British only D-Day

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Re: British only D-Day

#241

Post by jesk » 27 Sep 2017, 10:51

Richard Anderson wrote: Oh, except of course if the Germans had only been smart enough to equip all the soldiers in Norway, France, and North Africa with Adidas and 98K's and ordered them to run 70 KM a day to the East... :roll: :lol: :roll:
The American military held such opinion. :D :lol:

http://ww2f.com/threads/colonel-trevor-dupuy-said.1491/

'Brigadier Williams said: "The Germans adjusted much better to new conditions that we did. By and large they were better soldiers than we were. The Germans liked soldiering. We didn't". (p. 212).


It's fortunate indeed that the majority of German ground and air forces were tied up in the East, and that the Allied disinformation tactics created such great confusion in OKH. The irony was that of all the beaches that might likely be targets, Hitler correctly surmised the invasion would come at Normandy, yet for once he didn't force his commanders to comply with his view.

Here's a quote from 'Overlord'

'Brigadier Williams said: "The Germans adjusted much better to new conditions that we did. By and large they were better soldiers than we were. The Germans liked soldiering. We didn't". (p. 212).

There was a saying among the Wehrmacht 'Let's enjoy the war, because the peace will be terrible!' (I'm not sure that Woodrow would get it, but I believe that was supposed to be sardonic).

Here is another:
'The American Colonel Trevor Dupuy has conducted a detailed statistical study of German actions in the Second World War. Some of his explanations as to why Hitler's armies performed so much more impressively than their enemies seem fanciful. But no critic has challenged his essential finding that on every battlefield of the war, including Normandy, the German soldier performed more impressively than his opponents:

On a man for man basis, the German ground soldier consistently inflicted casualties at about a 50% higher rate than they incurred from the opposing British and American troops UNDER ALL CIRCUMSTANCES. [emphasis in original] This was true when they were attacking and when they were defending, when they had a local numerical superiority and when, as was usually the case, they were outnumbered, when they had air superiority and when they did not, when they won and when they lost. (Col. T.N Dupuy, A Genius For War, London 1977)

It is undoubtedly true that the Germans were much more efficient than the Americans in making use of available manpower. An American army corps staff contained 55 per cent more officers and 44 per cent fewer other ranks than its German equivalent. In a panzergrenadier division in 1944-45, 89.4 per cent of the men were fighting soldiers, against only 65.56 per cent in an American division. In June 1944, 54.35 per cent of the German army consisted of fighting soldiers, against 38 per cent of the American army. 44.9 per cent of the German army was employed in combat divisions, against 20.8 per cent of the American. While the U.S. army became a huge industrial organization, whose purpose sometimes seemed to be forgotten by those who administered it, the German army was designed solely as a machine for waging war. Even the British, who possessed nothing like the reserves of manpower of the Americans, traditionally employed officers on a far more lavish scale than the German army, which laid particular emphasis upon NCO leadership.

Events on the Normandy battlefield demonstrated that most British or American troops continued a given operation for as long as reasonable men could. Then - when they had fought for many hours, suffered many casualties, or were running low on fuel or ammunition - they disengaged. The story of German operations, however, is landmarked with repeated examples of what could be achieved by soldiers prepared to attempt more than reasonable men could. German troops did not fight uniformly well. But Corporal Hohenstein's assertion that they were trained always to try to do more than had been asked of them is borne out by history. Again and again, a single tank, a handful of infantry with an 88 mm gun, a hastily mounted counter-attack,stopped a thoroughly-organized Allied advance dead in its tracks.

German leadership at corps level and above was often little better than that of the Allies, and sometimes markedly worse. But at regimental level and below, it was superb. The .German army appeared to have access to a bottomless reservoir of brave, able and quick-thinking colonels commanding battle- groups, and of NCOs capable of directing the defence of an entire sector of the front. The fanatical performance of the SS may partly explain the stubborn German defence of Europe in 1944--45. But it cannot wholly do so, any more than the quality of the Allied armies can be measured by the achievements of their airborne forces. The defence of Normandy was sustained for 10 weeks in the face of overwhelming odds by the professionalism and stubborn skills of the entire Wehrmacht, from General of Pioneers Meise, who somehow kept just sufficient
road and rail links operational to maintain a thin stream of supplies to the front, to Corporal Hohenstein and his admittedly half.,hearted comrades of 276th Infantry.

