Fully mechanised Wehrmacht at beginning of WW2?

[Batman912]

What benefits and disadvantages do the Wehrmacht have if they did away with the horse before the start of WW2 and instead fully mechanised the army?

Any battles/campaigns where trucks, cars etc instead of horses that would be of benefit to the Germans?

[stg 44]

What benefits and disadvantages do the Wehrmacht have if they did away with the horse before the start of WW2 and instead fully mechanised the army?

Any battles/campaigns where trucks, cars etc instead of horses that would be of benefit to the Germans?

I don't see how that is achievable without massively reducing the Wehrmacht in size. Like by 50%. Not sure how that can work for them, but it does make their logistics a lot easier by having far less men in the field and having far less horses to feed:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Horses_in ... _logistics

Horse seemed to be a cheap and reliable transport especially in the spring and fall mud of the Eastern Front[16] but the associated costs of daily feeding, grooming and handling horses were staggering. In theory horse units could feed off the country, but grazing on grass alone rendered horses unfit for work and the troops had no time to spend searching the villages for fodder.[17] Hard-working horses required up to twelve pounds of grain daily;[17] fodder carried by the troops made up a major portion of their supply trains.[17]

Horses needed attendants: hitching a six-horse field artillery team, for example, required six men working for at least an hour.[1] Horse health deteriorated after only ten days of even moderate load, requiring frequent refits; recuperation took months and the replacement horses, in turn, needed time to get along with their teammates and handlers.[1] Good stables around the front line were scarce, makeshift lodgings caused premature wear and disease.[1] Refit of front-line horse units consumed eight to ten days, slowing down operations.[1]

Movements over 30 kilometers (daily horse travel limit[18]) were particularly slow and complex. Longer hauls were relegated to trucks at first opportunity, while horses persisted at divisional level[19] and in auxiliary units.[20] Horse transports were particularly inadequate in deep offensive operations, just like they were in 1914. American trucks supplied to the Soviets allowed operations up to 350 kilometers away from the railhead, a distance impossible for horse-drawn sleighs.[21] Likewise, replacement of field artillery horses with jeeps allowed towing 120-mm mortars in line with advancing troops, another tactic not possible with horses.[21]

[maltesefalcon]

The best contemporary example I can think of was DAK. They made use of trucks over horses and still ended up on the losing end. Yes I know they were outnumbered but as mentioned above; Germany would have to build a much smaller army to mechanize it thoroughly in any case.

[stg 44]

The best contemporary example I can think of was DAK. They made use of trucks over horses and still ended up on the losing end. Yes I know they were outnumbered but as mentioned above; Germany would have to build a much smaller army to mechanize it thoroughly in any case.

There was also the issue of not having any access to rail lines, which wouldn't be the case in Europe. Plus of course the harsh climate and it's impact on vehicles even with 'tropicalization'.

[ljadw]

What benefits and disadvantages do the Wehrmacht have if they did away with the horse before the start of WW2 and instead fully mechanised the army?

Any battles/campaigns where trucks, cars etc instead of horses that would be of benefit to the Germans?

A fully mechanised WM did not exist and could not exist 77 years ago . Besides, the motorised divisions did not advance quicker than the infantry divisions : only the motorised parts of the motorised divisions could do this,and mostly without success,because motorised units had more mobility ,but less manpower and less firepower and were dependent on the artillery and infantry .An army unit was as a convoy : advancing on the speed of the slowest element.If it didn't, it was searching for trouble .

[Sheldrake]

What benefits and disadvantages do the Wehrmacht have if they did away with the horse before the start of WW2 and instead fully mechanised the army?

Any battles/campaigns where trucks, cars etc instead of horses that would be of benefit to the Germans?

A fully mechanised WM did not exist and could not exist 77 years ago . Besides, the motorised divisions did not advance quicker than the infantry divisions : only the motorised parts of the motorised divisions could do this,and mostly without success,because motorised units had more mobility ,but less manpower and less firepower and were dependent on the artillery and infantry .An army unit was as a convoy : advancing on the speed of the slowest element.If it didn't, it was searching for trouble .

