TheMarcksPlan wrote: ↑30 Sep 2020 17:46
Your impression is based partly on uncritical analogy to OTL and failure to dig into the details of shipping logistics. It contradicts contemporary military analysis of the military/logistical situation and is flatly wrong on historical German plans/strategy.
Let me suggest something:
you've intellectually hobbled yourself by beginning this discussion with the view that my opinion is a fantasy, which has prevented you from critically examining your priors in light of new evidence.
I like and respect you enough to point this out; some others in this thread I consider lost causes who operate in bad faith. Regardless of one's mental capacity, it's impossible to do your best analysis if you don't take the opposing position seriously. The only times I got my ass handed to me in court were when I was overconfident and didn't put enough thought into opposing arguments.
I hope that doesn't come across the wrong way. I've enjoyed our discussion and learned quite a bit.
This is so not true!
I try to carefully examine your proposals with a more conservative method and I also changed my stance during the conversation from a 99% disaster to a bloody struggle and eventual defeat. I still think that this plan is a plan for defeat, but I never denied that an invasion against Turkey might succeed in late 1942 in your ATL. However, I still think that it is a fantasy that the Axis gains control of the seas by 1944 and pushes into India, Arabia and Africa. I remain in this conversation in good faith.
However, good faith does not prevent me to prove you wrong if I think you're wrong.
TheMarcksPlan wrote: ↑30 Sep 2020 17:46
Peter89 wrote:The more important bottleneck was in the shipping capacity. You have to prove that shipments from Triest could arrive in sufficient quantities to the Agean coast to support your invasion. I gave you a tons of details, including lost shipments via this route and the state of affairs in naval and aerial warfare in the MTO.
...and I have addressed each of your arguments.
No, you haven't.
First of all, you think that aerial supremacy is to be won by the redirected aircrafts of the Luftflotte Ost. Let me ask you, because it includes your ATL's unclear premises, how would the 2500 aircraft of the Luftflotte Ost look like in late 1942? You have to keep some planes there as well, and you've already cut the numbers of the Ju-88 program.
TheMarcksPlan wrote: ↑08 Aug 2019 10:15
The extra tanks come from not cutting the panzer program from 1,200 to 600 by mid-1940 during the 1939 financial crisis. Instead, cuts are made to the Z-plan and, if necessary, to the Ju-88 program.
In OTL, it looked like this (a total of 2113 aircrafts):
Luftflotte Ost
50 Fw189
63 Hs126
67 Do17
645 Ju88
214 He111
202 Ju87
489 Bf109
41 Fw190
82 Bf110
12 Hs129
26 Ar196
22 BV138
23 He160
166 Ju52
5 BV222
6 He115
Luftflotte 4 in southern Russia (a total of 886 aircrafts)
106 Fw189
16 Hs126
122 Ju88
8 Do17
147 He111
116 Ju87
23 Hs123
23 Hs129
89 Bf110
233 Bf109
2 He114
1 Ar196
A grand total of 3000 aircraft, of which 767 were Ju-88.
What we know from aerial warfare in WW2, the offensive operations contribute to higher losses of aircraft than defensive operations; mostly because the conditions under the aircrafts must operate, is a decisive factor for their operational availability and performance.
So you assume that the Luftflotte Ost would compromise 2500 "unemployed aircraft", but what does that mean? How many aircrafts did you leave in the East to recon and safeguard? Then how many aircrafts did you redirect to defend the airspace of the Reich? What type of surplus aircrafts do you think the Luftflotte Ost would possess - you've already cut the Ju-88 production (25% of the OTL planes in the Luftflotte Ost) for your victory in the SU.
TheMarcksPlan wrote: ↑19 Sep 2020 10:11
I understand that you're responding to a low-detail post by me (one that followed very detailed posts)... but I've provided multiple reasons why ATL would be different from OTL on many of the factors you list. Most critically is German plane production delta for ATL over OTL. Nearly as important is the German fuel situation in ATL versus OTL: with Caucasus oil the LW maintains pilot quality with the W.Allies. The Wallies couldn't reliably bomb Germany by daylight until 1944; in an ATL with >2x LW production it's at least questionable whether W.allies can establish air superiority over Germany. Lack of AS over Germany doesn't mean LW has beaten RAF/AAF, just means the central W.Allied strategic goal has been defeated.
