Falklands Island War

[Kingfish]

This one is more of a Would if than a What if

It has often been said that had Argentina sunk or disabled one of the two British carriers the task force would have been forced to withdraw. On May 21st the British went ashore at San Carlos and Ajax bay. Three days later the Argentine's managed to destroy the Atlantic Conveyor with Exocet missiles, and with it a sizeable number of helos.

Assuming the Exocet attack was aimed at the carriers, and one scored a crippling hit. With 3 Commando Brigade firmly established on East Falkland and 5th infantry brigade about to land would the British withdraw or stick it out with reduced air cover?

[T. A. Gardner]

Once the British were ashore, it was over. They lose a carrier, it won't matter. They'll cream the Argies on land and take the islands back. The best the Argentines can do at that point is make it expensive. The Argentine Air Force is losing aircraft at a rate they really can't afford too. At that point they were down to almost desperation measures.

[Robert Rojas]

Greetings to both brother Kingfish and the community as a whole. Howdy Kingfish! Well sir, in respect to your introductory posting of Tuesday - May 08, 2018 - 2:58pm, old yours truly would like to recommend the following thread for your perusal. The thread in question is entitled as LOSS OF 2 UK CARRIERS, May June 1982 and it is also located within the WHAT IF section of the forum. The author of the thread goes by the nom de plume of Simon K. and its creation date is Tuesday - September 09, 2008 - 12:34am. I believe you will find the thread's contents of relevant interest to your pursuits. Finally, I will refrain, at least for the time being anyway, from commenting on your hypothetical exercise until the forum's rather extensive British Commonwealth constituency has had a reasonable opportunity to vent its spleen on this matter. Incidentally, just to sate my curiosity, did you adopt the moniker of KINGFISH out of fond memory for the late Tim Moore of the now quite vintage Amos and Andy Show? Well, that is my two initial cents worth on this latest incarnation of the Anglo-Argentinian soap opera. In any case, I would like to bid you a copacetic day from sea to shining sea.

Best Regards,
Uncle Bob

[Max]

Hey Uncle Bob
Welcome back after all these years - where have you been ??

Cheers
Max

[Robert Rojas]

Greetings to both brother Kingfish and the community as a whole. Howdy Kingfish! Well sir, in continuing reference to your introductory posting of Tuesday - May 08, 2018 - 2:58pm, given the parameters of your hypothetical scenario, old yours truly will err on the side of caution and withdraw the entire expeditionary force from the Falklands archipelago to the nominal safety of the island of Ascension. From my quite limited perspective on such matters, it has been my relative "understanding" that the success OR failure of this shoestring operation was predicated upon the availability and application of naval airpower. That naval airpower was represented by the presence of the Royal Navy's two jeep carriers. Ostensibly speaking, one jeep carrier would provide air defense for the task force and one jeep carrier would provide tactical air support for the ground operation. Now, if something untoward should happen to just one of these jeep carriers, then the entire burden for air defense and tactical air support would collectively fall to the single remaining jeep carrier. Some might call this economy of force while others might call this Russian Roulette. Given what was at stake, attempting to execute the entire combat mission with a single jeep carrier would be tantamount to suicide. It should not be at all forgotten that even with the full participation of the Royal Navy's two jeep carriers, the Falklands task force still managed to lose two frigates and two destroyers at the hands of a Second World Air Force that did NOT have any previous combat experience in its aerial history. I won't even talk about the vitally important support vessels that were subsequently lost to the Argentinian air campaign. In short, failing to withdraw the entire expeditionary force would border on criminal negligence. I can already hear the indignant howls of outrage emanating from the forum's rather extensive Britannic constituency for even broaching the very thought of a withdrawal. It's a rotten job but someone has to do it! Well, that's my initial two cents OR pence worth on this hypothetical topic of interest - for now anyway. In any case, I would like to bid you a copacetic day from sea to shining sea.

Best Regards,
Uncle Bob

[Sheldrake]

The land battle was not a foregone conclusion. 3 Commando Brigade were very good soldiers, arguably as good as you could find anywhere. But without ammunition and fire support they could not fight an extensive land campaign. Once committed operationally with troops ashore there would have been no option but to continue even if one carrier had been lost.

Had both carriers been lost it might have been game over.

The person to ask is Major General Julian Thompson who is a visiting professor at Kings College London
https://www.kcl.ac.uk/sspp/departments/ ... mpson.aspx

Funnily enough this evening I will be attending a function with some senior Falklands veterans.If I see him there I will ask him.

[Sheldrake]

This evening I attended the presentation of the Duke of Wellington's Award for Military History to John Kizely for his excellent book on Norway. It is a really good book dissecting the failure of the campaign at every level. It is essential reading for anyone interested in Churchill.

