The Germans retreat behind the Dneiper in early 1943

Discussions on alternate history, including events up to 20 years before today. Hosted by Terry Duncan.
Stiltzkin
Member
Posts: 1159
Joined: 11 Apr 2016, 13:29
Location: Coruscant

Re: The Germans retreat behind the Dneiper in early 1943

#16

Post by Stiltzkin » 02 Jun 2018, 10:12

According to my calculations, if the Soviet Union would have taken the same casualties throughout 44 as they did during the Dnieper crossings in late 43, they would have had to reconsider further advances.
Anyway, it all came down to how much more manpower each belligerent could muster. If Germany could refill its EF forces to pre Zitadelle or pre Barbarossa levels once again, they could have turned it around, otherwise I see absolutely no possibility.

User avatar
Robert Rojas
In memoriam
Posts: 2658
Joined: 19 Nov 2002, 05:29
Location: Pleasant Hill, California - U.S.A.
Contact:

RE: Old Soldiers Never Die - Just Young Ones Do.

#17

Post by Robert Rojas » 02 Jun 2018, 19:03

Greetings to both citizen Stilzkin and the community as a whole. Howdy Rumple! Well sir, in respect to your posting of Saturday - June 02, 2018 - 12:12am, old yours truly will seldom dispute the ever critical importance of sheer numbers. After all, I believe that it was Joseph Stalin that once said and I will paraphrase "QUANTITY HAS A QUALITY ALL OF ITS OWN". Now, the musings of Koba The Terrible notwithstanding, numbers alone do not necessarily portend the potential success or failure of any two opposing combatants. Now, from my anecdotal perspective on such matters, what is often overlooked in many discussions, such as this one, are the not so inconsequential factors of the maturity and experience of the troops in question. Between June 22, 1941 and June 22, 1943, the Wehrmacht lost a healthy number of its technically proficient young men in their twenties who were the veterans of Poland, Norway, the Low Countries, France, Yugoslavia and Greece. By the Spring of 1943, this overall deficit would start making itself felt - especially within the ranks of the often under appreciated straight leg infantry. As the old and battered adage goes, "weapons are only as good as the men behind them". This would be especially true for the Wehrmacht's projected all out stand on the Eastern Wall. As for the Red Army, utter demographics was clearly on the side of old Moscovy. As long as they the had the significant human capital to literally throw away, then maturity and experience would clearly take a back seat over all other technical and moral considerations. I would certainly hate to be in a Soviet Shock Army. It's just some sobering food for thought. Well, that's my latest two pfennigs or kopecks worth on this now meandering topic into the hypothetical - for now anyway. In any case, I would like to bid you an especially copacetic day over in the Fatherland. Auf Wiedersehen!


Best Regards,
Uncle Bob :idea: :|
"It is well that war is so terrible, or we should grow too fond of it" - Robert E. Lee


Stiltzkin
Member
Posts: 1159
Joined: 11 Apr 2016, 13:29
Location: Coruscant

Re: The Germans retreat behind the Dneiper in early 1943

#18

Post by Stiltzkin » 03 Jun 2018, 03:47

"QUANTITY HAS A QUALITY ALL OF ITS OWN".
This sentence has a little bit of a eristic background (often quoted on the net), this is not a question of rhetorics but in relation to military studies at least, a bit unacademic. This is not a contrast of quantity vs quality per se, but relative quantity vs relative quality of both belligerents. Faction A efficiency and warmaking potential vs faction B efficiency and warmaking potential, boosted by politics/alliances. Any further success of the Allies past the 4th quarter of 1943 was based on a constant stream of manpower in the East, the chance of reaching Berlin on the other hand, to drag more manpower from the Eastern Front (and of course on the inability to replace more men). Less "fechtende Truppen" on a front result in a lower (overall) casualty infliction, on that respective theatre. There is this believe in historiography that the Allied victory was so inevitable and that the Soviet Union was this horde of endless troops. This was hardly the case. Germany was more developed than the Soviet Union which resulted in a superior casualty infliction, they either had to increase the effectiveness of their troops (beyond existing levels and historically the disparity was already great) or find a reliable ally which would join their fight to even the odds (both a difficult task).
There is also an opposite scenario: What would have happened if the Soviets would not have decided to stand idle in the Summer of 43, or if they had annihilated the German Army groups in late 43 already? This possibility existed, often overlooked.
Germany had 3 main weaknesses: A weak geostrategical location, a lack of manpower of military age (at least to fight a conflict of this magnitude) and a racist ideology, which denied them the ability to extract the labour force out of all occupied territories (aside from a few volunteers or fascists). The Axis Allies never sufficed to cover the losses and decided to bail out of the conflict once the UN was part of the Alliance and the full extent of the crimes were known.
WW2 was decided in peoples heads (eradication vs occupation, the choice is obvious), nobody wanted to cover such an obnoxious Nazi regime, while on the other hand the communist were overall more skilled in hiding their crimes and performed better on the political stage, at least only this can explain the emergence of the Anglo-American-Soviet Alliance.

