Could a German invasion of Turkey succeed?

[TheMarcksPlan]

The Liberty ship could carry up to 10,500 measurement or ship tons, which is of course a measure of volume. They also had a deadweight capacity of 7,800 long tons

FM-101-10 (66), pg. 7-56 gives 11,886 MT volumetric and 10,800 long tons DWT for Liberties.
GLS vol.1, App.A gives 12,500 MT and 10,800 Lton DWT.

FM's figures roughly correspond to the volumetric bale capacity of the holds in this diagram:



This is more of an art than a science: where you can stick something that isn't a hold-conforming substance (like grain) is kind of a judgment call. I'm sure wartime Liberties sailed with stuff jammed in nooks and crannies of the ship not counted in this diagram.

Page 7-58 specifies maximum operating ship supplies (ship stores, dunnage, water, etc.) at 2,800 long tons.

One thing my ton-miles analysis doesn't account for is the supply of troops during a 2-3 month journey to the MidEast. That'd cost some cargo carrying space/weight, which would tend to make my estimate an over-estimate.

In theory, a Liberty ship with 420,000 cubic feet could easily accommodate the 174,000 cubic feet of lift required for an entire infantry division

Huh? It was 90k MT for an ID even with boxed vehicles - 3.6mil ft3.

Even if you're just talking the men, at 3.75 MT/man (GLS vol.1, Table 21) that's >2mil ft3.

if you look at pages p 125 of Malta and British Strategic Policy, the author points out the Swordfish and by extension Albacores had shorter ranged ASV radar than the Wellingtons. Coupled with a longer flight range and the ability to carry two torpedoes this ASV advantage made the Wellingtons more useful for the longer missions this scenario would require.

True.

So we'd have ONLY the Wellingtons operating to assist an Aegean-focused submarine campaign, unlike OTL. Makes it a bit harder for the subs.

[TheMarcksPlan]

Another thing to consider for our post-SU ATL is that the Axis probably takes Malta.

OTL the operation was cancelled because:

• Rommel wanted the resources for his stupid Alam Halfa push, which isn't authorized/necessary in this ATL.
• Hitler wouldn't release enough oil to the Italian Navy. ATL there's no Eastern Front so we have some free oil for Regia Marina.

(There are other reasons, going off the top of my head)

In addition, beating the SU frees up 2,500 LW planes, some of which can help a bit with the C-3/Herkules (say 1,500 in MidEast, 2-300 in Aegean, the rest in Sicily). Oh and if you want to substitute some Germans for the mostly-Italian landing forces planned, there's a few idle Landser for that.

Taking Malta in, say, September '42 would functionally free up even more Axis shipping for support of the MidEast push (either version - with/against Turkey): with Malta captured, there's fewer ships sunk/damaged on the route and the use of ships is more efficient.

Germans would also assign the maritime-trained LW forces in Norway to the Med by late spring '42 when Archangelsk falls or the W.Allies decide it's futile sending more stuff to SU; that'd be really unfortunate for the Operation Pedestal fleet and/or any RN units trying the Aegean.

[Peter89]

Your impression is based partly on uncritical analogy to OTL and failure to dig into the details of shipping logistics. It contradicts contemporary military analysis of the military/logistical situation and is flatly wrong on historical German plans/strategy.

Let me suggest something: you've intellectually hobbled yourself by beginning this discussion with the view that my opinion is a fantasy, which has prevented you from critically examining your priors in light of new evidence.

I like and respect you enough to point this out; some others in this thread I consider lost causes who operate in bad faith. Regardless of one's mental capacity, it's impossible to do your best analysis if you don't take the opposing position seriously. The only times I got my ass handed to me in court were when I was overconfident and didn't put enough thought into opposing arguments.

I hope that doesn't come across the wrong way. I've enjoyed our discussion and learned quite a bit.

This is so not true!

I try to carefully examine your proposals with a more conservative method and I also changed my stance during the conversation from a 99% disaster to a bloody struggle and eventual defeat. I still think that this plan is a plan for defeat, but I never denied that an invasion against Turkey might succeed in late 1942 in your ATL. However, I still think that it is a fantasy that the Axis gains control of the seas by 1944 and pushes into India, Arabia and Africa. I remain in this conversation in good faith.