This is a very questionable statement.

#1 The motorised divisions seem to have been fully motorised. That was the whole point. They had operational mobility.

#2 Motorised formations typically had greater firepower than non mechanised. They had a higher establishment of machine guns, including vehicle mounted weapons and more heavy weapons.

#3 Motorised formations had motorised supply columns with higher capacity and capable of operating further from rail heads. This meant a motorised formation might have more ammunition to fire. (Eberbach, the GOC 5th Panzer army in Normandy said that horse drawn transport of the infantry formations was incapable of supporting these units and the transport columns of the motorised units ended up supplying the infantry. )

Of course the German Army could only have been fully motorised if adequate resources had been invested in producing the huge number of motor vehicles needed. (The Luftwaffe and Navy were motorised as were the German recruited SS formations.) More industrial capacity turned over the B vehicles = fewer tanks or aircraft.

Did the German army need to be fully motorised? If fighting a positional was, does an army need a great superority in the number of chauffeurs?

The British army had a mixture of formations. Some partially motorised, with support elements in motor vehicles and centralised lift capable of moving one brigade. There were some fully motorised formations in 1940, and those deployed in the North Africa. A large part of the British forces were non motorised.
Much of the Indian army was organised on a lighter scale around animal transport for operations in jungles and mountains.

[losna]

What benefits and disadvantages do the Wehrmacht have if they did away with the horse before the start of WW2 and instead fully mechanised the army?

Any battles/campaigns where trucks, cars etc instead of horses that would be of benefit to the Germans?

In Western Europe full motorisation wasn't needed, as the Fall of France show.
In the Soviet Union, full motorisation would have allowed the Wehrmacht to encircle, encircle, encircle and again encircle the Red Army as it did in 1941, but only until the logistical capabilities of trucks permitted. Trucks couldn't supply efficiently armies beyond a certain point, mainly because after that more fuel is consumed in carrying gasoline toward the frontlines than the fuel that is actually delivered. Not to mention that without building decent roads Germans would have soon faced a multitude of breakdowns.
Basically, what Germans really needed was a capillar network of good capacity - and quality - railways built at a pace of at least 8 km/day, to support from no more than 50 km behind the frontline the advancing army. With a similar infrastructure total motorisation wouldn't be so pressing, and armored spearheads would've kept the 1941 pace for much longer.

[ljadw]

What benefits and disadvantages do the Wehrmacht have if they did away with the horse before the start of WW2 and instead fully mechanised the army?

Any battles/campaigns where trucks, cars etc instead of horses that would be of benefit to the Germans?

A fully mechanised WM did not exist and could not exist 77 years ago . Besides, the motorised divisions did not advance quicker than the infantry divisions : only the motorised parts of the motorised divisions could do this,and mostly without success,because motorised units had more mobility ,but less manpower and less firepower and were dependent on the artillery and infantry .An army unit was as a convoy : advancing on the speed of the slowest element.If it didn't, it was searching for trouble .

This is a very questionable statement.

#1 The motorised divisions seem to have been fully motorised. That was the whole point. They had operational mobility.

#2 Motorised formations typically had greater firepower than non mechanised. They had a higher establishment of machine guns, including vehicle mounted weapons and more heavy weapons.

#3 Motorised formations had motorised supply columns with higher capacity and capable of operating further from rail heads. This meant a motorised formation might have more ammunition to fire. (Eberbach, the GOC 5th Panzer army in Normandy said that horse drawn transport of the infantry formations was incapable of supporting these units and the transport columns of the motorised units ended up supplying the infantry. )

Of course the German Army could only have been fully motorised if adequate resources had been invested in producing the huge number of motor vehicles needed. (The Luftwaffe and Navy were motorised as were the German recruited SS formations.) More industrial capacity turned over the B vehicles = fewer tanks or aircraft.

