Could a German invasion of Turkey succeed?

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TheMarcksPlan
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Re: Could a German invasion of Turkey succeed?

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 20 Sep 2020 09:40

Peter89 wrote:my only problem with your Operatrion Gertrude (late 1942) is that it has a wild range of preconditions
Returning to Turkey and this post - viewtopic.php?f=11&t=238638&start=15#p2292406 - which "wild" preconditions are you talking about? The only precondition I see is German victory over Russia and I thought we agreed that was feasible.

I've already conceded that some of my post-Turkey sketch has to be reconsidered, so I'll grant some wildness on my part post-Turkey.
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Re: Could a German invasion of Turkey succeed?

Post by Peter89 » 20 Sep 2020 11:07

I'm out of arguments.

Please just share your thoughts :milwink:
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Re: Could a German invasion of Turkey succeed?

Post by Kingfish » 20 Sep 2020 11:59

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
19 Sep 2020 00:08
I hope it's clear that any remotely-credible W.Allied assistance to Turkey in '42 would impose shipping burdens that would at least preclude Torch and Alamein. Probably Guadalcanal and any Bolero buildup as well.
Are you assuming the Axis would embark on a SW Asian campaign in addition to the historical efforts in North Africa and the Solomons / New Guinea?
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Re: Could a German invasion of Turkey succeed?

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 20 Sep 2020 12:26

Kingfish wrote:
20 Sep 2020 11:59
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
19 Sep 2020 00:08
I hope it's clear that any remotely-credible W.Allied assistance to Turkey in '42 would impose shipping burdens that would at least preclude Torch and Alamein. Probably Guadalcanal and any Bolero buildup as well.
Are you assuming the Axis would embark on a SW Asian campaign in addition to the historical efforts in North Africa and the Solomons / New Guinea?
No it would be at the expense of Solomons / NG.

There was a vivid debate at Japanese IGHQ in 1942 about whether to keep going south and east (IJN preference) or whether to go west and/or north (IJA option). Tully's Shattered Sword about the Midway battle has a decent recap of this internal dispute; many other books as well.

IMO the IJA wins the argument if Russia is collapsing, attacking Manchuria in Spring '42 by this ATL. Probably means delaying the main Burma push until after Russia also but no big deal IMO.

In that case, Yamamoto probably doesn't have a free hand for his mad capers south and east. It's conceivable that the IJN accepts a defensive perimeter at OTL August '42 lines, minus the Solomons and NG. In that case, IJN doctrine is to counterpunch the USN as it advances.

The following is not an essential part of my ATL but seems the likely outcome: USN gets crushed in a carrier battle around the Gilberts/Carolinas or Admiralties in late '42. They won't get any Essex-class carriers until '43 but it's hard to see Admiral King not launching an offensive against Japan while it's marauding across Asia. The US fleet would be in a position similar to OTL Santa Cruz and Eastern Solomons, minus the lessons learned in Coral Sea and Midway (i.e. that the Japanese were not a bunch of flying monkeys and were not to be trifled with). They're not ambushing a Japanese offensive thanks to intelligence scores but are being counterattacked (nearly ambushed themselves in a sense) by the full Kido Butai. Japanese pilots and carrier doctrine seems to have been better in '42; I can't see the USN winning absent ambush conditions.

Of course the Japanese could sink the whole Pacific Fleet in '42, without suffering any losses, and still lose the war decisively to the American production avalanche. But a big US defeat in the Pacific in '42 would postpone the OTL timing of B-29 devastation from Saipan and would make it increasingly likely that the W.Allies back down from what would be a slaughter in France/Germany even if successful - in order to focus on beating Japan instead.

In North Africa they'd just hold the line. That was always all that Hitler and OKH wanted anyway, Rommel had his own "plans" to capture more sand and waste logistical resources. With the Axis attacking Suez from the north via Turkey-Syria-Palestine, a route that contains secure land communications, there's no reason to do anything in North Africa except maybe distract Monty from trying to intervene in Turkey.
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Re: Could a German invasion of Turkey succeed?

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 20 Sep 2020 12:40

Peter89 wrote:By 1944, the very minimum even in your scenario is the following:
- the Wallies have control of the seas
- the Wallies have an enormous edge in intelligence
- the Wallies produce more and better aircraft
- the Wallies produce more AFVs
- the Wallies produce more guns and mortars
- the Wallies produce more trucks and vehicles
- the Wallies produce more POL
- the Wallies have more men
+ they do KNOW, that the A-bomb project is producing results
+ the Axis has no means to defeat them, so the Wallies have no reason to stop fighting and give them a break (and maybe allow them to compete on equal terms)
Back to the training, fuel was one problem, the lack of instructors and personnel was another, but we could continue the list. You might argue that if the emergency solutions of 1941/1942/1943 didn't happen, then there would be no shortage of instructors and mechanics. First of all, I seriously doubt that the Germans could double their aircrew output, second, I seriously doubt that they could do it during a super-successful, all-out attack on the SU.
Because I get frustrated when people gloss over my points, I went back to check if I missed any of yours.

Control of the seas

I already touched on - what that does this matter if Germany has everything she needs? How does a navy force Germany to surrender? What does Germany lack that makes inability to ship from Colombia relevant?

