Could a German invasion of Turkey succeed?

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glenn239
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Re: Could a German invasion of Turkey succeed?

Post by glenn239 » 03 Aug 2021 17:27

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
29 Jul 2021 07:24
Glenn does your case rely on Germany in no circumstances being able to protect its oil resources? We know that the Oil Campaign's success required continuous bombing of synthgas plants, else they'd be quickly repaired. How is this possible against, say, a 10x stronger LW? A 4x stronger?
We know that the Allied aircraft production hit 125,000 in 1944 then tailed off in 1945. Not because the US had hit its maximum air strength, but because they already had more than enough to win - a bit like how a runner in the lead will often ease up towards the finish line if no one is close behind. The case against Germany is threefold. First, the Germans have no ability to strike the United States while the US can strike Germany at will. Second, that under no concievable circumstances could Germany's production and deployment rate come close to the Anglo-Americans. Third, that the oil targets represented a vulnerability that the LW could not effectively defend against the weight of attacks the Anglo-Americans were able to achieve by 1944.
A post-SU Germany will also be getting much (most?) of its avgas from oil refineries, very few of which will be in range of British bases. Under my ATL conditions, where Allies hold only Morocco and maybe Algeria, how do they bomb Ploesti and/or Caucasian refineries?
Your ATL conditions apply to 1942, but fall off from there. By 1944 or 1945 at the latest Germany cannot hold Africa against the Anglo-Americans. By these dates all the shipping restrictions you mention fall away because by 1944 the US shipping production and inventory was going off the scale, and its over the beach capacity was doing so as well. Egypt is at the outside limit of the combat range of the P-51, but as the Allies retake Syria and march into Turkey, the refineries you mention come into range and get bombed flat, probably before the end of 1945.

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Re: Could a German invasion of Turkey succeed?

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 03 Aug 2021 18:37

glenn239 wrote:
03 Aug 2021 17:27
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
29 Jul 2021 07:24
A 4x stronger [LW]?
under no concievable circumstances could Germany's production and deployment rate come close to the Anglo-Americans.
German peak aircraft production in September '44 was 4,107 planes (3,375 fighters). USSBS Europe app. table 102. That's an annual production rate of 49,284 planes. 4x that production rate is nearly 200,000 planes. Of course these are fighters and therefore Germany's 200k would cost something like what US's planes cost to produce. But of course if the US switched to fighters to match German production then strategic bombing isn't happening.

So it seems quite feasible for Germany to have exceeded OTL US plane production and roughly to have matched its production by value or weight - if LW could get 4x OTL peak production.

Deployment of 200k planes would be more difficult. But it's unlikely that Germany would have produced so many cheap Me-109's in this ATL. Rather, they'd have switched to producing better planes earlier. Milch made an explicit decision to speed up production of Me109 and Fw190 in mid-'43 instead of prioritizing new types. From Caldwell and Murray's Defense of the Reich:
“We must definitely decide on priorities. That
means the 109, the 190 and the 110.” Other more advanced types, such as
the jet projects, would take a lower priority. The answer was clear; in the
short term at least, quality had to give way to quantity.
This priority continued until late '44, with the Me-262 unable to attain enough labor, jigs, and machine tools for production. From Uziel's Arming the Luftwaffe:
The manpower shortage affecting the Me 262 program was not solved even after the
Jägerstab took over. Friedrich Wilhelm Seiler, Messerschmitt’s chairman, later estimated
that at that time only 30 percent of the necessary manpower was supplied, but this figure
looks far too low.

Surprisingly, even with its ultra-high status, the Me 262 program could not escape
emergency call-up drives initiated in late 1944 in order to fill the ever dwindling ranks of
the Wehrmacht. Conscription was not the only reason for the loss of workers. By May 1944
Messerschmitt declared the loss of around 500 workers since 25 February 1944 due to
Feindwirkung (enemy action), health problems and social needs.
Only a limited number of replacements arrived to replace them.

During the same month [March 1944]
Messerschmitt lost several hundred of its workers to the Wehrmacht and was left
short of the 2,700 workers it required, especially for Me 262 production. This requirement
was only partially covered by the delivery of 1,400 concentration camp inmates.

