TheMarcksPlan wrote: ↑27 Sep 2020 05:37How so? Build 100 fewer tanks for 100 Siebels. By June ’42 the Red Army is kaput in this ATL; a hundred tanks (or equivalent in shells/guns) are surplus to requirements.The problem with this resource allocations in your ATL is that you often seem to spend the same coin twice.
No, you can't do this.
In your ATL for the victory in SU, you've already spent these coins. You want to have the extra Siebels, so first you maximize the panzer output. Then you retrospectively - after I agree that the SU is defeated - alter the plan that you cut the panzer output in order to have more Siebels. Then you redirect another division from the theatre and predict the same outcome.
TheMarcksPlan wrote: ↑08 Aug 2019 10:15The extra tanks come from not cutting the panzer program from 1,200 to 600 by mid-1940 during the 1939 financial crisis. Instead, cuts are made to the Z-plan and, if necessary, to the Ju-88 program. Projecting that higher rate of production forward, it's quite easy to get to 1,000 more tanks by mid-1941. A bigger panzer program should be attended by greater oversight and analysis. To that end I specify that the Germans begin rationalization of panzer production earlier than OTL by taking later-war steps such as using flow production instead of station production and by loosening up the Wehrmacht's counterproductive quality standards. Labor costs for a Panzer III declined by 50% OTL due to these steps; it's a matter of historical contingency that they did not happen earlier. The extra trucks represent ~6% of those available for Barbarossa. They can come from (1) greater production flowing from greater strategic priority for the Heer, (2) greater overall production from rationalization and better use of occupied Europe (i.e. for labor primarily), (2) the civilian economy, (3) sending only one division with Rommel to Africa, (4) some combination of the foregoing.
Also, when you think it is a real option to calculate with the cost of a weapon and you think that 100,000 RM in Panzer-production is interchangeable anytime with 100,000 RM in ship production, Ju-88 production or civilian production you are plainly wrong.
You also spent the extra railroad rebuilding capacities before, just as naval aviation resources, in favor of the successful invasion of the SU:
TheMarcksPlan wrote: ↑08 Aug 2019 10:15The additional forces are as follows:
5 standard infantry divisions converted to motorized infantry divisions. 3 come from the June 22, 1941 OKH/AGN reserve, 2 come from the west (Norway/France/Balkans).
5 additional panzer divisions created. Ration strength of these divisions is ~68,000; with non-divisional "slice" included it's ~85-90,000 additional Heer personnel.
up to 2 additional infantry divisions moved from West to support AGS in Romania.
Strategic planning for a more challenging two-year campaign against the SU
Besides an additional panzer group, the ATL specifies strategic planning for a two-year campaign towards approximately the A-A line. This strategic conception conception implies long-term planning for logistical issues attendant to supplying 3 million men far from the Reich, a consideration that was ignored based on the assumption of a quick campaign. As a result, the Eisenbahntruppen have additional equipment for signals, communications, and other railway infrastructure. The Reichsbahn as a whole is stronger than OTL. Better strategic planning also implies progressive mobilization of manpower and economic resources throughout the campaign as opposed to de-prioritizing army programs shortly after Barbarossa's launch. The takeaway is that while the Ostheer is only slightly stronger than OTL in June 1941, it's ~30% stronger, better-equipped, and better-supplied in ATL May 1942 than OTL.
What Beaver's source tells us is that the Wallies knew that the railways in the Balkans were in terrible conditions, and the Germans had no means to improve those conditions; some of them were of permanent nature, some could be upgraded, but the overall performance of these lines are expected to be really bad. The Wallies also knew about the chokepoints. Another thing is that in your own ATL the German railway-improving teams can't even start to improve the railways in the Balkans before the conclusion of the Soviet campaign.
