British only D-Day

[Meeko987]

Say no American involvement then maybe say just lend lease.

Could UK pull off D-Day on their own in 1944? Just army, RAF and RN Would it fail?

[Meeko987]

Oh and attempting to land on their historical beaches

[Sheldrake]

The actual cross channel assault could have been mounted using British and Canadian assault troops, but would have drawn on huge amounts of shipping, air and naval support well beyond lease Lend.

Not against the Germans in any most the most extraordinary circumstances, at least in the opinion of General Alan Brooke the CIGS 1942-45 or WS Churchill the PM.

As far as they were concerned it was a bit of a silly question.

Operation Overlord was mounted in order to establish a lodgement in Europe in order to pit an army of 100 divisions against the Germans, the number considered necessary to defeat the German army in the West. 75 would have been from the US Army and 25 from the British, Commonwealth and other.

The plans for a 1942 or 1943 Cross channel assault would have been predominantly mounted by British and Canadian Troops and the British baulked at either prospect. Brooke's diary notes that in April 1942 when Marshall visited the UK he challenged Marshall with a thought experiment. Suppose we did land ten divisions in France - where next? How would we develop the battle? There was no sensible answer.

Churchill knew of Britain's military weakness. Before the US entry into the war against Germany he had envisaged a situation where a Europe wide rebellion would create the circumstances for the British Army to provide the heavy weapons and armour to support a massed rebellion by lightly equipped partisans. Special Operations Executive was formed in July 1940 to ""set Europe ablaze." It also explains the very armour heavy structure of the mid WW2 British Army.

In 1943 plans were drawn up, in parallel with the Op Overlord, for the rapid occupation of German and liberated territories in the event that the Germans suddenly collapsed. (e.g. a military coup that lead to a civil war or surrender.) One of the more worrying scenarios was what would the allies do if the Germans suddenly evacuated , say, Norway? How much resources should be diverted to a front which could never be the main landing?

[Rob Stuart]

If the US was not in the war in 1944, or say was fighting Japan only, then many things would be different. The Commonwealth could probably have cleared North Africa on its own in 1942-43, with or without TORCH, but it's more doubtful that it would have invaded Sicily and then Italy. If it had done so then many of the Commonwealth divisions involved in OVERLORD would have been fighting in Italy in June 1944. If it had not, then Italy might still be in the war and the Germans would have had more troops in France. Also, without the USAAF having been in Europe since 1942, the Luftwaffe would have been stronger in 1944 than it was historically. The Allied air force in England in 1944 would still have been more powerful than the Luftwaffe, but not by the huge margin that existed historically. Also, if the US was at war with Japan but not with Germany, then it would have allocated US-produced materiel accordingly and the Commonwealth may not have had any US-produced landing craft. So, OVERLOAD without the US was a non-starter.

[jesk]

After the defeat of France in 1940, England and the United States did not depend on anything. Who would have thought that in Normandy, the Ardennes and Operation Nordwind, the Germans involved only 5-10% of the divisions of the total number in Europe. Ardennes the latest adventure? 30 out of 270 divisions went on the offensive. This is not an indicator, a German blow could be much stronger.

[The Ibis]

Churchill knew of Britain's military weakness. Before the US entry into the war against Germany he had envisaged a situation where a Europe wide rebellion would create the circumstances for the British Army to provide the heavy weapons and armour to support a massed rebellion by lightly equipped partisans. Special Operations Executive was formed in July 1940 to ""set Europe ablaze." It also explains the very armour heavy structure of the mid WW2 British Army.

The British didn't possess a large land army. That does not mean they were weak. They invested differently.

After the defeat of France in 1940, England and the United States did not depend on anything. Who would have thought that in Normandy, the Ardennes and Operation Nordwind, the Germans involved only 5-10% of the divisions of the total number in Europe. Ardennes the latest adventure? 30 out of 270 divisions went on the offensive. This is not an indicator, a German blow could be much stronger.

You need to get this raw numbers fixation out of your head. Numbers alone are meaningless. If you have 1000 tanks but only fuel for 100 of them - you have 100 tanks and a lot of spare parts.

[jesk]

You need to get this numbers fixation out of your head. Numbers alone are meaningless. If you have 1000 tanks but only fuel for 100 of them - you have 100 tanks, a lot of spare parts.