In addition, you're assuming too much IMO. The OKM had specific plans for carrier conversions, for example. Lutzow and Speer would have taken a year to convert and 400 workers. Seydlitz was to converted and may actually have started conversion (anyone know?). Eugen, Tirpitz, Scharnhorst, Gniesenau... Italy had several hulls that could have been converted, completed plans for Roma's conversion, and nearly completed an aircraft carrier in 43. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Italian_a ... ier_Aquila Germany had several ocean liner hulls that it considered converting and Russia left substantial hulls intended for its Kronstadt and Sovetskii Soyuz ships that could have been used. Image

Japan still had carriers and some of its older BB's could have been fully converted if traded to Germany (via Suez) for, say, a few thousand Me-109's, chromite from China, laborers from China, and/or thousands of tons of rubber (Trans-Siberian railroad).

If the Axis has greatly-enhanced economic resources, it probably goes ahead with all these conversions. If the Axis can put together a dozen or so carriers that can strike from the Med into Atlantic or Indian Oceans then the W.Allies need at least a dozen or so carriers in each spot to ensure that all underway shipping isn't wiped out if/when the Axis sorties into the shipping lane. Can the W.Allies maintain ~15 carriers in Atlantic, Indian, and Pacific Oceans at all times? Probably not, which probably means they don't try to defend the Indian Ocean.

Now look - I understand this scenario has a lot of suppositions behind it. Like I said re my sketch, more work would need to be done regarding the W.Allied defenses in Arabia and around India. But it's at AT LEAST not certain - not susceptible to uncritical assumption - that W.Allies can control all three oceans simultaneously even if they maintain overall naval superiority (which I concede they would).

The biggest assumption of long-term W.Allied sea security is the Type XXI U-boat. I've said a lot about it in another thread: viewtopic.php?f=11&t=250425

IMO this from that thread is representative:
The exercises in 1948–49 with Madden’s 6DF had confirmed that anti-submarine
ships had, as anticipated, a limited capability against a fast submarine.
In '48-'49 the RN was still unable to cope with a T21-style fast submarine.

So even if we assume that W.Allied publics have political appetite for an interminable war against the Axis in which they've conquered nearly all Eurasia and are sending V1's ad infinitum* against Britain, we can't assume that W.Allied communications are secure against T21.

*V1 was an efficient weapon; V2 was a waste. Hitler opposed the V2 as wasteful until he got desperate later in the war. The Brits were able to shoot down ~half of the ~9,000 V1's launched at her. As a V1 cost 5,000 RM, 10% of Germany's OTL GDP of ~100bn RM gives you 2mil V1's. If we double that cost for launchers etc. that's 1mil V1's. Shooting down 100x more V1's coming from many more launching sites is a far different ballgame from the OTL V1 defense program. You'd need tens of thousands of Flak guns and fighters devoted to the task, which obviously must be produced, manned, and deployed at the cost of something else. It would have been a very efficient campaign. One American Air Force general concluded that the V-1 was more efficient than heavy bombers. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/V-1_flyin ... Assessment

Better Wallied intelligence

Point conceded. How does this lead to W.allied victory? How do they march into Berlin with better intelligence?

Wallies produced more X,Y,Z in OTL

Again that's OTL not ATL and German production is much higher in ATL. For more details on why, here's copy/paste of previous points I've made:
Synth fuel plants consumed 13% of Germany's electricity. They'll be shut down by mid-'43, when the Russian oil is flowing. That alone gives you sufficient electricity to double aluminum production.

...and then there's increased coal mining. Might the millions of soldiers demobilized and/or not casualties contribute some coal production delta?

...and then there's increased food supply due to greater German conquests (taking and holding SU's entire Chernozem region) and higher agricultural productivity vs. OTL (replenishment of European agriculture's oil and fertilizer). Food supply was a binding constraint on coal production, as coal mining burns a lot of calories. More coal means more electricity, especially considering that Europe had much idle generating capacity OTL due to coal shortages. And if Germany needs to build more generating capacity, they can easily do so. See, e.g., Germany's reconstruction of the Zaporizhe generating station, an investment that the Red Army nullified OTL but that would be part of Ukraine's economic revival in this ATL.

That's not a full discussion but again you can't assume that W.allied battlefield production would sufficiently exceed Axis in this ATL.

What do I mean by "sufficiently exceed"? Well an attacker generally needs a huge material advantage; that's at least as true in modern warfare. A B-29 cost 20x as much as an Me-109, for example (B-17/24 ~10x). W.Allied fighter planes like Mustang and P-38, which unlike Me-109 had built-in capacity for offensive range, cost at least twice as much as Me-109. That math doesn't work if the Allied economic edge is 50% instead of 300% as in OTL.

Why did I say "battlefield production" instead of just "production?" Because the W.Allies offensive posture and geography required massive non-battlefield investments not required of the Axis. This is mostly a story of shipping and its protection. Wallies spent >10x as much on BoA as Germany. https://web.archive.org/web/20080409052 ... aigns.html

~15% of American production went to merchant shipping and escorts; for Germany this was negligible. Again, that math is fine when the Allies have a 3:1 production advantage but not if it's only 50%.