Towards the end, a
large proportion of the German workforce was unskilled too, composed of elderly men unfit
for military service, unskilled women of all ages, and Hitler-Jugend boys, as one slave worker
observed at Junkers’ jet-engine factory in Zittau.
The ATL LW will have sufficient resources and breathing room fully to "fund" production of Me-262 and other advanced types. As a result, by ATL 1945 the LW would have at least parity with USAAF numerically and qualitatively.
glenn239 wrote:the Germans have no ability to strike the United States while the US can strike Germany at will.
That's in many ways a German advantage, as it prevents wasting resources on strategic bombing. As I've discussed elsewhere, Big Week cost the US ~5x as much plane attrition by value and ~10x as much crew attrition as it cost Germany. If we multiply OTL LW strength by 4 then USAAF loses 900 bombers during Big Week [lost 226 OTL]. That either ends strategic bombing or renders it plainly bad military strategy.
glenn239 wrote:oil targets represented a vulnerability that the LW could not effectively defend against the weight of attacks the Anglo-Americans were able to achieve by 1944.
This point depends on the preceding points. If LW can knock down 900 bombers in one week then the oil targets aren't really vulnerable. Can USAAF drop a few thousand tons on them? Sure. But they can only do it a few times before all the bombers are gone. OTL the oil campaign required 200,000 tons [USSBS Germany, p.78]. ATL more tons are required for more targets but USAAD would be lucky to drop 10% of OTL before running out of bombers (and/or facing a crew mutiny amidst 20% loss rates).
glenn239 wrote:Your ATL conditions apply to 1942, but fall off from there. By 1944 or 1945 at the latest Germany cannot hold Africa against the Anglo-Americans. By these dates all the shipping restrictions you mention fall away because by 1944 the US shipping production
Allies might have the shipping to maintain 40 divisions in the MidEast by 1945*** but German infrastructure by that time is also better. Plus German fuel, food, and ammo are coming from the Caucasus and Ukraine over short LoC's. If the Allies put 40 divisions in the MidEast, the Germans send 50 or 60 divisions and probably capture most of the Allied expeditionary force.

The shipping problem never disappeared for the Allies. As the US Army Service Forces Statistical Review states (highlighted portion):
ASF - 1945 shipping shortage.png

***I estimate that total US Army shipping = 21bn MT-miles monthly 4Q '44. At 32,500 MT maintenance per division and a 14,000-mile journey to the MidEast, that's enough to maintain (not deploy) 46 divisions.

Image

TMP bookmark: ATL air war and late-war shipping
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Re: Could a German invasion of Turkey succeed?

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 03 Aug 2021 20:39

TheMarcksPlan wrote:If we multiply OTL LW strength by 4 then USAAF loses 900 bombers during Big Week [lost 226 OTL]. That either ends strategic bombing or renders it plainly bad military strategy.
Frankly the only question for me is whether and when the US changes its grand strategy. ATL '43 will have been an even worse bloodbath for 8th AF than OTL but Eaker, Arnold, etc. would probably argue (as in OTL) that the campaign was still young and would work once the fleet reached critical mass and more escort fighters arrived. It's Spring '44 before those conditions are met but, as discussed above, against 4x stronger LW Big Week is going to lose 900 bombers.

If the US recognizes the futility of daylight bombing in Spring '44, how quickly can they pivot to a different strategy and what would such a strategy be? A 4x stronger LW would have rendered nonviable Bomber Command's campaign as well. B-17/24's were inefficient night bombers anyway.

Does the US redirect all bomber production to fighters? Absent the CBO and any hope of Overlord, to what strategic end would air superiority be sought? Even if US does so reorient production, it takes effect only by late '44 and the Germans are deploying thousands of Me-262's by then.

The other factor is the V-1 offensive. With at least 4x OTL's V-1's being launched at Britain, and with Germany retaining the Pas de Calais and Cotentin, more Operation Crossbow, more AAA, and more fighters will be expended. In ATL, however, fighters chasing V-1's could easily be bounced by Me-262's.

---------------------------------

Once more, under these conditions it's hard to see the European war continuing if Hitler is willing to cut the West a deal.
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Re: Could a German invasion of Turkey succeed?

