What Britain needs to win in Singapore/Far East

Discussions on alternate history, including events up to 20 years before today. Hosted by Terry Duncan.
Sid Guttridge
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Re: What Britain needs to win in Singapore/Far East

#46

Post by Sid Guttridge » 30 Oct 2018, 20:09

Hi Fatboy Coxy,

Your post seems to have overlooked that the UK was also fighting a war with Germany and Italy, with the attitudes of Spain,Vichy France and much of the Middle East questionable. Certainly Britain could have built a better defence of Singapore, but at what cost elsewhere?

Cheers,

Sid.

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Terry Duncan
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Re: What Britain needs to win in Singapore/Far East

#47

Post by Terry Duncan » 30 Oct 2018, 21:01

Places like Australia and India are certainly closer than Britain, its a shame they had a negligible manufacturing base for war materials, especially tanks and planes. Only at the last minute was any naval force available to the defence, Force Z, and even then it was against all professional advice to send the ship there as they were too badly needed elsewhere and could not be spared, even if it were not viewed as a suicide mission for them. Japan also had the luxury for implementing a long existing war plan, whilst Britain really did not have such a plan for a major war in Europe and the Middle East to be interrupted by a surprise Japanese attack in the Far East. Singapore really wasn't as important as the Middle East so was a rather obvious 'what is left over' cobbled together defence. The Japanese forces were very capable and not recent recruits still completing their training, unlike many of the Empire forces.


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Re: What Britain needs to win in Singapore/Far East

#48

Post by Fatboy Coxy » 01 Nov 2018, 22:22

Sid Guttridge wrote:
30 Oct 2018, 20:09
Hi Fatboy Coxy,

Your post seems to have overlooked that the UK was also fighting a war with Germany and Italy, with the attitudes of Spain,Vichy France and much of the Middle East questionable. Certainly Britain could have built a better defence of Singapore, but at what cost elsewhere?

Cheers,

Sid.
Hi Sid

I made the mistake of trying to reply to both yours and Terrys posts at the same time, and made a mess of it! I make you right on what you wrote, except your conclusions.

Your applying a lot of cures that although are obvious with hindsight, wouldn't have been so at the time. Up until the fall of France, something no one could have predicted, the British in the Far East were, given the threat level, OK. I'd suggest to give a meaningful reply the original post of what could be done, we have to go back to June 1940, which given the situation, is a challenging one. An even more challenging timeframe is June 1941, following Barbarossa.

Personally, with a little more planning, they could have built a defence that would have at least given a good account of itself, from June 1940, but I'd suggest starting a change of POD from June 1941, it would be unrealistic to expect much better than what happened.
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Re: What Britain needs to win in Singapore/Far East

#49

Post by Fatboy Coxy » 01 Nov 2018, 22:32

Terry Duncan wrote:
30 Oct 2018, 21:01
Places like Australia and India are certainly closer than Britain, its a shame they had a negligible manufacturing base for war materials, especially tanks and planes. Only at the last minute was any naval force available to the defence, Force Z, and even then it was against all professional advice to send the ship there as they were too badly needed elsewhere and could not be spared, even if it were not viewed as a suicide mission for them. Japan also had the luxury for implementing a long existing war plan, whilst Britain really did not have such a plan for a major war in Europe and the Middle East to be interrupted by a surprise Japanese attack in the Far East. Singapore really wasn't as important as the Middle East so was a rather obvious 'what is left over' cobbled together defence. The Japanese forces were very capable and not recent recruits still completing their training, unlike many of the Empire forces.
Hi Terry

Again, I make you right too, regarding what you say, but the point I was trying to say was in logistical terms, it wasn't as bad as first seems. India and Australia were able to provide some logistical support, along with the resources Malaya herself provided. While Japan was challenged just reaching that far, even with the support of Indo-China. The fact it was over in less that the 100 days Japan planned, meant the logistical problems the Japanese were having, didn't impact on the campaign anywhere as much as they would have if say the British were able to hold mainland Malaya for three months.
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Fatboy Coxy

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aghart
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Re: What Britain needs to win in Singapore/Far East

#50

Post by aghart » 15 Nov 2018, 09:01

What Britain needed to win was what was sent, but it needed to be there at the start.

99 Hurricane Fighters (half ended up in Sumatra)
British 18th Division
6th Australian Division (diverted to Australia)
7th Australian Division (diverted to Australia)
7th Armoured Brigade (diverted to Burma)
44th Indian Brigade
45th Indian Brigade

To stop the Japanese from reaching Singapore is to win, and this lot I believe would have stopped the Japanese if they had been in theatre at the start.

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Re: What Britain needs to win in Singapore/Far East

#51

Post by James A Pratt III » 17 Nov 2018, 06:26

more on the Hyderabad Infantry regiments:

1st Hyderabad an Indian state unit given the job of defending the Kota Bahru airfield 8 December 1941. After the units CO was either KIA or killed by his own men the unit fell apart and fled. A few days later the unit was disarmed. Few men of this unit as POWs joined the Indian national Army.