DISTANCE is a strategic factor in WW2 that can't be ignored. I could list other factors as well, such as the USN's enormous investment in floating drydocks because its fleet operated far ahead of home bases.


Finally, there's some big pieces of the puzzle missing from your comparative weapons production list. The single biggest army expenses item was ammunition. Guess who produced the most ammunition in every year besides 1945? Germany.

Armies also require non-weapons items like field kitchens, uniforms, boots, etc. For the U.S. Army, Engineering and Quartermaster procurement was ~1/3 of the total. (depending on how you slice Eng. and Quarter between ground and air forces). See Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940-43 appendex B. https://history.army.mil/html/books/001 ... ub_1-5.pdf As Germany's army was ~90% the size of America's, their production of these basic items was probably roughly similar.

Armies also use fortifications unless they're always the attackers. Germany spent 3.7bn RM on the French portion of the Atlantic Wall alone, or about 8% of its annual weapons budget. https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/a ... population. In this ATL there's no need for a French Atlantic Wall.

Taking all these factors together presents, IMO, a substantial revision to the picture shown by the more popular weapons numbers. Germany's war production was disproportionately in things that popular accounts don't highlight, production of which would become unnecessary after defeat of the SU. The W.Allied production edge would be significantly diminished in absolute terms; in battlefield terms it's at least doubtful whether distance factors would ensure material superiority on the battlefield. Given higher German army combat effectiveness (20-30% versus USA and ~50% vs. Britain), substantial material superiority is a precondition of W.Allied victory but not German.

LW training programs

Here you're right: I assume the LW won't disastrously mis-manage its training programs given adequate fuel resources. There's no evidence to suggest the LW would be so incompetent, IMO. LW training programs were sidelined by emergency conditions (e.g. Stalingard airlift) that don't occur ATL. Goering was a distracted, gluttonous buffoon but the real brains of the LW were men like Eberhard Milch and Adolf Galland. Hard to see those two not matching training to production, given the breathing room to do so.
Peter89 wrote:I'm out of arguments.

Please just share your thoughts
:) As I said I'm in the process of organizing all these thoughts into a coherent alternate WW2 timeline so these posts were helpful. Thanks.

To summarize (for me if not for you):
  • First ~six months after SU's Fall:
  • 1. Post-SU, Germany's next moves are through/with Turkey, through/with Spain, and through Iran. If through Turkey, two rail lines seem more than sufficient to support a 20-division Heer in Thrace and western Anatolia. If more forces are needed, trucks are relatively plentiful absent an Eastern Front and rail investments can be made. The move is likely with Turkey rather than through.
  • 2. Germany demobilizes most of the Ostheer, returning thousands of skilled workers to industry. Germany stops producing so much ammunition and from '43 restored Russian oil is flowing. Germany switches her enormous chemical industries from powder/synthgas to fertilizer. More oil also supports greater food production than OTL. More food allows more coal production and recruitment of foreign workers. More workers, coal, and electricity mean more aluminium for more planes. More planes mean less bomb damage, meaning even more planes. Germany's overall war production in '44 is conceivably twice OTL's and more concentrated on planes and subs.
  • 3. From Turkey and the Caucasus, Germany advances on three axes: Suez, Basra/Abadan, and Tehran. The W.Allies do not have sufficient shipping capability to oppose these advances with more than 20 or so divisions until well into 1943 and Germany takes all three objectives.
  • 4. Meanwhile Germany has most likely enticed/threatened Spain into the Axis, less likely is forced to invade her. Either way the fall of Suez and Gibraltar close off the Med to the W.Allies.
  • 5. Japan redeploys Kwantung Army to conquer China in 1943, likely with German hardware and adviser assistance sent via the Vichy'd SU.


    Next stage of Post-SU WW2:
  • 6. After 3 & 4, depending on W.Allied choices, Germany advances on two axes: (1) around the Red Sea to open sea links with Japan and (2) towars India. W.Allies likely have to choose one axis to defend.
  • 7. Depending on Wallied choice in (6), Japan may send/trade naval assets to the Mediterranean in exchange for further German aid. In conjunction with German/Italian naval assets, the Axis has a Fleet in Being that can strike into Atlantic or Indian Oceans, probably compelling Allied consolidation in Atlantic and Pacific and leaving Axis in control of the Indian Ocean, which implies the loss of India.
  • 8. If W.Allies focus defenses on Red Sea axis of advance instead of India/Persian Gulf axes, then Germany/Japan may conquer India. Further discussion/research necessary.
  • 9. Regardless of what happens on the Red Sea and India axes, the W.Allies are playing defense in the West.

    The Great Wallied Strategic Conundrums: Air-sea production or armies, Germany or Japan?

