What Britain needs to win in Singapore/Far East

[James A Pratt III]

I believe the book "Empires in the Balance" has a good account of the Malay campaign and how the British screwed up so badly.

The KAR was not available for Malaysia they were still needed in Ethiopia because the campaign didn't end till nov 1941 and there was a low level insurgency until early 1943 going on there.

The Indian Infantry battalions in Malaysia did badly because of the following: all these units were repeatedly being milked or bled of their best officers and EMs to form new units. There replacements were newly commissioned officers and raw recruits. The units were hard up to do much training do to this turn over. Also the artillery and support elements of the Indian divisions did not arrive until shortly before the war began there was no time to do any brigade or division level training before the shooting started. The Indian units also had some morale problems. The 4/19th Hyperbad Infantry had to be disarmed in May 1941 do to some trouble in the ranks. Indian officers where treated like second class citizens by the local White officials which didn't make them very happy. Some units where also these 2 Canadian Battaloreported to be influenced by Japanese propaganda. The Indian units sent as reinforcements were also made up of mainly green troops.

Aircraft the Buffalo squadrons pilots were mainly men who had just finished flight training in Australia and instead of being sent to England to a OTU were sent right to Malaysia!? Where they trained to fly the Buffalo. not all the 4 Buffalo squadrons were operational when the Japanese attack began. A few Hurricane Squadrons at the start would have been a big help. One should remember the average RAF fighter Squadron at this time had few experienced pilots.

Percival did request tanks but none were on hand when the Japanese attacked.

The 2 Canadian battalions sent to Hong Kong should have been sent to Singapore along with most of the rest of the garrison Hong Kong was impossible to defend. Note: These 2 Canadian battalions were two of the worst in their army in terms of training add to this the ship carrying most of their equipment was at manila when the Japanese attacked and never got to them. The US Army put it to use on Bataan.

Note most the coast defense guns in Singapore could be trained inland and did fire in the defense of the island. Sadly most of the ammo they had was AP when they needed HE.

[BDV]

The 4/19th Hyperbad Infantry had to be disarmed in May 1941 do to some trouble in the ranks. Indian officers where treated like second class citizens by the local White officials which didn't make them very happy.

Hyderabad, maybe? Freudian slip?

[Markus Becker]

I agree with T.A. Gardner,

more airpower was needed and it had to be in place well before December 1941. Something was availabe. After France and other nations had fallen the UK inherited planes these nations had originally ordered. Some were well liked, others not.

The Buffaloes ended up in Malaya because they were judged useless anywhere else. Why not send more planes to the Far East that are American and either second rate or available in insufficient numbers? On top of the 100 Buffaloes the RAF could have gotten 200 Curtiss Hawks, 100 Douglas A-17 and maybe 50 Vindicators.

That would have doubled the RAF’s bomber strength and tripled the number of (operational) fighters to 150. The ‘fighter gap’ would have been narrowed considerably.

Throw in some obsolete 3” AA guns, add blast pens and the airfields have become a much harder target.


Now to the ground troops:

AFAIK the untis were raised in 39/40 and ok trained and equipped. They even had anti tank weapons that might have sufficed. If they had been kept ready. I read they were not because despite the rather good roads the British didn’t anticipate tanks.

What IMO really messed up the British deference was Operation Matador. It was not feasible. In order to work the British had to arrive in southern Thailand at least a day before the Japanese landed. Aside form the not unimportant matter of invading a neutral nation there was also the problem that the British did not have enough advance warning. When their air searches spotted Japanese convoys they were already too close. Not that spotting them sooner would have helped. How do you know it’s an invasion force and not supplies and reinforcements for the garrison of Indochina?

They should have canceled plans to advance into Thailand and concentrated on defending against an attack from there. They did not until hours after the Japanese had already landed. At that point the troops were ordered back into defensive positions and while they were redeploying the Japanese hit them. The resulting costly defeat had been avoidable.

At Kotha Baru the defenders were literally in position. They inflicted serious casualties and managed to withdraw in good order to fight another day.

If that had also happened in the north west of Malaya the invaders might have been worn down before they reached Singapore.