The strategy of defence should have been pursued after the failure of Barbarossa, with Stalingrad and Kursk in mind, I cannot see how the war could have been turned around with the existing constellations.

User avatar
Cult Icon
Member
Posts: 4472
Joined: 08 Apr 2014, 20:00

Re: The Germans retreat behind the Dneiper in early 1943

#19

Post by Cult Icon » 03 Jun 2018, 15:53

The German counterattacks/counterstrikes of 1943 were much less successful than those of 1942 due to 1. improved soviet defense doctrine and production (saturating the frontline with AT and engineer units) so panzer attacks ran into a gauntlet of anti-tank guns and mines. This allowed soviet mobile units to be held in reserve and deployed for deliberate offensives 2. declining german infantry strength after july 1943 which had a sharp impact on counterattacks.

User avatar
Cult Icon
Member
Posts: 4472
Joined: 08 Apr 2014, 20:00

Re: The Germans retreat behind the Dneiper in early 1943

#20

Post by Cult Icon » 03 Jun 2018, 16:36

Stiltzkin wrote:Germany was more developed than the Soviet Union which resulted in a superior casualty infliction, they either had to increase the effectiveness of their troops (beyond existing levels and historically the disparity was already great) or find a reliable ally which would join their fight to even the odds (both a difficult task).
I think that the increase in effectiveness of some of their troops (Panzer) and decreased in others ( like infantry divisions) wasn't the primary factor in german combat power.

German combat power hinged on their success in maneuver/encirclement, not attrition. This required deploying a certain, well balanced mass of troops that were capable of attacking.

User avatar
Robert Rojas
In memoriam
Posts: 2658
Joined: 19 Nov 2002, 05:29
Location: Pleasant Hill, California - U.S.A.
Contact:

RE: The Eastern Wall of Fortress Europe.

#21

Post by Robert Rojas » 04 Jun 2018, 02:07

Greetings to both citizen Cult Icon and the community as a whole. Howdy C.I.! Well sir OR madam, in respect to your posting of Sunday - June 03, 2018 - 6:36am, old yours truly is rather doubtful that you will ever attract a great deal of dissention over what constitutes the classic mobile doctrine of the Wehrmacht. Fire, maneuver and shock action were certainly the quintessential hallmarks of the Fatherland's combined arms operations. And yes, this was THE ESSENCE of traditionally accepted German combat power across much of greater Europe and North Africa. Now that I have all of the requisite accolades out of the way, given the hypothetical parameters as set forth by brother Futurist, I believe we are now dealing with a static linear defense policy on both the West Dvina and Dnieper River systems. Given the overall geopolitical situation on the Eastern Front in the late Spring of 1943, the strategic planners in Zossen have clearly opted to prosecute a reactive war of containment versus a proactive war of maneuver. For all intents and purposes, the forward edge of the battle area on the Eastern Front will morph into something more reminiscent of the trenches of the First World War with the Wehrmacht's mobile formations now acting as fireman to seal off any breach in the line. Generally speaking, THE MOBILE WAR IN THE EAST has now morphed into a WAR OF ATTRITION and like the First World War, I rather suspect that chemical weapons will eventually make their ghastly reappearance. Finally, one must ask this question again, will Joseph Stalin grow weary of such a war of attrition OR will Joseph Stalin continue this fight into perpetuity? There is much for Reich President Hermann Goring to ponder. On a purely incidental note, you certainly do have a unique avatar. Do you identify yourself more with Generalfeldmarschall Erich von Manstein OR do you identify yourself more with Generaloberst Hermann Hoth? Curious and nosey minds want to know! Well, that's my latest two pfennigs or kopecks worth on this expansive hypothetical topic of interest - for now anyway. In any case, I would like to bid you a copacetic day no matter where you might presently find yourself on Terra Firma.