4/19th Hyderabad May 1941 the unit mutinied because an Indian officer was ordered home ostensibly for living with a white woman. The officer had nationalist views. The unit was disarmed by the Argyll & Sunderland highlanders. The officer was reinstated and the incident was hushed up. Afterwards the CO needed an escort to protect him from his own men!? The unit had a mixed record in the fighting in the campaign. Many men taken POW later joined the Indian National Army. I would say the mutiny almost sounds like a Raj soap opera than a serious mutiny.

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Re: What Britain needs to win in Singapore/Far East

#52

Post by Sid Guttridge » 27 Nov 2018, 12:59

Hi Guys,

The British had some 130,000 troops in Malaya, none of them in campaign tested formations. The Japanese used about half as many, mostly in formations with some previous campaign experience, though not in jungle.

Battle casualties on both sides were about the same, which means that proportionally the Japanese losses were about twice as high.

This implies that there were sufficient Commonwealth troops of sufficient quality to have held the Japanese for much longer, if well led.

The difference was that the Japanese casualties were successfully expended to repeatedly gain tactical advantage, ground and prisoners, whereas the British casualties were wasted in that they were accompanied by the repeated loss of defensive positions, considerable numbers of POWs and organizational cohesion.

The US debacle in the Philippines shows similar characteristics, but had better PR. There is not too much to be said in favour of Percival, but at least he went into captivity with his men.

Cheers,

Sid.

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Terry Duncan
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Re: What Britain needs to win in Singapore/Far East

#53

Post by Terry Duncan » 27 Nov 2018, 13:24

Percival didn't bug out like some, but from what I have read he was a very capable staff officer, and maybe, like von Paulus, he was not overly suited to an independent command. My understanding is that the worry of massive civilian casualties was the decisive factor for him in deciding to surrender, whereas a more 'publicity conscious' commander like Montgomery may have decided to fight it out irrespective of the civilian losses and the water situation until surrender was the only option. Percival seems to have viewed the surrender as inevitable and hoped to reduce losses, though had he known of how the men would be treated in captivity he may well have fought it out anyhow. It is easy to be harsh on Percival, but he inherited a terrible position from others who had had the time to make a real difference.

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Re: What Britain needs to win in Singapore/Far East

#54

Post by Sid Guttridge » 28 Nov 2018, 12:52

Hi Terry,

The Paulus analogy occurred to me as well. However, Paulus was put in charge of Germany's largest army at the critical focus of Germany's war. Percival, by contrast, was put in charge of a ill-equipped imperial backwater that was essentially being used as a training area for the Indian Army.

That said, I feel sure that Percival could have done rather better.

Cheers,

Sid.

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Re: What Britain needs to win in Singapore/Far East

#55

Post by South » 28 Nov 2018, 13:13

Good morning Sid,

Had just scribbled a couple of sentences on definitions elsewhere.

Was the Philippines a US - debacle - or a planned campaign to vacate the place ?!

Pearl Harbor, Hong Kong and the Philippines had similar complexions.


~ Bob
eastern Virginia, USA

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Re: What Britain needs to win in Singapore/Far East

#56

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 30 Nov 2018, 19:16

Sid Guttridge wrote:
27 Nov 2018, 12:59
Hi Guys,

The British had some 130,000 troops in Malaya, none of them in campaign tested formations. The Japanese used about half as many, mostly in formations with some previous campaign experience, though not in jungle.

Battle casualties on both sides were about the same, which means that proportionally the Japanese losses were about twice as high.

This implies that there were sufficient Commonwealth troops of sufficient quality to have held the Japanese for much longer, if well led.
...
If well led...
I've long contended all the Commonwealth needed were a handful of better men at the top. Not a last minute housecleaning, but from at least the start of 1941. Several corps and brigade commanders do not look good in terms of their attention to training and preparing their men, nor in their battle decisions. The Japanese won by a very small margin & it does not look like long odds to have them defeated at about any point among the way to the loss of the Singapore water resivoir. Were the Key Brit leaders really typical of the talent pool, or under performers sent off out of the way?

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Re: What Britain needs to win in Singapore/Far East

#57

Post by T. A. Gardner » 01 Dec 2018, 03:35

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
30 Nov 2018, 19:16
If well led...
I've long contended all the Commonwealth needed were a handful of better men at the top. Not a last minute housecleaning, but from at least the start of 1941. Several corps and brigade commanders do not look good in terms of their attention to training and preparing their men, nor in their battle decisions. The Japanese won by a very small margin & it does not look like long odds to have them defeated at about any point among the way to the loss of the Singapore water resivoir. Were the Key Brit leaders really typical of the talent pool, or under performers sent off out of the way?
Much of the problem was from the top down. Field commanders generally wanted to drill and train their troops realistically. But, the senior leadership, and civilian political leadership wouldn't hear of it. They were against units drilling on private property for fear that the owners would demand payment for damages, etc. They wouldn't allow units to properly fortify their positions with wire, etc., for the same reasons.