    10. Regardless of what happens in the Indian Ocean theater, the W.Allies must decide whether to invade Europe. It is conceivable that the W.Allies could mount an army sufficient to defeat Germany and its Allies in Europe. As American planners recognized, however, building an army sufficient to engage the European Axis would significantly reduce war production (see Victory Program of 1941). The manpower commitment and need to produce many more tanks, guns, shells, and quartermaster supplies would likely preclude building enough planes and ships to defeat both Germany and Japan. They probably have to choose one at most. The American public will overwhelmingly favor a focus on Japan, as will Australia and New Zealand. That choosing Japan instead of Germany saves millions of war dead would seal the decision. Britain had no appetite for massive land battles in WW2 anyway; Churchill was still trying to avoid Overlord well into 1944. The likely outcome is Wallies-German peace - idk the terms. Britain's primary security interest is maintained by coming under a US/UK-NATOish security umbrella, with their combined navies sufficient to keep the barbarians at bay. If India is still in W.Allied hands, Germany can guarantee the British Empire to buy peace and its acknowledged domination of Europe. Hitler feels a pang of conscience as he betrays his Japanese ally to secure his empire (just kidding).

    11. Nightmare world for much of the Eastern Hemisphere. Don't want to think about that part of the story. Glad it didn't happen. We're lucky Hitler didn't take the SU seriously. But we JUST got lucky. We really should have lost the war.
Last edited by TheMarcksPlan on 20 Sep 2020 12:46, edited 1 time in total.
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Re: Could a German invasion of Turkey succeed?

Post by Kingfish » 20 Sep 2020 12:46

Then your point about allied shipping burdens precluding historical campaigns is irrelevant.

Also, why are logistical constraints only a problem for the allies? You present a map with arrows advancing through what is arguably some of the most difficult terrain in the world, sweeping any opposition like a broom on a tile floor. WTH?
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Re: Could a German invasion of Turkey succeed?

Post by Peter89 » 20 Sep 2020 13:08

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
20 Sep 2020 12:40
Peter89 wrote:By 1944, the very minimum even in your scenario is the following:
- the Wallies have control of the seas
- the Wallies have an enormous edge in intelligence
- the Wallies produce more and better aircraft
- the Wallies produce more AFVs
- the Wallies produce more guns and mortars
- the Wallies produce more trucks and vehicles
- the Wallies produce more POL
- the Wallies have more men
+ they do KNOW, that the A-bomb project is producing results
+ the Axis has no means to defeat them, so the Wallies have no reason to stop fighting and give them a break (and maybe allow them to compete on equal terms)
Back to the training, fuel was one problem, the lack of instructors and personnel was another, but we could continue the list. You might argue that if the emergency solutions of 1941/1942/1943 didn't happen, then there would be no shortage of instructors and mechanics. First of all, I seriously doubt that the Germans could double their aircrew output, second, I seriously doubt that they could do it during a super-successful, all-out attack on the SU.
Because I get frustrated when people gloss over my points, I went back to check if I missed any of yours.

Control of the seas

I already touched on - what that does this matter if Germany has everything she needs? How does a navy force Germany to surrender? What does Germany lack that makes inability to ship from Colombia relevant?

In addition, you're assuming too much IMO. The OKM had specific plans for carrier conversions, for example. Lutzow and Speer would have taken a year to convert and 400 workers. Seydlitz was to converted and may actually have started conversion (anyone know?). Eugen, Tirpitz, Scharnhorst, Gniesenau... Italy had several hulls that could have been converted, completed plans for Roma's conversion, and nearly completed an aircraft carrier in 43. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Italian_a ... ier_Aquila Germany had several ocean liner hulls that it considered converting and Russia left substantial hulls intended for its Kronstadt and Sovetskii Soyuz ships that could have been used. Image

Japan still had carriers and some of its older BB's could have been fully converted if traded to Germany (via Suez) for, say, a few thousand Me-109's, chromite from China, laborers from China, and/or thousands of tons of rubber (Trans-Siberian railroad).

If the Axis has greatly-enhanced economic resources, it probably goes ahead with all these conversions. If the Axis can put together a dozen or so carriers that can strike from the Med into Atlantic or Indian Oceans then the W.Allies need at least a dozen or so carriers in each spot to ensure that all underway shipping isn't wiped out if/when the Axis sorties into the shipping lane. Can the W.Allies maintain ~15 carriers in Atlantic, Indian, and Pacific Oceans at all times? Probably not, which probably means they don't try to defend the Indian Ocean.

Now look - I understand this scenario has a lot of suppositions behind it. Like I said re my sketch, more work would need to be done regarding the W.Allied defenses in Arabia and around India. But it's at AT LEAST not certain - not susceptible to uncritical assumption - that W.Allies can control all three oceans simultaneously even if they maintain overall naval superiority (which I concede they would).

The biggest assumption of long-term W.Allied sea security is the Type XXI U-boat. I've said a lot about it in another thread: viewtopic.php?f=11&t=250425

IMO this from that thread is representative:
The exercises in 1948–49 with Madden’s 6DF had confirmed that anti-submarine
ships had, as anticipated, a limited capability against a fast submarine.
In '48-'49 the RN was still unable to cope with a T21-style fast submarine.

So even if we assume that W.Allied publics have political appetite for an interminable war against the Axis in which they've conquered nearly all Eurasia and are sending V1's ad infinitum* against Britain, we can't assume that W.Allied communications are secure against T21.

