The Gibraltar of the East
The Gibraltar of the East
The U.K. spent a staggering amount of resources during the 20's and 30's to building a modern naval base at Singapore whose purpose appears to have been to deter Japanese expansion into Southeast Asia. Would these resources have been better spent on other projects; e.g. expansion of minor bases (a spreading of the forces and thereby the risk), greater concentration on offensive and defensive aerial technologies, an expansion of the army, etc.?
Re: The Gibraltar of the East
Where would the RN base their IO/Pacific fleet?
The gods do not deduct from a man's allotted span the hours spent in fishing.
~Babylonian Proverb
~Babylonian Proverb
Re: The Gibraltar of the East
Trincomalee and/or Colombo could have been expanded. And the other harbors in India could have been utilized as well.Kingfish wrote:Where would the RN base their IO/Pacific fleet?
Re: The Gibraltar of the East
That's over 1500 nautical miles to the west.
Not sure the Japanese would consider that much of a deterrence.
Not sure the Japanese would consider that much of a deterrence.
The gods do not deduct from a man's allotted span the hours spent in fishing.
~Babylonian Proverb
~Babylonian Proverb
Re: The Gibraltar of the East
And as history has shown, Singapore was not that much of a deterrent to a Japanese attack. Granted, the original conception was for the Home Fleet to sally forth to Singapore should hostilities ensue, as well as more troops, airplanes, torpedo bombers. etc, etc, etc....
Getting back to the O.P., what could the U.K. have spent their resources on instead of the Singapore Naval Base.
Getting back to the O.P., what could the U.K. have spent their resources on instead of the Singapore Naval Base.
- Markus Becker
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Re: The Gibraltar of the East
The location was ok. Close enough but not too close. Had France not fallen or Italy remained neutral everything would have been fine. But the events of 1940 could not be forseen.
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Re: The Gibraltar of the East
Importent to recognise the obvious- the 1920's and the way a naval war was to be fought was a very different era to the 1940's. Key differences:
1) Limited role of airpower- although increasing all the time
2) In the twenties any Japanese attack would be mounted from Japan- ie the IJN would need to sail south and be engaged somewhere NE of Singapore. No air power, no French airbases.
3) The RN needed somewhere to base its squadron of commerce raiding heavy cruisers. In the absence of the "main fleet" Britain intended to fight Japan by attacking its trade and to do this permenently stationed a squadron of "Counties" in the Far East. These ships were specifically designed to raid Japanese commerce and had the endurance to stay on station across Japanese trade routes in the South China Sea. Moving any base across the IO would completely invalidate this concept.
By the 1940's this strategy had been overtaken by events. The French had given the Japanese their airfields, the air launched torpedo was now a serious threat and the dive bomber could locate and sink heavy cruisers- see Dorsetshire and Cornwall.
One element of interwar planning that DID come in very useful was the provision of a number of "secret bases" across the IO- which included Addu Attol, the "Port T" described by Somerville.
1) Limited role of airpower- although increasing all the time
2) In the twenties any Japanese attack would be mounted from Japan- ie the IJN would need to sail south and be engaged somewhere NE of Singapore. No air power, no French airbases.
3) The RN needed somewhere to base its squadron of commerce raiding heavy cruisers. In the absence of the "main fleet" Britain intended to fight Japan by attacking its trade and to do this permenently stationed a squadron of "Counties" in the Far East. These ships were specifically designed to raid Japanese commerce and had the endurance to stay on station across Japanese trade routes in the South China Sea. Moving any base across the IO would completely invalidate this concept.
By the 1940's this strategy had been overtaken by events. The French had given the Japanese their airfields, the air launched torpedo was now a serious threat and the dive bomber could locate and sink heavy cruisers- see Dorsetshire and Cornwall.
One element of interwar planning that DID come in very useful was the provision of a number of "secret bases" across the IO- which included Addu Attol, the "Port T" described by Somerville.