There was simply a laxity and maliase of indifference in Malaysia with the Commonwealth. The attitude was it was a peacetime location, not one at war for two years.

Had the British and Commonwealth pushed in additional troops as mentioned above in the thread, several times I might mention, the divisions on the British side could have all been 3 brigade formations versus the 2 brigade ones that were historically present. More pilots could have been either sent or trained. Given that there were more planes than pilots in Malaya, training on available aircraft for low hour pilots should have been carried out even to the point of wearing out and having to replace many of the aircraft in service.

The addition of a tank brigade (the 7th was diverted to Burma) would have helped massively. Sending some heavy guns, even obsolesent ones in the 6" + range for added coast defense at expected landing points would have made a huge difference.

Kota Bharu almost failed as an amphibious assault. Had the Indian division present had a thrid brigade and there was as little as a couple of 6" gun batteries present to mess up the Japanese transports it almost certainly would have failed. Just one or two such setbacks would have crippled the Japanese plan and timetable.

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Re: What Britain needs to win in Singapore/Far East

#58

Post by Sid Guttridge » 04 Dec 2018, 19:54

A problem that the British had with preparing higher commanders for corps and armies was that these formations did not exist in peacetime. At the time of the Munich Crisis in 1938 the UK could offer just two divisions. The Czechoslovaks alone could mobilize 40!

The British Army was small by continental standards and half of it was distributed in penny packets across the globe, making training in higher formations impossible for most. Even the penny packets were subdivided.The West Indies battalion had four companies spread between Bermuda and Jamaica. Even the Germans under the restrictions imposed under the Versailles Treaty could immediately field a more substantial army than the UK!

Massive wartime expansion stretched already limited higher level expertise even further and Malaya, as a backwater, was never in line for the brightest and the best.

Cheers,

Sid.

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Re: What Britain needs to win in Singapore/Far East

#59

Post by T. A. Gardner » 04 Dec 2018, 20:58

Sid Guttridge wrote:
04 Dec 2018, 19:54
A problem that the British had with preparing higher commanders for corps and armies was that these formations did not exist in peacetime. At the time of the Munich Crisis in 1938 the UK could offer just two divisions. The Czechoslovaks alone could mobilize 40!

The British Army was small by continental standards and half of it was distributed in penny packets across the globe, making training in higher formations impossible for most. Even the penny packets were subdivided.The West Indies battalion had four companies spread between Bermuda and Jamaica. Even the Germans under the restrictions imposed under the Versailles Treaty could immediately field a more substantial army than the UK!

Massive wartime expansion stretched already limited higher level expertise even further and Malaya, as a backwater, was never in line for the brightest and the best.

Cheers,

Sid.
Britain and the Commonwealth had been at war for two years when the Japanese invaded. In roughly the same amount of time, the US managed to go from about a dozen peacetime divisions to 40+ and were raising even more. The problem wasn't the peacetime British IGS, it was the wartime IGS that proved largely incompetent logistically.

In Malaya, the British had more divisions than the Japanese. The problem was all of them were 2 brigade divisions. That didn't have to be. They could have been given their third brigade and the additional artillery to bring them up to full strength. It really wouldn't have mattered if the artillery was obsolescent guns like the 18 pdr or 3.7" howitzer. Those would have been perfectly adequate for Malaya. The troops for that were sent after the invasion started but were a day late and pound short in arriving.

There was no reason a brigade of tanks couldn't have been sent other than some chowder heads claiming Malaya wasn't tank country. I mean the 7th armored brigade was sent after the invasion started.
The RAF had more planes than pilots. There was little reason to hold back on training. Gasoline for that was available. Low hour pilots should have been flying every day they could for several hours a day. Who cares if the plane they're using gets worn out. Uncrate another and issue that when war comes.

There was no reason realistic training couldn't have been held other than the British military leadership was unwilling to press the local business and political interests to allow it. Given that there was already a war going should have made that easy to get done.

Lethargy and incompetence are the only clear conclusions that can be reached here.

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Re: What Britain needs to win in Singapore/Far East

#60

Post by Sid Guttridge » 05 Dec 2018, 12:32

Hi T. A. Gardner,

Indeed, the USA's army underwent similar expansion from a small base - with largely the same results, if one looks at Dupuy's Numbers, Prediction and War. Dupuy, an American, rated British and American divisions similarly, and the Germans rather higher than both.

Yup, lethargy, caused by the lack of a sense of urgency in a backwater, and incompetence, caused by second rank officers, under trained men and obsolescent materiel being deployed in Malaya, certainly played a role.

Cheers,

Sid.

P.S. 7th Armoured Brigade had to be withdrawn from an active theatre in the Middle East, and ended up in Burma, not Singapore.

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