*When I said "anatomy" I meant to say "autonomy."
Anyway Ijadw, the problem with arguing that Generals are interchangeable is that the Generals have a key role in developing the situation that they find themselves and their successors in. By the time that Stumme, Von Arnim, and Von Kluge came in, the battlefield had already been picked and their actions were heavily constrained. It's not a fair comparison.
As poor of a position as El Alamein was from a logistical standpoint, it did take a string of impressive tactical victories to get there in the first place; I'm not convinced these could've been easily replicated, and maybe they shouldn't have. In any case, Rommel planned the layout of defenses and defensive strategy for Alamein, which Stumme attempted to carry out before being killed - nevermind that Rommel might've attempted to preempt the British attack by a spoiling attack on their assembly areas (considering Medenine later on, it's probably better that Stumme was in charge). In any case, once Rommel returned, he held on for about a week. In the end, Rommel ordered a retreat and presented his decision
fait accompli to Hitler.
Another General might not have reacted in time to counterattack each penetration, exhausting the British offensive. Another might have squandered their limited fuel and ammunition during the battle. Another might've waited for Hitler's permission to withdraw, until it was too late. Another might've failed to organize an effective rearguard action to forestall the British breakthrough. While Kesselring questioned Rommel's decision to withdraw over a thousand miles to the Mareth Line in Tunisia, a less independent / more impressionable commander might've made a stand at Mersa Brega or Buerat (with disastrous results). At the same time, although Montgomery advanced cautiously (with Alexander's approval), he didn't give Rommel an opportunity to envelope his spearheads and wrestle back the initiative.
After that, given the loss of the eastern ports together with the Allied naval and air interdiction of Tunis, Axis defeat there was inevitable. However, Rommel's plan for driving through Kasserine and rolling up American lines, as risky as it was, carried with it the only hope of significantly prolonging the campaign. Keeping in mind, prolonging the Tunisian Campaign would've upset the Sicilian Campaign, which in turn affected Kursk. However, Von Arnim was unwilling to support Rommel's plans while their commands were separate, so Kasserine couldn't be exploited.
By the time Von Arnim was in command of a unified
Heeresgruppe Afrika, the Tunisgrad Pocket was already solidified. Of course, one may argue that Von Arnim could've lasted a bit longer if Rommel hadn't run his tanks into prepared British defenses at Medenine, thus becoming too weak to defend the Mareth Line. In that regard, Von Arnim and Rommel both served to inadvertently sabotage each other. Things might've turned out slightly better if Rommel had just been sent home in January 1943.
As for Von Kluge, he was brought in as OB West to replace Von Rundstedt, Rommel's boss. By this point, German forces were completely tied down in a desperate attempt to contain the Allied beachhead, and OKW restricted all freedom of movement. If Von Kluge had been in Normandy from the get-go, maybe the panzers would be available near the beaches for an immediate counterattack on June 6th. On the reverse, Rommel might've instilled more confidence in Von Funck and Von Schwerin to commit to
Lüttich around Mortain, maybe at least slowing the development of the Falaise Pocket. Perhaps Rommel, already regarding his life as forfeit, would do the same thing that he did in Africa and what Walter Model ended up doing anyway - withdrawal behind the Seine.
Taking all of that into account, is it better far-fetched to believe that, had:
- Von Kluge been OB Süd in November 1941 (with Luftflotte 2 in someone's hands other than Kesselring).
- Stumme commanding the Afrika Korps in February 1941.
- Von Arnim's 17.PzD instead of the 15.PzD sent there between March-May 1941.
. . . That a different command team might've produced different results?