It then goes on to discuss the operational, if not numerical superiority of German equipment from the Tiger and Panther (versus Cromwell and Sherman) tanks down to the simple but deadly Panzerfaust and the higher frequency of distribution of machine guns that made German units far more effective than their numbers would suggest.

I have every reason to agree with you that during World War 2, the Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS were probably the finest ground forces in the world. From years of study, I have come to believe that the cream of the Luftwaffe fighter pilots were the best in the world, and just maybe the best the world will ever see, given the increasing use of remote and automated pilotage. They were all wasted.

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Re: British only D-Day

#242

Post by Richard Anderson » 29 Sep 2017, 03:22

jesk wrote:The American military held such opinion. :D :lol:
Sigh.

1. Nowhere in that random series of quotes you proposed as an answer did Trevor "hold" the "opinion" that German troops could run 70 KM a day, with or without Adidas and 98K,

2. Trevor was never one to suffer fools gladly. I suspect I know what he would be saying to you right now.

3. At the time Trevor wrote that he was long retired from the U.S. Army. Those statements and opinions were his and not that of the "American military". That you cannot discern the difference speaks volumes.

4. Your response is a rather poor example of a "strawman" argument. No one has argued anything such as you are "countering" by it...and it has absolutely nothing to do with the core argument either.
Richard C. Anderson Jr.

American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
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Re: British only D-Day

#243

Post by jesk » 29 Sep 2017, 06:00

Richard Anderson wrote:
jesk wrote:The American military held such opinion. :D :lol:
Sigh.

1. Nowhere in that random series of quotes you proposed as an answer did Trevor "hold" the "opinion" that German troops could run 70 KM a day, with or without Adidas and 98K,

2. Trevor was never one to suffer fools gladly. I suspect I know what he would be saying to you right now.

3. At the time Trevor wrote that he was long retired from the U.S. Army. Those statements and opinions were his and not that of the "American military". That you cannot discern the difference speaks volumes.

4. Your response is a rather poor example of a "strawman" argument. No one has argued anything such as you are "countering" by it...and it has absolutely nothing to do with the core argument either.
Soviet textbook of 1940. Written on the march of tank units. And you have 200 km and it is already impossible.

http://militera.lib.ru/science/kuznetsov_tp/08.html

The movement of tank troops is carried out either by one's own march (marching order), or by transportation and railways, by road and by waterways.
The establishment of a method for the movement of tank troops depends primarily on the purpose of movement. Naturally, with the upcoming participation of tanks in battle, this method of movement is chosen (alone or in combination with others), which in this situation gives the greatest effectiveness: timeliness of arrival to the battlefield in full force and readiness, retention of the forces of personnel, .
Movement marching in accordance with the appropriate measures of combat and logistics in terms of the degree of constant readiness for combat is for tank troops the only way to move on the battlefield and when approaching it. At the same time, the tank unit or connection for one day passes an average of 80-100 km, spending 8 hours on traffic and 2 hours on halts, maintaining the ability to fight, and for three days - up to 400 km followed by (if the situation allows) a break for the recreation of personnel and the reorganization of the material part.
The average daily travel speed of a part or compound of medium (heavy) tanks is 60-80 km.
Such speed of movement by marching order provides the possibility of moving entire tank units from depth to the front and castling them from the area of ​​one army to the region of the other during one day. The ability of tank forces to move with their own speed at the speed indicated above makes them, under conditions of front-line operation, independent of vehicles (road, rail and water) and allows them to be concentrated in the necessary quantity in the decisive direction of the front during the time allotted for the preparation of the offensive operation.
Tank parts (less often joints) can be transported on vehicles of the appropriate tonnage or on trailed platforms [202] of special design, moved by wheeled or caterpillar tractors.
This will be the case when the motor resources of tank units are limited, and there is no time to rebuild them before the battle, when the number of tanks on this front is limited, and the requirements for them appear consistently in different directions. Transportation by road is possible if there are good roads near the front of the network and cost-effective at a distance of at least 150 km; The units can also be transported to smaller distances.
Transportation of tank troops on cars, tractors with a trailer, railways and along waterways has its both positive and negative sides. On the one hand, the transport of tank forces retains the strength of the personnel and the material part of the machines, and time is also gained. On the other hand, during transportation, additional means of combat support are required (especially from enemy aviation), and the movement itself is carried out in a tiered manner and only in directions suitable for this mode of transport and, most importantly, the transported units and connections are in the state of least readiness to combat operations.