*V1 was an efficient weapon; V2 was a waste. Hitler opposed the V2 as wasteful until he got desperate later in the war. The Brits were able to shoot down ~half of the ~9,000 V1's launched at her. As a V1 cost 5,000 RM, 10% of Germany's OTL GDP of ~100bn RM gives you 2mil V1's. If we double that cost for launchers etc. that's 1mil V1's. Shooting down 100x more V1's coming from many more launching sites is a far different ballgame from the OTL V1 defense program. You'd need tens of thousands of Flak guns and fighters devoted to the task, which obviously must be produced, manned, and deployed at the cost of something else. It would have been a very efficient campaign. One American Air Force general concluded that the V-1 was more efficient than heavy bombers. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/V-1_flyin ... Assessment

Better Wallied intelligence

Point conceded. How does this lead to W.allied victory? How do they march into Berlin with better intelligence?

Wallies produced more X,Y,Z in OTL

Again that's OTL not ATL and German production is much higher in ATL. For more details on why, here's copy/paste of previous points I've made:
Synth fuel plants consumed 13% of Germany's electricity. They'll be shut down by mid-'43, when the Russian oil is flowing. That alone gives you sufficient electricity to double aluminum production.

...and then there's increased coal mining. Might the millions of soldiers demobilized and/or not casualties contribute some coal production delta?

...and then there's increased food supply due to greater German conquests (taking and holding SU's entire Chernozem region) and higher agricultural productivity vs. OTL (replenishment of European agriculture's oil and fertilizer). Food supply was a binding constraint on coal production, as coal mining burns a lot of calories. More coal means more electricity, especially considering that Europe had much idle generating capacity OTL due to coal shortages. And if Germany needs to build more generating capacity, they can easily do so. See, e.g., Germany's reconstruction of the Zaporizhe generating station, an investment that the Red Army nullified OTL but that would be part of Ukraine's economic revival in this ATL.

That's not a full discussion but again you can't assume that W.allied battlefield production would sufficiently exceed Axis in this ATL.

What do I mean by "sufficiently exceed"? Well an attacker generally needs a huge material advantage; that's at least as true in modern warfare. A B-29 cost 20x as much as an Me-109, for example (B-17/24 ~10x). W.Allied fighter planes like Mustang and P-38, which unlike Me-109 had built-in capacity for offensive range, cost at least twice as much as Me-109. That math doesn't work if the Allied economic edge is 50% instead of 300% as in OTL.

Why did I say "battlefield production" instead of just "production?" Because the W.Allies offensive posture and geography required massive non-battlefield investments not required of the Axis. This is mostly a story of shipping and its protection. Wallies spent >10x as much on BoA as Germany. https://web.archive.org/web/20080409052 ... aigns.html

~15% of American production went to merchant shipping and escorts; for Germany this was negligible. Again, that math is fine when the Allies have a 3:1 production advantage but not if it's only 50%.

DISTANCE is a strategic factor in WW2 that can't be ignored. I could list other factors as well, such as the USN's enormous investment in floating drydocks because its fleet operated far ahead of home bases.


Finally, there's some big pieces of the puzzle missing from your comparative weapons production list. The single biggest army expenses item was ammunition. Guess who produced the most ammunition in every year besides 1945? Germany.

Armies also require non-weapons items like field kitchens, uniforms, boots, etc. For the U.S. Army, Engineering and Quartermaster procurement was ~1/3 of the total. (depending on how you slice Eng. and Quarter between ground and air forces). See Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940-43 appendex B. https://history.army.mil/html/books/001 ... ub_1-5.pdf As Germany's army was ~90% the size of America's, their production of these basic items was probably roughly similar.

Armies also use fortifications unless they're always the attackers. Germany spent 3.7bn RM on the French portion of the Atlantic Wall alone, or about 8% of its annual weapons budget. https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/a ... population. In this ATL there's no need for a French Atlantic Wall.

Taking all these factors together presents, IMO, a substantial revision to the picture shown by the more popular weapons numbers. Germany's war production was disproportionately in things that popular accounts don't highlight, production of which would become unnecessary after defeat of the SU. The W.Allied production edge would be significantly diminished in absolute terms; in battlefield terms it's at least doubtful whether distance factors would ensure material superiority on the battlefield. Given higher German army combat effectiveness (20-30% versus USA and ~50% vs. Britain), substantial material superiority is a precondition of W.Allied victory but not German.

LW training programs

Here you're right: I assume the LW won't disastrously mis-manage its training programs given adequate fuel resources. There's no evidence to suggest the LW would be so incompetent, IMO. LW training programs were sidelined by emergency conditions (e.g. Stalingard airlift) that don't occur ATL. Goering was a distracted, gluttonous buffoon but the real brains of the LW were men like Eberhard Milch and Adolf Galland. Hard to see those two not matching training to production, given the breathing room to do so.
Peter89 wrote:I'm out of arguments.

Please just share your thoughts
:) As I said I'm in the process of organizing all these thoughts into a coherent alternate WW2 timeline so these posts were helpful. Thanks.