However, good faith does not prevent me to prove you wrong if I think you're wrong.

The more important bottleneck was in the shipping capacity. You have to prove that shipments from Triest could arrive in sufficient quantities to the Agean coast to support your invasion. I gave you a tons of details, including lost shipments via this route and the state of affairs in naval and aerial warfare in the MTO.

...and I have addressed each of your arguments.

No, you haven't.

First of all, you think that aerial supremacy is to be won by the redirected aircrafts of the Luftflotte Ost. Let me ask you, because it includes your ATL's unclear premises, how would the 2500 aircraft of the Luftflotte Ost look like in late 1942? You have to keep some planes there as well, and you've already cut the numbers of the Ju-88 program.

The extra tanks come from not cutting the panzer program from 1,200 to 600 by mid-1940 during the 1939 financial crisis. Instead, cuts are made to the Z-plan and, if necessary, to the Ju-88 program.

In OTL, it looked like this (a total of 2113 aircrafts):

Luftflotte Ost
50 Fw189
63 Hs126
67 Do17
645 Ju88
214 He111
202 Ju87
489 Bf109
41 Fw190
82 Bf110
12 Hs129
26 Ar196
22 BV138
23 He160
166 Ju52
5 BV222
6 He115

Luftflotte 4 in southern Russia (a total of 886 aircrafts)
106 Fw189
16 Hs126
122 Ju88
8 Do17
147 He111
116 Ju87
23 Hs123
23 Hs129
89 Bf110
233 Bf109
2 He114
1 Ar196

A grand total of 3000 aircraft, of which 767 were Ju-88.

What we know from aerial warfare in WW2, the offensive operations contribute to higher losses of aircraft than defensive operations; mostly because the conditions under the aircrafts must operate, is a decisive factor for their operational availability and performance.

So you assume that the Luftflotte Ost would compromise 2500 "unemployed aircraft", but what does that mean? How many aircrafts did you leave in the East to recon and safeguard? Then how many aircrafts did you redirect to defend the airspace of the Reich? What type of surplus aircrafts do you think the Luftflotte Ost would possess - you've already cut the Ju-88 production (25% of the OTL planes in the Luftflotte Ost) for your victory in the SU.

I understand that you're responding to a low-detail post by me (one that followed very detailed posts)... but I've provided multiple reasons why ATL would be different from OTL on many of the factors you list. Most critically is German plane production delta for ATL over OTL. Nearly as important is the German fuel situation in ATL versus OTL: with Caucasus oil the LW maintains pilot quality with the W.Allies. The Wallies couldn't reliably bomb Germany by daylight until 1944; in an ATL with >2x LW production it's at least questionable whether W.allies can establish air superiority over Germany. Lack of AS over Germany doesn't mean LW has beaten RAF/AAF, just means the central W.Allied strategic goal has been defeated.

1. I, again, did not argue whether the LW production could be doubled in half a year after the SU's fall, but you made a commitment yourself that you need the extra fighters from the Luftflotte Ost to do that.
2. Pilot quality was determined by a lot of factors, fuel was only one of them. If the Germans double their aircraft output, how do you plan to cope with it with the same aircrew and personnel quality? What are the losses in your Soviet ATL in this regard?
3. The Caucasus oil wasn't immediately available for the Germans, so it didn't affect pilot quality in late 1942-early 1943.

During our period (November 1942 - May 1943), the Germans lost 2422 aircraft in the MTO:
Fighters: 888 (62.6% of their initial strength at November 1942)
Bombers: 734 (58.3 % of their initial strength at November 1942)
Twin-Engine Fighters 117 (41.1 % of their initial strength at November 1942)
Dive Bombers 128 (35.2 % of their initial strength at November 1942)
Transports 371 (31.5 % of their initial strength at November 1942)

What makes such losses so appalling is the fact that Luftwaffe strength in the Mediterranean varied from 200 to 300 fighters and from 200 to 300 bombers throughout the period. Thus, combat wastage was well over 200 percent of unit strength. Admittedly, some losses were unavoidable. Nevertheless, the impression left by the North African debacle is that had the Germans cut their losses at Libya, they could have defended Sicily with ground forces deployed to Tunisia. In the air, the Luftwaffe could have used the strategy it had waged so successfully in western Europe over the past year and a half: fighting only on its own terms or for a decisive strategic object. However, the commitment to Tunisia placed the Luftwaffe in a position where it had to fight at great disadvantage with a resulting high rate of attrition.