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Re: British only D-Day

#244

Post by Richard Anderson » 30 Sep 2017, 19:04

jesk wrote:Soviet textbook of 1940. Written on the march of tank units. And you have 200 km and it is already impossible.
1) Do you suffer from the delusional notion that a straw man argument is actually logical? Where did I ever say that a 200 kilometer administrative movement by "tank troops" was "impossible"?

2) What does a "Soviet textbook of 1940" have to do with the real world events of 1944?

3) However do you imagine that bodenständige translates as "tank troops"?

Meanwhile, for those of you who prefer facts over straw men, a study of actual operational movements of German and Allied units of different sizes and characteristics in World War II indicated that ADMINISTRATIVE (i.e., non-tactical) movement rates were:

69.78 km/day, average;
45.00 km/day, corps-sized unit rate;
120.00 km/day, armored division rate;
55.60 km/day, infantry division rate.

However, the infantry division movement rates were derived from the activities of U.S. Army infantry divisions, i.e., NOT German bodenständige infantry divisions, which had virtually zero organic transportation capability, but by U.S. infantry divisions with 1,325 motor vehicles and access to non-divisional QM Transportation Corps companies. The actual movement rates of actual German bewegung type infantry divisions and the "mobile" elements of actual bodenständige divisions created on an ad hoc, emergency basis in Normandy, were covered earlier.
Richard C. Anderson Jr.

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Re: British only D-Day

#245

Post by jesk » 30 Sep 2017, 20:56

Richard Anderson wrote: 1) Do you suffer from the delusional notion that a straw man argument is actually logical? Where did I ever say that a 200 kilometer administrative movement by "tank troops" was "impossible"?
You wrote about divisions. I do not see a difference, tanks or infantry on the march. The soldiers have legs. In the army horses. Transport is a good thing for Americans. The Germans moved around the old ways.
2) What does a "Soviet textbook of 1940" have to do with the real world events of 1944?
Tanks, legs are real. Unlike your hypothesis not capable units.
The actual movement rates of actual German bewegung type infantry divisions and the "mobile" elements of actual bodenständige divisions created on an ad hoc, emergency basis in Normandy, were covered earlier.
It's about marching divisions, not moving in battle. On the march, speed and distance are not limited (within France for example).

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Re: British only D-Day

#246

Post by Richard Anderson » 30 Sep 2017, 21:37

jesk wrote:You wrote about divisions. I do not see a difference, tanks or infantry on the march.
I know you do not, but your ignorance is not my problem.
The soldiers have legs. In the army horses. Transport is a good thing for Americans. The Germans moved around the old ways.
"Transport" is a "good thing" for all armed forces. It is primarily how personnel, equipment, weapons, and material are moved.
Tanks, legs are real. Unlike your hypothesis not capable units.
Sigh...how many "tanks" did bodenständige divisions have? Yes, they had "legs". How do "legs" move artillery pieces "70km a day"? Tons of supplies? Ammunition?
It's about marching divisions, not moving in battle. On the march, speed and distance are not limited (within France for example).
Sigh...an ADMINISTRATIVE move IS "about marching divisions, not moving in battle". I deliberately put it in all CAPS and bold in the faint hope you might notice and comprehend. You did not. I am not surprised.

"On the march, speed and distance" are ALWAYS limited. Limitations include the ability of the route network to support the numbers, sizes, and weights of the tactical and combat vehicles assigned to or supporting the unit making the move, and available refueling and maintenance sites and crew-rest areas. Weather and strategic opposition are also limitations to administrative movements.
Richard C. Anderson Jr.

American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
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Re: British only D-Day

#247

Post by jesk » 30 Sep 2017, 23:20

Richard Anderson wrote:
"Transport" is a "good thing" for all armed forces. It is primarily how personnel, equipment, weapons, and material are moved.
In the first world moved mainly on horses and did quite well.
Sigh...how many "tanks" did bodenständige divisions have? Yes, they had "legs". How do "legs" move artillery pieces "70km a day"? Tons of supplies? Ammunition?
These are logically empty conclusions. Ammunition by rail. 50 artillery pieces of the division moved by horse-drawn traction. :)

Image
Sigh...an ADMINISTRATIVE move IS "about marching divisions, not moving in battle". I deliberately put it in all CAPS and bold in the faint hope you might notice and comprehend. You did not. I am not surprised.

