Thanks.OpanaPointer wrote: ↑05 Nov 2019 00:54Secretary of War Stimson noted in his diaries that on two occasion in 1941 FDR's entire cabinet was unanimous that he could get a declaration of war against Japan if they attacked British and/or Dutch colonies in South East Asia. The first time was on July 5th, Stimson noting this in his entry for July 7th. (Stimson was an indefatigable diarist, his diaries run to thousands of pages. He didn't make an entry every day, but he made notes every day that made it into the diary when he had time to update it.)TheMarcksPlan wrote: ↑05 Nov 2019 00:50What are some good sources on the likelihood and timing of American entry into WW2 absent Pearl Harbor?
I've seen it argued that America wouldn't have gone to war in the event of an attack on Singapore/DEI, let alone an attack on the USSR.
Any evaluation of this ATL has to account for the global impact of delayed - perhaps indefinitely? - American involvement.
National Interest has a blog entry analyzing FDR's moves during latter 1941. My overall impression from the article is that FDR wouldn't have been prepared to ask Congress/America to authorize war against Japan but for the clear indications of Japanese aggressive intent in that area throughout the period. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-b ... page=0%2C1
The article also reminds that the American oil embargo in response to Japan's seizures in Indochina didn't come until August 1941, nearly a year after Japan initiated its presence in Indochina (but immediately after certain seizures).
An ATL in which Japan coordinates with Germany in an attack on Russia should be one in which Japan isn't making aggressive moves on Indochina from 1940. Hitler had some leverage here, as he was enticing Vichy France into an alliance but was simultaneously pushing Japan towards confrontation with the U.S. Perhaps some Nazi pressure against the Indochina move, combined with intimations not to ally too closely with Russia, could have at least delayed Japan's move on Indochina.
That would have removed the direct impetus for the beginning and subsequent escalation of embargoes against Japan (starting with steel/copper scrap then moving to oil). It might have maintained Roosevelt's less-bellicose stance towards Japan that prevailed during 1940. Roosevelt planned a speech for December 8th explaining the danger of Japan's moves with an eye towards getting Congressional support for war based on Japanese aggression against the UK/DEI. The article states,
Furthermore, given the desultory 1940 response to Indochina (no oil embargo until ~10 months afterwards), it might have been possible for Japan to continue importing U.S. oil for at least a few months after an ~August/September attack on the USSR [given no Indochina move]. The politics of standing up for Stalin versus for France would surely have been different but I need to learn more on the likely extent of the difference.Stimson’s stated conclusion that Roosevelt was “undoubtedly considering an attack on Jap forces threatening Southeast Asia” was incorrect. Instead, Roosevelt was scrambling to avoid having to make an after-the-fact appeal to Congress, in light of additional intelligence reports on December 1 that the Japanese expedition had rounded the southern tip of Indochina and was heading into the Gulf of Siam.
If Japan can deal a big blow against SU in 1941 and early 42, all while importing oil, it would be in decent shape for a less-ambitious southwards push during 1942. If the U.S. never embargoes oil due to SU attack, then maybe Japan waits until late 1942 or early 43- when its perceived window of naval superiority would still be somewhat open.
That ATL would delay U.S. entry for 6-12 months, meaning no Torch in 1942. And potentially a Soviet collapse by 1943, prior to delayed U.S. land operations such as Torch.
We were already providing Lend-Lease by October 1941 and non-LL (purchased) aid before then. LL was small in magnitude early in the war and has to go through the LW/KM gauntlet to Murmansk in this ATL. It's not going to make much of a difference.BobTheBarbarian wrote:So I would imagine some sort of economic assistance to the USSR/pressure on Japan would be forthcoming in the event of an invasion by the latter.