[T. A. Gardner]

Well, certainly the RAF could have shipped Hawk 75A-3's and A-4's to Singapore, or even Rangoon, given that the US had set up a factory there to assemble them for the Chinese air force (CAMCO / Central Aircraft Manufacturing) and the RAF had 227 in storage in England as of late 1940. About half of these were eventually sent to India once the Pacific war started. Another case of a day late and pound short.

There was one squadron of FAA (811) using the Vindicator but it was replaced by the Swordfish for the squadron to operate from the HMS Archer, so at least one squadron could have had this plane in use.

Kota Bharu would have failed as an amphibious assault if the Indian division there had a third brigade. It nearly failed against the two brigade division. As I said, add a couple of batteries of 6" guns, even obsolescent ones, and the invasion fleet off shore would have had serious issues as well.

[Markus Becker]

Kota Bharu would have failed as an amphibious assault if the Indian division there had a third brigade. It nearly failed against the two brigade division. As I said, add a couple of batteries of 6" guns, even obsolescent ones, and the invasion fleet off shore would have had serious issues as well.

Yes but different rules of engagemant might have sufficed.

The Australians had a some Hudsons at Kota Bharu. They quickly set one transport on fire and damaged several more but they did not start their attacks until 90 minutes or so after the landings had begun. At that point too many Japanese soldiers had already disembarked.

[T. A. Gardner]

Even if the rules stayed the same, the extra brigade would have stalled the Japanese on the beaches while a battery or two of guns capable of reaching the transports off shore, along with aircraft attacks, could have done sufficient damage to them to preclude the advance due to lack of supply and the loss of troops still aboard those ships.

[James A Pratt III]

British radio problems in Malaysia people still them today

A major failure of the British Civilian and Military leadership in Malaysia was not to recruit large numbers of civilian laborers to build defenses. At kota Bharu the Indian troops had to pretty much build theirs instead of training. The British also after 8 Dec 41 failed to construct any defense on the north side of Singapore Island because Persival thought it would be bad for morale. So no work was done until the troops retreated to the Island.

I understand there was a staff officer in England who pointed out in January 1942 Singapore would be impossible to defend in the long run and advised a evacuation. Send the 18th Infantry division and other troops to Burma. and start evacuating the troops in Malaysia to India. There they will be available to fight again another day.

If the British did manage to defeat the February Japanese attack which they could have if they weren't so inept. They have another problem as to how to supply Singapore in the long run. Singapore did have food for 6 months but running large enough convoys to supply the place is impossible in the long run. About the best plan is to wait for the monsoon season in May and run in a extra large convoy protected by the Eastern fleet plus reinforcements and parts of the USN. That is if Kido Butai isn't around. load up as many troops as you can in a day or two and head for India.

[Nautilus]

If the British did manage to defeat the February Japanese attack which they could have if they weren't so inept.

The old proverb says "the best way to win a gun fight is not getting into one". People assume it means running away, surrendering, giving up lands or resources, or other "dishonorable" thing. The basic logic behind the proverb says if you can trick the enemy into not going there in the first place (build a fortress he has no chance to conquer, move your troops where he can't counter them, retreat to a position too costly to assault, keep nearby a fleet too strong to be beaten at first chance), you won before the gun has fired.

Imperial Japan had the same problem to supply her forces in the long run, this is why they needed to invade East Asia. They were running out of resources. As Tojo said, the Imperial Navy used 400 tons of oil per hour, in peacetime, the decisions had to be taken quickly. Roosevelt's government knew it. They tried to strangle Japan step by step, cuting off supplies of raw materials. This worked exactly in the spirit of the proverb: fighting an fleet of battleships and carriers on the high seas is costly (just as it turned out to be in practice), cutting supplies is not.

So the British Generals were not inept when the first shot has been fired in December 1941. They had been inept 20 years before, when they squandered precious material on impractical defenses.

We say nowadays: why didn't they send modern warplanes and tanks, with obsolete artillery from the reserves, to Singapore?

All this ironmongery had a pretty small fault: it weighed some hundreds of thousands of tonnes. One needs to use the British fleet, embroiled already into supply of the Isles, to carry thousands of men and hundreds of thousands tonnes of supplies, to impractical defenses half the planet away. They should have been there in 1938, 1939, or even earlier. December 1941 was too late.

