The Germans retreat behind the Dneiper in early 1943

[Konig_pilsner]

This is a mistaken judgment. if you have less forces than the enemy, you should increase the action space. Reducing the space of action you give the enemy the opportunity to beat you with great power in the place and at the time when he wants. This strategy was proposed by Manstein in December 1943. Hitler has rightly rejected the Manstein's strategy as not wealthy.

Umm, no. When your infantry is immobile and spread thin you get encircled. A shortened front frees up reserves to counter breakthroughs, and hopefully weaken the enemy enough to call off an offensive. Hitler didn't reject Manstein's strategy because it was tactically unsound, he did so because he wanted to retain control of the resources in the Caucasus which were necessary to continue the war.

[Yuri]

Umm, no. When your infantry is immobile and spread thin you get encircled. A shortened front frees up reserves to counter breakthroughs, and hopefully weaken the enemy enough to call off an offensive. Hitler didn't reject Manstein's strategy because it was tactically unsound, he did so because he wanted to retain control of the resources in the Caucasus which were necessary to continue the war.

In December 1943 Wehrmacht was far from Caucasus, he was already on Dnieper and beyond the Dnieper river.
Manstein offered Hitler is exactly what provides You - to cut the front line, dial reserves etc.
This old recipes and they do not work against this enemy as the Red Army.

[Yuri]

well, a little more about the air base in Poltava
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4mMj7Sr4188

[Konig_pilsner]

You are right, I should have been more clear. I was referring to the spring of 1943 not December. By then they were protecting the Romanian oil fields, prior to that they hoped to retake the Caucasus. Either way Hitler's unwillingness to retreat had to do with economic realities not tactical military strategy.

[Yuri]

In the most in full the fallacy strategy of the short front - when Your enemy is the Red Army or another army, professing the same agresivny the principle of action - demonstrated the Stalin's seventh strike (Yasso-Kishinev operation) in period August 20-25, 1944.
6th Army was literally wiped out in three days. Remember that in Stalingrad, the same army lasted two and a half months.

[Stiltzkin]

n the most in full the fallacy strategy of the short front - when Your enemy is the Red Army or another army, professing the same agresivny the principle of action - demonstrated the Stalin's seventh strike (Yasso-Kishinev operation) in period August 20-25, 1944.
6th Army was literally wiped out in three days. Remember that in Stalingrad, the same army lasted two and a half months.

Correct, giving up the initiative and concentrating the forces on a theatre with vast terrain provokes a double envelopment, however:

Stalingrad offensive, daily losses: 6,392
Iassi-Chisinau, daily losses: 6,713

Looks like they did not do any better, its the situation and mission involved, factoring in terrain, leadership, weather and more favourable odds. The Soviets achieved success by paying the price in blood, while the circumstances and opponents condition was worse than that in the winter of 42. Simply put: They burned through their personnel faster (10 vs 76 days) to achieve penetration and success, while fighting Romanian formations and significantly weaker German formations than the Units present at the Volga two years before.
Furthermore, that was hardly the same army, because it was mostly rebuilt. Wiped out armies have the habit of losing over 66-90% of their personnel.

[Robert Rojas]

Greetings to both brother Futurist and the community as a whole. Howdy Futurist (or Alvin Toffler if you so prefer)! Well sir, in continuing reference to your introductory posting of Tuesday - May 29, 2018 - 2:44pm, it is all well and good that the participants of this creation of yours wish to wander off into colorful, if not irrelevant, tangents, but are you personally satisfied that your ORIGINAL questions are being addressed? Without going into a droning treatise on the subject, I would continue to assert that the Red Army would be bled dry attempting to storm the Wehrmacht's positions in depth along the West Dvina and Dnieper River Systems. I would also continue to assert that the omnipotent General Secretary of the Rodina will never authorize ANY corrupting Anglo-American presence on the soil of his "Workers Paradise". Now, if it is your plain desire for your creation to be inundated with all shades of martial theory, statistical analysis and ideological polemics, THEN PLEASE SAY SO! Well, that's my latest two cents or kopecks worth on this topic so entitled as THE GERMANS RETREAT BEHIND THE DNEIPER IN EARLY 1943 - for now anyway. In any case, I would like to bid you a copacetic day down in your corner of the Southland that was once our glorious Golden State of California.