Best Regards,
Uncle Bob :idea: :|
Last edited by Robert Rojas on 04 Jun 2018, 06:15, edited 1 time in total.
"It is well that war is so terrible, or we should grow too fond of it" - Robert E. Lee

Stiltzkin
Member
Posts: 1159
Joined: 11 Apr 2016, 13:29
Location: Coruscant

Re: The Germans retreat behind the Dneiper in early 1943

#22

Post by Stiltzkin » 04 Jun 2018, 06:04

German combat power hinged on their success in maneuver/encirclement, not attrition. This required deploying a certain, well balanced mass of troops that were capable of attacking.
I would not say so. Massive casualties have been inflicted by the standard IDs over all conflicts (in fact the main contributor to success in France 1940), Barbarossa on the other hand, was the textbook example of maneuver. This sentence makes absolutely no sense, since this would imply that Germany was only capable of resisting Soviet advances by relying on operativ warfare only. The Soviets took massive casualties when attacking static German defensive formations, this can be observed in Rzhev sycheva and at the Dnejpr. In fact, due to Germanys economic advantage, the war of attrition did not go in Soviet favour, on the contrary, the Soviets had to reach Berlin before they were out of men. Only few people understand this issue. The only problem with this are territorial gains. Germany achieved quick advances by maneuvering, instead of a slow approach. Counterattacking in the later phases would be based on the decimation of the assailant, however it was their labour force which started to dwindle, not the opponents. It is simple: The numerical advantage of the Soviets negated a fast German success, whereas the impact of other fronts made a victory through attrition impossible. The factor of territory is ignored too: If the Wehrmacht was capable of giving ground in a similar fashion as the Soviets in 41, this would have substantially diminished Soviet odds.
Not to mention that the German Army consisted of flexible formations till the end of the war, just like the IDF today.
Honestly, the military apparatus of each nation does not fundamentally change throughout the years. I mean there were WW1 traditions incorporated. People always speak about a change in doctrines and radical solutions, but since warfare is an evolution I cannot see how there is a substantial difference in the German performance between WW1 and WW2, the Soviet performance in the Winter War, WW1 or even WW2. Not even from 41-45, the true difference dictating the outcome of the war were odds. If anything the Soviet quality diminishes (same for Germany) because capable personnel is lost, under the influence of continuous combat.
Last edited by Stiltzkin on 04 Jun 2018, 10:59, edited 1 time in total.

User avatar
sitalkes
Member
Posts: 471
Joined: 18 Feb 2013, 01:23

Re: The Germans retreat behind the Dneiper in early 1943

#23

Post by sitalkes » 04 Jun 2018, 06:21

Futurist wrote: So, Stalin wouldn't even allow U.S. military engineers to operate on Soviet territory?
No, Russian people could get into trouble just for talking to British or Americans in Murmansk even though those people were bringing all sorts of freebies to Russia. I suggest reading what the Americans did during the Russian civil war and also what happened to the American bomber squadron that was supposed to operate out of Poland and never really did - also the Russians were reluctant to let any of the western allies land planes on Russian territory.

"The American Expeditionary Force, Siberia (AEF in Siberia) was a formation of the United States Army involved in the Russian Civil War in Vladivostok, Russia, during the end of World War I after the October Revolution, from 1918 to 1920. The force was part of the larger Allied North Russia Intervention." Please Mr Stalin, can we invade your country again? This time we promise not to try to overthrow your government!
Futurist wrote: How about simply having Hitler hit his head on something really hard and become just a tiny bit more rational afterwards? Would that do the trick here?
Wouldn't help, he'd still be a paranoid junkie who thought he knew better how to run things than his generals.

User avatar
Cult Icon
Member
Posts: 4472
Joined: 08 Apr 2014, 20:00

Re: The Germans retreat behind the Dneiper in early 1943

#24

Post by Cult Icon » 05 Jun 2018, 05:25

I will get to the responses later, but I need to add:

-The operational/tactical dynamic of 41/42 was a different stratosphere, particularly in the attack. The german units remained tough in the defense in 43-45 but in the offense they were much weaker. The tactical achievements of even the 'elite' G.D, W-SS units pale in comparison to what similar and lesser units achieved earlier on.