Post by glenn239 » 04 Aug 2021 17:47

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
03 Aug 2021 18:37
So it seems quite feasible for Germany to have exceeded OTL US plane production and roughly to have matched its production by value or weight - if LW could get 4x OTL peak production.
American production was not fully tapped out at its peak in 1944 at about 100,000. It could have continued to expand, and always faster than German production because the US production could not be bombed and the country's resources were much greater.
Deployment of 200k planes would be more difficult. But it's unlikely that Germany would have produced so many cheap Me-109's in this ATL. Rather, they'd have switched to producing better planes earlier. Milch made an explicit decision to speed up production of Me109 and Fw190 in mid-'43 instead of prioritizing new types. From Caldwell and Murray's Defense of the Reich:
Dunno about any of that. Germany is pushing it to reach 100,000 planes per year feverishly building the older types I would think. The only way I see the Axis getting anywhere near what you're suggesting is in alliance with the Soviet Union. Anything else seems fantastical.

Surprisingly, even with its ultra-high status, the Me 262 program could not escape
emergency call-up drives initiated in late 1944 in order to fill the ever dwindling ranks of
the Wehrmacht.
We're talking grand strategy. IMO, any particular combat system, like the ME-262, does not rise to that level. The A-bomb? Sure, but the Americans will have that, not the Germans.
That's in many ways a German advantage, as it prevents wasting resources on strategic bombing.
IMO, the 4-engine bomber concept was probably obsolescent during the war. I grant that it's possible the LW might defeat the strategic bombing campaign using these types. But were that to occur, the USAAF would have switched their bombing campaign to night and used their fighters on deep missions during the day. The oil production could be greatly reduced by night bombing with the improvements in accuracy by 1945.

Allies might have the shipping to maintain 40 divisions in the MidEast by 1945*** but German infrastructure by that time is also better. Plus German fuel, food, and ammo are coming from the Caucasus and Ukraine over short LoC's. If the Allies put 40 divisions in the MidEast, the Germans send 50 or 60 divisions and probably capture most of the Allied expeditionary force.
I think there is no chance whatever that the Germans can hold Africa or the Middle East against the Allied logistics by 1944/1945.

***I estimate that total US Army shipping = 21bn MT-miles monthly 4Q '44. At 32,500 MT maintenance per division and a 14,000-mile journey to the MidEast, that's enough to maintain (not deploy) 46 divisions.
46 divisions at 800 tons per day each is 1.1 million tons a month, 13 million tons per year. Port turn-around by 1944 will have vastly improved so each ship can do 2.5 trips per year, meaning about 5 million tons is required for the supply of 46 divisions in the Middle East. I seem to recall the US had at least 18 million tons in the Pacific alone by late 1944.

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Re: Could a German invasion of Turkey succeed?

Post by KDF33 » 04 Aug 2021 21:18

glenn239 wrote:
04 Aug 2021 17:47
American production was not fully tapped out at its peak in 1944 at about 100,000. It could have continued to expand, and always faster than German production because the US production could not be bombed and the country's resources were much greater.
I don't think it's a useful framework to think of any industrial sector as being 'tapped out'. Obviously, with more inputs U.S. aircraft production could have been increased, but then so could have been Germany's. TMP's ATL postulates the successful conclusion of the Soviet-German war; in that context, Germany would have benefited from a far larger pool of manpower, whereas the picture for the U.S. would have remained unchanged.
glenn239 wrote:
04 Aug 2021 17:47
Dunno about any of that. Germany is pushing it to reach 100,000 planes per year feverishly building the older types I would think. The only way I see the Axis getting anywhere near what you're suggesting is in alliance with the Soviet Union. Anything else seems fantastical.
Why? With the USSR out of the war, couldn't the Germans have allocated, say, a million additional workers to aircraft production?

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Re: Could a German invasion of Turkey succeed?

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 04 Aug 2021 23:34

glenn239 wrote:The only way I see the Axis getting anywhere near what you're suggesting is in alliance with the Soviet Union. Anything else seems fantastical.
Wondering whether I'm running into a point where you'll never consider contrary arguments quantitatively. It's fine if so, we all have those points. Maybe just let me know if so.