- T. A. Gardner
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Re: The Gibraltar of the East
I think a lot of Singapore's mythology is found in British puffing about it's greatness. The coast defenses were really pretty weak. Other than the two 15" gun batteries (2 each) that covered mainly the entry to the channel leading to the naval base, they consisted of old 9.2" and 6" guns scattered here and there.
The facilities and harbor were okay, but I wouldn't call them great by any means.
The facilities and harbor were okay, but I wouldn't call them great by any means.
Re: The Gibraltar of the East
As pointed out by others 1941 was very different from the 1920’s when building the Singapore base was conceived.
Singapore was never a fortress, it was a rear area support and repair base with enough defenses to fend off any quick raids by Japanese forces. Any major attack by the Japanese would take time and the British had a plan to reinforce Singapore with ships and planes.
It was only when Japanese forces moved south and were within air raid range of Singapore that this changed and due to British already being at war in Europe that meant that reinforcements were not enough to defend it.
Singapore was never a fortress, it was a rear area support and repair base with enough defenses to fend off any quick raids by Japanese forces. Any major attack by the Japanese would take time and the British had a plan to reinforce Singapore with ships and planes.
It was only when Japanese forces moved south and were within air raid range of Singapore that this changed and due to British already being at war in Europe that meant that reinforcements were not enough to defend it.
Re: The Gibraltar of the East
Singpore coast artillery defences were:T. A. Gardner wrote:I think a lot of Singapore's mythology is found in British puffing about it's greatness. The coast defenses were really pretty weak. Other than the two 15" gun batteries (2 each) that covered mainly the entry to the channel leading to the naval base, they consisted of old 9.2" and 6" guns scattered here and there.
The facilities and harbor were okay, but I wouldn't call them great by any means.
5 - 15-inch guns
6 - 9.2-inch guns
18 - 6-inch guns
8 - 12-pdrs
10 - 6-pdrs
Don't think there would be too many hostile navies sanguine about sailing near that.
Largest dry dock in the world at the time, I believe.
Re: The Gibraltar of the East
One has to wonder whether or not the initial estimates for fleet reinforcement were grounded in defensible facts, rose tinted hopeful wishes or somewhere in between. The initial estimates were for a fleet reaching Singapore was 42 days. By 1938, this had been increased to 70 days with a further 14 days for reprovisioning. By June '39, this was increased again to 90 days with another 15 days for reprovisioning, followed shortly thereafter, Septmber 1939 to 180 days.
http://fla-sir.weebly.com/uploads/2/4/7 ... terson.pdf see pp 51-2
Granted, the war with Germany was the reason for the drastic increase in time from June '39 to September '39, but what about the increase from 42 days to 105 days? That's a serious underestimation, IMHO, for the arrival of a fleet, upon which the viability of Singapore was based upon.
There's also the rapid fall of France in 1940, which, I'm sure, the planners of the 1920's regarded as so near to zero as to make no odds.
If the defense of Singapore was grounded upon the premise of rapid fleet reinforcement, might it not have been more prudent to either expend these funds in enlarging the facilities at either or both Trincomalee or Sydney and then having a smaller base at Singapore instead. Granted, Tricomalee and Sydney would be much father from the 'action', but they would also be more defensible.
http://fla-sir.weebly.com/uploads/2/4/7 ... terson.pdf see pp 51-2
Granted, the war with Germany was the reason for the drastic increase in time from June '39 to September '39, but what about the increase from 42 days to 105 days? That's a serious underestimation, IMHO, for the arrival of a fleet, upon which the viability of Singapore was based upon.
There's also the rapid fall of France in 1940, which, I'm sure, the planners of the 1920's regarded as so near to zero as to make no odds.
If the defense of Singapore was grounded upon the premise of rapid fleet reinforcement, might it not have been more prudent to either expend these funds in enlarging the facilities at either or both Trincomalee or Sydney and then having a smaller base at Singapore instead. Granted, Tricomalee and Sydney would be much father from the 'action', but they would also be more defensible.