To summarize (for me if not for you):
  • First ~six months after SU's Fall:
  • 1. Post-SU, Germany's next moves are through/with Turkey, through/with Spain, and through Iran. If through Turkey, two rail lines seem more than sufficient to support a 20-division Heer in Thrace and western Anatolia. If more forces are needed, trucks are relatively plentiful absent an Eastern Front and rail investments can be made. The move is likely with Turkey rather than through.
  • 2. Germany demobilizes most of the Ostheer, returning thousands of skilled workers to industry. Germany stops producing so much ammunition and from '43 restored Russian oil is flowing. Germany switches her enormous chemical industries from powder/synthgas to fertilizer. More oil also supports greater food production than OTL. More food allows more coal production and recruitment of foreign workers. More workers, coal, and electricity mean more aluminium for more planes. More planes mean less bomb damage, meaning even more planes. Germany's overall war production in '44 is conceivably twice OTL's and more concentrated on planes and subs.
  • 3. From Turkey and the Caucasus, Germany advances on three axes: Suez, Basra/Abadan, and Tehran. The W.Allies do not have sufficient shipping capability to oppose these advances with more than 20 or so divisions until well into 1943 and Germany takes all three objectives.
  • 4. Meanwhile Germany has most likely enticed/threatened Spain into the Axis, less likely is forced to invade her. Either way the fall of Suez and Gibraltar close off the Med to the W.Allies.
  • 5. Japan redeploys Kwantung Army to conquer China in 1943, likely with German hardware and adviser assistance sent via the Vichy'd SU.


    Next stage of Post-SU WW2:
  • 6. After 3 & 4, depending on W.Allied choices, Germany advances on two axes: (1) around the Red Sea to open sea links with Japan and (2) towars India. W.Allies likely have to choose one axis to defend.
  • 7. Depending on Wallied choice in (6), Japan may send/trade naval assets to the Mediterranean in exchange for further German aid. In conjunction with German/Italian naval assets, the Axis has a Fleet in Being that can strike into Atlantic or Indian Oceans, probably compelling Allied consolidation in Atlantic and Pacific and leaving Axis in control of the Indian Ocean, which implies the loss of India.
  • 8. If W.Allies focus defenses on Red Sea axis of advance instead of India/Persian Gulf axes, then Germany/Japan may conquer India. Further discussion/research necessary.
  • 9. Regardless of what happens on the Red Sea and India axes, the W.Allies are playing defense in the West.

    The Great Wallied Strategic Conundrums: Air-sea production or armies, Germany or Japan?

    10. Regardless of what happens in the Indian Ocean theater, the W.Allies must decide whether to invade Europe. It is conceivable that the W.Allies could mount an army sufficient to defeat Germany and its Allies in Europe. As American planners recognized, however, building an army sufficient to engage the European Axis would significantly reduce war production (see Victory Program of 1941). The manpower commitment and need to produce many more tanks, guns, shells, and quartermaster supplies would likely preclude building enough planes and ships to defeat both Germany and Japan. They probably have to choose one at most. The American public will overwhelmingly favor a focus on Japan, as will Australia and New Zealand. That choosing Japan instead of Germany saves millions of war dead would seal the decision. Britain had no appetite for massive land battles in WW2 anyway; Churchill was still trying to avoid Overlord well into 1944. The likely outcome is Wallies-German peace - idk the terms. Britain's primary security interest is maintained by coming under a US/UK-NATOish security umbrella, with their combined navies sufficient to keep the barbarians at bay. If India is still in W.Allied hands, Germany can guarantee the British Empire to buy peace and its acknowledged domination of Europe. Hitler feels a pang of conscience as he betrays his Japanese ally to secure his empire (just kidding).

    11. Nightmare world for much of the Eastern Hemisphere. Don't want to think about that part of the story. Glad it didn't happen. We're lucky Hitler didn't take the SU seriously. But we JUST got lucky. We really should have lost the war.
How about Africa? I want Africa, too! Not just the desert and the jungle, but those nice safaris with amiable locals... shoot some rhinos before we finish off Washington, shall we? It must be converted into some recreational area for the tired troops of the Eastern campaign. I am sure we can find the budget for that and do the work with Russian pows. Besides, I think Italy wants Etiopia back, no?

In any case, AFAIK the Germans had some grandiose plans for Madagascar and the jews, so probably Auschwitz will not happen either.

Can we include Africa, please?
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Re: Could a German invasion of Turkey succeed?

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 20 Sep 2020 13:19

Kingfish wrote:
20 Sep 2020 12:46
Then your point about allied shipping burdens precluding historical campaigns is irrelevant.

Also, why are logistical constraints only a problem for the allies? You present a map with arrows advancing through what is arguably some of the most difficult terrain in the world, sweeping any opposition like a broom on a tile floor. WTH?
I thought you were asking what the Axis would be doing - it appears you were asking what the Wallies do.

As I said in my last post responding to you, I don't think it's feasible for the US not to launch any offensives against Japan while she is conquering in the Eastern Hemisphere. Whether it's Guadalcanal or an Admiralties/NG substitute they forego, it's a strategic choice to allow Japan a secure Pacific rear while she attacks China, Russia, and India.

In North Africa, Monty is free to launch Second Alamein as historically. But if he does so, who/what opposes the German armies pushing through Syria and Palestine into his rear? Once these take Suez, how is he supplied?