-In 43-45 there is a pattern of german panzer counterattacks of having significant but limited effect. They pale compared to counterattacks of 41/42 (such as the encirclement of 2nd Shock Army in 1942 with the attack of 4 x Korps or the german response to soviet offensive at Kharkov Spring 1942) A more dramatic case was in Nov-Dec 1943 where Balck's 48.PzK (~650 tanks and AG) created the Kiev salient (some 80 KM iirc deep). This strong armored force got this far but was so weak in infantry that it could not consolidate its gains. Meanwhile, Vatutin held the front with infantry units while he held back his mobile forces for a series of offensives that would push Manstein out of the Ukraine ( starting from the Zhitomir-Berdichev offensive ).

-A lot of the operational/tactical weakness of the german forces in the attack in 1943 were due to a loss of competitiveness, particularly in 1. infantry 2. mobility 3. artillery/firepower/air support 4. Equipment levels in general and independent specialist assets vs. their enemies. The RKKA had evolved, detailed of this is covered in Glantz's Colossus Reborn and can be read in unit histories/tactical accounts/and operations 43-45.

- The german ability to inflict heavy losses and hold in extreme pressure was proven everywhere in 43-45. However, the use of stats to prove that the RKKA would 'bleed to death' runs into problems as an army that had limited attack ability (the German) would appear overinflated in its potential.

User avatar
Yuri
Member
Posts: 1969
Joined: 01 Jun 2006, 12:24
Location: Russia

Re: The Germans retreat behind the Dneiper in early 1943

#25

Post by Yuri » 05 Jun 2018, 08:59

The actual history of the direction of the Anglo-American forces in the USSR is as follows.
In May 1942 the United Kingdom and the Norht American United States pledged to open a second front in France.
This commitment by British Prime Minister Churchill has sabotaged every fiber of his soul and has persuaded President Roosevelt to violate that commitment.
Then the Chairman of the State Defense Committee (he is Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, he is the People's Commissar of Defense and he is the Supreme Commander of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army) Joseph Dzhugashvili (Stalin) has offered his Western colleagues on the anti-Hitler coalition to send to the USSR their the Ground Army and the Air Force of formations to the South of Russia.
At the same time, not only Anglo-American forces, but also the territory on which they operated would be under the full jurisdiction of Great Britain and the North American United of States.
Further, as you know the North American United of States and Great Britain were at war with Bulgaria, but the USSR is not. Therefore, I. Stalin promised to declare war on Bulgaria, so that the Anglo-American Air Force and Naval Forces could act against Bulgaria from the territory of the USSR.
In addition, I. Stalin offered W.Churchill to carry out a joint the Anglo-Soviet operation on Northern Norway.
British Prime Minister and President of the North American United of States refused to send their Ground Armies to USSR to participate in the battles against armies of the European coalition led by Germany, which operated in the South of Russia. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill afraid as hell of incense that the soldiers and sergeants of his Majesty King George VI to get infected in the USSR "bolshevism" and returning back to Great British Isles to overthrow the power of capital and aristocracy in England. President of the United States of North of America expressed similar concerns, but to a lesser extent, but the main reason for his refusal was different.
From what ended Stalin's proposal to use the Anglo-American air force in the South of Russia next time.
I.Stalin and his Government Ministers, as well as members of the Politburo were not afraid of the emergence of a large number of Western citizens in the USSR. In the 30-ies in Western countries rampant unemployment and in front of the consulates of USSR were long queues of specialists interested in the construction of socialism on Dnieper, Kursk, Ural, Western Siberia and Northern Kazakhstan.
Hundreds thousands of workers and specialists of Western countries helped workers and peasants of the Soviet Union to build industrial and energy giants.
About one of these professionals should be told in more detail. He was drafted into Wehrmacht in the 10th ID (mot.) - commander of the maintenance platoon and was captured in Zhlobin in July 1941 units of 154th Rifle Division (commander major General Fokanov, chief of staff Colonel Golosko), which in November 1942 he received the title guard and in December 1942 participated in the battle for state farm "Red Star" (sovkhoz № 79) as 47th Guard Rifle Division.
But what ended the attempt to use Anglo-American Air Force in the South of Russia in 1942, as well as the American air base near Poltava in 1944 the next time.

