more often than not, your information has either been in error, or misrepresented. So, it is quite hard to take you seriously, as you don't want to do any research before posting, rather working off an imperfect memory seems to be what you are best at.
So, thankfully, you have given up "educating" me...Because that is an education I certainly don't need.

Cheers chum, TTFN
Takao

User avatar
Takao
Member
Posts: 3776
Joined: 10 Mar 2002, 20:27
Location: Reading, Pa

Re: Nagumo with 7 carriers at Midway

#86

Post by Takao » 08 Sep 2017, 03:11

alecsandros wrote: As a side note, the number of destroyers that you mention doesn't appear to be matched by the actual division strength. You seem to have ~ 200 DDs for both oceans, while the total for Dec 1941 was more like 150.
Forum member "mescal" has done quite a bit of research on the subject, his data is what I have used. See this thread:
/viewtopic.php?f=113&t=161584

User avatar
Takao
Member
Posts: 3776
Joined: 10 Mar 2002, 20:27
Location: Reading, Pa

Re: Nagumo with 7 carriers at Midway

#87

Post by Takao » 08 Sep 2017, 04:20

alecsandros wrote: ... But she was still "mixed up" with a 29kts ship... (Ryujo)...
Out of necessity, not by design, and that "relationship" did not last long.
alecsandros wrote: If you look carefully, all IJN carrier classes were quite different from the others.
Yes, because many of the Japanese larger carriers were conversions; Kaga, Akagi, the Shohos, the Chitoses, Ryuho, the Hiyos, and Shinano. Still, most made at least 28 knots, the outliers being the Ryuho and the Hiyos.

alecsandros wrote: There was no "good reason" in place, just arrogance and blindness to the enemy power. The seaplane carriers should have supplemented the attack group, and not replace the cruisers. Thus the total available number of longrange recon would be 14 (4+4+3+3), and not 6 (3+3).
The seaplane carriers were providing air cover, for their charges...Standing in for carriers the Japanese did not have. Chitose's F1M Pete floatplanes would kill a VP-44 PBY.
alecsandros wrote: Sending 6 recon seaplanes + 2 D4Y Judy's in support, for a total of 8 machines, is simply ridiculous for Pacific warfare. For instance, WHAT PLANES would be doing recon after 12:00AM (the maximum hour at which the seaplanes could be at their designated coordinates) ?
The Japanese Shokaku & Zuikaku used 7 B5Ns as reconnaissance at Coral Sea on May 8. Likewise, the Americans used 18 SBDs, but they had to search a full 360 degrees(12 were sent north, and 6 south). AFAIK, roughly the same Japanese reconnaissance plan was used in the Indian Ocean raid and at Pearl Harbor.

alecsandros wrote:
I wouldn't , but they would be usefull as combat air patrol.
Only against unescorted strike aircraft, and then the Aichi D3A would be just as effective, maybe moreso with it's rear gun.
alecsandros wrote: As long as the 7 decks work as a unit, it won't be hard for the combat air patrol to protect them. It becomes hard when they separate.
But, the 7 decks won't operate as a unit when under air attack...That was not how Japanese AA defense doctrine worked. It was every twisting and turning carrier for itself. Individual maneuverability was their defense, not an organized task force maneuvering as a whole.

alecsandros wrote: As for Junyo catching a torpedo or three, all the better, at least she would be an effective "bait"...
Pretty expensive bait...That is what battleships are for, they can absorb the bomb hits with little measurable loss of effectiveness and can easily take one or two torpedoes. The carriers, well, not so much.

User avatar
Takao
Member
Posts: 3776
Joined: 10 Mar 2002, 20:27
Location: Reading, Pa

Re: Nagumo with 7 carriers at Midway

#88

Post by Takao » 08 Sep 2017, 04:46

alecsandros wrote: At the same time, Fletcher wouldn't have any more strikes to perform, as his own SBD waves would be returning for refuel/rearm and try to land at ~ 12:00 - 13:00. Thus with refueling/rearming taking until 15:00, it is probable that Fletcher couldn't launch other strikes before the 2nd Japanese strike hits him, which makes the battle pretty much sealed at that point.
But, that's not exactly true though, is it? 17 VS-5 SBDs and 6 escort F4Fs are spotted om Yorktown's deck awaiting the word go. They would most certainly be launched when word was received that there were more than two or four Japanese carriers.