Over a glass of wine and canapes I did have the chance to ask a retired admiral about the OP's question.The naval personage told me that he was working in MOD during the Falklands War. There was a paper circulating the MOD entitled "Contingency Planning" covering the course of action in the event of different eventualities. These included the loss of one or both carriers. There was no answer. No plan B.

[Robert Rojas]

Greetings to both citizen Sheldrake and the community as a whole. Howdy Sheldrake! Well sir, in light of your installment of Tuesday - May 15, 2018 - 12:56pm, old yours truly was thunderstruck to learn that there was no plan (B) ever contemplated by the Royal Navy's planning division. One can only hope that the confining limitations of time and resources was the reasoning for the glaring absence of a plan (B). I would really hate to think that certain quarters within Her Majesty's Admiralty might have held the Argentine military establishment in such low esteem that a plan (B) might have even been considered as superfluous. I guess we all live and learn! Oh, and by the way, the outcome of your pleasant social gathering only reaffirms my unscientific belief that the liberal consumption of adult libation always produces much better results than the administration of sodium pentothal! Remember, loose lips sink ships! Well, that's my latest two cents OR pence worth on this now expansive topic of interest - for now anyway. In any case, I would like to bid you a copacetic day over in merry old England. GOD SAVE THE QUEEN - not to mention everybody else.

Best Regards From The Upstart Colonies!
Uncle Bob

[Sheldrake]

old yours truly was thunderstruck to learn that there was no plan (B) ever contemplated by the Royal Navy's planning division. One can only hope that the confining limitations of time and resources was the reasoning for the glaring absence of a plan (B). I would really hate to think that certain quarters within Her Majesty's Admiralty might have held the Argentine military establishment in such low esteem that a plan (B) might have even been considered as superfluous.

It wasn't a question of not thinking about the problem. The existence of the contingency paper is evidence that there ought to be a plan B. It was just that wasn't anything much that could be done to mitigate the loss of both carriers. The Falklands War was a huge gamble.(It was on both sides:it cost the Galtieri regime power and resulted in a revolution.)

IIRC the British military did not treat the Argentine forces with contempt ahead of the war. For a start no one spent much time looking at South American military power. We were thereto deter the Russians and stop the Irish from killing each other. Military history teaches us the folly of under estimating the opposition. Who would have thought the Turks would have put up a stronger performance against the British and French in 1915 than they did in the earlier Balkan wars? The troop office assessment in Sheldrake's battery was based on previous campaigns involving long supply lines and the recovery of occupied islands. About the only post war intervention was Suez, which was hardly encouraging.

[Robert Rojas]

Greetings to both citizen Sheldrake and the community as a whole. Howdy Sheldrake! Well sir, in respect to your installment of Wednesday - May 16, 2018 - 12:00am, old yours truly would like to convey his appreciation for your continuing input on the not so inconsequential matters of threat assessment and contingency planning. Your commentary was (and is) quite illuminating. Having an alternative option OR options is just one of my many eccentricities. Now you know! Well, that's my latest two cents OR pence worth on this continuing saga - for now anyway. In any case, I would to bid you an especially copacetic day over on your side of the pond. GOD SAVE THE QUEEN - not to mention everybody else.


Best Regards From The Upstart Colonies!
Uncle Bob

[Hoover]

Hi,

Major Julian Thompson said himself in an interview, that the British Force had big transport problems after the sinking of the Atlantic Conveyor. A lot of helicopters and supplies were lost. If the Argentines would have sunk the 2 carriers, the British assault would have been cancelled.
Also, if the Argies had sunk tze other maor tramsport ship, the Atlantic Causeway, the loss of the air transport capability would have forced the British to retreat, too.
It was "luck" (sorry for that term) for the British, that the Argentines were focussed on the British destroyers and frigates and not on the transport and supply ships.

Regards
Frank

[Sheldrake]

Hi,

Major Julian Thompson said himself in an interview, that the British Force had big transport problems after the sinking of the Atlantic Conveyor. A lot of helicopters and supplies were lost. If the Argentines would have sunk the 2 carriers, the British assault would have been cancelled.
Also, if the Argies had sunk tze other maor tramsport ship, the Atlantic Causeway, the loss of the air transport capability would have forced the British to retreat, too.
It was "luck" (sorry for that term) for the British, that the Argentines were focussed on the British destroyers and frigates and not on the transport and supply ships.

Regards
Frank

Greetings to a denizen of the home of the old HQ 1 Armd Div. Are you a BAOR Brat?

There was lots of luck - and what Clausewitz called friction. The side that won was that best able to continue despite the confusion and bad weather.

One of the desperate measures was serious consideration to deploying a Shackleton AEW aircraft for a one way mission to provide radar cover for eight hours. I met one of the crew...

