What Britain needs to win in Singapore/Far East

[T. A. Gardner]

Hi T. A. Gardner,

Indeed, the USA's army underwent similar expansion from a small base - with largely the same results, if one looks at Dupuy's Numbers, Prediction and War. Dupuy, an American, rated British and American divisions similarly, and the Germans rather higher than both.

Dupuy's QJM is pretty much all crap. It is a crap system. I can prove just how useless it is in a matter of a couple of his formulas:

Dupuy uses two final formulas to determine the outcome of a battle: One based on historical results, the other on the predicted outcome. These are when combined into the final form give:

(Ra - Rd)/5 = (Pa / Pd) - 1 he restates these as Pa/Pd = (Ra - Rd)/ 5+1

The two are not the same equation. The math error in the later is that the +1 should be applied thusly: Pa / Pd = ((Ra - Rd)/5) +1

When set to zero you get:

(Pd (Ra - Rd) / 5Pa) + 1 = 0 or combining fractions 5PaPd(Ra - Rd)/5Pa = 0

The problem is that you never get a zero answer except by chance. So, this formula is not a valid equation. I could go through the rest of Dupuy's methodology, but it's really pointless. You can get almost any answer you want simply by changing the value of variables throughout it.

Yup, lethargy, caused by the lack of a sense of urgency in a backwater, and incompetence, caused by second rank officers, under trained men and obsolescent materiel being deployed in Malaya, certainly played a role.

Cheers,

Sid.

P.S. 7th Armoured Brigade had to be withdrawn from an active theatre in the Middle East, and ended up in Burma, not Singapore.

That shows in the commanders sent to Malaysia. They were the "Major Blimp" sort of useless bureaucrat and generals cashiered for incapacity to lead elsewhere but who were too senior to just kick out of the military because of politics.

An armored brigade could have been sent. There were over 500 Covenantor tanks in England that were considered unsuitabe for combat against the Germans but would have been fine against the Japanese. Sending 100 or so in a brigade could have been done. But, the prevailing view was tanks wouldn't work in Malaysia.

[Russ3Z]

An armored brigade could have been sent. There were over 500 Covenantor tanks in England that were considered unsuitabe for combat against the Germans but would have been fine against the Japanese. Sending 100 or so in a brigade could have been done. But, the prevailing view was tanks wouldn't work in Malaysia.

My understanding is that some of the main problems with the Covenanter were related to engine cooling, excluding it from North Africa, the Middle East and, by extension, the Far East. Is that incorrect?

[T. A. Gardner]

My understanding is that some of the main problems with the Covenanter were related to engine cooling, excluding it from North Africa, the Middle East and, by extension, the Far East. Is that incorrect?

Yes, that was the main problem. But, sending it to a "quiet" theater for training and for use if the Japanese do show up makes sense. The US sent two battalions of M3 tanks to the Philippines (108 vehicles). Britain had the extra tanks. They were simply too conservative and myopic to use them.
Imagine the Germans building 1000+ of some tank only to decide that it wasn't good enough for combat and never use it. Even the US wouldn't have done that. The Marmon Herrington light tanks that were built for the Dutch in the DEI ended up being issued for use to several US Army tank companies (used in the Aluetians) and to the USMC.

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi T. A. Gardener,

Don't worry. I lent the Dupuy book to a US veteran friend of mine in Zimbabwe in about 1981 and he wrote an unsolicited 20 page demolition of it then.

However, the main point, whether the book is flawed or not, is that Dupuy makes very little differentiation between British and American divisions. It appears that the massively expanded armies of the Anglophone liberal democracies had similar characteristics and limitations compared with their opponents.

Certainly the British had a good number of second rate officers in Malaya, but then they were already at war with Germany and Italy, their homeland was under threat, they were expanding their army massively and mopping up assorted second line and third powers like Vichy, Iraq and Iran. Yet, for all their handicaps, their result in Malaya was very similar to that of the USA in the Philippines, and the USA at that stage had no prior opponents and therefore arguably even less excuse than the British in Malaya.

The Covenanters equipped armoured divisions in the UK, which was itself under threat. They were not therefore probably available until at least June 1941. When these divisions were later deployed overseas they went with better tanks. I am unclear whether the Covenanters were free much before 1943. What have you in this?

Who were these officers in Malaya who had previously been cashiered?