Then you make a few more ATL alterations, including more Uboats and eliminating the Greek question
TheMarcksPlan wrote: ↑04 May 2019 05:10• I will detail additional ancillary ATL aspects including:
o Hitler decides to eliminate the Greek question months earlier than OTL, further bolstering Barbarossa’s strength
o Hitler follows through on, and the Wehrmacht abides, Hitler’s 1940 demand for longer barrels on the Mark IV.
o Early- and pre-war boosts to Uboat production at the expense of surface fleet
These ancillary aspects are not essential to the ATL’s thesis but they bolster its feasibility.
but then the Reich is in full mood of building up a carrier fleet and the control of the seas:
TheMarcksPlan wrote: ↑20 Sep 2020 12:26Control of the seas
In addition, you're assuming too much IMO. The OKM had specific plans for carrier conversions, for example. Lutzow and Speer would have taken a year to convert and 400 workers. Seydlitz was to converted and may actually have started conversion (anyone know?). Eugen, Tirpitz, Scharnhorst, Gniesenau... Italy had several hulls that could have been converted, completed plans for Roma's conversion, and nearly completed an aircraft carrier in 43. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Italian_a ... ier_Aquila Germany had several ocean liner hulls that it considered converting and Russia left substantial hulls intended for its Kronstadt and Sovetskii Soyuz ships that could have been used.
And you do the same with the Luftwaffe:
TheMarcksPlan wrote: ↑19 Sep 2020 10:11That's OTL not ATL.
I understand that you're responding to a low-detail post by me (one that followed very detailed posts)... but I've provided multiple reasons why ATL would be different from OTL on many of the factors you list. Most critically is German plane production delta for ATL over OTL. Nearly as important is the German fuel situation in ATL versus OTL: with Caucasus oil the LW maintains pilot quality with the W.Allies. The Wallies couldn't reliably bomb Germany by daylight until 1944; in an ATL with >2x LW production it's at least questionable whether W.allies can establish air superiority over Germany. Lack of AS over Germany doesn't mean LW has beaten RAF/AAF, just means the central W.Allied strategic goal has been defeated.
So first we allocate the freed aircraft units from the SU (obviously, they are victorious, so haven't lost a significant number of their own) in order to protect the AS over Germany to keep the industry running at a higher pace. But then
...the same aircrafts are establishing aerial AND naval control of the Eastern Med.TheMarcksPlan wrote: ↑24 Sep 2020 05:23
The extra capacity can support more divisions and/or a very powerful LW contingent in the ME. The LW has 2,500 unemployed frontline aircraft after the SU falls, this is very bad news for the W.Allies. In OTL campaigns in the Med, the LW was heavily outnumbered and, particularly in Tunisia, out-supplied. As a result its losses far exceeded Wallied losses - LW couldn't defend its bases and had such a spare-parts problem that >600 AC were abandoned in Africa. Here the LW has at least numerical parity unless the W.Allies focus all their limited ME shipping capacity on air forces (not a good idea). As a result, the LW would achieve approximate casualty parity with W.Allies, which implies the LW saving ~1,500 AC and their crews versus OTL Med campaigns through Salerno. Combined with the absence of LW losses in the East, this has serious implications for the W.Allied bombing campaign in Europe.
It's like I had 100 dollars last week OTL, and I spent it on food. But ATL I spend it on clothes so I can fill my stomach and look fancy, too! o.O
But when it comes to the Wallies or the Soviets, they are passive, incompetent, inexperienced and everything is twice as hard for them as in OTL.
While the 10th Indian division in 1941 was:
THE INDIAN ARMY IN AFRICA AND ASIA, 1940-42: Implications for the Planning and Execution of Two Nearly-Simultaneous CampaignsThe 10th Indian Division deployed to Iraq hurriedly. The lack of fighting there was fortunate; the division had inadequate training and insufficient equipment. Most new formations were lamentably deficient in AT guns, AA artillery, and armored vehicles. For example, the 1940 divisions contained only 36 percent of their authorized artillery, 19 percent of the LMGs, and 11 percent of the mortars.
Gooner1 questioned me whether I classify the 10th Indian Division as hodgepodge. I confirmed. In 1941.
Because by late 1942 they became trained, equipped and battle-hardened.
Once again you think that these units were basically an inexperienced garrison force, who has to face the shining panzers of the Ostheer.
It was simply not the case.