Fully mechanised Wehrmacht at beginning of WW2?

[MarkN]

In the case of the DAK, their defeat was largely due to poor logistics and engineering support.

The question to ask is did the Germans have the resources to win in North Africa - but the conditions and the distances defeated their logistic and engineering services?

The answer is first yes (to having the resources) but then no (logistical and engineering defeat).

North Africa was always the poorly resourced bridesmaid to the Russian effort. Germany had the resources and the capability to win in North Africa, they just chose not to resource it to winning potential. What little they did send was never enough and thus what they had worked even harder than 'normal' and thus looked even more tired than 'normal'.

The Axis didn't lose in North Africa because of logistic and engineering failure, they lost because they were never given the tools to win. The logistic and engineering issues were a product of the lack of resources, not a source of the defeat.

[T. A. Gardner]

The question to ask is did the Germans have the resources to win in North Africa - but the conditions and the distances defeated their logistic and engineering services?

I think they did up to Alamein. By then the US / British economic and production advantage began to be really felt. In the early stages, of the campaign I think the British were mediocre at best and Rommel was mostly hamstrung by a combination of benign neglect by the OKW to the possibilities of winning in N. Africa along with a bad understanding of the logistics of the theater.

The answer is first yes (to having the resources) but then no (logistical and engineering defeat).

The Wehrmacht was abysmally poor at civil engineering compared to the US and bad compared to the British. That's a separate problem from their really have a good grasp on how to push logistics forward. The forces available to Rommel with proper supplies and engineering support would have almost certainly defeated the British.

North Africa was always the poorly resourced bridesmaid to the Russian effort. Germany had the resources and the capability to win in North Africa, they just chose not to resource it to winning potential. What little they did send was never enough and thus what they had worked even harder than 'normal' and thus looked even more tired than 'normal'.

The Axis didn't lose in North Africa because of logistic and engineering failure, they lost because they were never given the tools to win. The logistic and engineering issues were a product of the lack of resources, not a source of the defeat.

In part I think they did. Even at Alamein, the Germans with good logistics could probably have defeated Monty's offensive. When you are using roughly 5 gallons of gasoline to deliver one to the front, and your supplies sit in rotting piles on docks in Libya because you can't move what's delivered forward fast enough, there's a serious problem.

They would have needed fewer trucks hauling supplies, had more at the front, and that would have equated into even more of the available equipment being combat effective.

[MarkN]

The question to ask is did the Germans have the resources to win in North Africa - but the conditions and the distances defeated their logistic and engineering services?

I think they did up to Alamein. By then the US / British economic and production advantage began to be really felt. In the early stages, of the campaign I think the British were mediocre at best and Rommel was mostly hamstrung by a combination of benign neglect by the OKW to the possibilities of winning in N. Africa along with a bad understanding of the logistics of the theater.

The answer is first yes (to having the resources) but then no (logistical and engineering defeat).

The Wehrmacht was abysmally poor at civil engineering compared to the US and bad compared to the British. That's a separate problem from their really have a good grasp on how to push logistics forward. The forces available to Rommel with proper supplies and engineering support would have almost certainly defeated the British.

North Africa was always the poorly resourced bridesmaid to the Russian effort. Germany had the resources and the capability to win in North Africa, they just chose not to resource it to winning potential. What little they did send was never enough and thus what they had worked even harder than 'normal' and thus looked even more tired than 'normal'.

The Axis didn't lose in North Africa because of logistic and engineering failure, they lost because they were never given the tools to win. The logistic and engineering issues were a product of the lack of resources, not a source of the defeat.

In part I think they did. Even at Alamein, the Germans with good logistics could probably have defeated Monty's offensive. When you are using roughly 5 gallons of gasoline to deliver one to the front, and your supplies sit in rotting piles on docks in Libya because you can't move what's delivered forward fast enough, there's a serious problem.

They would have needed fewer trucks hauling supplies, had more at the front, and that would have equated into even more of the available equipment being combat effective.

I think you're saying the same thing.

The logistic facilities and equipment that they had in North Africa couldn't cope with the demands. That was a key determinant to where and when the furthest line was drawn in the sand. If they were given even less to play with, that line would have been further west.

The Germans were not defeated because of logistics and engineering; they were defeated due to a lack of resources. Some may argue the problem was not lack of resources being offered by Berlin but the lack of infrastracture (port capacity and shipping) to land it. But it's the same argument from a different direction.

[ljadw]

In part I think they did. Even at Alamein, the Germans with good logistics could probably have defeated Monty's offensive.

