No arguments there. In terms of equipment, the Turks were much worse off than the Soviets. They had hardly any tanks or anti-tank guns, which would put them at a huge disadvantage against the Germans. The shortages of artillery, motor vehicles, and radios are additional factors that will handicap the Turks. The Heer will have a much easier time against them than the Red Army. The initial German attack into Thrace would be a clean sweep. Constantinople would probably be in their hands within about a week or so.TheMarcksPlan wrote: ↑07 Jan 2021 03:59There's a range of variance about what would be needed but I'm fine with that figure as well for ATL purposes. The very concept of "needed" has some ambiguity - it could range from "average ideal" through "minimum for success" to "minimum for survival." German mechanized units at the bleeding edge of deep operations in Barbarossa seem to have operated on far less against strong Soviet reserves; probably a German unit facing a quantum of poorly-equipped Turks needs less supply than one facing an equal quantum of Soviets.Avalancheon wrote:Thus, a force of 10 infantry and 10 panzer divisions would need 5600 tons of supplys a day.
It is a weird argument to make, no question. Peter89 seems to think that there is some iron law of nature preventing the Bulgarian railway from operating more than 10 trains per day. The volume of trains it historically supplied is the maxiumum volume it could ever supply, regardless of any improvements. He doesn't give any reasons why this is so, he just waves his hands and expects us to take it at face value.TheMarcksPlan wrote: ↑07 Jan 2021 03:59Don't you know the Germans are not allowed to act rationally in any respect whatsoever?Avalancheon wrote:Peter89s estimate on the capacity of a single track railway are unrealistically low. He says 10 train (pairs) per day, but in fact it was 12. More importantly, it was possible to greatly improve the capacity of a single track line, to the point where they could handle 72 train (pairs) per day. (Thats an increase of 6 times) This is explained in the article, The Influence of Railways on Military Operations in the Russo-German War 1941–1945, by H.G.W. Davie.
Seriously it's a point I made upthread (loooong thread though) and whose logic is just unavoidable. As Davie's article discusses, Germany carried off probably the largest pre-operation rail program in history ahead of Barbarossa (Operation Otto), laying 300,000 tons of steel. That's probably on the order of total track weight in the Balkans at that time. To pretend they can't upgrade Turkey-bound railways is pure fantasy. Germany upgraded rail connections to the French frontier ahead of Fall Gelb as well. Nonetheless there's a fad about Germans and logistics; it's impervious to evidence.
Yes, the Middle Eastern railroads were very deficient. This doesn't directly relate to the subject at hand, BUT... It is interesting to speculate what consequences this could have had in another timeline, if the battle of El Alamein had gone differently.TheMarcksPlan wrote: ↑07 Jan 2021 03:59The problem for the Allies is shipping more than rails and ports (which were worse than in Turkey anyway, btw - one decent line from Basra that needed upgrading and one incomplete line in Palestine/Levant). Peter89 upthread admits to being unable to quantify the shipping factor (hope I don't have to find that post but will do so if challenged); his faith that the W.Allies could fight extensively in the ME lacks analytical grounding.Peter89 wrote:The problemis that the Western Allies had a pretty good railroad network towards Turkey by late 1942, with multiple ports, airfields and whatnot.
If the Germans had succeeded in pushing the British out of Egypt, then they would have had a very difficult time supplying their forces in Palestine and TransJordan. The British would have needed to ship supplys in to the port of Basra in Iraq. Then transport them on the Taurus railway from Basra to Aleppo in Syria. And then transport them again over a different railway from Aleppo to Haifa in Palestine. Thats an enormous distance to cover, and supply volumes cannot have been very great.
Meanwhile, the Germans would have a much easier time suppling their forces in Egypt. They would have control of the huge port of Alexandria, not to mention the smaller ports of Said and Suez. The railway lines were short and direct, enabling them to quickly move large supply volumes to the front. The Middle East would be indefensible against them. So you see, a British defeat at El Alamein would have really screwed them over in the long run, because their logistical situation would be untenable.
...Or unless they invade in conjunction with the Soviet Union.