It is true that the US Army and Marine Corps got most of the Dutch Marmon-Herringtons. Which begs the question, why were they partly reliant for armour on the accidental availability of armoured vehicles intended for the Allies?

Cheers,

Sid.

P.S. The mythical Blimp was a colonel.

[Sid Guttridge]

Double post

[T. A. Gardner]

Hi T. A. Gardener,

Don't worry. I lent the Dupuy book to a US veteran friend of mine in Zimbabwe in about 1981 and he wrote an unsolicited 20 page demolition of it then.

However, the main point, whether the book is flawed or not, is that Dupuy makes very little differentiation between British and American divisions. It appears that the massively expanded armies of the Anglophone liberal democracies had similar characteristics and limitations compared with their opponents.

The book is seriously flawed. And, US and British divisions have some major differences between themselves and German ones. With one exception, German infantry divisions never proved capable of successful offensive action against their US or British counterparts after 1940. The one exception is the 106th ID in the Ardennes.

With attachments, a US infantry division by early 1944 was the equivalent of a very strong panzer division. One could reasonably expect a US infantry division to have attached a tank battalion, a tank destroyer battalion, an antiaircraft battalion (light / automatic weapons), several artillery battalions, and possibly a mechanized cavalry squadron. With a quartermaster truck company or two, that makes it the equivalent of a panzer division at full strength and then some.

Certainly the British had a good number of second rate officers in Malaya, but then they were already at war with Germany and Italy, their homeland was under threat, they were expanding their army massively and mopping up assorted second line and third powers like Vichy, Iraq and Iran. Yet, for all their handicaps, their result in Malaya was very similar to that of the USA in the Philippines, and the USA at that stage had no prior opponents and therefore arguably even less excuse than the British in Malaya.

The real problem was that, seemingly, nobody was taking action at a wartime pace. All the divisions assigned there were 2 brigade ones. They were like half-divisions rather than full ones. Expansion doesn't excuse this. The extra brigades existed elsewhere and could have been sent. Training could have occurred at an accelerated, wartime pace. Even from the point of view of these units being readied for rotation into other theaters of combat, they should have been on a wartime footing and preparing for combat. They weren't. They were training as if it was still peacetime.

In the Philippines, the story is a bit different. The US realized what was necessary. I will say up front, that MacArthur did make a serious blunder by not accepting a second US National Guard division to reinforce the PI. But, that said, the US problem was it was peacetime for them. The mobilization schedule in the PI was to have everything ready there by August 1942. The biggest bottleneck was the available peacetime shipping to get stuff there.

Even without the second National Guard division, the overall build up for the PI was to be the Philippine division brought up to a full strength US triangular division. There would be 10 Philippine army divisions equipped with mostly WW 1 weapons but trained to 1940 standards as triangular US infantry divisions. The Philippine Scouts cavalry regiment would still exist. There would be 2 battalions of M3 light and one of M3 medium (Lee) tanks. The coast defenses would have several more 155mm gun battalions, along with 2 battalions of 8.2 guns that ended up on Oahu.

There would have been about 500 aircraft deployed to the PI by August 1942. In route alone were over 100 P-40E fighters, 52 A-24 (USAAC version of the SBD dive bomber) and about 20 B-17 when the Japanese struck.

Wake was the same way. Only about 50% of what was planned arrived on Wake before the war. The Marine defense battalion had only about half their full complement of troops although they had close to 100% of the weapons assigned. The SBD squadron and radar unit for Wake were both in Hawaii awaiting transportation when the war started. Again, had the full assignment of units been present, the island likely wouldn't have fallen.

The odd one for the US was Guam. There was no real attempt to defend Guam. The US made little or no effort to reinforce the island or hold it.

The Covenanters equipped armoured divisions in the UK, which was itself under threat. They were not therefore probably available until at least June 1941. When these divisions were later deployed overseas they went with better tanks. I am unclear whether the Covenanters were free much before 1943. What have you in this?

The Covenantor was used solely for training. For this purpose, any tank could have been used. There is no reason 100 or so couldn't have been sent to Malaya for that purpose with the intent to eventually convert the unit to some other vehicle. It wouldn't have detracted in the least from British defenses.

It is true that the US Army and Marine Corps got most of the Dutch Marmon-Herringtons. Which begs the question, why were they partly reliant for armour on the accidental availability of armoured vehicles intended for the Allies?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marmon-Herrington_CTLS

The important thing here is that they got used. Whether the US Army, Marines, or Chinese used them, they go used. They didn't sit and weren't simply used for training then discarded. This was the fate of the Covenantor.

