Japan shares it's cavity magnetron with German in 1940?

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Richard Anderson
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Re: Japan shares it's cavity magnetron with German in 1940?

Post by Richard Anderson » 27 Aug 2020 22:23

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
27 Aug 2020 21:49
Anyone have any literature on this from the US AAF, 8th AF or other sources?
Bombing Accuracy
http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/sing ... 5216/rec/1
http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/sing ... 3334/rec/3
http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/sing ... 339/rec/31

IIRC, the rest of the Eighth AF quarterly Bombing Accuracy reports are available from Maxwell.

Eighth Air Force Tactical Development
http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/sing ... 4112/rec/6

Flak Analysis
http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/sing ... 4788/rec/8

Flak Neutralization
http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/sing ... 238/rec/10
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

Carl Schwamberger
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Re: Japan shares it's cavity magnetron with German in 1940?

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 28 Aug 2020 13:18

Thanks Rich. Years ago I was shown parts of similar docs from the 9th AF for 19443-44. Hard to judge at this point but it looks sort of like the two bomber units were playing a different game. I also see Gen Andersons name pop up there. A understudied character in the efforts of the 8th and 9th AF.

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Re: Japan shares it's cavity magnetron with German in 1940?

Post by Richard Anderson » 28 Aug 2020 15:28

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
28 Aug 2020 13:18
Thanks Rich. Years ago I was shown parts of similar docs from the 9th AF for 19443-44. Hard to judge at this point but it looks sort of like the two bomber units were playing a different game. I also see Gen Andersons name pop up there. A understudied character in the efforts of the 8th and 9th AF.
Well Carl, of course they were playing a "different game". :lol: One was playing a strategic "game" and the other a tactical "game".
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

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Re: Japan shares it's cavity magnetron with German in 1940?

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 28 Aug 2020 18:47

Rich, I was looking strictly at the technical aspects. The targets and the techniques. From experience when you get down to those things the Tactical vs Strategic become increasingly transparent.

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Re: Japan shares it's cavity magnetron with German in 1940?

Post by Richard Anderson » 29 Aug 2020 01:15

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
28 Aug 2020 18:47
Rich, I was looking strictly at the technical aspects. The targets and the techniques. From experience when you get down to those things the Tactical vs Strategic become increasingly transparent.
But the technical aspects of targets and techniques were different between the Eighth and Ninth Air Force virtually from the beginning. Eighth was a strategic air force that depended on (despite what AAF propaganda held) pattern bombing from large numbers of heavy bombers dropping large numbers of bombs for effect from relatively high altitude. Because the altitude affected visibility, it also became highly reliant on technical means for blind bombing, which required more or less "obvious" target identification by radar to be effective, so large strategic targets. The Ninth Air Force and the light and medium bombers of IX BC flew at lower altitudes, with often lighter bomb loads and flew against what were essentially point targets, so required more precision and were able to achieve it. The infighting over how to achieve the battlefield interdiction of western France during NEPTUNE really highlighted the differences...initially Solly Zuckerman et al focused on attacking large strategic targets - railroad marshaling yards - as the means of achieve that objective so insisted on using the heavy bombers of Eighth Air Force and BC. However, Ninth Air Force insisted the better targets to achieve the interdiction were the rail lines and bridges, which could be accurately hit by the light and medium bombers...and even fighter bombers.

That transparency essentially occurred between March and June of 1944.
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

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Re: Japan shares it's cavity magnetron with German in 1940?

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 29 Aug 2020 01:53

My father was a ordnance officer in the 9th BD. He was involved from mid 43 when his squadron crossed over. Zuckerman may have been one of the theorists he referred to as "knothead". He also described failure, discontent, and a bottom up push for change. It's was clear the techniques or tactics they started with were not working.

It appears this Gen Anderson directed some attention to the improvement of the 9th.

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Re: Japan shares it's cavity magnetron with German in 1940?

Post by Richard Anderson » 29 Aug 2020 03:03

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
29 Aug 2020 01:53
My father was a ordnance officer in the 9th BD. He was involved from mid 43 when his squadron crossed over. Zuckerman may have been one of the theorists he referred to as "knothead". He also described failure, discontent, and a bottom up push for change. It's was clear the techniques or tactics they started with were not working.

It appears this Gen Anderson directed some attention to the improvement of the 9th.
I think you mean Samuel E. Anderson? CO of the 3d Bomb Wing from July 1942 to October 1943 when he assumed command of IX BC? If so, again I'm not sure how this all ties in? The changes were not to tactics, but rather were in terms of strategic decision making and how OR influenced the use of various weapons systems to achieve results. Zuckerman developed the Transportation Plan based upon using strategic bombers, not tactical bombers. Pete Quesada, among others in Ninth AF, probably including Anderson, pushed for achieving the same result with tactical bombers, directed at a different target set. The "knotheads" that achieved that were the OR personnel at Ninth Air Force.
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

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Re: Japan shares it's cavity magnetron with German in 1940?

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 29 Aug 2020 03:11

We are talking on two different subjects here. I might be able to bridge that if I weren't on my phone & at a resort cabin.

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Re: Japan shares it's cavity magnetron with German in 1940?

Post by Richard Anderson » 29 Aug 2020 07:31

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
29 Aug 2020 03:11
We are talking on two different subjects here. I might be able to bridge that if I weren't on my phone & at a resort cabin.
:lol: My heart bleeds for you, :D Enjoy. I'll be happy to pick up this conversation later.
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

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Re: Japan shares it's cavity magnetron with German in 1940?