Best Regards,
Uncle Bob

[Cult Icon]

When reading the russian materials and glantz's numerous books plus materials on the battles in the Ukraine/Hungary 43-45, it's rather clear why the German forces were so unsuccessful in offensive operations in 1943. Forcyck has a decent summary in "Tank warfare on the Eastern Front 43-45". There was a break-down in the German combined arms team in 43 and the same patterns repeat over and over again.

The panzer division and 1-2 x panzer korps attacks were just too 'lightweight' to achieve great results- not enough armor, artillery, infantry, engineers, airpower, or heavy weapons (artillery, flak, etc.) support. The infantry strengths of the Pzds have a repetitive pattern of burning out in several days of attacking. after that, there's no forces for tactical encirclements.

In the East there was saturation of AT guns (produced over 100,000 during the war) and mines plus the weakening of german infantry formations (the panzer divisions became the primary counterattack element in 43-45). This had the effect of sealing off the eastern front and pre-empting or reducing many breakthroughs and deep penetrations.

The oob of soviet combined arms armies had very high numbers of AT weapons and also more engineer units. There was the rise of the SP AT artillery arm equipped with Tank destroyers and assault guns. Also, there were units like "fortified regions" that were designed for the defense and economized infantry for the rifle corps.

For the offense, the soviet forces were proliferating more and more artillery, and more effective units, especially the rocket artillery units and the artillery Corps, which were opening up offensives with unprecedented firepower. The Tank Armies 1- 6 were their most powerful weapon. In Warsaw 1944 the 2TA stopped the counterattack of some 5 x panzer divisions in a short period of time.

[Cult Icon]

The high soviet infantry losses should not be compared to the impact of german losses. In the red army, the soviet troops were like artillery shells in the allied POV- readily replaceable and their value was not as reliant on their quality as the German forces. The operational shell that held and deployed them were often still there as the Germans captured and destroyed very few soviet formations wholesale in 1943. (compared to 42 and 41).

Even if the soviets lost 2 times more men than they historically did in the summer of 43'-A dried up STAVKA reserve would simply just lengthen the duration of the war and delay the building and deployment of assault reserves.

The Germans still have a hurdle to cross- how to attack? Hold forces back to make a new Panzergruppe that is capable of penetrating into the operational depths while the front is undermanned and in flames?

[Yuri]

I would also continue to assert that the omnipotent General Secretary of the Rodina will never authorize ANY corrupting Anglo-American presence on the soil of his "Workers Paradise".

Best Regards,
Uncle Bob

Well, You flatter Your fellow men. It is well known that Champions of debauchery are not Anglo-Americans, but French.
However, the General Secretary of Central Committee of VKP/b/ not afraid of the influence of French on the Russian soul and in 1942 agreed with proposal of leader of "Free France" of General de Gaulle to take in USSR the French infantry division and the aviation squadron.
Already in November 1942, the French pilots arrived in USSR and began training on the Soviet aircraft.

Le commandant Pouyade avec ses mécanos russes.jpg (48.69 KiB) Viewed 7943 times

https://www.agoravox.fr/culture-loisirs ... men-193940

But to send to USSR the infantry division General de Gaulle was not allowed by Prime Minister of His Majesty's government Winston Churchill, who said that the French infantry needed him in North Africa.
As a result, de Gaulle appealed to comrad Stalin with a request to send to Africa those French, who were called to serve in the German Wehrmacht or being part of the French Legion were captured by troops of the Red Army.
Do You know why the Secretary General was not afraid of the influence of French debauchery on the worker-peasant soul of the Russian man? No?!!
Then let me tell You a big secret - Russians themselves who want to plunge into debauchery and French and Americans and sons of the foggy Albion and Germans and all of them put together.

[Yuri]

n the most in full the fallacy strategy of the short front - when Your enemy is the Red Army or another army, professing the same agresivny the principle of action - demonstrated the Stalin's seventh strike (Yasso-Kishinev operation) in period August 20-25, 1944.
6th Army was literally wiped out in three days. Remember that in Stalingrad, the same army lasted two and a half months.