"On the march, speed and distance" are ALWAYS limited. Limitations include the ability of the route network to support the numbers, sizes, and weights of the tactical and combat vehicles assigned to or supporting the unit making the move, and available refueling and maintenance sites and crew-rest areas. Weather and strategic opposition are also limitations to administrative movements.
You have lost the thread of the discussion, and I will remind you how it began. The words about the prohibition of Hitler to use the 15th Army in Normandy, were disputed by the conclusions about the inability of divisions. 233 km from Walcheren for you a lot. In fact, within a week it would not be difficult to pass such a distance.
Richard Anderson wrote:No, not speculation, analysis based on reading the documentation. So just how long do you think it would take the rather unsteady legs of the Whitebread Division to get from Walcheren to Normandy? Have you prepared a movement analysis for getting those units to Normandy?

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Re: British only D-Day

#248

Post by Richard Anderson » 01 Oct 2017, 00:29

We're back to nonsense masquerading as facts. So where is the Fuehrebefehl ordering 15. Armed to stay in place? The order cancelling 346. ID moving against 6 Airborne? The order freezing 16. LW Feld, preventing it from being in the way of Goodwood. The halt of 2. Panzer...etc.

And please, no more pictures from the Great War demonstrating how to move heavy artillery on trackways in the mud as evidence of how the Germans could easily shift divisions designed tp be immobile defensive formations hundreds of kilometers.
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Re: British only D-Day

#249

Post by jesk » 01 Oct 2017, 07:53

Richard Anderson wrote:We're back to nonsense masquerading as facts. So where is the Fuehrebefehl ordering 15. Armed to stay in place? The order cancelling 346. ID moving against 6 Airborne? The order freezing 16. LW Feld, preventing it from being in the way of Goodwood. The halt of 2. Panzer...etc.

And please, no more pictures from the Great War demonstrating how to move heavy artillery on trackways in the mud as evidence of how the Germans could easily shift divisions designed tp be immobile defensive formations hundreds of kilometers.
You are like Hitler in a conversation with Weidling, shy away from the topic and go on to assess the fighting efficiency of individual divisions. The fact remains, Hitler long kept in reserve 15 army in case of landing in the Pas-de-Calais. Other opinions ignored by him. Just like 5 divisions with garrisons on the peninsula of Bretagne and the islands in the English Channel. Dönitz assured him that there would not be a landing there.

https://booksbunker.com/vladimir_bryuha ... 96/26.html
Further Weidling reported the situation on the front of the corps subordinate to him and made a number of proposals.
"The Fuhrer nodded his head approvingly, and then began to speak. In long sentences, he outlined the operational plan for the proceeds of Berlin. At the same time, he increasingly evaded the topic and switched to an assessment of the fighting efficiency of individual divisions. / ... / I listened with great and great amazement to the rhetoric of the Fuhrer. / ... / They let me go. Again the Fuhrer tried to get up, but could not. Sitting he gave me his hand. I left the room, deeply shocked by the heavy physical condition of the Fuhrer. I was like in a fog! "
The next day, April 24, 1945, Weidling received a new appointment. Krebs announced to him: "At your report last night, you made a favorable impression on the Fuhrer, and he appointed you commander of the defense of Berlin."

http://militera.lib.ru/memo/german/doen ... t.html#t22
Despite the weighty strategic arguments put forward by the army command, and also considering all the modern technical means available to the allies, the Navy command considered it unlikely that the Somma area would be invaded. In doing so, we were guided only by considerations of maritime practice. The structure of the shore on this site made the landing process significantly more difficult, and in addition to this, the area was open to the western winds. From our point of view, even on the rocky coast of Bretagne, where the sea is always uneasy, and the weather is extremely unstable, disembarkation was also unlikely. But the Bay of Seine with its wide sandy beaches, sheltered from the western winds, in our opinion, was to be very attractive to the enemy. In addition, despite the availability of modern technical means, the possibility of creating artificial harbors, etc., the enemy, landing on an unequipped shore, had to think about the speedy restoration of the effective operation of existing ports. Therefore, the proximity of Le Havre, according to the naval command, was to be an additional argument in favor of the choice of the enemy for the landing of the Seine