Stiltzkin
Member
Posts: 1159
Joined: 11 Apr 2016, 13:29
Location: Coruscant

Re: The Germans retreat behind the Dneiper in early 1943

#26

Post by Stiltzkin » 05 Jun 2018, 10:08

particularly in 1. infantry 2. mobility 3. artillery/firepower/air support 4.
How do you show that? It does not seem that the Soviets made any substantial effort of bridging the qualitative gap, despite a) The German airforces being constrained by fuel and decimated in the West b) a constant bloodletting of skilled personnel over 2 years of constant fighting, c) the decline of overall available strength.
In 1943 the Soviet army took immense operational losses, one of the greatest of the entire war. Their losses only started to diminish gradually due to less and less german manpower, present on the EF. There is a correlation between that.
During combat, they still took 4 losses for each german casualty inflicted, in respect to the size of the committed and engaged forces.
I think it is hard to argue against this. Quality is a relative term, if your opponent improves, so may you. The decline of tactical effectiveness is compensated by learning effects of the staff on the operational level and by improved training programmes, besides introducing more powerful equipment in the arms race that is happening. Everything else comes down to odds. Its simple: Soviet victories of 43 and 44 were based on odds.

These are the core points of the discussion I am going to throw in here to be substantiated: You need to be able to demonstrate that
a) the Soviet Union would have been victorious in both years without the impact of other fronts, (avg. to good chance)
b) without the decline of German manpower (low chance, unlikely)
c) without a numerical superiority (very unlikely)
d) and by that, would have achieved the same territorial gains (advance rates).

User avatar
Robert Rojas
In memoriam
Posts: 2658
Joined: 19 Nov 2002, 05:29
Location: Pleasant Hill, California - U.S.A.
Contact:

RE: The Ghost of Ilya Ehrenberg.

#27

Post by Robert Rojas » 05 Jun 2018, 13:14

Greetings to both citizen Yuri and the community as a whole. Howdy Yuri! Well tovarich, in light of your colorful installment of Monday - June 04, 2018 - 10:59pm, old yours truly must hand it to you and duly concede that I have not seen such an ideologically composed slice of AGITPROP in quite a long period of time. In many ways, your effort was akin to reading an excerpt out of that classic literary masterpiece entitled as THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR OF THE SOVIET UNION. Now, there is absolutely no doubt in my mind that you are personally convinced of both the truth and accuracy of your varied assertions, but I rather suspect (rightly OR wrongly) that your wanting efforts are NOT very likely to attract a sympathetic audience from your Axis History Forum peerage. It's just some sobering food for thought. Piroshki anyone? Well, that's my latest two cents or kopecks worth on this hypothetical topic now clearly wandering into the absurd. In any case, I would like to bid you an especially copacetic day over in the once and future RODINA.

Best Regards,
Uncle Bob :idea: :|
"It is well that war is so terrible, or we should grow too fond of it" - Robert E. Lee

User avatar
Yuri
Member
Posts: 1969
Joined: 01 Jun 2006, 12:24
Location: Russia

Re: The Germans retreat behind the Dneiper in early 1943

#28

Post by Yuri » 05 Jun 2018, 18:59

American air base in Poltava in 1944.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gGyDGUbc3mI
American soldiers were filmed.
As you know, everything Russian is in frame show- the agents of NKVD, even cow, which the American pilot to milk (2:40 - 2:45), in reality the disguised agent of NKVD.

Konig_pilsner
Member
Posts: 321
Joined: 19 Dec 2003, 08:34
Location: Hamilton, Canada

Re: The Germans retreat behind the Dneiper in early 1943

#29

Post by Konig_pilsner » 05 Jun 2018, 19:43

Any chance of winning the war was lost in 1941. By 1943 the only rational German strategy would be to seek peace on the best terms it could, and that would involve a general retreat in the east. Shorten lines, create reserves, build defenses and conserve fuel. Make it as costly as possible on the Allies and hope they choose not to annihilate the Reich at their leisure. Hitler holds zero cards at this point so it is doubtful that anything less than unconditional surrender would be on the table, but that would be better then prolonging a lost war.

User avatar
Yuri
Member
Posts: 1969
Joined: 01 Jun 2006, 12:24
Location: Russia

Re: The Germans retreat behind the Dneiper in early 1943

#30

Post by Yuri » 05 Jun 2018, 20:12

Konig_pilsner wrote: Shorten lines, create reserves, build defenses and conserve fuel.
This is a mistaken judgment. if you have less forces than the enemy, you should increase the action space. Reducing the space of action you give the enemy the opportunity to beat you with great power in the place and at the time when he wants. This strategy was proposed by Manstein in December 1943. Hitler has rightly rejected the Manstein's strategy as not wealthy.

Post Reply

Return to “What if”