I'll give you an abbreviated version of the argument that German aircraft production could have been 4x its OTL peak and then will separately address ATL US production.

OTL conditions:
  • First data point is German industrial+transport labor force in OTL 1944. Including transportation and encompassing Greater Germany, there were no more than 15mil people producing all of Germany's armaments, basic military equipment, and general industrial goods.
  • Next data point is Germans drafted into military: 13mil by Sept. 44.
  • Next data point is foreign laborers: 7.5mil in Sept. 44.
ATL conditions:
  • Instead of 13mil Germans in the Wehrmacht (or KIA/MIA/disabled), ATL Germany needs only ~100 active divs to defend beaches. Germany would place soldiers on "temporary" armaments leave as it did in '40-'41 and call up a much larger army the Allies somehow secured a beachhead. Payout is only ~6mil Germans on active service and 7mil more German workers.
  • Having conquered the SU, Germany has millions more workers to "recruit." Outside the SU, its better war fortunes encourage greater compliance with German "recruitment," whereas in OTL that Germany was going to lose made it harder to ensure compliance by workers who'd rather hide out until Germany was defeated. Doubling foreign labor supply would not have been hard under ATL conditions, especially given ATL specification of earlier foreign labor drive and consequently ensuring most Soviet PoW's didn't die or become too sick/malnourished to work. Payout: +7.5mil foreign workers.
...that's easily enough to double the entire industrial labor force.

-----------------------------------------

What implications from doubling industrial labor force?

First, far from all of German industrial production went to armaments. A great proportion went to basic equipment: ~1/4 of military labor force engaged producing it during '40-'41. Basic common sense tells us that this was overwhelmingly concentrated on the army, as it's field soldiers who need basic military equipment. With the the number of ATL field soldiers drastically slashed, the basic equipment requirements would drastically decline as well.

Second, not all German industrial production went to armaments and basic equipment. Among other things, Germany had to maintain basic civilian needs, poured millions of tons of concrete for fortifications and (in '44) underground factories.

The long and short is that doubling total industrial labor force would easily 2x total armaments labor inputs.

----------------------------

From total armaments inputs let's move to distribution of such inputs.

In mid-44, aircraft's share of armaments output was 46.3%. ATL it would be ~70% if nearly all ATL:OTL input deltas went to LW [ 1.463 / 2 = 73% ].

Payout: at least 3x the production input to aircraft manufacture.

---------------------------------

Now let's move from aircraft inputs to aircraft outputs by including productivity of inputs.

As KDF33 has shown in his tables here, the ratio of German:US productivity in aircraft manufacture (by weight of airframes) declined by 45% percent between February '43 (when RAF's Battle of the Ruhr started seriously damaging the war economy) and July '44 (when bombing damage/dispersal had become immensely disruptive and drafts of skilled aviation workers had taken a deep toll).

Given these massively deleterious effects on German aviation industry, it would be conservative to project 33% higher German productivity in ATL conditions where skilled aviation workers aren't drafted and when daylight strikes on specific factories in 1944 are largely stopped (as I think glenn239 concede would have been possible).

Combining 3x the inputs with 33% greater productivity gives us 4x the aircraft production.

Payout: 4x OTL German aircraft production.

Hopefully it's clear that in each of the foregoing analytical steps I have adopted very conservative parameters. 4x OTL German aircraft production is a conservative estimate, IMJ.

--------------------------------

I recognize this is a surprising result and understand perceptions that it's fantastic. But I'm following the numbers and would encourage that approach to the issue.

What one should realize is there's a historically unique - superficially fantastic and morally terrible - dynamic underlying all of this: Germany's ability to "recruit" millions of foreigners into armaments production. The only historical analogue is colonial powers' ability to create a world-changing sugar/tobacco/cotton industry by enslaving millions of Africans, but even that took centuries whereas Germany was able to do it in a couple years.