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Re: British only D-Day

#250

Post by Richard Anderson » 01 Oct 2017, 20:15

jesk wrote:
Richard Anderson wrote:We're back to nonsense masquerading as facts. So where is the Fuehrebefehl ordering 15. Armed to stay in place? The order cancelling 346. ID moving against 6 Airborne? The order freezing 16. LW Feld, preventing it from being in the way of Goodwood. The halt of 2. Panzer...etc.
You are like Hitler in a conversation with Weidling, shy away from the topic
Shying away from the topic? Really?

PLEASE ANSWER MY QUESTIONS THEN!

Avoiding answering simple questions and then posting random quoted passages from various sources is shying away from the topic.

1) Where is the citation for the Fueherbefehl ordering 15. Armee to stay in place?
2) Where is the citation for the orders freezing specific divisions in place that were available for commitment as mobile divisions.
3) Explain to me why, if 15. Armee and the "5 divisions with garrisons on the peninsula of Bretagne and the islands in the English Channel" were ordered to stay in place, then:

Of those divisions in Brittany:

In LXXIV AK, 77. ID, a bewegung division, was ordered to Normandy on 6 June. 266. ID, a bodenständige division, prepared a mobile Kampfgruppe under the expectations planned for months, and dispatched it when ready as ordered on 14 June. Shouldn't they have stayed in place as "ordered"?

In XXV AK, 343. ID, a bodenständige division, prepared a mobile Kampfgruppe under the expectations planned for months, and dispatched it when ready as ordered on 22 June, 265. ID, a bodenständige division, prepared a mobile Kampfgruppe under the expectations planned for months, and dispatched it when ready as ordered on 6 June, 275. ID, a bodenständige division, prepared a mobile Kampfgruppe under the expectations planned for months, and dispatched it when ready as ordered on 8 June, and 353. ID, a bewegung division, was ordered to Normandy on 11 June. Shouldn't they have stayed in place as "ordered"?

4) Explain to me why you think there were five divisions when there were in fact six, plus 319. ID in occupation of the Channel Islands. Are your sources that inadequate?
5) How many "tanks" did bodenständige divisions have?
6) How did bodenständige divisions move artillery pieces "70km a day", along with tons of supplies, ammunition, and equipment, without limbers, horses, or mechanized transport? (And please do not "answer" by posting a random photo of British troops moving heavy artillery from a railhead to a fixed battery position in the Great War on trackways.)

Or shy away again. Your choice.
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American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
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Re: British only D-Day

#251

Post by jesk » 01 Oct 2017, 20:43

Richard Anderson wrote:
jesk wrote:
Richard Anderson wrote:We're back to nonsense masquerading as facts. So where is the Fuehrebefehl ordering 15. Armed to stay in place? The order cancelling 346. ID moving against 6 Airborne? The order freezing 16. LW Feld, preventing it from being in the way of Goodwood. The halt of 2. Panzer...etc.
You are like Hitler in a conversation with Weidling, shy away from the topic
Shying away from the topic? Really?

PLEASE ANSWER MY QUESTIONS THEN!

Avoiding answering simple questions and then posting random quoted passages from various sources is shying away from the topic.

1) Where is the citation for the Fueherbefehl ordering 15. Armee to stay in place?
You must believe in oral testimonies. Hitler gave an oral instruction, based on his words, formed an order. Memoirs of Warlimont are full of evidence about the instructions of Hitler. As in the court, not necessarily a documentary confirmation. Oral evidence is accepted. Hitler is to blame.
First, read the memoirs of Warlimont, Spidel, the diaries of Halder, von Bock. Then we can exchange opinions. You argue with a limited amount of sources, because of which the picture is distorted.

http://dlx.b-ok.org/genesis/905000/363c ... b6410/_as/

Image

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Re: British only D-Day

#252

Post by Richard Anderson » 01 Oct 2017, 21:05

jesk wrote:You must believe in oral testimonies. Hitler gave an oral instruction, based on his words, formed an order. Memoirs of Warlimont are full of evidence about the instructions of Hitler. As in the court, not necessarily a documentary confirmation. Oral evidence is accepted. Hitler is to blame.
First, read the memoirs of Warlimont, Spidel, the diaries of Halder, von Bock. Then we can exchange opinions. You argue with a limited amount of sources, because of which the picture is distorted.
Still shying away from the topic I see. Instead, you're posting random pages from random and unidentified books again, which have little or no bearing on the topic.

