#55
Post
by pugsville » 12 Nov 2017, 17:04
"It was a good thing for the AEF that armistice came on 11 November 1918., The American force in the Meuse-Argonne had almost exhausted it's ability to fight on. Poor supplies, breakdowns in command and stand, and bad weather had weakened the effort. Donald Symthe, Pershing's biographer , later wrote "that the First army was able to break through on November 1 was due not to any new method like open warfare, nor even to the Army's growing competence, but in large part to the steady deterioration of the enemy". In hi after-action report Charles P Summerall, the ruthless and hard-driving V Corps commander, stated "By desperate fighting, the fresh divisions were able to carry the line forward to the Kriemhilde Stellung, where it was again temporarily stabilised. In spite of successive efforts, the gains were slight during a period of two weeks." Summerall's use of the word "stabilised" really meant meant that the troops were unable to advance and simply remained in position in the face of the determined and skilled enemy"
Pershing and His Generals: Command and Staff in the AEF (page 139)
By James J. Cooke
"But the US 1st Army not only outnumbered rtes dispirited german forces by a margin of four to one , they possessed overwhelming superiority in artillery, aircraft and tanks, all supplied by the allies. In fact the germans did not have any tanks available in their defence. American success would largely depend on sheer numbers"
"However , it did not take long for the inexperienced troops to develop problems. Soldiers grouped together making easy targets for the enemy machine guns that mowed down entire platoons in one sweep. Divisional artillery was ineffective , firing blindly without direct observation. Tanks failed to progress forward at an adequate rate and soldiers recognising that tanks were an easy target, refused to accompany them hence tanks were easy prey for the Germans who systematically disabled them. Compounding the problems in execution , communications was extremely poor due to a combination of incomplete, conflicting reports and a breakdown in the means of transmission notably , cut phone wires. by nightfall the Americans , in the words of Colonel George C Marshall Jr, "disorganised and confused to a remarkable degree", were stopped at a point centred on Montfaucon , well short of their ten mile goal.
The Attack resumed the nest day with similar results. The Rolling barrage advanced too quickly allowing the germans to remain in their entrenched positions until the barrage passed and then rise and cut down the bunched up attackers"
"Again , uncoordinated and disorganised infantrymen were methodically cut down. On the 14 october 1918, new corps commanders led a new wave of assaults with similar results"
"Execution of the 1st Army's plan of attack, though eventually meeting it's objectives , was riddled with errors. Fault can be identified in all the combined arms. Infantry soldiers attacked in groups rather than spread out, did not use cover and concealment when attacking enemy positions, failed to use grenades in close combat, and failed to mop up pockets of resistance. Artillery performed badly too, advancing too slowly and firing blindly rather than by direct observation leaving unharmed machine gun nests for the infantry to assault. Likewise , cooperation and coordination between artillery and infantry was non-existent largely because liaison between the various echelons was difficult to maintain die to the broken nature of the terrain and the numerous wooded areas. In General, command and control was impaired by incomplete and contradictory information reported by frequently malfunctioning radios, telephone wires and messaengers. Colonel R.T. Ward of the AEF Operations Section succinctly summarised the initial assault "It would seem that our troops are not well organised for an attack. The gaining of the objectives, for the present , does not seems possible without undue losses unless time mistaken to reorganise and prepare for concentrated , simultaneous attacks"
" The training agenda mandated by general Pershing was responsible for many of the problems encountered by the AEF"
"The foundation for the poorly conceived trading was erroneous AEF doctrine."
"hence , training provided to soldiers did not emphasise fire and manoeuvre or coordination between the two most significant arms in battle, m the infantry and artillery,The sane was true for other supporting arms, notably tanks and aircraft. The AEF clearly failed to adapt to the doctrinal lessons of the war learned by the French and the British"
"For the Meuse-Argonne offensive AEF headquarters provided detailed instructions to attacking commanders. therefore , units frequently halted their advance while waiting for units on the flank to catch up, even when objectives could have been taken without waiting. Detailed guidance was necessary, however , to manage organisation as large as the square division (two brigades , two regiments per brigade) Though General Pershing installed in his soldiers the idea that they should take the initiative , specific orders listing specifiic boundaries and objectives actually curtails initiative. But to have a force trained to take the initiative requires string junior leaders. Unfortunately for the AEF, string junior leadership was among the many things it did not have abundance. training, doctrine and planning were not complimentary
"The 1st Army faced a decimated enemy who did not have adequate reserves""
----- "Preparing for Battle: learning the lessons in the US army during WW1" (Glen T Cullen LCDR USN 1985)
(thesis of the US army staff and command college)
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