Correct, giving up the initiative and concentrating the forces on a theatre with vast terrain provokes a double envelopment, however:

Stalingrad offensive, daily losses: 6,392
Iassi-Chisinau, daily losses: 6,713

Looks like they did not do any better, its the situation and mission involved, factoring in terrain, leadership, weather and more favourable odds. The Soviets achieved success by paying the price in blood, while the circumstances and opponents condition was worse than that in the winter of 42. Simply put: They burned through their personnel faster (10 vs 76 days) to achieve penetration and success, while fighting Romanian formations and significantly weaker German formations than the Units present at the Volga two years before.
Furthermore, that was hardly the same army, because it was mostly rebuilt. Wiped out armies have the habit of losing over 66-90% of their personnel.

1. You're building losses into an absolute factor. It's wrong. Meanwhile, the loss is only one component of the factor of power. War is a function of three factors - strength, space and time. And one goal - the enemy's army. It is necessary to be able to combine these three factors to achieve the goal.
2. The position of 6th Army on August 19, 1944 is better than November 19, 1942. in all attitude.
a) in August 1944 there was no element of surprise - Germans knew that the Red Army would conduct an operation to destroy. In In November 1942, Germans believed that Soviet Union has no forces for conduct of operations on environment and destroy powerful enemy groups in thirty divisions;
b) August 1944 in Moldova this summer - November 1942 in Stalingrad this winter;
c) Reserves in August 1944 were ready and were intended to reflect the expected advance of the Red Army;
d) Length of the front line in August 1944 is less than in November 1942,
e) In November 1942, both attacks were carried out on the Romanian troops, and in August 1944, the 37th Army struck the left flank of 6th German army, which accelerated the defeat. The reference to the weakness of the Romanian troops is untenable. Shouldn't have dragged Romania into the war on your side
etc.

[Stiltzkin]

You're building losses into an absolute factor. It's wrong. Meanwhile, the loss is only one component of the factor of power.

You cannot ignore losses, they are an absolute just as a relative factor, always have been in every war. The Soviets did not possess unlimited manpower, not even China has unlimited manpower. Losses represent the performance on the tactical level which is summed up to the operational level, they are like an open book to read. You can pay a higher price to achieve a certain goal on the operational level, still the daily losses remained the same, they are a mirror of effectiveness. I can demonstrate that with other conflicts and operations throughout history, or other WW2 battle results. People on the internet believe in a sudden change for 43-44, yet it is merely the time the participants are exposed to combat. The RKKA's performance is actually worse than those of French formations (German daily losses in 1940 are higher than on the EF), but it is the scale and duration of the conflict that differs. Axis power is in decline and the Soviets now possessed absolute numerical superiority and decided to go in the offensive. The average CEV for 43-44 was about 2.0-2.5, the numerical ratio for 44 2.77 : 1. If the Soviets possessed the same effectiveness as their adversaries they would have destroyed all Army groups in 1941. Daily losses of this magnitude, cannot be sustained infinitely.

The position of 6th Army on August 19, 1944 is better than November 19, 1942. in all attitude.

I would say their odds are far worse, so is their support element and its quality and it is not so much about 6th Army's condition rather than the Soviet situation which improved.

b) August 1944 in Moldova this summer - November 1942 in Stalingrad this winter;

Exactly, faster approach, more attrition in combat instead of environmental factors.

c) Reserves in August 1944 were ready and were intended to reflect the expected advance of the Red Army;

Correct, they "threw in more men". In 1942 the forces were so battered after Stalingrad and Wintergewitter that it was impossible for them to reach Kharkov. The Germans could stabilize with some reserves, in 1944 there is nothing to spare.

d) Length of the front line in August 1944 is less than in November 1942,

True, but this does not mean that the enemies superior firepower is not going to affect the assailing Soviet forces, they still had to endure the same they did just 2 years earlier.
All in all I cannot see how the Soviet performance was much different, it remained rather constant, their odds improved. Literature will then present everything as a flawless victory, "improvements", "deep strike". "Blitzkrieg", a fancy term, the same has been done in Nazi media. It is the exact equivalent. There was never a Blitzkrieg, it was a propagandistic term (Fritz Sternberg "A Lightning War" 1938). There was only a quick destruction of the opponents forces, or a stalemate due to an equilibrium. Poland was wrestled down with demographic and economic power, Norway was conducted before substantial defensive measures were present, France was destroyed by classic IDs (also weakened by WW1), after Germany acquired the assets of their neighbors. Barbarossa was certainly the textbook example of maneuver, until they ran out of steam.

e) In November 1942, both attacks were carried out on the Romanian troops, and in August 1944, the 37th Army struck the left flank of 6th German army, which accelerated the defeat. The reference to the weakness of the Romanian troops is untenable. Shouldn't have dragged Romania into the war on your side

Rather irrelevant, even if the Soviet attack would have been primarily aimed against German units et aliae, the outcome of the winter battles of 42 would have been quite the same, it was dictated by the mission, posture and force ratios.