Same with Torch: the Wallies can go ahead but what happens when Spain joins the Axis? Supply ships can't enter the Med now, there's no rail line from Morocco to Tunisia, they have to retreat back to Morocco or starve. You could try to invade Spain to keep the supply lines open but there's a suddenly-free force called the Ostheer, only ~20% of which has been committed to Turkey/Iran. Do the Wallies really want to have two forces cut off from sea communications in North Africa? I could have written the ATL that way but it's worse for the Wallies than an orderly retreat between Alexandria and Tehran in the six months after Russia falls.

Re Axis logistics: For the immediate post-SU events, there are rail lines from Turkey/Caucasus along all three axes of advance.

I already conceded that the later stages (red and orange arrows) need more logistical explication. More to come some day; the high-level intuition is to analogize W.Allied construction in the Persian Corridor to what Germany needs in Eastern Iran for an Indian push. Along the Red Sea axis there's the option of restoring the short-gauge Hejaz railway. On a three-year timeline a lot is possible, all of which is probably cheaper than shipping logistics on the 12,000-mile trek from the U.S. to Indian Ocean ports. In either theater, Axis use of coastal shipping logistics to support advances along coasts of Red Sea, Persian Gulf, and Arabian sea are possible but require local air superiority. Interesting topic for discussion.

And again, it's not essential for the Axis to take India or Arabia. If the W.Allies commit enormous logistical and combat resources there they're missing elsewhere. The Axis has interior lines within Eurasia; the Wallies have to sail around Africa or Indonesia to return resources to Europe or the Pacific. For Britain especially that's a dangerous proposition, as the threat of invasion will have re-emerged.
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Re: Could a German invasion of Turkey succeed?

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 20 Sep 2020 13:29

Peter89 wrote:Can we include Africa, please?
Only after we figure out your idea for Vichy-Syrian Airlines to support a German invasion of the Middle East.
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Re: Could a German invasion of Turkey succeed?

Post by Peter89 » 20 Sep 2020 13:57

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
20 Sep 2020 13:29
Peter89 wrote:Can we include Africa, please?
Only after we figure out your idea for Vichy-Syrian Airlines to support a German invasion of the Middle East.
We don't need that anymore, because we've conquered Turkey with perfect rail lines as part of Operation Easy Peasy.
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Re: Could a German invasion of Turkey succeed?

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 20 Sep 2020 14:44

Peter89 wrote:
20 Sep 2020 13:57
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
20 Sep 2020 13:29
Peter89 wrote:Can we include Africa, please?
Only after we figure out your idea for Vichy-Syrian Airlines to support a German invasion of the Middle East.
We don't need that anymore, because we've conquered Turkey with perfect rail lines as part of Operation Easy Peasy.
You're right. What sane person could think Germany would roll over a mountainous Balkan country in a quick campaign? Might as well suggest two at once while you're at it.
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Re: Could a German invasion of Turkey succeed?

Post by Peter89 » 20 Sep 2020 14:49

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
20 Sep 2020 14:44
Peter89 wrote:
20 Sep 2020 13:57
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
20 Sep 2020 13:29
Peter89 wrote:Can we include Africa, please?
Only after we figure out your idea for Vichy-Syrian Airlines to support a German invasion of the Middle East.
We don't need that anymore, because we've conquered Turkey with perfect rail lines as part of Operation Easy Peasy.
You're right. What sane person could think Germany would roll over a mountainous Balkan country in a quick campaign? Might as well as suggest two at once while you're at it.
Yeah, whom exactly? To conquer Greece and Turkey is essentially the same, I can't conjure up any difference between the two.

But really, if you don't give me Africa, we shouldn't stay offtopic for too long. I had enough of Greece for a lifetime :D
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Re: Could a German invasion of Turkey succeed?

Post by Kingfish » 20 Sep 2020 20:11

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
20 Sep 2020 13:19
I thought you were asking what the Axis would be doing - it appears you were asking what the Wallies do.
My post was directed at the Axis. You post implied they would be able to drive into SW Asia while at the same time keep to their historical campaigns in North Africa and the Solomons / PNG, thereby forcing the allies to shelve one or more historical counters.
In North Africa, Monty is free to launch Second Alamein as historically. But if he does so, who/what opposes the German armies pushing through Syria and Palestine into his rear? Once these take Suez, how is he supplied?
This is an entirely new scenario so the skies the limit as to how we would envision an allied response. With multiple attackers converging on the Nile Delta the need for Torch is replaced with the need to reinforce the Levant. Monty can hold his own against the resource starved DAK, allowing him to divert forces northward. Meanwhile, British 1st army can be brought into the theater to bolster the defense.
And again, it's not essential for the Axis to take India or Arabia. If the W.Allies commit enormous logistical and combat resources there they're missing elsewhere. {/quote]

But what "elsewhere" do you envision? The SU is out of the picture so the resources devoted to LL are now filling up the allied coffers. That frees up a lot of naval assets, especially British, to give pause to any German intention for a cross channel invasion. The Japanese have stopped at Rabaul, thereby ensuring the US-Aussie LOC is secured.
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Re: Could a German invasion of Turkey succeed?