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/AAF ... ffe-5.html

So let me summarize:

1. You cut the Ju-88 program and the Z-Plan in order to conjure up extra 1000 panzers in 1941
2. You think that the Soviets could be defeated by 1942 in a largely offensive manner by moderate losses compared to OTL (which contradicts every OTL aerial operational reality)
3. Then you allocate the surviving 2500 unemployed aircrafts to the defense of the Reich and the MTO (types and numbers are missing), in order to make the doubled LW production and the full air cover of the Med
4. Then you assume that no serious losses will be suffered on the Adria-Corinth-Agean route because the LW will be able to clear the skies of Wallied aircrafts and the seas clear of naval units
5. Then you assume that the LW is still capable to be on the offensive against the Wallies in the ME, where we know they will have the lower hand

What we actually know is that the LW suffered one of its worst defeats in the MTO in this given time period, losing 40%+ of its initial strength. Instead of defending Sicily where they still had the upper hand, the LW decided to face the Wallies in NA, and they've lost. And you think it is still reasonable that they could maintain a foothold in NA if the Wallies are present, AND protect the shipping lanes in the Agean? Just how?

Also, you said that for a successful 1941 Soviet operation, the Germans must conclude the Balkans campaign even faster (which actually contributed a lot to their failure to clear up the partisans), and move more units from the Balkans / NA in order to bolster their strength. These transfers most likely lead to a Wallied superiority, and a sooner collapse of the Axis forces in the theatre.

Let's not forget that the Wallies were able to defeat 2422 LW units in the area. The cause of the defeat was obvious, and it wasn't simply numerical inferiority.

With operations conducted in support of the Central and Western Task forces, Twelfth Air Force aircraft outnumbered those in Eastern Air Command by a ratio of more than 2 to 1. The air plan called for the Twelfth Air Force to initially commit 1,094 aircraft to Operation TORCH, while the combat-experienced RAF supplied the Eastern Air Command (EAC) with 454 planes of all types—234 of which were the short-ranged Hurricane and Spitfire fighters.
The air requirements for the Western Air Command were calculated at 160 short-range fighters, 13 fighter-observation aircraft, and 15 light bombers. Aircraft were to begin arriving on D+2 and would incrementally increase with daily flights from Gibraltar. Within six days of the initial assault, the assigned aircraft were to be fully operational supporting the Western Task Force in the Casablanca area. Final end strength would consist of 400 short-range fighters, 240 long-range fighters, 70 heavy bombers, 228 light bombers, and 156 transports. By 12 December 1942, the Axis air forces possessed just 1,220 aircraft in the entire Mediterranean Theater. A majority of these aircraft—298 German and 574 Italian—were based in Sicily and Sardinia; less than 200 miles from Tunisia and Bizerte.

Let's not forget that the Wallies:
- operated about 1548 aircrafts in the MTO
- the Axis 1220
- the result is a resounding defeat for the Axis

It wasn't simply about numbers, you see.

The SCR-582 radar was able to detect low-flying aircrafts from 40km, SCR-268 was able to do it for 40-110km (the Germans used 45kmx22km zones in the Himmelbett system). The point is that if you attack into a radar-controlled, integrated AA system, your casualties will be disproportionately higher. In late 1942-early 1943, it was the case for the Germans.

But I'm really curious what kind of aerial units could you summon into this theatre?

Until how long do you think the Axis is able to cope with the Wallies in the ME, especially after they've lost NA?

How fast do you think the naval assets of the Axis will held in the Med?

Do you want to allocate all the Luftflotte Ost to the MTO? Okay, then bye bye doubled AC production for Germany, and by 1944, the air war is over, the Germans are expulsed from the Med, and it's effectively game over for the Axis expansion plans.

To repeat: Using Axis ships on relatively secure routes to Tripoli and the Aegean instead of Tobruk means those ships provide more shipping. Instead of sitting ports waiting for escorts, and instead of repeated abortive sailings due to RN/RAF interference, they conduct regular runs to Tripoli and the Aegean.