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi T. A. Gardener,

A lot of very good information in your post. Thanks.

German infantry divisions weren't meant to spearhead offensives and, by the time they met the Anglo-Americans in strength in 1942-43, Germany was on the strategic defensive and had lost control of the air, so their prospects for offensive action were limited. The qualitative advantage of German infantry divisions over their opponents was highest among the active Welle I divisions at the beginning of the war, before casualties on the Eastern Front and improvements in their opponents began to relatively degrade them.

If US infantry divisions really were the equivalent to a strong panzer division, one has to wonder why the war didn't end in late 1944.

The idea that the British in Malaya were operating at a peacetime tempo is untrue. The garrison had been expanded from no field divisions in September1939 to three field divisions by December 1941, all of which were wartime creations. Furthermore, many of the British and Indian regulars available in 11939 had been withdrawn to provide cadres for other new British and Indian divisions forming nearer the active theatre of war in the Middle East. Everybody knew there was a war on, and they were preparing to feed trained men into active theatres elsewhere.

The "extra brigades" you talk about did not exist in a vacuum. The UK had its homeland under threat, some fifty colonies to protect, several new territories to garrison, and a major campaign going on in the Middle East. There were reasons why they did not front-load Malaya with their best formations. Could they have done more? Undoubtedly, but at what expense elsewhere?

It may have been peacetime for the USA, but that is hardly a good excuse, given Japanese aggression elsewhere and US trade embargoes actively beginning to strangle Japanese industry of natural resources. One can't poke a man-eating tiger and then act surprised if it reacts!

If there was a shortage of peacetime shipping, it was the USA's own fault. The Neutrality Act stopped US merchantmen trading to combatant powers. There was thus a surplus of US bottoms in 1939-40. Some were sold to countries such as Mexico, but far more were put under the Panamanian registry so they could evade the act and trade to the UK. These were choices freely made by the USA.

Just like the British in Malaya, the US could have acted differently in the Philippines. I would suggest that the US may have had rather less excuse because it was not engaged elsewhere when the Japanese attacked and had some three times the population and industry of the metropolitan UK.

Personally I am grateful the US helped the UK so much under the counter in 1940-41, sometimes at the expense of its own defences, but these were choices made freely by the USA. The UK had far less freedom of action in 1940-41 and was virtually bankrupt.

There seems a lot of commonality between the UK's and USA's experiences. Both hid behind the sea and had major navies to defend their vital interests, but only small, regular armies and no peacetime conscription as a consequence. In both cases it took several years to field a viable army for continental warfare, but neither had such a force in the Far East in December 1941, though for different reasons.

Cheers,

Sid.

[Carl Schwamberger]

... It is true that the US Army and Marine Corps got most of the Dutch Marmon-Herringtons. Which begs the question, why were they partly reliant for armour on the accidental availability of armoured vehicles intended for the Allies? ...

Mostly the ramp up time for industrial mobilization. In 1939 the US had a insignificant AFV production capability & even less for actual tanks. Look at the number of M2 Medium tanks on hand when the production of the M3 Medium tank started. Part of this was lack of interwar preparation. During the 1920s Congress budgeted far less than necessary for a industrial mobilization plan, or weapons development. During the Depression that was cut nearly to zero. Only in aircraft development was anything of value accomplished, and that confined to a few models. ie: the XB 17 of the heavy bomber project.

Once the funds flooded in to the War & Navy Departments in 1940 there was not accompanying legislation clarifying priority for production. Peacetime law left the 'free market' in place, so military contracts were filled alongside competing civilian sector contracts. In this the existing contracts to sell stuff to the Brits, Dutch, USSR had precedence over the new contracts for the Army or Navy. It really took the DoW in December 1941 & subsequent legislation to unjamb a gridlock in priority for allocation of materials, factory floor space, labor, and capitol. Even with that legislation it took over another year to get things running at a efficient level.

On the political side this was one of the issues of the America First group/s. That the 1,600,000 men in the Army in early 1941 lacked combat weapons and were short training necessities, while much of the needed material was enroute to the Brits.

[EJss]

Is it just me or does he look like hes trying not to burst out laughing as he is saying that???