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 30 Aug 2020 17:20

Rich. I've been looking at the technical aspects. Attack altitudes, bomb sizes, length of run under bombardier control, size of attacking group, ect... ect... ect.... When we did our fire planning terms like strategic or tactical were meaningless to us = transparent. The thought sequence was Effect desired, Target configuration, Weapons available/appropriate, Duration & density of attack, Security or exposure of attacking force. Each of those affecting the other items. Put them in a bag a shake. Theorists can wring their hands over if its a strategic, tactical, or operational target, but if you are preparing or executing a attack its kind of meaningless.

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Re: Japan shares it's cavity magnetron with German in 1940?

Post by Richard Anderson » 30 Aug 2020 17:52

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
30 Aug 2020 17:20
Rich. I've been looking at the technical aspects. Attack altitudes, bomb sizes, length of run under bombardier control, size of attacking group. When we did our fire planning terms like strategic or tactical were meaningless to us = transparent. The thought sequence was Effect desired, Target configuration, Weapons available/appropriate, Duration & density of attack, Security or exposure of attacking force. Each of those affecting the other items. Put them in a bag a shake. Theorists can wring their hands over if its a strategic, tactical, or operational target, but if you are preparing or executing a attack its kind of meaningless.
Okay, I see what you meant, but your experience was built on the experience of World War II, which developed just that type of analysis. In World War II, planners utilized tactical air forces to attack tactical targets and strategic air forces to attack strategic targets. The thought sequence then began with target configuration, which defined weapons systems used, which then restricted the weapons available/appropriate/duration & density of attack/security or exposure of attacking force to yield the effect desired. It was a Very Big Deal when the idea of using strategic air assets to attack a tactical target was raised.

Different days, different mindset.
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

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Re: Japan shares it's cavity magnetron with German in 1940?

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 30 Aug 2020 22:08

I'd agree there was confusion in this at the upper levels. Some more so that others. Eisenhower seems to have been judging and demanding from a results oriented perspective vs a set of somewhat arbitrary labels from theory. Others perhaps not so much. In any case it looks like more than a few were reaching back to their experience in the 1920s and 1930 to use other solutions. That is they had other technical experience to drawn on than what they were gaining from 1942 & later.

[/quote] Okay, I see what you meant, but your experience was built on the experience of World War II, which developed just that type of analysis. In World War II, planners utilized tactical air forces to attack tactical targets and strategic air forces to attack strategic targets.
[/quote]

From my fathers & similar sources it looks like the medium bombers in the 8th AF in the summer of 1943 (pre 9th AF) were having 'strategic' thought imposed on them. That some person or persons were trying to make units equipped with shorter range twin engined aircraft use the same technical attack techniques as the four engined aircraft. That makes sense only if the circumstances of their attacks are the same. Which looking at the targets the A20 & B26 were sent against that summer & early autumn aligns part of the time, but certainly not all. I can't say how long that dragged into the separation into the 9th AF. One description of Andersons activities suggests he's still fighting this battle, or finishing it in November.

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Re: Japan shares it's cavity magnetron with German in 1940?

Post by Thumpalumpacus » 31 Aug 2020 04:31

T. A. Gardner wrote:
26 Aug 2020 05:28
The biggest error input into the system was that the fire control system was slow in calculation and second that the time between fuze setting and firing. A faster and continuous calculation fire control system helped but there was still a lag between data input and calculation output of as much as 30 seconds. Electro-mechanical systems were just slow. It doesn't help if the enemy is not flying a steady course and altitude.

Then there's fuze setting. On almost all WW 2 heavy AA guns this was done by the loaders well ahead of loading. There could be several shells with fuzes set waiting for loading. The US on the M2 90mm tried to alleviate this by using a power rammer and automatic fuze setter that set the fuze just before ramming it home for firing.

This is the problem that the proximity fuse did so much to solve, no? Removing timing from the gunlayers and instead basing it upon internal radar?

Someone correct me if I'm wrong, but I'd thought that was the big breakthrough: fusing the shell itself rather than having the gun-crew making a guess. (Not that the 90mm had those shells, I don't know).

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Re: Japan shares it's cavity magnetron with German in 1940?

Post by T. A. Gardner » 31 Aug 2020 18:50

Thumpalumpacus wrote:
31 Aug 2020 04:31
This is the problem that the proximity fuse did so much to solve, no? Removing timing from the gunlayers and instead basing it upon internal radar?

Someone correct me if I'm wrong, but I'd thought that was the big breakthrough: fusing the shell itself rather than having the gun-crew making a guess. (Not that the 90mm had those shells, I don't know).
The proximity fuze took the guesswork out of setting a time fuze correctly along with any lag between setting it and the shell arriving near the target. But even it could be countered by jamming as the USAAF proved at Wright Field late in 1944. There they conducted a live fire trial against a B-17 using practice ammunition with proximity fuzing. The bomber's ECM crew were able to successfully jam the fired rounds making them detonate much further from the plane than they would otherwise. (Yes, they used a manned aircraft for this!)

The other solution was reducing the time between the calculation of the target's position (with increased accuracy from radar) and the firing of the guns. The shorter this cycle was the more accurate the fire of the guns was.

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