Axis still has ~1.5mil tons of ships at this point; to achieve 5,000t/day throughput to the Aegean at 30 day ship TRT requires only 10% of the merchant fleet.

The problem here is that the Italian logistical line was already overburdened to sustain the war effort in NA/Sicily. The same goes for the Balkans railway, only a small percentage of that could be used. So most of the shipping must come from Triest or the upper Adriatic.

30 day ship TRT?
Wow. Can you please recall the average cruising speed of the available cargo ships in the area?

Why do you assume that every kind and size of cargo ships had a berth in the Western ports of Turkey?

For how long do you think this route will be relatively safe to the Axis?

Why do you think that a campaign against Axis shipping would not be as fruitful in the Eastern med as it was in the Western med?

The historical cause of the relative lack of ship sinkings here was that the Axis was not doing any major shipping operations here. As soon as the Wallies had the time to clear this up, they sank eg. all the small Spanish supply ships sustaining Crete.

In addition, Italian warships can be used for running troops. This was done OTL some but the need for heavy escorts limited it. ATL there's little need for heavy convoy escort. To repeat, the Tripoli sea line is now >1,000mi from British bases while the Brindisi-Corinth and Aegean sea lines are immune to surface and air interdiction.

Are you kidding me?

Capital ships of Italy withdrew to La Spezia and other northern ports to save them from sinking. To deploy them offensively or as transports would have been a suicide.

They are not immune, they are more protected, but that doesn't mean that they will be protected FOREVER, and it doesn't mean that they will take no losses.

Losses that the Axis cannot replace.

Long story short: if you can't assemble a properly sized and typed airforce, meet their logistical needs (not just tons, but personnel, airfields, radars, etc. too) and prove that somehow they will effectively fight the Wallies in the theatre overperforming the OTL by 100-200%, then their defeat is only the question of time. And if the magic air cover will disappear above the shipping lanes, the Wallies will sink the cargo ships - in fact Corinth Canal will be one of the most exposed routes, because the shipping traffic is easily and precisely observeable there.

[Ружичасти Слон]

Let me suggest something: you've intellectually hobbled yourself by beginning this discussion with the view that my opinion is a fantasy, which has prevented you from critically examining your priors in light of new evidence.

Let me suggest something: you've intellectually hobbled yourself on write with the view that all opinion and fantasy you have must to be possible, which has prevented you from critically examining real history datas and evidences.

Tmp was not examine real history datas and evidences critical tmp was misrepresent and was manipulate history datas and evidences to make tmp imagination storys. When not have history datas or evidences tmp just make big wave on hand. Example. Balkan railways was have poor capacitys. No problem tmp wave on hand make good capacitys by take signals on Russian railways. And for to remember can only take signals on Russian railways after tmp was make big wave on hand and imagination story on Nazis win war on Soviet union.

Regardless of one's mental capacity, it's impossible to do your best analysis if you don't take the opposing position seriously.

Regardless of one's mental capacity, it's impossible to do your best analysis if you don't take real history seriously and ignore all opposing positions that you was not like.

Tmp must to understand mostest on what tmp was write was be tmp imagination storys. How can to take imagination storys serious when ideas only on tmp head ?

[Peter89]

I don't want to be entirely negative. IF your ATL about the SU would become real, the Germans might be able to shore up their defenses and put up a much more stubborn resistance for the continent, that might have been a bargaining power, given there wasn't an A-bomb project going on. So if they continue to fight on their own terms for their predestined strategic objectives, the Wallies could have a hard time to crack the nut of the continental domination of the Germans. Also, a successful campaign in the SU might ensure the minor Axis allies' loyality to the cause, and that meant a lot of resources they could have utilized better. Eg. the manganese and bauxite from Hungary alone might erase all the German needs in the economic warfare in regards of these raw materials.

The possibility of an operational pause might allow the Germans to remove the bottlenecks from their war economy, lay their hands on the Turkish chromite and the Iberian tungsten, as well as the POL. It might enable the battered branches of the Wehrmacht to regenerate (except the KM, that battle was lost), improve their training standards, give the sufficient time to produce more spare parts and develop a better infrastructure behind their OTL fucked up training and repair system, developing a combination of veterans and well-trained units, that might have been a stalemate for long enough to earn a few A-bombs.