The reference to the weakness of the Romanian troops is untenable. Shouldn't have dragged Romania into the war on your side
etc.

Romanian troops had about the same effectiveness as Soviet troops, whether they posed a liability or addition needs to be substantiated, I think it was probably both. They gave a false sense of "Alliance" which never sufficed to cover the manpower needs of such a war. On the other hand I do not know if Case Blue would have been possible without auxiliaries.
If what you are claiming is true, then I will refer to the points I have posted above which have to be substantiated: You have to show that the Soviets would have been able to carry out the operations without the improvement and less favourable odds and without the exposure of 3 years of combat, factoring in the vast territory of the Eastern Front and also without the impact of other occurances, because after I quantified most battles and operations I came to the conclusion that the best personnel the Soviet Union had to offer, perished in 1941. For Germany it resulted in a substantial loss of qualified personnel as well, with further losses in the winter of 42. In 1943 both refilled their cup, the Soviets profited the most of the build up. However, since quality is a relative term, their decline resulted in a similar performance difference, with improvements on weaponry, the introduction of new gear and learning effects for their Staffs, so perhaps they did improve, but the quality of their human material declined.
Also: I did not drag Romania on "our" side, I have nothing to do with my ancestors decisions. Romania stood in a conflict with Hungary and the ever oppressing menace of imperialist Moscow, which probably motivated the nationalist forces of Romania to join the fight. The Soviets relied on tons of Allies, in fact about half of the Soviet military losses were from the R.S.F.S.R and that is without including factions from other fronts for the Allied total.

[Robert Rojas]

Greetings to both citizen Yuri and the community as a whole. Howdy Yuri! Well tovarich, in light of your installment of Tuesday - June 05, 2018 - 11:53pm, old yours truly must duly concede that you clearly nailed me with your French gambit! Yes, one should never overlook the French and all things French. However, I strongly believe that you are either misinterpreting OR taking something out of its proper context with your particular use of "debauchery". My usage of CORRUPTING ANGLO-AMERICAN PRESENCE addresses the actual or potential exposure of a Soviet citizen to ANY idea emanating from the WEST. Your usage of DEBAUCHERY addresses the traditionally accepted definition of one's sexual weaknesses or predilections. Now, with that said, old Uncle Bob must admit that I did take delight with your politically incorrect characterization of the French. Yes, there will always be those unique endeavors in life where the French will always put the British and the Americans to shame. I just hope the forum's management also enjoys your parody. Well, that's my latest two cents or kopecks worth on this excursion into the bizarre - for now anyway. In any case, I would like to bid you a copacetic day over in the once and future RODINA.


Best Regards,
Uncle Bob

[Yuri]

Also: I did not drag Romania on "our" side, I have nothing to do with my ancestors decisions.

Sorry, I didn't mean you personally, but these gentlemen.

Among the documents of Army Group DON there are several the Manstein's orders in which he demands from his generals and commanders to stop inappropriate treatment of the Romanian military. This is just one of those documents.
There is a the Marshal Antonescu's letter in which he writes in particular about General Hollidt disdainful and rude treatment of Romanian soldiers, officers and generals.
Antonescu's letter is long so I will not reproduce it.

[Stiltzkin]

Among the documents of Army Group DON there are several the Manstein's orders in which he demands from his generals and commanders to stop inappropriate treatment of the Romanian military. This is just one of those documents.
There is a the Marshal Antonescu's letter in which he writes in particular about General Hollidt disdainful and rude treatment of Romanian soldiers, officers and generals.
Antonescu's letter is long so I will not reproduce it.

Yes, I have read several reports which indicated that Romanian troops were mistreated/beaten, especially after the Stalingrad debacle.