1. I, again, did not argue whether the LW production could be doubled in half a year after the SU's fall, but you made a commitment yourself that you need the extra fighters from the Luftflotte Ost to do that.
2. Pilot quality was determined by a lot of factors, fuel was only one of them. If the Germans double their aircraft output, how do you plan to cope with it with the same aircrew and personnel quality? What are the losses in your Soviet ATL in this regard?
3. The Caucasus oil wasn't immediately available for the Germans, so it didn't affect pilot quality in late 1942-early 1943.
During our period (November 1942 - May 1943), the Germans lost 2422 aircraft in the MTO:
Fighters: 888 (62.6% of their initial strength at November 1942)
Bombers: 734 (58.3 % of their initial strength at November 1942)
Twin-Engine Fighters 117 (41.1 % of their initial strength at November 1942)
Dive Bombers 128 (35.2 % of their initial strength at November 1942)
Transports 371 (31.5 % of their initial strength at November 1942)
What makes such losses so appalling is the fact that Luftwaffe strength in the Mediterranean varied from 200 to 300 fighters and from 200 to 300 bombers throughout the period. Thus, combat wastage was well over 200 percent of unit strength. Admittedly, some losses were unavoidable. Nevertheless, the impression left by the North African debacle is that had the Germans cut their losses at Libya, they could have defended Sicily with ground forces deployed to Tunisia. In the air, the Luftwaffe could have used the strategy it had waged so successfully in western Europe over the past year and a half: fighting only on its own terms or for a decisive strategic object. However, the commitment to Tunisia placed the Luftwaffe in a position where it had to fight at great disadvantage with a resulting high rate of attrition.
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/AAF ... ffe-5.html
So let me summarize:
1. You cut the Ju-88 program and the Z-Plan in order to conjure up extra 1000 panzers in 1941
2. You think that the Soviets could be defeated by 1942 in a largely offensive manner by moderate losses compared to OTL (which contradicts every OTL aerial operational reality)
3. Then you allocate the surviving 2500 unemployed aircrafts to the defense of the Reich and the MTO (types and numbers are missing), in order to make the doubled LW production and the full air cover of the Med
4. Then you assume that no serious losses will be suffered on the Adria-Corinth-Agean route because the LW will be able to clear the skies of Wallied aircrafts and the seas clear of naval units
5. Then you assume that the LW is still capable to be on the offensive against the Wallies in the ME, where we know they will have the lower hand
What we actually know is that the LW suffered one of its worst defeats in the MTO in this given time period, losing 40%+ of its initial strength. Instead of defending Sicily where they still had the upper hand, the LW decided to face the Wallies in NA, and they've lost. And you think it is still reasonable that they could maintain a foothold in NA if the Wallies are present, AND protect the shipping lanes in the Agean? Just how?
Also, you said that for a successful 1941 Soviet operation, the Germans must conclude the Balkans campaign even faster (which actually contributed a lot to their failure to clear up the partisans), and move more units from the Balkans / NA in order to bolster their strength. These transfers most likely lead to a Wallied superiority, and a sooner collapse of the Axis forces in the theatre.
Let's not forget that the Wallies were able to defeat 2422 LW units in the area. The cause of the defeat was obvious, and it wasn't simply numerical inferiority.
With operations conducted in support of the Central and Western Task forces, Twelfth Air Force aircraft outnumbered those in Eastern Air Command by a ratio of more than 2 to 1. The air plan called for the Twelfth Air Force to initially commit 1,094 aircraft to Operation TORCH, while the combat-experienced RAF supplied the Eastern Air Command (EAC) with 454 planes of all types—234 of which were the short-ranged Hurricane and Spitfire fighters.