The Wallies might have been lured into a faulty decision making by their too much successful raid on Hamburg; so they might have been less and less effective, well into 1944. I tend to agree with Robert Citino, and I'd advise the Germans to take a defensive stance and hope for the best. ( Something they could have more easily achieved by doing nothing or a Med strat in 1940-1942 )

[Richard Anderson]

I don't want to be entirely negative. IF your ATL about the SU would become real, the Germans might be able to shore up their defenses and put up a much more stubborn resistance for the continent, that might have been a bargaining power, given there wasn't an A-bomb project going on.

Gee, I suppose I should pay more attention to these fantasies occasionally. MANHATTAN has been hand-waved away too? Along with the the Ju 88? Along with the Soviet Union? Along with rail capacity limitations? Along with shipping limitations? Along with port capacity limitations? What else have I missed that was hand-waved away?

[Peter89]

I don't want to be entirely negative. IF your ATL about the SU would become real, the Germans might be able to shore up their defenses and put up a much more stubborn resistance for the continent, that might have been a bargaining power, given there wasn't an A-bomb project going on.

Gee, I suppose I should pay more attention to these fantasies occasionally. MANHATTAN has been hand-waved away too? Along with the the Ju 88? Along with the Soviet Union? Along with rail capacity limitations? Along with shipping limitations? Along with port capacity limitations? What else have I missed that was hand-waved away?

We are taking some serious shit here, and the pill isn't called HISTORY

[Carl Schwamberger]

I'm thinking of the contrast between here on AHF where expert witnesses cannot be 'guided', where facts cannot be shielded from context, where objections and evidence are not blocked, and other venues where such things occur. It must be disorienting or frustrating for some members to be unable to craft the presentation of evidence as they can elsewhere.

[Terry Duncan]

Despite allowing a lot of leeway in this thread, it has little prospect of offering the reader any further useful details and as this is as good a point as any now, the thread is locked.

Terry Duncan

[Terry Duncan]

Unlocked as per request.

Terry Duncan

[Carney]

Hi all.

This topic title jumped out at me because I'd recently seen a YouTube video from TIK about it.



The specific issue of the feasibility of a German invasion starts to be discussed at 8:59.

Given the incredible amount of detail in this thread already, I'm not sure that the video adds anything new, but I thought some might find it interesting..

Thanks for unlocking, Duncan!

[TheMarcksPlan]

Hi all.

This topic title jumped out at me because I'd recently seen a YouTube video from TIK about it.



The specific issue of the feasibility of a German invasion starts to be discussed at 8:59.

Given the incredible amount of detail in this thread already, I'm not sure that the video adds anything new, but I thought some might find it interesting..

Thanks for unlocking, Duncan!

Thanks for bringing this my attention; I find TIK insufferable but occasionally check in on his ramblings. I didn't - constitutionally can't - watch the whole video but around 10:50 he talks about the Soviet and British fleets blowing up bridges in the Bosporus.

There were no bridges over the Bosporus until 1973.

The idea of using a "fleet" for this work is equally stupid. Just park valuable fleet assets in range of the bridge? Have them fire all their shells over hours, while exposed to numerous threats? Where is the British fleet and how is it preserved after Germans take Thrace? If you're firing naval shells at a (non-existent) bridge instead of placing demo charges that means the Germans have already conquered Thrace, which means any British fleet would be sailing past a hostile shore into Marmara, which was a disaster even in 1915. I could go on...

You could get better analysis by surveying the crowd at a Wendy's.

The few minutes I watched also show that TIK considered only the Bosporus route for logistical support; there's no discussion of the Aegean or Black Seas except to say "Germany lacked the fuel to supply their troops by sea."

The video appears to contemplate a pre-Barbarossa attack on Turkey so many of the points in our discussion are inapplicable.

[Richard Anderson]

Thanks for bringing this my attention; I find TIK insufferable but occasionally check in on his ramblings. I didn't - constitutionally can't - watch the whole video but around 10:50 he talks about the Soviet and British fleets blowing up bridges in the Bosporus.

Trying to gain information from history videos is problematic at the best of times. The Mythtry Channel was bad enough, but now anyone can make up history and post it on BoobTube. Few are tolerable, most are simply awful.

There were no bridges over the Bosporus until 1973.

I see you are feeling my pain. See? It does help to be grounded in the real history before inserting fantasy history.