Yes, I have read the self-serving "memoirs of Warlimont, Spidel, the diaries of Halder, von Bock", as well as the stenographic records of the Fuehrer Conferences and the German contingency planning documentation for the invasion of Europe. Along with Geyr's postwar memoir, the Rommel Papers, Hesketh's Fortitude, Cross-Channel Attack, and any number of other primary, secondary, and documentary sources on the subject, including the Ob.West and 7. Armee KTB and anlagen. When you have done the same, then maybe we can exchange opinions, until then I have some new questions for you to shy away from.

1) What does your Weidling post have to do with events in Normandy nearly a year earlier?
2) How was von Bock, who was relieved of command on 13 July 1942, privy to Hitler's decision-making in June 1944?
3) How was Halder, who was relieved of command on 24 September 1942, privy to Hitler's decision-making in June 1942.
4) When are you going to answer the other questions I have asked you?
Richard C. Anderson Jr.

American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
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Re: British only D-Day

#253

Post by jesk » 01 Oct 2017, 21:40

Richard Anderson, you came up with a serious story. With documents, orders, an assessment of the fighting efficiency of divisions. But there really is everything simple. Many divisions moved in Normandy and won the war. I will remind Andrey Kuptsov's quote:

For anyone who was seriously interested in the war of 1939-1945 and read the postwar literature from all directions - from textbooks and analytical reports to the memoirs of participants and the works of art of the front-line writers (naturally, from the "one" and this side) - a completely permissible evaluation of war. This is not a confrontation of enemies, but the use of mistakes of the enemy. And these mistakes are inexplicably primitive, they could be avoided, the result of an erroneous decision was predictable, everything is clear, but ... but nothing.(Для любого, кто серьезно интересовался войной 1939–1945 годов и читал послевоенную литературу всех направлений – от учебников и аналитических отчетов до мемуаров участников и художественных произведений авторов-фронтовиков (естественно, с «той» и этой стороны) – не может не возникнуть вполне допустимая оценка войны. Это не противостояние врагов, а использование ошибок противника. И эти ошибки необъяснимо примитивны, их можно было избежать, результат ошибочного решения был предсказуем, всем понятен, но… а ничего.)

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Re: British only D-Day

#254

Post by Richard Anderson » 01 Oct 2017, 22:39

jesk wrote:Richard Anderson, you came up with a serious story. With documents, orders, an assessment of the fighting efficiency of divisions. But there really is everything simple. Many divisions moved in Normandy and won the war. I will remind Andrey Kuptsov's quote:
No, please, rather let me remind you to please stop shying away from the topic and avoid answering very simple and direct questions put to you. You have made some claims that "Audrey Kutsov's" quote does nothing to answer. Please answer the questions.

1) Where is the citation for the Fueherbefehl ordering 15. Armee to stay in place? [Yes, I know you posted a random page from a book to "answer" this, but it did nothing to answer the simple fact that despite such a supposed "order", DIVISIONS FROM 15. ARMEE DID MOVE TO NORMANDY.]
2) Where is the citation for the orders freezing specific divisions in place that were available for commitment as mobile divisions.
3) Explain to me why, if 15. Armee and the "5 divisions with garrisons on the peninsula of Bretagne and the islands in the English Channel" were ordered to stay in place, then:

Of those divisions in Brittany:

In LXXIV AK, 77. ID, a bewegung division, was ordered to Normandy on 6 June. 266. ID, a bodenständige division, prepared a mobile Kampfgruppe under the expectations planned for months, and dispatched it when ready as ordered on 14 June. Shouldn't they have stayed in place as "ordered"?

In XXV AK, 343. ID, a bodenständige division, prepared a mobile Kampfgruppe under the expectations planned for months, and dispatched it when ready as ordered on 22 June, 265. ID, a bodenständige division, prepared a mobile Kampfgruppe under the expectations planned for months, and dispatched it when ready as ordered on 6 June, 275. ID, a bodenständige division, prepared a mobile Kampfgruppe under the expectations planned for months, and dispatched it when ready as ordered on 8 June, and 353. ID, a bewegung division, was ordered to Normandy on 11 June. Shouldn't they have stayed in place as "ordered"?