alecsandros
Member
Posts: 298
Joined: 23 Jun 2010, 09:37

Re: Nagumo with 7 carriers at Midway

#89

Post by alecsandros » 08 Sep 2017, 07:14

Takao wrote: You have made some rather outlandish claims, and when I ask you to back them up, I am treated with "proof" that has no bearing on your claim whatsoever. For instance, your claim on the sinkings of the Jersey coast during the simmer of 1942...You offered up "proof" of sinkings in the winter of 1942, not summer. then you offered up a sinking during the summer of 1942, but it is off Virginia, not New Jersey.
The sinkings of the East Coast are very well documented and came in substantial numbers in S1 1942.
A very superficial research on Uboat.net returned USS Gannet (840tons), Berganger (6500 tons), Rio Tercero (4800 tons), SS City of Birmingham (6000 tons), SS Santore (7000 tons), SS William Rockefeller (14000 tons oiler), trawler AS-139 (150 tons), all sunk within 300nm of New Jersey in the month of June 1942 (a "summer" month).
Then you flub with the commissioning of the Sangamon carriers and CVEs. Apparently, only you are allowed to include recently commissioned carriers, but when I pointed out the CVEs that you had forgotten...Then suddenly it is no, no, no...'commisioned' does NOT mean ready for service.
The Sangamons weren't in service... They entered service later in the war.
Also, your bit about the Long Island carrying "the only aircraft the USN had available," which is patently untrue, and easily proven otherwise by anyone wishing to do one iota of research.
... Research gives USS Wasp was still in her European mission, USS Ranger in a mission to Africa, USS Saratoga - earmarked for supporting Midway.


Further research gives USN started negotiations for taking HMS Victorious (converted to USS Robin) in the Pacific as early as June 1942... For lack of existing carriers to combat the Japanese carrier power.

This all provides an ample, gloomy picture, of USN carrier force as of summer of 1942.
Last edited by alecsandros on 08 Sep 2017, 07:38, edited 1 time in total.

alecsandros
Member
Posts: 298
Joined: 23 Jun 2010, 09:37

Re: Nagumo with 7 carriers at Midway

#90

Post by alecsandros » 08 Sep 2017, 07:30

Takao wrote: Out of necessity, not by design, and that "relationship" did not last long.
That relationship lasted longer then the Kido Butai lasted.
alecsandros wrote: The seaplane carriers were providing air cover, for their charges...Standing in for carriers the Japanese did not have. Chitose's F1M Pete floatplanes would kill a VP-44 PBY.
The purpose of this thread was to present concentration of forces, in the detriment of air support for various "bodies" of the fleet.
Thus concentration would also be made of the seaplane tenders.
alecsandros wrote: The Japanese Shokaku & Zuikaku used 7 B5Ns as reconnaissance at Coral Sea on May 8. Likewise, the Americans used 18 SBDs, but they had to search a full 360 degrees(12 were sent north, and 6 south). AFAIK, roughly the same Japanese reconnaissance plan was used in the Indian Ocean raid and at Pearl Harbor.
Recon for a known and certain enemy, at a certain estimated range, is one thing, recon for an unknown and uncertain enemy, at an unknown range (which is possible to enter combat range at various hours in the day) is another.

alecsandros wrote:
Only against unescorted strike aircraft
Precisely.
alecsandros wrote: But, the 7 decks won't operate as a unit when under air attack...
The air umbrella of the combat air patrol could and did protect the fleet under enemy air attack.
The typical number (for 1942 carrier battles) of fighters allocated for CAP on Japanese carrier squadrons was 8 machines per carrier. Adding 3 extra carriers (Zuiho Junyo Ryujo) increases the number of necessary fighters by 24 (8 x 3), while offering an increase in total available machines by approximately 80. 80 - 24 = 56 extra machines available to Nagumo, in addition to the overall boost in AA defense provided by the 24 fighters.

alecsandros wrote: Pretty expensive bait...That is what battleships are for, they can absorb the bomb hits with little measurable loss of effectiveness and can easily take one or two torpedoes. The carriers, well, not so much.
Expensive , but highly prized and used by Japanese commanders. Ryujo was lost while used as "bait".
Last edited by alecsandros on 08 Sep 2017, 07:43, edited 1 time in total.

Post Reply

Return to “What if”