While most people correctly intuit that the American economy was much larger than the German, what they usually miss is:
  • The prewar continental European economy was significantly larger than America's and Germany possesses basically all of it in this ATL.
  • Germany put more men under arms than the U.S. in WW2; soldiers have a production opportunity cost.
------------------------------

On the issue of greater-than-OTL American aircraft production my answer will be summary for now but, IMO, is sufficient to limit its feasible scope. Main points:
  • US/UK almost certainly need larger land armies. US industrial labor force in 1944 was ~18mil. As US division slice was ~60k, raising another 50 US divisions would cost ~3mil men or >15% of US industrial labor force (agriculture can't be cut because soldiers need more food than workers). As a percentage of industrial production after civilian minimum, removing 3mil Americans from industry would cut armaments production significantly more than 15%.
  • Because US/UK need larger armies than OTL, the proportion of (smaller) arms production going to aircraft would have to decline.
Taking those two factors together, it is extremely unlikely that US/UK could have produced more aircraft (by value) than it produced OTL. Indeed it is likely they would have produced less value.

As referenced upthread, I concede it would have been possible for US/UK to match German fighter production and total frames by abandoning the CBO.

TMP bookmark: argument summary on ATL German aircraft production
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Re: Could a German invasion of Turkey succeed?

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 05 Aug 2021 00:04

KDF33 wrote:TMP's ATL postulates the successful conclusion of the Soviet-German war; in that context, Germany would have benefited from a far larger pool of manpower, whereas the picture for the U.S. would have remained unchanged.
...at the best unchanged. The most likely outcome is a Soviet-Axis armistice that enables Germany to use the TSRR to ship weapons to Japan (and Japan to ship rubber and other rare materials to Germany). Even if the armistice doesn't happen, Axis can conquer the length of TSRR with relatively small forces by 1944, with same results (but delayed).

Either makes Japan able to conquer China and threaten India unless the US/UK put significantly greater land armies in Asia.

US/UK must meanwhile deal with at least the credible threat of Sealion, which ties down most of their ground forces. Assuming they don't abandon Africa and the Middle East, they need significant land forces there as well.

...so US/UK have lower productive resources unless overall and more are going to land warfare (and to building merchant shipping to support far-flung land forces).

Which is why I don't think any of this happens. Rather, US/UK make a peace with Germany that enables them to save their empires and influence in the East.

This is exactly what the US Council of Foreign Relations envisioned after France fell but before Soviet endurance was shown: containing Germany in Europe and taking over the rest of the world.
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Re: Could a German invasion of Turkey succeed?

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 05 Aug 2021 00:15

glenn239 wrote:We're talking grand strategy. IMO, any particular combat system, like the ME-262, does not rise to that level.
I don't get the objection. At whatever level of description, thousands of Me-262's traded 5-1 against Allied fighters prevents the Allies from establishing air superiority.
glenn239 wrote:IMO, the 4-engine bomber concept was probably obsolescent during the war. I grant that it's possible the LW might defeat the strategic bombing campaign using these types. But were that to occur, the USAAF would have switched their bombing campaign to night and used their fighters on deep missions during the day. The oil production could be greatly reduced by night bombing with the improvements in accuracy by 1945.
Again the B's 17/24 were inefficient night bombers. But even were they efficient, Me-262 night fighters are an easy solution to slow bombers. So are more Ju-88 nightfighters.
glenn239 wrote:I think there is no chance whatever that the Germans can hold Africa or the Middle East against the Allied logistics by 1944/1945.
Why not?
glenn239 wrote:46 divisions at 800 tons per day each is 1.1 million tons a month, 13 million tons per year. Port turn-around by 1944 will have vastly improved so each ship can do 2.5 trips per year, meaning about 5 million tons is required for the supply of 46 divisions in the Middle East. I seem to recall the US had at least 18 million tons in the Pacific alone by late 1944.
In March '45 US had 95 divisions overseas - 68 in Europe and 27 in Pacific (inc. 6 Marine). Global Logistics and Strategy v.2, app. D-4.

At ~3-1 shipping burden Europe:ME and ~2-1 Pacific:ME, that's the logistical equivalent of ~36divs in the MidEast.

That was a maximal effort. As the above-captured Army Services Forces summary stated:
At no time during the war did the United Nations have enough ships to fulfill their commitments.
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Re: Could a German invasion of Turkey succeed?