[Peter89]

Hi all.

This topic title jumped out at me because I'd recently seen a YouTube video from TIK about it.



The specific issue of the feasibility of a German invasion starts to be discussed at 8:59.

Given the incredible amount of detail in this thread already, I'm not sure that the video adds anything new, but I thought some might find it interesting..

Thanks for unlocking, Duncan!

This video is completely missing the facts.

Iraq's oil production was nowhere near that of the Caucasus, and the infrastructure was under development.

If the territory that contains the infrastructure is attacked, it is highly unlikely that it will fall into the hands of the Germans. The chance that the Germans can capture the Iraqi oil installations intact through an attack via Turkey is close to zero. Then they either had to transport the oil back to the continent or build a refinery there. But neither will give them oil in time. The only hope for the Germans was to capture the oil installations more or less intact, and defend them. The occasional sabotage either did not really work (see Operation Boatswain) or didn't make much sense, because the Germans could replace both the pumping stations' machinery and the 12 inch pipes with relative ease. But if the refineries and the wells are destroyed, the damage could hinder the Germans substantially.

What could have worked for the Germans was either local cooperation, like the Iraqi rebellion, or surprise commando-style assaults, like the one that the British used at Abadan. Also, a lot of the Iraqi oil infrastructure was pointed southeast instead of west, so in any case the Germans would face a lot of difficulties to utilize it.


As for chromite, the situation was even more clear. The Germans both captured and possessed stockpiles and sources in 1940-1941, and the lack of chromite did not become a burning issue before the losses (and subsequently the production) rose through the roof. The Turkish were also keen to supply Germany without an invasion.

The British had little means to get the Turkish ore in 1941/1942, so what the Turkish actually did was stockpiling. If the Med was closed for the British, the Turkish ore (and other trade) would go to the Germans.


As for food, the Germans - despite their repulsive policies - suffered no major shortages in 1940-1942, so it is highly unlikely that they've got defeated because of this. The photos the guy showed about the near skeleton kids are depressing enough, but the majority of the population of Europe didn't look like that in 1940-1941.

What the Germans missed totally that they needed allies to defeat the British and neutrals to stay neutrals and do not join the British... the policy that they will take raw materials by force regardless of the local population's political orientation was stupid enough if we consider the fact that black people from Senegal and Madagascar, as well as Arabic people from Iraq fought for the nazi interests in this sector - not the typical soldiers we imagine in the Reich's service. Despite full of illusions and grandiose plans with no means to complete, Raeder was right about the narrow-minded colleagues in the Heer who lacked a more worldwide outlook.

Also a big question for me, why did the nazis and the muslims get along so well in so many occasions. I am still amazed by this, and frankly, I have no idea if they could have cooperated even on mid-term or not. Anyone any thoughts on this?

[TheMarcksPlan]

I see you are feeling my pain. See? It does help to be grounded in the real history before inserting fantasy history.

Might it be just a tad self-important to consider identifying error as "feeling [Richard's] pain"?

I've had the general feeling before. Upthread some guy told me that a Liberty Ship could carry a whole infantry division:

In theory, a Liberty ship with 420,000 cubic feet could easily accommodate the 174,000 cubic feet of lift required for an entire infantry division,

As the larger Wilhelm Gustloff could "only" fit 10,582 refugees when packed to the gills for a short evacuation trip, putting an ID's 14,000+ in a Liberty Ship would require stacking bodies. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MV_Wilhelm_Gustloff

People make errors, the key is not to be an obnoxious idiot - something TIK has trouble with.

--------------------------------

now anyone can make up history and post it on BoobTube. Few are tolerable, most are simply awful.

Agreed. There are some good channels though. Greg's Airplanes and Automobiles, for example, does good and deep technically-based WW2 aircraft analysis. https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCynGrI ... gHJAIp9oSg

Dr. Alexander Clarke is an academic who does very long, very detailed warship analysis. https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCE2x09 ... iSbFPEhIwQ Probably because of his virtues, he is not the most-viewed naval analyst on YouTube.

BTW - the best way to "watch" Youtube is to convert videos into MP3 and listen to them while doing dishes, walking the dog, etc. https://ytmp3.cc/en13/ If there are interesting cites/tables reference you can go back to the video.