Did the German army need to be fully motorised? If fighting a positional was, does an army need a great superority in the number of chauffeurs?

The British army had a mixture of formations. Some partially motorised, with support elements in motor vehicles and centralised lift capable of moving one brigade. There were some fully motorised formations in 1940, and those deployed in the North Africa. A large part of the British forces were non motorised.
Much of the Indian army was organised on a lighter scale around animal transport for operations in jungles and mountains.

[ljadw]

In WWII mobility was no match for enemy fortifications ,examples : Warsaw, Sedan, Dunkirk ,because more mobility resulted in less manpower and less firepower :a 100% motorisation would claim all manpower from a division ,the more mobile a division was, the less it would have fighting manpower and firepower : firepower was artillery, and heavy artillery was not motorised . In 1941 the big encirclments in the East failed, because the PzD lacked infantry and the Pz generals (Guderian) blamed the infantry (Kluge ) who was to slow;the infantry replied that the PzD acted as primadonnas without coordination with the infantry . 3 years later the same situation was repeating : the Allied motorized divisions were not able to march through Germany, because they lacked manpower and firepower (fieldartillery was not advancing with the divisions)and, this time, the front generals blamed logistics .As they always do .

[ljadw]

What benefits and disadvantages do the Wehrmacht have if they did away with the horse before the start of WW2 and instead fully mechanised the army?

Any battles/campaigns where trucks, cars etc instead of horses that would be of benefit to the Germans?

In Western Europe full motorisation wasn't needed, as the Fall of France show.
In the Soviet Union, full motorisation would have allowed the Wehrmacht to encircle, encircle, encircle and again encircle the Red Army as it did in 1941, but only until the logistical capabilities of trucks permitted. Trucks couldn't supply efficiently armies beyond a certain point, mainly because after that more fuel is consumed in carrying gasoline toward the frontlines than the fuel that is actually delivered. Not to mention that without building decent roads Germans would have soon faced a multitude of breakdowns.
Basically, what Germans really needed was a capillar network of good capacity - and quality - railways built at a pace of at least 8 km/day, to support from no more than 50 km behind the frontline the advancing army. With a similar infrastructure total motorisation wouldn't be so pressing, and armored spearheads would've kept the 1941 pace for much longer.

This is only partially correct: the main problem (which was not solved during WWII by neither side ) was that armoured forces who advanced without the protection of the artillery and infantry, were very vulnerable :armoured spearheds could advance succesfully only at the low speed of the infantry and artillery . Armoured spearheds/motorised units were cavalry only useful for the exploitation of a successful attack . Better railways (the railway system the Germans built in the east was not bad) would not change the fact that motorised units were confined to the roads, while the infantry could operate on the country .

[maltesefalcon]

From a logistical point of view...
German had roughly 120 divisions in Sept 1939. Of those 10 were PZ and 5 were motorized infantry.
Assuming 5000 non support troops per division in need of transport and 10 troops per truck you end up with a rough figure of 50000 transport vehicles to move the other 100 ish. Then you need to add in logistical support and resupply vehicles.

How many trucks could Germany realistically produce between 1933-1936?

[Sheldrake]

In WWII mobility was no match for enemy fortifications ,examples : Warsaw, Sedan, Dunkirk ,because more mobility resulted in less manpower and less firepower :a 100% motorisation would claim all manpower from a division ,the more mobile a division was, the less it would have fighting manpower and firepower : firepower was artillery, and heavy artillery was not motorised . In 1941 the big encirclments in the East failed, because the PzD lacked infantry and the Pz generals (Guderian) blamed the infantry (Kluge ) who was to slow;the infantry replied that the PzD acted as primadonnas without coordination with the infantry . 3 years later the same situation was repeating : the Allied motorized divisions were not able to march through Germany, because they lacked manpower and firepower (fieldartillery was not advancing with the divisions)and, this time, the front generals blamed logistics .As they always do .

Where do I start with this....