Post by Tom from Cornwall » 05 Aug 2021 17:35

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
04 Aug 2021 23:34
I'll give you an abbreviated version of the argument that German aircraft production could have been 4x its OTL peak and then will separately address ATL US production.
Your argument only covers the workforce? Do we not need to consider raw materials, factory space, aviation fuel, machine tools, airfields, pilots, ground crews, radar systems, jet engine technology design limitations, etc, etc.
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
03 Aug 2021 20:39
B-17/24's were inefficient night bombers anyway.
Why? Genuine question.
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
05 Aug 2021 00:04
(and Japan to ship rubber and other rare materials to Germany).
Wouldn't that be difficult in the face of the US anti-shipping campaign against the Japanese merchant fleet?
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
05 Aug 2021 00:04
Rather, US/UK make a peace with Germany that enables them to save their empires and influence in the East.
Your ATL doesn't leave the UK with an empire to save. :lol:

BTW I've found some more British information from mid-42 about Persian gulf port capacity issues which I'll try to post up later.

Regards

Tom

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Re: Could a German invasion of Turkey succeed?

Post by KDF33 » 05 Aug 2021 18:19

Tom from Cornwall wrote:
05 Aug 2021 17:35
Your argument only covers the workforce? Do we not need to consider raw materials, factory space, aviation fuel, machine tools, airfields, pilots, ground crews, radar systems, jet engine technology design limitations, etc, etc.
Most of these issues largely boil down to manpower, ultimately.

In terms of factory space and machine tools, however, even that available to Germany historically was working far below capacity - again, due to insufficient manpower.
Tom from Cornwall wrote:
05 Aug 2021 17:35
Wouldn't that be difficult in the face of the US anti-shipping campaign against the Japanese merchant fleet?
TMP means overland after the USSR is destroyed / 'Vichyfied'.

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Re: Could a German invasion of Turkey succeed?

Post by Richard Anderson » 05 Aug 2021 20:03

KDF33 wrote:
05 Aug 2021 18:19
Tom from Cornwall wrote:
05 Aug 2021 17:35
Your argument only covers the workforce? Do we not need to consider raw materials, factory space, aviation fuel, machine tools, airfields, pilots, ground crews, radar systems, jet engine technology design limitations, etc, etc.
Most of these issues largely boil down to manpower, ultimately.
Indeed, however, the problem is the "solution" is based not just on hindsight, but also on numerical prestidigitation and confirmation bias run amuck. I've hesitated to comment on the tendentious and self-congratulatory posts, but...

For example,

Yes, c. 13 million were drafted into the German military by September 1944. Of those, 3,632,434 were permanent losses. However, reducing divisional requirements of the Heer to "~100 active divs to defend beaches" does not "save" 7 million. For one thing, that was actually c. 4,190,000 to start, plus the addition of c. 9 million over the course from 1 September 1939 to 1 September 1944. For another, that is the entire combatant force of the Wehrmacht, not the Feldheer, which is where those "~100 active divs to defend beaches" would be found.

Instead, what you actually had was c. 2,740,000 in the 112 divisions of 1 September 1939, growing to c. 3,800,000 in 212 divisions 1 September 1941. Say for the sake of argument the USSR is somehow Vichyfied by 1 September 1943. At that point there were c. 4,250,000 in 296 divisions. A reduction to "~100 active divs to defend beaches" "saves" c. 2.8 million, not 7 million. Or, even better, lets take 1 September 1941 and assume the Soviet Union collapses from the sheer terror of TMP's "quantitative argument". So there were c. 3,800,000 in 212 divisions. Reducing that to "~100 active divs to defend beaches" then would "save" 2,007,547 or thereabouts.

Worse, the requirement for additional Luftwaffe personnel, flying and ground, gets swept under the rug. Using the same quantitative "logic" employed by TMP, a quadrupling of Luftwaffe aircraft strength requires a quadrupling of Luftwaffe personnel strength. For example, take September 1944, when c. 888,000 Luftwaffe personnel operated a front line aircraft strength of 6,317 on hand, of which 4,572 were operational. An additional 2,664,000 Luftwaffe personnel are required, nicht wahr?
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Re: Could a German invasion of Turkey succeed?