[BDV]

To the point above

With RN unable to fight IJN in the Pacific, and USN hobbled after Perl Harbor, can Great Britain afford another besieged enclave?

That is, Singapore was going to fight and live-or-die with whatever it had on hand and whatever little could be squeezed from ANZAC. This is not to claim there wasn't subpar performance from the local commanders, and that more could not have been achieved with what was on hand.

[Nautilus]

The core of the Singapore Strategy had been just the plan for the RN to fight the IJN in the Pacific.

If this couldn't happen as of 1941, then what were they supposed to do?...

Britain could not afford a two-front war more than the Reich (much wealthier in 1941!) could. In practice, they had to fight on 3 fronts at once.

This, incidentally, shows how some leaders, Hitler included, were inept strategists: they had all information and options on the table, and drew conclusions straightly against reality.

Brits can't afford an European war -> they gave up in 1935 over naval agreements -> they gave up in 1938 -> they lost in 1940 -> they can't afford to defend their empire - the logical conclusion, drawn in Berlin, is they are no longer able to resist for long. They will give up.

They didn't.

[Markus Becker]

The Japanese arrived at Singapore with much less men than the defenders had and also not a lot of supplies. They had to win and quickly. They were just fighting the beaten and broken remnants of an army defeated in Malaya, so they did win quickly.

And events in Malaya are the key to that victory. The British did not just loose. The repeatedly lost very, very badly. In the north west, where not only many troops were lost but also many supplies fell into Japanese hands. Then the evacuation of of Penang island was botched and the Japanese got enough small ships for an amphibious fleet to outflank the British along the west coast. And finally there was Muar, where the British lost at least one birgade and an artillery regiment.

If these defeats had been less severe, say like Kota Bharu the Japanese would have arrived in the south/at Singapore later, with even less supplies, faced more defender whose morale would have been better.

They could have very well been stopped. While its possible that they then bypass Malaya and invade Java and Sumatra to cut Singapore off its not a given. Japanese troops from Malaya landed on Sumatra only after Singapore had fallen. If the decisive battle in Malaya is fought later, the garrison of Sumatra could have been stronger and the strong one on Java would not have felt practically isolated if everybody around had not been defeated.

And then? Two Australian divisions were closely behind the ill fated 18th British division, the Americans were steadily arriving in Australia and already rushing air units into Java.


Like at Singapore the Japanese need to win quickly or the local garrisons become too strong to overwhelm. And if they can’t be overwhelmed on Sumatra, Java and at Singapore the Malaya barrier holds, making it much more difficult for the IJN to get into the Indian Ocean and continuously interdict reinforcements.

[T. A. Gardner]

Part of the problem for the British, both in terms of what they started with, and what they did during the campaign, is that they had a penchant for massing far too much in reserve rather than committing more up front into battle. For the Japanese, every unit landed fought and there was only a minimal reserve, if any in some cases. This allowed the Japanese, outnumbered overall, to defeat the British battle after battle in detail / piecemeal rather than face what the British potentially could have had present.
Rommel faced much the same thing in North Africa and could win until the British had built up overwhelming odds where even what was being committed grossly outnumbered him.

I bring up the Covenanter tank as a perfect example of this. Over a thousand produced and none used in combat. What other nation did anything close to that? Even the US usually used obsolescent or obsolete tanks in training, and when the Sherman became plentiful, older models were used until worn out in training then rebuilt to be used again. Most armored units used the tanks in training they'd use in combat.

Holding back large reserves and taking a very conservative approach to land warfare only got Britain a string of defeats.

[Nautilus]

The example isn't perfect as long as land forces were not 100% essential for Britain's survival. The RN was.

They could afford to squander metal and industrial facilities to build an experimental tank, as long as the barrier of the RN meant the tank was not going to be used on the front line too soon. Japanese fought with every unit landed since they gambled on their very survival, do or die.