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[Sid Guttridge]

Hi EJss,

Probably just you.

Sid.

[Fatboy Coxy]

Some batteries of obsolescent, even obsolete, heavy artillery should have been sent. There was stuff lying about in England that had been pulled out for use against Seelöwe that could have been better used covering beaches in Malaya. A single battery of BL 6" Mk XIX guns at Kota Bharu would have given the Japanese shipping off shore fits. Yes, they were all but obsolete, but they were used on anti-invasion duty in England in 1940 so, they were available.

The British were desperately short on Artillery, but as T.A.Gardner suggests above, they could have sent some heavy artillery. The 6 Medium Regt RA, (18 & 19 Btys) with 16 x 6-inch Howitzers, based in India, could have been sent, although I think one battery went to Iraq for a short while.

Regards
Fatboy Coxy

[Sheldrake]

Some batteries of obsolescent, even obsolete, heavy artillery should have been sent. There was stuff lying about in England that had been pulled out for use against Seelöwe that could have been better used covering beaches in Malaya. A single battery of BL 6" Mk XIX guns at Kota Bharu would have given the Japanese shipping off shore fits. Yes, they were all but obsolete, but they were used on anti-invasion duty in England in 1940 so, they were available.

The British were desperately short on Artillery, but as T.A.Gardner suggests above, they could have sent some heavy artillery. The 6 Medium Regt RA, (18 & 19 Btys) with 16 x 6-inch Howitzers, based in India, could have been sent, although I think one battery went to Iraq for a short while.

Regards
Fatboy Coxy

Two batteries of medium artillery would have made very little difference in the defence of Malaya and Singapore.

Fighting power is a composite of the physical, conceptual and morale components. I am not sure how DuPuy or any of the war games really calculates these.

The physical components missing from the defence of Malaya were a strong air force, with an integrated air defense system, a strong enough Navy and well trained ground troops. Percival made a sensible estimate in the late 1930s which was then largely ignored.

At a conceptual level, the British got it wrong at strategic, operational and tactical levels.

Strategically, the defence of Malaya and Singapore was a bluff that was called. Britain did not have the resources to fight a simultaneous war with Germany Italy and Japan. The defences of the far east were denuded to support operations in the Middle east. Britain failed to mobilise its Imperial subjects, many of whom had much to fear from a Japanese occupation.

Operationally, the British both underestimated the Japanese skill and will, and over-estimated their numbers in Malaya

Tactically the British Army was very poor and woefully ill equipped for fighting in jungle and other wooded areas. FSR 1935 has staggeringly little to say about fighting in jungle or bush, and much of it based on the assumption that the operation can be treated as a punative expedition against an uncivilised enemy. In summary the vegetation and climate make this jolly difficult country and hard to deploy modern weapons. You have to rely on disciplined well led infantry. But don't worry. If you face an enemy led by Europeans they will be at the same disadvantage and anyone else is likely to be less well armed.

At a moral level. Malaya and Singapore would have been more stoutly defended if they had any idea what the Japanese were going to do to British PW, and the Malay and Chinese population.

Compare the siege of Sevastapol and Singapore.

[Fatboy Coxy]

Two batteries of medium artillery would have made very little difference in the defence of Malaya and Singapore.

I say old chap, steady on there, that’s a bit harsh. I don’t think anyone’s expecting a couple of batteries of artillery to be the game changer.

I think your spot on with all your analytical observations regarding unpreparedness, however, some of those criticisms are made from the comfort of hindsight. But if we can go back to, pre the fall of France, the Far East wasn’t in mortal danger, and quite rightly, priorities had to be elsewhere.

Come the fall of France, and now Britain is fighting for her very existence, and resources for the Far East are hard to come by. Nevertheless, the strength of the forces there was being gradually built up. However, this was not a balance force, and although there is an argument that says they could have managed without tanks, what they couldn’t manage without was artillery, and as late as November 41, artillery was still arriving to round out the force. The 6th Medium Regt RA, based in India, although not ideal, could have been sent much earlier, thereby providing the Army with a slightly bigger climatised artillery force.

Regards the tactical use of infantry in jungle warfare, I take the point that the British Army in general was woefully inept at conducting operations in that environment. But being realistic, even if they had a good tactical doctrine, the poorly trained Indian infantry, the majority of the garrison, would have been unable to implement it. The General’s did appreciate that to some degree, and tried to lean to the old British strengths of the combined arms of Infantry and Artillery in fixed defences.