Do really really mean is to think that Sedan was a triumph of fortifications over mobility?

Heavy artillery needed to be motorised. IIRC some German general said that the Germans should have motorised their medium artillery not their anti tank guns.

Heavy artillery may not move very often, but needs a continuous supply of ammunition - for which motor transport offers great advantages over animals.

True the allies came to a halt on the German frontier, but they got as far as they did, and as fast as they did because they were motorised, and able to deploy motor vehicles to supply their units hundreds of miles from the Normandy beaches.

[Don71]

@ sheldrake

all your points are correct!
ljadw is on a complete wrong way, the Artillery of a normal german Inf Division wasn't at any point stronger then the Artillery of the mot. Inf Division. They were absolute equal, 36 X 10,5cm Howitzer and 12 X 15cm Howitzer or 10,5cm long range gun. The heavy german Artillery was organized on a Corps or Army level and not at Division level.
The german mot, 1940/1941 Inf Division had more firepower as you correctly stated, because of the Kradschützen Battalion with 6 Kompanies, a stronger Aufklärungs Abteilung and Pionier Abteilung and a much stronger anti Tank Abteilung. The mot. Inf Division had much more machine weapons, especially 2cm and MGs and much more heavy anti tank guns, this compensate the 1 less Regiment more then enough. Also the mot. Inf had the same manpower strenght, then the normal Inf Division.

[ljadw]

In WWII mobility was no match for enemy fortifications ,examples : Warsaw, Sedan, Dunkirk ,because more mobility resulted in less manpower and less firepower :a 100% motorisation would claim all manpower from a division ,the more mobile a division was, the less it would have fighting manpower and firepower : firepower was artillery, and heavy artillery was not motorised . In 1941 the big encirclments in the East failed, because the PzD lacked infantry and the Pz generals (Guderian) blamed the infantry (Kluge ) who was to slow;the infantry replied that the PzD acted as primadonnas without coordination with the infantry . 3 years later the same situation was repeating : the Allied motorized divisions were not able to march through Germany, because they lacked manpower and firepower (fieldartillery was not advancing with the divisions)and, this time, the front generals blamed logistics .As they always do .

Where do I start with this....

Do really really mean is to think that Sedan was a triumph of fortifications over mobility?

Heavy artillery needed to be motorised. IIRC some German general said that the Germans should have motorised their medium artillery not their anti tank guns.

Heavy artillery may not move very often, but needs a continuous supply of ammunition - for which motor transport offers great advantages over animals.

True the allies came to a halt on the German frontier, but they got as far as they did, and as fast as they did because they were motorised, and able to deploy motor vehicles to supply their units hundreds of miles from the Normandy beaches.

The German PzD were blocked at Sedan, because they had not enough firepower to neutralize the French fortifications,only the intervention of the Stukas saved the situation .

The German PzD failed at Dunkirk, because the tanks had advanced to fast,and without the cooperation of the artillery and the infantry, tanks are very vulnerable .

About the allied divisions in 1944 :the attempt to supply them by trucks was not a success : the Red Ball Express failed ; the German infantry divisions advanced as far and as fast in 1940,even farther (to the border with Spain ) :motorised divisions can advance only at the speed of the slowest element (the artillery) and they can only advance as long the enemy is on the run,the moment the enemy is recovering, the advance is blocked .

As long as the enemy is on the run, there are no supply problems and when he has recovered, more supplies will not help : only more divisions can renew the advance .

[Don71]

The German PzD failed at Dunkirk, because the tanks had advanced to fast,and without the cooperation of the artillery and the infantry, tanks are very vulnerable .

What a bullshit claim, the PzD failed at Dunkirk, because of Hitlers stop order and his personal infighting with the OKH and nothing else.

The German PzD were blocked at Sedan, because they had not enough firepower to neutralize the French fortifications,only the intervention of the Stukas saved the situation .

That was the official misssion for the Stukas, to support the motorized fast german Divisions, for that they were developed and trained.