Post by glenn239 » 05 Aug 2021 20:27

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
04 Aug 2021 23:34
I'll give you an abbreviated version of the argument that German aircraft production could have been 4x its OTL peak and then will separately address ATL US production.
I don't think it was possible under any conditions for Germany to outproduce the Anglo-Americans in aircraft. I don't think it could be done except under the condition of the Soviet Union joining the Axis in 1940. That is to say, your premise precludes the outcome you need. That's why Barbarossa was a bad idea. The American production was completely unhindered by bombing and was drawing on an industrial base x3 the German industrial base. Even assuming a miracle in Russian resource extraction, it's still x2.5 the German base without counting the British. Then, in 1945 the A-bomb comes in and the USAAF can start destroying entire oil refinery complexes or major aircraft factories with one bomb.

Taking those two factors together, it is extremely unlikely that US/UK could have produced more aircraft (by value) than it produced OTL. Indeed it is likely they would have produced less value.
If the Germans actually started to press the Americans, the Americans would have switched more of their production to single engine to regain their lead. (I suspect the US could surpass 300,000 aircraft per year at maximum peak rate with the emphasis on single engine). The LW would not be able to stop the bombing campaign because the USAAF would switch to night bombing if casualties got too heavy, and we know from the history of the ECM/ECCM game that the Americans played that Germany would never be able to dominate the night air battle.

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Re: Could a German invasion of Turkey succeed?

Post by Takao » 05 Aug 2021 20:32

KDF33 wrote:
05 Aug 2021 18:19
TMP means overland after the USSR is destroyed / 'Vichyfied'.
I must have missed the part, where in this ATL, Stalin is a masochist with suicidal tendencies...

Allowing supplies to flow from Germany to Japan, so that the Nipponese can Nipponify his rump state seems fairly suicidal.
Perhaps, his name is Cut Me Own Throat Stalin.

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Re: Could a German invasion of Turkey succeed?

Post by glenn239 » 05 Aug 2021 20:43

Takao wrote:
05 Aug 2021 20:32
I must have missed the part, where in this ATL, Stalin is a masochist with suicidal tendencies...

Allowing supplies to flow from Germany to Japan, so that the Nipponese can Nipponify his rump state seems fairly suicidal.
Perhaps, his name is Cut Me Own Throat Stalin.
I'd advised Marcus that the idea of Stalin capitulating was improbable - he'd be executed for losing the war, so his only chance would be to fight on.

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TheMarcksPlan
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Re: Could a German invasion of Turkey succeed?

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 05 Aug 2021 20:58

Tom from Cornwall wrote:Your argument only covers the workforce?
As KDF33 says, most of the other factors are manpower factors. I've doubled total industrial workforce; therefore doubled total workers available to build machine tools, factory floor space, mining, transport, etc. The only difference is timing: yesterday's labor is today's capital and raw materials. As we're discussing 1944 and the ATL Wehrmacht has devoted all marginal gains to LW/KM since mid-41, timing isn't an issue.

This is a somewhat Marxist insight when first formulated long ago but Marx didn't have the details right. He wrote before the "marginal revolution" and therefore naively equated price and value, not seeing the role of marginal prices (a mistake economists continue to make but not quite so naively). The Harrison article I linked you in another thread discusses the modern economic concept of broad substitutability between various forms of production in modern economies, including the German war economy.
glenn239 wrote:I'd advised Marcus that the idea of Stalin capitulating was improbable - he'd be executed for losing the war, so his only chance would be to fight on.
Executed by who? And why did Stalin put out peace feelers OTL?
glenn239 wrote:I don't think it was possible under any conditions for Germany to outproduce the Anglo-Americans in aircraft.
I suspected as much. Let's leave it that on this sub-topic. I've very much enjoyed our discussion, thank you.

[to be clear, I can see Germany significantly out-producing US only [not US+UK] and only if Allies raise larger armies]
glenn239 wrote:we know from the history of the ECM/ECCM game that the Americans played that Germany would never be able to dominate the night air battle.
What game? I suspect it wasn't played under ATL conditions...
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