[Robert Rojas]

Greetings to both citizen Hoover and the community as a whole. Howdy Frank! Well sir, in respect to your installment of Tuesday - June 05, 2018 - 9:23am, old yours truly appears to be in overall concurrence with your sage commentary. And yes, the British certainly did have the LUCK OF THE IRISH when the Argentinian Air Force focused the preponderance of its attention to the warships of the Royal Navy task force. As the old and battered adage goes, AMATEURS TALK ABOUT TACTICS WHILE PROFESSIONALS TALK ABOUT LOGISTICS. Apart from the near suicidal courage of the Argentinian Air Force, I have also wondered how events might have been impacted IF the Argentinians had made better and more creative use of its naval assets. The torpedoing and subsequent sinking of the heavy cruiser General Belgrano pretty much ended that "party" before it even began and the jury is still out on the potential use of the Argentinian Navy's diminutive and quite obsolete submariner force. Yes, there is much that could have gone terribly wrong for Her Majesty's Forces but the fortunes of war were smiling on old Britannia. One can only hope that important lessons were learned. Well, that's my latest two cents worth on this continuous Anglo-Argentinian saga - for now anyway. In any case, I would like to bid you a copacetic day over in the Fatherland. Auf Wiedersehen!

Best Regards,
Uncle Bob

[Sheldrake]

As the old and battered adage goes, AMATEURS TALK ABOUT TACTICS WHILE PROFESSIONALS TALK ABOUT LOGISTICS.

I think that adage can be adjusted.

Amateurs may talk tactics while the professionals talk logistics, but the great captains talked about morale - the spiritual and emotional element in war.

There was a moral and morale dimension.

Whatever emotional attachment Argentinians have to the dubiously claimed Malvinas, the people who lived there firmly did not want to belong to that country. In 1982 I met islanders who had been taken in helicopters by the invaders and threatened with "disappearing into the ocean. The Galtieri regime was a nasty dictatorship. There was a sense of indignation at the invasion, and, despite the logical lunacy it was something that I felt was worth fighting for.

. From a military morale point of view this pitted a conscript force against some of the elite units of a professional army.

The Royal Navy's tradition is for aggressive action without being afraid to risk ships.Look at its record in WW2. One of the reasons why the Argentinians failed to sink more big ships was because RN pilots flew some very scary decoy missions.I am told there is a photograph in a P&O director's office of a Sea King rolling away from a chaff release. The pilot is supposed to have been HRH Prince Andrew.

[Robert Rojas]

Greetings to both citizen Sheldrake and the community as a whole. Howdy Sheldrake! Well sir, in respect to your installment of Tuesday - June 05, 2018 - 11:20pm, first and foremost, thank you for your unique insights on this topic and other topics ELSEWHERE! It does seem that both brother South and yourself have morphed into MY GO TO GUYS for geopolitical matters that are anything BUT related to the Second World War. Now, with that said, It is quite refreshing that you brought up the ever critical issue of morale. I will NEVER dispute the overwhelming importance of the dimension of morale with you OR anyone else. If anything, old Uncle Bob presently is AND has been mystified why the morale dimension is treated like an orphan in so many military related topics across the length and breath of the Axis History Forum. I can only conclude (RIGHTLY or WRONGLY) that the community's disparate armchair generals and admirals are at a complete loss where to fit the intangibility of morale amongst production quotas and armament capabilities. If anything, the dimension of morale is akin to leprosy - a malady to be studiously avoided. OH WELL! Incidentally, you should never feel badly about the reclamation of the Falkland Islands. Logical lunacy notwithstanding, the Falkland Islands were AND are the sovereign territory of the United Kingdom and Lieutenant General Leopoldo Galtieri certainly had no damned business doing what he did. He got his uppcommance and it is truly unfortunate that young men on both sides had to lose their lives for his idiotic aggrandizement. Now, on the not so inconsequential matter of the Royal Navy's tradition of aggressive action, old Uncle Bob believes that it would be safe to say that you are preaching to the choir. After all, where do you think we upstart colonials INHERTIED our navy's tradition of aggressive action from? It's just some fraternal food for thought. Oh, and by the way, there is a thread over in the OTHER ERA section of the forum that might OR might not tickle your fancy. It is entitled as ARGENTINA WOULD INVADE CHILE AFTER THE FALKLANDS? The thread's author goes by the nom de plume of Leonardo Miregi and its creation date is Sunday - November 08, 2015 - 4:51pm. It is a mystery to me how and why this thread wound up in the OTHER ERA section. Well, that's my latest two cents or pence worth on this hypothetical topic for interest - for now anyway. In any case, I would like to bid you an especially copacetic day over in merry old England. GOD SAVE THE QUEEN - not to mention everybody else.


Best Regards From the Upstart Colonies!
Uncle Bob