There were 240 infantry and 30 panzer divisions. About fuel your speculation. You do not know how much it was, supposedly not enough ..

[Richard Anderson]

There were 240 infantry and 30 panzer divisions. About fuel your speculation. You do not know how much it was, supposedly not enough ..

Actually, we do know how much it was and that it was not enough.

7. Armee OQu, T-311, R-1, F-571, 572, 575, 700029-063, 616-636:

11 May - Because of the deterioration in transport situation as a result of air attacks, fuel supplies have been affected. It has not been possible to replenish the fuel in dumps as quickly as it has been released.

27 May - OQu reports truck transport can no longer offer much help moving supplies due to lack of fuel. It was anticipated that wood-gas vehicles would have to be used.

29 May - Because of the increased air attacks on the synthetic fuel plants and anticpated attacks on fuel dumps in the west, more vehicles must be adapted to burning wood-gas. Of 14,578 trucks in the 7. Armee, 15. Armee, and WBN zone, 3,552 have been converted.

USSBS European Summary Report, pp. 8-9:

"The Attack on Oil

With the reduction of German air power, oil became the priority target in the German economy. The bomber force for several months had been adequate for the task. A preliminary attack was launched on May 12, 1944, followed by another on May 28; the main blow was not struck, however, until after D-day. In the months before D-day and for a shorter period immediately following, all available air power based on England was devoted to insuring the success of the invasion.

Virtually complete records of the German oil industry were taken by the Survey. In addition, major plants that were subject to attack and their records were studied in detail.

The German oil supply was tight throughout the war, and was a controlling factor in military operations. The chief source of supply, and the only source for aviation gasoline, was 13 synthetic plants together with a small production from three additional ones that started operations in 1944. The major sources of products refined from crude oil were the Ploesti oil fields in Rumania and the Hungarian fields which together accounted for about a quarter of the total supply of liquid fuels in 1943. In addition, there was a small but significant Austrian and domestic production. The refineries at Ploesti were attacked, beginning with a daring and costly low-level attack in August 1943. These had only limited effects; deliveries increased until April 1944 when the attacks were resumed. The 1944 attacks, together with mining of the Danube, materially reduced Rumanian deliveries. In August 1944, Russian occupation eliminated this source of supply and dependence on the synthetic plants became even greater than before.

Production from the synthetic plants declined steadily and by July 1944 every major plant had been hit. These plants were producing an average of 316,000 tons per month when the attacks began. Their production fell to 107,000 tons in June and 17,000 tons in September. Output of aviation gasoline from synthetic plants dropped from 175,000 tons in April to 30,000 tons in July and 5,000 tons in September. Production recovered somewhat in November and December, but for the rest of the war was but a fraction of pre-attack output.

The Germans viewed the attacks as catastrophic. In a series of letters to Hitler, among documents seized by the Survey, the developing crisis is outlined month by month in detail. On June 30, Speer wrote: "The enemy has succeeded in increasing our losses of aviation gasoline up to 90 percent by June 22d. Only through speedy recovery of damaged plants has it been possible to regain partly some of the terrible losses." The tone of the letters that followed was similar.

As in the case of ball-bearings and aircraft, the Germans took the most energetic steps to repair and reconstruct the oil plants. Another czar was appointed, this time Edmund Geilenberg, and again an overriding priority on men and materials was issued. Geilenberg used as many as 350,000 men for the repair, rebuilding, and dispersal of the bombed plants and for new underground construction. The synthetic oil plants were vast complex structures and could not be easily broken up and dispersed. The programs of dispersal and underground construction that were undertaken were incomplete when the war ended.

