Yes, just like I wrote, food was about 11%, POL was about 50%, etc.TheMarcksPlan wrote: ↑04 Jun 2021 07:11My spreadsheet only addresses deployment.Peter89 wrote:You are checking the numbers for A-4, but that doesn't cover the maintenance of the units.
You're right that fuel is a bigger part of maintenance than of deployment; I should have applied the "Fuel Adjustment" to maintenance as I did with deployment in my rough estimate upthread. When I add maintenance to the spreadsheet I'll remember that.
Per A-5, btw, food was 11-13% of maintenance requirements.
But, the point is that no such thing as an average day with an average soldier existed. Belligerents used to build up strength and resources, stockpile every kind of material, then launched an offensive which ran until exhaustion.
It's not that if there is no POL incoming, then the army will perish.
Also, the American deployment / maintenance numbers were the highest of all belligerents, so it does not mean that an army could not exist with much, much less supplies or could not be deployed with way less shipping.
Besides, in case of a German attack on Turkey, the British offered the Turks every kind of help, of which the Turks gladly took the aircrew training options and the weapon deliveries. The Turkish army, which was the biggest non-belligerent army in Eurasia, did not lack the numbers, but modern weaponry, signal equipment, motorization, rolling stock, etc. So for me it is questionable how many Allied troops exactly had to be deployed in Turkey to defend it against Germany.
The British Empire & co. also built up a logistical base at Suez, which was not the same as the Persian Corridor, but ran parallel of it. By late 1942, they supported many battle-hardened units, which were probably the most experienced ground units in Allied OOB. The British did not need to deploy units with full of their equipment, etc. to the theatre; and not from the British Isles either.
The combined Suez-Persian Gulf logistical base, in conjunction with Turkish cooperation,
The Americans were not the only possible Allies in the theatre.TheMarcksPlan wrote: ↑04 Jun 2021 07:11But again: even with ALL Army and Soviet LL shipping devoted to the MidEast, US can deploy only ~5 divisions to the MidEast by September '42 (rounding up from 4.4 to give you room to push the Arabs into famine - happened to the Bengalis so it's not beyond the British Empire to do so). Even were maintenance air forces shipping 100% free, that's not enough to stop the smallest German army.
Thanks, but I think it's not being smart, but to know the limits of my capabilities.TheMarcksPlan wrote: ↑04 Jun 2021 07:11You're plenty smart and have sufficient data to know whether Allies could have fielded, say, 20 more divisions in the Middle East in late '42. It's a simple matter of ships and distance. You're invoking uncertainty on the margins to avoid seeing the bigger picture. Even if all food and fuel were sourced in-theater, it doesn't get the Allies anywhere close to 20 more divisions in the MidEast in late '42, not even if they stop defending India and Australia and abandon Torch and Bolero.Peter89 wrote:this is why the complexity of this matter is well beyond the scope of my knowledge...We simply cannot know, or at least I can't know what were the British capable of in late 1942 or early 1943.
For example, for the Haifa-Beirut railway, they used Australian engineers, African workers, steelwork from India, England and USA, ballast, stone and cement from local colonies, etc. All these materials fall under the category of "engineering materials", but how on earth can we calculate the shipping requirements for such an undertaking? Of course, the sources of these materials and labour were interchangeable as well. In my opinion, it is impossible and futile.
To answer your question directly, if the "Allies" incorporate Turkey, then an obvious yes is my answer. If Middle East covers the region from Iran to Sudan, then my answer is also yes. If the British and Americans could deploy an EXTRA 20 divisions into Turkey, then my answer is probably no.
But, this is also subject to change, because late 1942 was a period in the war when the American industrial giant just began to flex its muscles. What was true in late 1942 might not be true in mid-1943, and definately not true in late 1943.
German capabilities were vastly overestimated after the fall of France.
For me it is extremely hard to imagine such a scenario, because the Turks, quite unlike the Iberians, always supported the underdog until the outcome of the war became clear. I think the Allies would try to hold the Basra-Abadan region and the Suez base, for which they had adequate means. Of course, I can imagine an army that could crush both areas and the Allied units in the theatre, but I think it's a bit far-fetched.TheMarcksPlan wrote: ↑04 Jun 2021 07:11Because I'm not very interested in Gertrude, and meant to start a separate thread, can we clarify a specific question?Peter89 wrote:the Germans planned Operation Gertrude OTL
If a post-SU Turkey allows Germany passage through Anatolia or joins the Axis - i.e. the fighting starts at the Turkish border - do you find it plausible that the Allies could have held Syria, Palestine, and Iraq?
I can think of two scenarios which would be plausible:
1.) Absent Barbarossa, the Germans attack Turkey in mid 1941.
2.) Barbarossa present, the Germans attack Turkey in mid 1942 with limited goals.
I am not sure if such thing as "post-SU" could have existed, because as many contemporaries pointed out, the whole idea was wrong, and the Germans simply could not fight until the Pacific Ocean. The Luftwaffe was incapable of carrying out its role in the plan, and it was not clear how many troops had to be stationed in the occupied lands. What I am sure about is that we can have no actual knowledge about such a scenario, these are just guesses.
For me the most obvious guess is that any extra success in the SU would require the German units spent in the peripheries (which you correctly said in other threads), but that would mean, for example, that the Allies would held Africa by late 1942, probably mastering the Mediterranean sea as well. That could mean two things; first, their troops would be available in sufficient numbers to help defend Turkey, against, let's say, 20 German divisions trying to make their way through the sea. Second, the shipping lanes would be secure, and there would be less or no need to sail around Africa.