4) Explain to me why you think there were five divisions when there were in fact six, plus 319. ID in occupation of the Channel Islands. Are your sources that inadequate?
5) How many "tanks" did bodenständige divisions have?
6) How did bodenständige divisions move artillery pieces "70km a day", along with tons of supplies, ammunition, and equipment, without limbers, horses, or mechanized transport? (And please do not "answer" by posting a random photo of British troops moving heavy artillery from a railhead to a fixed battery position in the Great War on trackways.)
7) What does your Weidling post have to do with events in Normandy nearly a year earlier?
8) How was von Bock, who was relieved of command on 13 July 1942, privy to Hitler's decision-making in June 1944?
9) How was Halder, who was relieved of command on 24 September 1942, privy to Hitler's decision-making in June 1942.

To which I can now add a tenth:

10) What the hell does "Audrey Kutsov's" quote have to do with answering those questions?
Richard C. Anderson Jr.

American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
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jesk
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Re: British only D-Day

#255

Post by jesk » 01 Oct 2017, 22:45

Richard Anderson wrote:
jesk wrote:Richard Anderson, you came up with a serious story. With documents, orders, an assessment of the fighting efficiency of divisions. But there really is everything simple. Many divisions moved in Normandy and won the war. I will remind Andrey Kuptsov's quote:
No, please, rather let me remind you to please stop shying away from the topic and avoid answering very simple and direct questions put to you. You have made some claims that "Audrey Kutsov's" quote does nothing to answer. Please answer the questions.

1) Where is the citation for the Fueherbefehl ordering 15. Armee to stay in place? [Yes, I know you posted a random page from a book to "answer" this, but it did nothing to answer the simple fact that despite such a supposed "order", DIVISIONS FROM 15. ARMEE DID MOVE TO NORMANDY.]
2) Where is the citation for the orders freezing specific divisions in place that were available for commitment as mobile divisions.
3) Explain to me why, if 15. Armee and the "5 divisions with garrisons on the peninsula of Bretagne and the islands in the English Channel" were ordered to stay in place, then:

Of those divisions in Brittany:

In LXXIV AK, 77. ID, a bewegung division, was ordered to Normandy on 6 June. 266. ID, a bodenständige division, prepared a mobile Kampfgruppe under the expectations planned for months, and dispatched it when ready as ordered on 14 June. Shouldn't they have stayed in place as "ordered"?

In XXV AK, 343. ID, a bodenständige division, prepared a mobile Kampfgruppe under the expectations planned for months, and dispatched it when ready as ordered on 22 June, 265. ID, a bodenständige division, prepared a mobile Kampfgruppe under the expectations planned for months, and dispatched it when ready as ordered on 6 June, 275. ID, a bodenständige division, prepared a mobile Kampfgruppe under the expectations planned for months, and dispatched it when ready as ordered on 8 June, and 353. ID, a bewegung division, was ordered to Normandy on 11 June. Shouldn't they have stayed in place as "ordered"?

4) Explain to me why you think there were five divisions when there were in fact six, plus 319. ID in occupation of the Channel Islands. Are your sources that inadequate?
5) How many "tanks" did bodenständige divisions have?
6) How did bodenständige divisions move artillery pieces "70km a day", along with tons of supplies, ammunition, and equipment, without limbers, horses, or mechanized transport? (And please do not "answer" by posting a random photo of British troops moving heavy artillery from a railhead to a fixed battery position in the Great War on trackways.)
7) What does your Weidling post have to do with events in Normandy nearly a year earlier?
8) How was von Bock, who was relieved of command on 13 July 1942, privy to Hitler's decision-making in June 1944?
9) How was Halder, who was relieved of command on 24 September 1942, privy to Hitler's decision-making in June 1942.

To which I can now add a tenth:

10) What the hell does "Audrey Kutsov's" quote have to do with answering those questions?
I nevertheless will deviate from the topic. Do you admit that Hitler made a gross mistake by prohibiting the use of the 15th army in Normandy in June, the first half of July?

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