- T. A. Gardner
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Re: The Gibraltar of the East
The naval base at Singapore:
On the Johore Straight
The commercial harbor at Singapore
Little hard to see but a map of the coast defense guns:
Compare to Manila Bay...
http://cdsg.org/the-harbor-defenses-of- ... ilippines/
On the Johore Straight
The commercial harbor at Singapore
Little hard to see but a map of the coast defense guns:
Compare to Manila Bay...
http://cdsg.org/the-harbor-defenses-of- ... ilippines/
- T. A. Gardner
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Re: The Gibraltar of the East
Manila Bay had:
4 14" guns in turrets (2 ea)
4 14" disappearing mounts
2 12" long range barbette mount 360 degree fire
14 12" guns disappearing mounts
20 12" mortars
2 10" guns disappearing mounts
1 8" gun barbette mount
6 6" guns disappearing mount
4 6" guns casemate mount
9 3" guns pedestal mount
29 155mm gun panama mount
4 14" guns in turrets (2 ea)
4 14" disappearing mounts
2 12" long range barbette mount 360 degree fire
14 12" guns disappearing mounts
20 12" mortars
2 10" guns disappearing mounts
1 8" gun barbette mount
6 6" guns disappearing mount
4 6" guns casemate mount
9 3" guns pedestal mount
29 155mm gun panama mount
Re: The Gibraltar of the East
That's a little bit of overkill isn't it? Was this a job-creation scheme or were they thinking of fighting HG Wells' Martians?T. A. Gardner wrote:Manila Bay had:
4 14" guns in turrets (2 ea)
4 14" disappearing mounts
2 12" long range barbette mount 360 degree fire
14 12" guns disappearing mounts
20 12" mortars
2 10" guns disappearing mounts
1 8" gun barbette mount
6 6" guns disappearing mount
4 6" guns casemate mount
9 3" guns pedestal mount
29 155mm gun panama mount
I maintain that Singapore's coastal defence artillery was sufficient to deter and prevent any amphibious invasion of the isle.
- T. A. Gardner
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Re: The Gibraltar of the East
Actually, no. The US has always been big on coast defense. With the 3rd system forts (aka Endicott board forts) started in the 1890's, the US concluded (correctly) that coast defense guns had to be as large in caliber as any ship's they were likely to face. Three types of mount were chosen:Gooner1 wrote: That's a little bit of overkill isn't it? Was this a job-creation scheme or were they thinking of fighting HG Wells' Martians?
I maintain that Singapore's coastal defence artillery was sufficient to deter and prevent any amphibious invasion of the isle.
The Buffington-Crozier disappearing mount. This was for the larger caliber guns and chosen over using barbettes and turrets on the basis of cost. At the time, this was estimated at about 18 disappearing mounts for the cost of a single turret. Given that incoming fire would be relatively flat, disappearing mounts made sense at that point. They also proved relatively resilient right up through WW 2.
Medium caliber guns went into barbette mounts with a wrap around shield. Small guns got pedistal mounts with a shield.
The last type of weapon recommended was a heavy mortar for plunging fire against ship's decks.
The initial forts called for 12" guns, 12" mortars, for the most critial ports and locations, 10" or 8" guns for secondary locations or places cruisers might strike, and 6" or smaller guns for other locations.
Yes, the object was overkill.
By 1905 14" guns were being added and a 16" mortar started to get designed. The intention was to eventually go to 16" guns for the heaviest positions. Searchlights up to 60" in diameter with up to 194 million candle power were added too.
Then, post WW 1, panama mounts for 155 mm guns were added all over the place and the surplus USN 16" guns for the S. Dakota class battleships that weren't built were given to the US Army and used on long range barbette mounts along with 12" guns that were already being mounted that way.
The objective was that important ports and such would have coast defenses equal to any attacking fleet. The US spent a lot of money on these fortifications and the coast defense branch of the US Army was the largest branch of service, if not the most prestigeous.
The US Army also developed command detonated mines and laid thousands of these in rivers, bays, and other water access points using Army mine planter ships.