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 20 Sep 2020 20:39

Peter89 wrote:
20 Sep 2020 14:49
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
20 Sep 2020 14:44
Peter89 wrote:
20 Sep 2020 13:57
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
20 Sep 2020 13:29
Peter89 wrote:Can we include Africa, please?
Only after we figure out your idea for Vichy-Syrian Airlines to support a German invasion of the Middle East.
We don't need that anymore, because we've conquered Turkey with perfect rail lines as part of Operation Easy Peasy.
You're right. What sane person could think Germany would roll over a mountainous Balkan country in a quick campaign? Might as well as suggest two at once while you're at it.
Yeah, whom exactly? To conquer Greece and Turkey is essentially the same, I can't conjure up any difference between the two.

But really, if you don't give me Africa, we shouldn't stay offtopic for too long. I had enough of Greece for a lifetime :D
I can't tell whether you're serious or want tourism info. If the former, what are you asking about specifically?
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Re: Could a German invasion of Turkey succeed?

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 20 Sep 2020 22:41

Kingfish wrote:You post implied they would be able to drive into SW Asia while at the same time keep to their historical campaigns in North Africa and the Solomons / PNG, thereby forcing the allies to shelve one or more historical counters.
Gotcha. Take it in the spirit of me genuinely asking from where the W.Allies would get the shipping capacity to field much larger forces between Alexandria and Tehran in 1942. They get "shipping credits" for the shipping not used in the OTL Guadalcanal offensive and Australian buildup, regardless of whether we consider those offensives cancelled or just unnecessary.
This is an entirely new scenario so the skies the limit as to how we would envision an allied response.
W.Allies have lots of theoretical options, just as in OTL, but the need for stronger forces in the MidEast seems obvious unless they just abandon the region. Might they just abandon it? Honest question - defense of Suez, Basra, and Tehran seem doomed to fail. I'm open to considering other options. Maybe they invade Norway and go light in the MidEast? But if the SU goes down, Hitler has 150 free divisions and is certain to reinforce Norway to block that move.
With multiple attackers converging on the Nile Delta the need for Torch is replaced with the need to reinforce the Levant. Monty can hold his own against the resource starved DAK, allowing him to divert forces northward. Meanwhile, British 1st army can be brought into the theater to bolster the defense.
British First Army is the clear first choice for the MidEast assignment but:
  • 1. Where does the shipping for sending First Army to Levant instead of Algeria come from? You need ~4x the shipping to deploy the same forces in Levant versus Algeria. ATL "shipping credits" consist of at least OTL's shipping for (1) Guadalcanal/Australia (minus residual defense as discussed below), (2) Persian Corridor LL to Russia*, (3) Torch. Upthread I calculate that the Persian Corridor LL shipping credit is sufficient to support 6 divisions but not to deploy them. We need additional shipping for deployment and for attendant air forces.

    *Other LL aid was suspended/low-volume in '42 (Arctic Route), or was carried in Soviet bottoms (Far East).
  • 2. Is First Army enough? Are the W.Allies just defending Levant? What about Army Group South/A coming down through the Caucasus? Germany's logistical resources to the Turkish/Caucasus fronts include the entire Soviet railway system that OTL supported 150 divisions approximately 1,000km from the Reich. If we call it 2,000km from the Reich to the Caucasus, an equivalent logistical effort (measured in ton-miles) would support 75 divisions in the Middle East. And that's before we account for the Black Sea being an Axis lake, making the German logistical effort that much easier.
I'm not saying the Axis sends 75 divisions into the Middle East - that's overkill. If they send "just" 40 divisions, British First Army is a drop in the bucket.
The SU is out of the picture so the resources devoted to LL are now filling up the allied coffers.
The value of American aid to SU in the period Jan 42 - June 43 was $1.46bn. That's ~4% of total US procurement in the period, 2-3% of total W.Allied procurement. [Global Logistics and Strategy, vol.1, App C).
But what "elsewhere" do you envision?
On the 1944-45 timeline where a largescale battle over India becomes relevant, elsewhere would primarily be the threat of invasion against UK.

British and American bluewater naval assets - CV's, BB's, cruisers - aren't necessarily decisive in a Channel battle and risking them there has dire implications. During OTL '40 Britain didn't assign much of its bluewater navy to Channel defense. France and England are the equivalent of infinite CV's for each side in a Channel battle. Germany can build many more build destroyers, E-boats, minesweepers, etc. in this ATL, making the Channel contested naval ground regardless of what's happening in the open oceans. Germany demonstrated competence in amphibious operations (Kerch, Baltic Islands, Dodecanese), had experience with MFP's and Siebel Ferries, and had more landing craft on the drawing boards. The threat of invasion is at least sufficiently credible to tie down substantial W.Allied ground forces.
The Japanese have stopped at Rabaul, thereby ensuring the US-Aussie LOC is secured.
I know I specified a defensive perimeter at the Admiralties rather than Solomons earlier but let's treat this as a flexible discussion depending on each side's actions.

If the W.Allies do nothing to defend the Solomons and the Aussie LoC, re-apportioning literally all shipping and combat assets to the MidEast or elsewhere, then Japan can pick off some/most/all of the Solomons cheaply. Stopping at Rabaul defines the strategic priority, not opportunistic tactical/operational options. IGHQ and most of the IJN understood a Southwest Pacific push as a means to entice the USN into a decisive battle. So the Wallies need some presence in and defense of SWPac or else the OTL threat that prompted Guadalcanal emerges on the cheap for Japan.
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