Examples of this are Kota Bharu, the fixed beach defences, although very stretched, was nearly a British success. Jitra was a political compromise, in a poor location and the defences never completed. Gurun, by far a better position that Jitra, was overrun before they could properly prepare themselves. And Kampar successfully demonstrated the strength of the tried and trusted Infantry/Artillery combo.

So maybe a couple of batteries, or even half batteries here and there could have made things a little more difficult for the Japanese. I think use of the 6-inch howitzer would have had to be pre planed, and given how quickly some positions were abandoned, I’d expect most of the regiment lost by the time they got into Johore.

But when we are searching for how the position in Malaya might have been improved, the 6th Medium would be an incremental addition, and not reliant on the old chestnut of the reliance of how things played out in North Africa.

Regards
Fatboy Coxy

[T. A. Gardner]

Two batteries of medium artillery would have made very little difference in the defence of Malaya and Singapore.

Fighting power is a composite of the physical, conceptual and morale components. I am not sure how DuPuy or any of the war games really calculates these.

Don't go to Dupuy... :roll:

The physical components missing from the defence of Malaya were a strong air force, with an integrated air defense system, a strong enough Navy and well trained ground troops. Percival made a sensible estimate in the late 1930s which was then largely ignored.

What was ignored was putting in place coast defenses against enemy landings. By way of comparison, the US plan for the Philippines when fully implemented would have had 155mm and 240mm guns covering every point the Japanese made a landing in at least battery (4 to 6 guns) strength. The 155mm would be on Panama mounts while the 240mm would have been in fixed positions.

The British could have done the same thing and shipped something like a dozen or so obsolescent 6" guns like the BL Mk XIX or VII to Malaysia with the intent of putting 2 to 4 covering the most likely landing beaches. At Kota Bharu, the presence of a few guns like that would have made a huge difference. They could have decimated the Japanese transports anchoring a few thousand yards off shore (at most). They could have shot up the naval escort.
The USMC certainly proved the viability of that at Wake using a few 5"/51 guns. But, then again, the US was big on coast defense while for Britain it was often almost an afterthought.

The whole Kota Bharu landing most likely would have failed had the defenders had a third brigade present, a few coast defense guns, and some aircraft that could carry heavier bombs. The available Hudsons did attack the transports sinking one and damaging others, but their bomb load simply was too light to complete the job. If that landing had failed, the Japanese plan would have failed.

As for the air situation... The RAF didn't put anything heavier in Malaya for offensive action than a light bomber. The US made Hudson and Blenheim were the planes available. Neither had a bombload that could really cripple a ship, nor could they tote a load that could be used to take something like a bridge or airfield out. The situation really called for a couple of squadrons of heavier bombers like a Whitley or Hampton. Both were being taken out of frontline service and being relegated to secondary roles like Coastal Command or training. Unlike the light Hudson or Blenheim, these planes could tote a serious bombload (for the time) and had the means to really defend themselves against Japanese fighters.

The only torpedo planes were two squadrons of obsolete Vildebeest that made a Swordfish look modern.

Against the IJAAF the RAF did pretty good with what they had. The Buffalo could just manage against the Ki 43 and Ki 27 as both were usually armed with just 2 7.7mm machineguns. When the IJNAF showed up with A6M's that changed. The Zero clobbered the Buffalo. The biggest problem the RAF faced was most of their pilots had very few operational flying hours.

[Sheldrake]

You have missed one aircraft whose moment of glory illustrates the priorities accorded to the far east. The torpedo bomber force was equipped with the Vickers Wildebeest. Click the link to see the photos of doomed men
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vickers_V ... t_ExCC.jpg

Better than coastal guns would have been half of the 400 single seat fighters and hundreds of day bombers lost in the policy of Leaning into France in 1941. 200 modern fighters and 100 day bombers supported by the integrated radar GCI would have made the Japanese think again, or changed history. The Japanese landings would have been much harder against a strong modern air force and 10 December 1941 might have been the massacre of the Japanese torpedo bomber force by the CAP over force Z which forced the Japanese to abandon their abortive landings in Northern Malaya.

This would not have involved lots of extra stuff to be built, just a sensible use of the RAF in 1941 which wasted much of its efforts in a fruitless attempt to replay the Battle of Britain as the Germans and get a better result.