1) This is starting from the POV that the average German soldier was better than the average British soldier and that he needed only better logistics to win .

2) This is also neglecting the fact that the British superiority at Alamein could not be made up by the Germans.


3) Finally this is totally neglecting the fact that the war in NA was not a war between" Britons" and Germans, but between "Britons" ,Germans and Italians, who always had a numerically superiority over the Germans .At Alamein the Axis forces were Germans and Italians .

[T. A. Gardner]

1) This is starting from the POV that the average German soldier was better than the average British soldier and that he needed only better logistics to win .

No, it starts from the POV that the average German field grade officer was better than the average British field grade officer. That is, the Germans applied better tactics and leadership to their operations than the British did and that material superiority did play a significant role in Britain winning in N. Africa. If that superiority were to be significantly reduced, then yes, the Germans win.

2) This is also neglecting the fact that the British superiority at Alamein could not be made up by the Germans.

In large part because the German logistics system was so poor. As I pointed out, the reason there was a tactical (front line) shortage of fuel for units at Alamein was because the Germans were using as much as three quarters of their gasoline moving supplies forward. Reduce the inefficiency of moving the supplies the roughly 2000 miles by truck they were going and you increase the supplies at the front. The overall amount can remain constant and that happens.
A better supply situation, would give the Germans more ammunition, likely more running equipment, and potentially more troops as more could be supported on the supplies delivered and fewer would be engaged in that activity.

3) Finally this is totally neglecting the fact that the war in NA was not a war between" Britons" and Germans, but between "Britons" ,Germans and Italians, who always had a numerically superiority over the Germans .At Alamein the Axis forces were Germans and Italians .

This changes nothing in the above.

[ljadw]

1) This is starting from the POV that the average German soldier was better than the average British soldier and that he needed only better logistics to win .

No, it starts from the POV that the average German field grade officer was better than the average British field grade officer. That is, the Germans applied better tactics and leadership to their operations than the British did and that material superiority did play a significant role in Britain winning in N. Africa. If that superiority were to be significantly reduced, then yes, the Germans win.

2) This is also neglecting the fact that the British superiority at Alamein could not be made up by the Germans.

In large part because the German logistics system was so poor. As I pointed out, the reason there was a tactical (front line) shortage of fuel for units at Alamein was because the Germans were using as much as three quarters of their gasoline moving supplies forward. Reduce the inefficiency of moving the supplies the roughly 2000 miles by truck they were going and you increase the supplies at the front. The overall amount can remain constant and that happens.
A better supply situation, would give the Germans more ammunition, likely more running equipment, and potentially more troops as more could be supported on the supplies delivered and fewer would be engaged in that activity.

3) Finally this is totally neglecting the fact that the war in NA was not a war between" Britons" and Germans, but between "Britons" ,Germans and Italians, who always had a numerically superiority over the Germans .At Alamein the Axis forces were Germans and Italians .

This changes nothing in the above.

1) There is no proof that the average German field grade officer was better than the average British field grade officer

2)It was no so that the German logistics system was so poor : the German logistics system in NA could no be better,because the transport system in Libya prevented this .Libya was a desert without good transport system . And more troops,ammunition, ... were not available,because there was a decisive war in the easy going on . .Besides, there was no such thing as a German logistics system in NA: transport from Italy to NA and in NA was the work of the Italians, and not only did they a good job, but more was not possible .

If Britain had started from Tripoli to Egypt, it would have had the same problems .

3 ) It changes everything :Germans and Italians were interwoven in NA and one can not separate both armies .
The war in NA can not be used as an example to discuss the OP .

Speaking about the OP : in may /june 1940 a partially mechanised WM defeated the partially mechanised armies of Belgium, the Netherlands, France and the BEF .And there is no proof that more mechanisation would have resulted in more successes.

A year later, a partialy mechanised WM failed to defeat the Soviet Armies who were less mechanised than the Allies a year before .This indicates that more mechanisation would not result in more successes . The reason is that the recept for winning is to have more mobility, more manpower and more firepower than the opponent, but that 77 ! years ago more mobility meant less firepower and less manpower,more manpower less mobility and less firepower .,and more firepower less mobility and less manpower.And the problem of squaring the circle is still not solved .

[SpicyJuan]

What benefits and disadvantages do the Wehrmacht have if they did away with the horse before the start of WW2 and instead fully mechanised the army?

Any battles/campaigns where trucks, cars etc instead of horses that would be of benefit to the Germans?

For what it's worth, there were scenarios made for The Operational Art of War IV (a new wargame) that dealt with this hypothetical for Barbarossa. Overall, the German's do much, much better than their historical non-motorized counterparts.