The synthetic oil plants were brought back into partial production and in remarkably short time. But unlike the ball-bearing plants, as soon as they were brought back they were attacked again. The story of Leuna is illustrative. Leuna was the largest of the synthetic plants and protected by a highly effective smoke screen and the heaviest flak concentration in Europe. Air crews viewed a mission to Leuna as the most dangerous and difficult assignment of the air war. Leuna was hit on May 12 and put out of production. However, investigation of plant records and interrogation of Leuna's officials established that a force of several thousand men had it in partial operation in about 10 days. It was again hit on May 28 but resumed partial production on June 3 and reached 75 percent of capacity in early July. It was hit again on July 7 and again shut down but production started 2 days later and reached 53 percent of capacity on July 19. An attack on July 20 shut the plant down again but only for three days; by July 27 production was back to 35 percent of capacity. Attacks on July 28 and 29 closed the plant and further attacks on August 24, September 11, September 13, September 28 and October 7 kept it closed down. However, Leuna got started again on October 14 and although production was interrupted by a small raid on November 2, it reached 28 percent of capacity by November 20. Although there were 6 more heavy attacks in November and December (largely ineffective because of adverse weather), production was brought up to 15 percent of capacity in January and was maintained at that level until nearly the end of the war. From the first attack to the end, production at Leuna averaged 9 percent of capacity. There were 22 attacks on Leuna, 20 by the Eighth Air Force and 2 by the RAF. Due to the urgency of keeping this plant out of production, many of these missions mere dispatched in difficult bombing weather. Consequently, the order of bombing accuracy on Leuna was not high as compared with other targets. To win the battle with Leuna a total of 6,552 bomber sorties were flown against the plant, 18,328 tons of bombs were dropped and an entire year was required.

Consumption of oil exceeded production from May 1944 on. Accumulated stocks were rapidly used up, and in six months were practically exhausted. The loss of oil production was sharply felt by the armed forces. In August the final run-in-time for aircraft engines was cut from two hours to one-half hour. For lack of fuel, pilot training, previously cut down, was further curtailed. Through the summer, the movement of German Panzer Divisions in the field was hampered more and more seriously as a result of losses in combat and mounting transportation difficulties, together with the fall in fuel production. By December, according to Speer, the fuel shortage had reached catastrophic proportions. When the Germans launched their counter-offensive on December 16, 1944, their reserves of fuel were insufficient to support the operation. They counted on capturing Allied stocks. Failing in this, many panzer units were lost when they ran out of gasoline. In February and March of 1945 the Germans massed 1,200 tanks on the Baranov bridgehead at the Vistula to check the Russians. They were immobilized for lack of gasoline and overrun."

In 1941, the Grossreich produced 4.8-million metric tons of finished petroleum products, 5.6-million in 1942, and 6.6-million in 1943...and consumed 7.305-million in 1941, 6.483-million in 1942, and 6.971-million in 1944.

[jesk]

As in the case of ball-bearings and aircraft, the Germans took the most energetic steps to repair and reconstruct the oil plants. Another czar was appointed, this time Edmund Geilenberg, and again an overriding priority on men and materials was issued. Geilenberg used as many as 350,000 men for the repair, rebuilding, and dispersal of the bombed plants and for new underground construction. The synthetic oil plants were vast complex structures and could not be easily broken up and dispersed. The programs of dispersal and underground construction that were undertaken were incomplete when the war ended.

What can I distinguish from this text. At the beginning of 1945, there were 15 German divisions in Norway, the total strength of the grouping was 400 thousand people. Until the end of the war, there remained 11 divisions, 330 thousand people. Hitler forbade the use of these troops in battle. Reducing the production of aviation gasoline is sad, but this is not the main thing.

In February and March of 1945 the Germans massed 1,200 tanks on the Baranov bridgehead at the Vistula to check the Russians. They were immobilized for lack of gasoline and overrun."

The Vistula was already lost. In some sources it is written that 1200 tanks were allocated for the Solstice, this is not true. Tanks total 300 and not all could deliver because of problems on the railway.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Solstice

[Richard Anderson]

What can I distinguish from this text.

I doubt anything, since you seem incapable of logical argument supported by documentary evidence.

At the beginning of 1945, there were 15 German divisions in Norway, the total strength of the grouping was 400 thousand people. Until the end of the war, there remained 11 divisions, 330 thousand people. Hitler forbade the use of these troops in battle. Reducing the production of aviation gasoline is sad, but this is not the main thing.

What does that have to do with "About fuel your speculation. You do not know how much it was, supposedly not enough."? Those are numbers of immobile divisions - most were designated bodenstandiges.

The Vistula was already lost. In some sources it is written that 1200 tanks were allocated for the Solstice, this is not true. Tanks total 300 and not all could deliver because of problems on the railway.

What does that have to do with "About fuel your speculation. You do not know how much it was, supposedly not enough."?