The air requirements for the Western Air Command were calculated at 160 short-range fighters, 13 fighter-observation aircraft, and 15 light bombers. Aircraft were to begin arriving on D+2 and would incrementally increase with daily flights from Gibraltar. Within six days of the initial assault, the assigned aircraft were to be fully operational supporting the Western Task Force in the Casablanca area. Final end strength would consist of 400 short-range fighters, 240 long-range fighters, 70 heavy bombers, 228 light bombers, and 156 transports. By 12 December 1942, the Axis air forces possessed just 1,220 aircraft in the entire Mediterranean Theater. A majority of these aircraft—298 German and 574 Italian—were based in Sicily and Sardinia; less than 200 miles from Tunisia and Bizerte.
Let's not forget that the Wallies:
- operated about 1548 aircrafts in the MTO
- the Axis 1220
- the result is a resounding defeat for the Axis
It wasn't simply about numbers, you see.
The SCR-582 radar was able to detect low-flying aircrafts from 40km, SCR-268 was able to do it for 40-110km (the Germans used 45kmx22km zones in the Himmelbett system). The point is that if you attack into a radar-controlled, integrated AA system, your casualties will be disproportionately higher. In late 1942-early 1943, it was the case for the Germans.
But I'm really curious what kind of aerial units could you summon into this theatre?
Until how long do you think the Axis is able to cope with the Wallies in the ME, especially after they've lost NA?
How fast do you think the naval assets of the Axis will held in the Med?
Do you want to allocate all the Luftflotte Ost to the MTO? Okay, then bye bye doubled AC production for Germany, and by 1944, the air war is over, the Germans are expulsed from the Med, and it's effectively game over for the Axis expansion plans.
TheMarcksPlan wrote: ↑30 Sep 2020 17:46
To repeat: Using Axis ships on relatively secure routes to Tripoli and the Aegean instead of Tobruk means those
ships provide more
shipping. Instead of sitting ports waiting for escorts, and instead of repeated abortive sailings due to RN/RAF interference, they conduct regular runs to Tripoli and the Aegean.
Axis still has ~1.5mil tons of ships at this point; to achieve 5,000t/day throughput to the Aegean at 30 day ship TRT requires only 10% of the merchant fleet.
The problem here is that the Italian logistical line was already overburdened to sustain the war effort in NA/Sicily. The same goes for the Balkans railway, only a small percentage of that could be used. So most of the shipping must come from Triest or the upper Adriatic.
30 day ship TRT?
Wow. Can you please recall the average cruising speed of the available cargo ships in the area?
Why do you assume that every kind and size of cargo ships had a berth in the Western ports of Turkey?
For how long do you think this route will be relatively safe to the Axis?
Why do you think that a campaign against Axis shipping would not be as fruitful in the Eastern med as it was in the Western med?
The historical cause of the relative lack of ship sinkings here was that the Axis was not doing any major shipping operations here. As soon as the Wallies had the time to clear this up, they sank eg. all the small Spanish supply ships sustaining Crete.
TheMarcksPlan wrote: ↑30 Sep 2020 17:46
In addition, Italian warships can be used for running troops. This was done OTL some but the need for heavy escorts limited it. ATL there's little need for heavy convoy escort. To repeat, the Tripoli sea line is now >1,000mi from British bases while the Brindisi-Corinth and Aegean sea lines are immune to surface and air interdiction.
Are you kidding me?
Capital ships of Italy withdrew to La Spezia and other northern ports to save them from sinking. To deploy them offensively or as transports would have been a suicide.
They are not immune, they are more protected, but that doesn't mean that they will be protected FOREVER, and it doesn't mean that they will take no losses.
Losses that the Axis cannot replace.
Long story short: if you can't assemble a properly sized and typed airforce, meet their logistical needs (not just tons, but personnel, airfields, radars, etc. too) and prove that somehow they will effectively fight the Wallies in the theatre overperforming the OTL by 100-200%, then their defeat is only the question of time. And if the magic air cover will disappear above the shipping lanes, the Wallies will sink the cargo ships - in fact Corinth Canal will be one of the most exposed routes, because the shipping traffic is easily and precisely observeable there.
"Everything remained theory and hypothesis. On paper, in his plans, in his head, he juggled with Geschwaders and Divisions, while in reality there were really only makeshift squadrons at his disposal."