[Gooner1]

North Africa was always the poorly resourced bridesmaid to the Russian effort. Germany had the resources and the capability to win in North Africa, they just chose not to resource it to winning potential.

Germany had the resources to win in North Africa, except those resources were in Europe.

Any Axis attempt to increase the flow of resources to North Africa would likely result in an initial reduction of Axis combat power in theatre - engineers and construction troops plus their stores competing for precious shipping space.

[MarkN]

For what it's worth, there were scenarios made for The Operational Art of War IV (a new wargame) that dealt with this hypothetical for Barbarossa. Overall, the German's do much, much better than their historical non-motorized counterparts.

Such the shame those Prussian Generals didn't think to consult a bunch of armchair wargamers, they could have been in Moscow by Christmas...... If only!!!

Did the modern day wargamers factor in what scale and capabilities the Wehrmacht would lose if industry had been focussed on full mechanisation during the 1930s - or did they just flick a switch and the historical Wehrmacht's bulls and horses magically transformed into Opel Blitz's etc etc etc.?

[T. A. Gardner]

For what it's worth, there were scenarios made for The Operational Art of War IV (a new wargame) that dealt with this hypothetical for Barbarossa. Overall, the German's do much, much better than their historical non-motorized counterparts.

Such the shame those Prussian Generals didn't think to consult a bunch of armchair wargamers, they could have been in Moscow by Christmas...... If only!!!

Did the modern day wargamers factor in what scale and capabilities the Wehrmacht would lose if industry had been focussed on full mechanisation during the 1930s - or did they just flick a switch and the historical Wehrmacht's bulls and horses magically transformed into Opel Blitz's etc etc etc.?

We have the advantage of the internet rather than one of these...

[SpicyJuan]

For what it's worth, there were scenarios made for The Operational Art of War IV (a new wargame) that dealt with this hypothetical for Barbarossa. Overall, the German's do much, much better than their historical non-motorized counterparts.

Such the shame those Prussian Generals didn't think to consult a bunch of armchair wargamers, they could have been in Moscow by Christmas...... If only!!!

Did the modern day wargamers factor in what scale and capabilities the Wehrmacht would lose if industry had been focussed on full mechanisation during the 1930s - or did they just flick a switch and the historical Wehrmacht's bulls and horses magically transformed into Opel Blitz's etc etc etc.?

Are you actually dismissing the value of war games?

Anyways, from the scenario notes of the scenario. I'm not assigning any metric of plausibility to this, however I am sure that this is what the OP is looking for.

After Barbarossa, the Germans looted 290,000 trucks from the occupied countries of Europe in response to the failure of Barbarossa. But it would only have taken 170,000 trucks to fully motorize the Wehrmacht prior to Barbarossa. What if they had done the looting before Barbarossa? This hypothetical variant considers that very possibility. Note that this is the realization of a “What If” contained in SPI’s 1977 reference work “War in the East, the Russo-German Conflict, 1941-45”.

In this hypothetical scenario, the Axis player will find that almost all of his German units have received sufficient trucks to give them motorized movement. There are a few exceptions due to the need to retain a few units capable of entering badlands terrain (which motorized units can’t do). AGN faces the most of this, so it has XXIII Corps, 215th ID, and the Spanish 250th ID still foot-bound. AGC has the 2nd Panzer Army Reserve foot-bound. And AGS has XVII Corps foot-bound. Note that even the one mountain corps has been motorized (it retains the mountain ability via an alternate icon). Finally, the Slovak Corps was motorized. Units above the Arctic Circle, in Finland, and the Rumanians are unchanged.

Other changes are that there is now an additional 100 VPs awarded to the Soviet side at the start. Obviously, having already done the looting before Barbarossa, the Germans will not be able to do it after Barbarossa as well. That means they must cripple the Soviets in 1941. If 1942 requires more than just mopping up, they’re going to be in real trouble. So, the bar has been raised for rating Barbarossa a success.

Of course, gasoline stocks will now be under even greater demand. My assumption is that the existing trucks in the supply net (the vast majority of the historical trucks) – moving continuously back and forth – expend fuel at a greater average rate than the new trucks moving the combat elements – which only move when the unit moves, and always forward. So, while this is about a 50% increase in total trucks going into Barbarossa, I’m assuming only about a 20% increase in fuel needs. And I assume that at least some of the fuel requirements for the extra trucks will have been looted right along with those trucks. Obviously, the looted countries won’t need as much without them. Furthermore, some fuel can be temporarily borrowed from the German economy, which had a lot of slack in it. But, in the end, I’m assuming only a fraction of that 20% need will be met. The shortfall will be modeled by reducing the Axis FSL.