Sinking of Force Z was a much greater blow for Britain. As Churchill himself said: "In all the war, I never received a more direct shock... As I turned over and twisted in bed the full horror of the news sank in upon me. There were no British or American ships in the Indian Ocean or the Pacific except the American survivors of Pearl Harbor, who were hastening back to California. Across this vast expanse of waters, Japan was supreme, and we everywhere were weak and naked"

December 1941 was after 2 years of war and the disastrous French Campaign of 1940. Two dreadnoughts lost in the wrong place count more than a field army intact in the right place.

[aghart]

General Dobbie when in command in Malaya 1936-7 won funds for the constuction of a defence line that stretched from the West coast of Malaya to the East Coast. The terrain meant that it was impossible for this line to be by passed (except by amphibious landings behind the line). This defence line in Johore would have kept the Japanese out of Artillery range of the Singapore Naval base. A British force, concentrated behind this line might have been able to hold out indefinitely. The construction began, but, then Dobbie left and everything changed. Instead of defending Johore and thus the Naval base, the policy changed to defending the whole of Malaya rather than just the southern section. The defence line was abandoned and construction stopped. Force levels were not increased as required and the situation arose that forces large enough to defend Johore were expected to defend the whole country. British ground forces were reinforced but not by the level needed.

As the main army force was made up of Indian Battalions, the "milking" of these units meant that they never got beyond basic levels of training. The British units kept to a peacetime routine and remained as Garrison troops rather than an effective fighting force. The in depth training and expertise of the 2nd Battalion, Argyle & Sutherland Highlanders, showed what could have been achieved if the Armed Forces in Malaya had been on a war footing since 1940 when France fell. This single Battalion inflicted huge casualties on the Japanese 5th Division, causing them to be replaced by the Imperial Guards Division.

The UK Government was pre occupied with Europe and did not give Malaya the time and attention required. The UK Government may have known troop numbers in Malaya & Singapore, but did not know how unprepared Malaya was. Irrespective of how little attention London paid to Malaya, The military Commanders in Malaya must accept the blame for those forces continuing to exist in a cushy peacetime environment. Other factors were to blame, London failed to sanction realistic rates of pay for civilian construction workers, the result was that nobody could be recruited to build Field Defences because of the low pay offered. Equipment could not be purchased locally, it had to be sent from England or elsewhere. Pumps to flood the flanks of the Jitra position had to be ordered from Australia and had not even arrived in country when the Japanese attacked. All because of the inflexible structure in place. This also meant that those Indian Units with inadequate levels of Military training spent their time buiding defences instead of learning how to fight in the Jungle. Although present in Inadequate numbers, the defenders were also unprepared mentally and physically for the coming conflict. The Japanese expected to take Malaya in 100 days, they did it in 70. Operation Matador was a waste of time and should have been abandoned months before the conflict began. It should have been realised that insufficient troops were available to have any chance of success. The total unprepardness and failure of Krochol, the operation to seize the ledge in Thailand was just the first of a long list of catastrophic failures of the British High Command. The forces in Malaya could not hope to stop the Japanese, but, if they had been prepared, fit and ready, and on a war footing, they could have been expected to slow the Japanese down long enough to allow substantial British reinforcements to arrive and make a difference. The longer the fight in Malaya went on, meant the Japanese would get weaker while the British got Stronger. I try very hard to avoid using the benefit of hindsight, and so can understand the failure of the UK to put modern weapons and increase force levels into Malaya, critisism of the failure of the British Military Command to ensure the Forces in Malaya were ready for the conflict, is not an unfair use of hindsight. Another forum has a thread about Monty being in Malaya instead of Percival. Monty would have been banging heads together and "kicking butt" in Malaya during 1941, whilst Percival was shuffling paper.

[magicdragon]

I agree with everything you wrote but your salient comment was

The terrain meant that it was impossible for this line to be by passed (except by amphibious landings behind the line).

Surely the whole issue depend on the British forces being tactically flexible and having sufficient mobile reserves to deal with any landing to the rear? Tomoyuki Yamashita would undoubtedly have tried to outflank and defensive line with an amphibious assault(s) and was smart enough to make this work. Regardless of the defensive line closer to Singapore I find it hard to conceive that some British & Imperial Forces would not have been committed north of this defence line (for political reasons) and there still would have been a split in the forces?