Oh, by the way, "In February and March of 1945 the Germans massed 1,200 tanks on the Baranov bridgehead at the Vistula to check the Russians. They were immobilized for lack of gasoline and overrun." was not anything that I wrote. If you have a response to that please address it to that poster.

[jesk]

What can I distinguish from this text.

I doubt anything, since you seem incapable of logical argument supported by documentary evidence.

You have useless figures about fuel. I'm talking about 30 of the 270 divisions in the Ardennes .. It's true with me!

At the beginning of 1945, there were 15 German divisions in Norway, the total strength of the grouping was 400 thousand people. Until the end of the war, there remained 11 divisions, 330 thousand people. Hitler forbade the use of these troops in battle. Reducing the production of aviation gasoline is sad, but this is not the main thing.

What does that have to do with "About fuel your speculation. You do not know how much it was, supposedly not enough."? Those are numbers of immobile divisions - most were designated bodenstandiges.

Immobile divisions - your contribution to history. In general, soldiers have legs and they could run 50-70 km a day, shooting at the enemy.

The Vistula was already lost. In some sources it is written that 1200 tanks were allocated for the Solstice, this is not true. Tanks total 300 and not all could deliver because of problems on the railway.

What does that have to do with "About fuel your speculation. You do not know how much it was, supposedly not enough."?

Oh, by the way, "In February and March of 1945 the Germans massed 1,200 tanks on the Baranov bridgehead at the Vistula to check the Russians. They were immobilized for lack of gasoline and overrun." was not anything that I wrote. If you have a response to that please address it to that poster.

You are mistaken. The figure of 1200 tanks is taken from here

http://www.thefullwiki.org/Operation_Sonnenwende
Wehrmacht
Over 1,200 tanks were allocated to the offensive, but due to serious shortages only three days' ammunition and fuel were immediately available.

overestimated 4 times

[jesk]

General Heinz Guderian had originally planned to execute a major offensive against the 1st Belorussian Front, cutting off the leading elements of Georgy Zhukov's forces east of the Oder. The Soviet forces were to be attacked from Stargard (Pomerania) in the north as well as from Glogau (Silesia) and Guben (Brandenburg) in the south.[3] In order to carry out these plans, he requested that the Courland Pocket be evacuated to make available the divisions trapped there, removed troops from Italy and Norway, and involved Sepp Dietrich's 6th Panzer Army which had been intended for counter-attacks in Hungary. In a meeting with Guderian Hitler insisted that Courland be held and that the army continue with its planned attacks in Hungary; the meeting rapidly degenerated into a heated and farcical argument.[4]

[Richard Anderson]

You have useless figures about fuel. I'm talking about 30 of the 270 divisions in the Ardennes .. It's true with me!

You asked for evidence of German fuel shortages. It was provided. Now you say evidence is useless with you and instead you believe in what you want to believe. Fine, but please stop bothering people that rely on evidence rather than faith...I suggest you join a monastery instead.

Immobile divisions - your contribution to history. In general, soldiers have legs and they could run 50-70 km a day, shooting at the enemy.

No, the designation and use of the divisions is the German contribution, not mine. It is reality as opposed to your fantasy. I suppose then if they can walk from Norway to Germany they can also swim the Skaggerak...

You are mistaken. The figure of 1200 tanks is taken from here

Oh, I see, so then you are simply posting random quotes from Wiki, attributing them to other posters, and then "refuting" that poster by disproving the random Wiki quote. That is a truly modern version of the straw man fallacy.

overestimated 4 times

What a sharp eye you have for nonsense irrelevant to the argument, not expressed by anyone other than you. Brilliant.

[jesk]

No, the designation and use of the divisions is the German contribution, not mine. It is reality as opposed to your fantasy. I suppose then of they can walk from Norway to Germany they can aslo swim the Skaggerak...

Obviously, Guderian also did not understand the problems with logistics and fuel. You substitute the real events of history with the problems invented by you Germans. Maybe there were problems with nutrition, or, for example, with tooth decay??

[jesk]

Many people have clung to a simple story. German men fought on the battlefield with English muzhiks and in an honest fight found out which of them is stronger. There is no question of mistakes of any kind, this is nonsense, not like a man. We know the peasants how it really was. Such machismo in history.