The initial Axis Force Supply Stockpile Level has been reduced from 30 to 27 (a 10% drop). Note that lowering the FSL will cause units to receive less net supply per turn, on average. And that will cause their MP allowance to be reduced, thereby reducing their average fuel expenditures. So, lowering the FSL can account for some level of any fuel shortfall. In fact, the 10% reduction in FSL is equivalent to only a little over half the increased fuel needs being scrounged up – and even that assumes that the FSL is all fuel (which, of course, it isn’t). In other words, the drop in the FSL may seem slight, but it actually may be overcompensation.

The Axis supply net is unchanged. So hex supply values will be advanced at the same rate as historically. This net will therefore deliver the same tonnage of supply as far and as fast as historically. Note, however, that some towed equipment that had been towed by horse-drawn vehicles will now be drawn by trucks. So, while the tonnage delivered is the same, the tonnage of fodder historically delivered to those vehicles has been deducted from the total. That can then be replaced with additional gasoline tonnage. Also, note that fodder is a much less efficient fuel source than gasoline. A ton of gasoline can propel a truck about 1500 miles, while a ton of fodder will only propel a team of six horses about 100 miles. So, while the number of trucks added far exceeds the number of horse teams deducted (about 20,000 vs. about 170,000), the net tonnage of fuel required will be comparable if not favorable. So I assume there will be sufficient lift for whatever additional gasoline is made available despite the same tonnage of deliveries.

The Soviets are unchanged.

The expectation is that the Axis will be able to advance much faster than historically. However, as noted above, their supply net will not be advancing any faster. Couple this with the new supply state rules, and the Soviets have a chance of stopping them – although probably further east than historically.

[hselassi]

After Barbarossa, the Germans looted 290,000 trucks from the occupied countries of Europe in response to the failure of Barbarossa. But it would only have taken 170,000 trucks to fully motorize the Wehrmacht prior to Barbarossa.

OK, just to throw some numbers around. The 1941 German Inf Div had ~17K men and 750 MVs (+1200 Hs Teams) and the UK Inf Div (which was motorized, or actually lorried, which is what I think we are discussing here as opposed to an Inf Div (mot) -> Pz-Gr Div) had ~17K men and 2150 MVs. Therefore to be fully lorried, a German Inf Div needs 1400 additional MVs (I know this is not exact since arty and AT establishments were quite different, but most of those (AT at least) in the Ger Inf Div were already motorized). Which means the 170K looted vehicles would motorize 121 Ger Inf Divs. Calculated backwards, the 170K MVs would provide the roughly 95 Inf Divs (removing the exceptions noted in Spicy Juan's attachment) an additional 1,800 MVs each. Trusting Wikipedia (not the best source, but good enough for this exercise), there were about 600K MVs in Barbarossa, so this would increase the amount by about 30% which makes the fuel calculation a bit suspect, but within the realm of possibility. A larger issue would be the training of an additional 400K+ drivers, co-drivers, mechanics, etc. I believe I read somewhere that by 1940 the WH had exhausted the available pool of civilian motor personnel (most trained civilians being unfit or required in the home front) and any new drivers/mechanics/etc. had to be trained from scratch.

[ljadw]

May I remind people of the words of Quvist who said that he doubted that a fully motorised Ostheer could operate in the East .

There was insufficient road space,as most roads were unfit for motorised transport .

Motorized forces were more vulnerable than infantry .

More mobility would mean less fighting manpower and less fire power .

Last and maybe most important point : it was not a question of advancing faster :if the SU was defeated, the advance to the AA line would happen by train .

[ljadw]

Average lift capacity for German transport in 1941

Trucks :274 ton km

Light transport : 66 ton km

Tractors-Prime Movers : 358 ton km

Horse teams :38 ton km

Source : Operation Barbarossa (Nigel Askey ) Volume II B P 312


But : it was easier to supply and replace horses than trucks and trucks needed more supplies than horses .

[MarkN]

We have the advantage of the internet rather than one of these...

You don't need a sliderule let alone the internet to come up with the idea that full mechanisation as an idea. The British managed it - and according to the curbstomper who has reappeared to infect the forum, the British couldn't come up with any smart ideas or improvisations....

There was a jolly good reason why the Wehrmacht was principally leg powered. And it was not because it was a problem so difficult to fathom that only supersmart wargaming geeks 75 years later could resolve. :roll: