Could a German invasion of Turkey succeed?

[Richard Anderson]

Sigh...this is getting silly again.

Luftwaffe Operational 1e and 2E Day Fighter Aircraft with Operational Units Average Strength for the Month/Loss per Sortie against Allied day bomber operations 1944:

January 1,236/5.9%
February 1,390/10.4%
March 1,291/10.8%
April 1,327/8.8%
May 1,348/10.6%
June 1,156/13.6%
July 1,146/13.1%
August 1,216/13.4%
September 1,556/15.8%
October 2,201/8.1%
November 2,470/18.5%
December 2,036/13%

Compare those to the Eighth Air Force Operational HB with Operational Units Average Strength for the Month/Loss per Sortie to All Causes (MIA, Missing, and Cat E)/Loss per Sortie to E/A

January 842/3.8/2.2
February 1,046/3.5/1.72
March 1,094/3.3/1.54
April 1,323/3.6/2.17
May 1,655/2.2/1.06
June 2,123/1.1/0.39
July 2,026/1.5/0.35
August 1,929/1.5/0.25
September 2,045/2.2/0.75
October 2,119/1.1/0.19
November 2,071/2.2/0.29
December 1,944/1.2/0.15

And, yes, that is the total German Jagd and Zerstörer Waffe versus just Eighth AF, so should probably include Fifteenth AF and BC daylight raids, but then we'd likely just start round and round again over First Line versus Operational, ad nauseum.

[TheMarcksPlan]

Luftwaffe Operational 1e and 2E Day Fighter Aircraft with Operational Units Average Strength for the Month/Loss per Sortie against Allied day bomber operations 1944:

January 1,236/5.9%
February 1,390/10.4%
March 1,291/10.8%
April 1,327/8.8%
May 1,348/10.6%
June 1,156/13.6%
July 1,146/13.1%
August 1,216/13.4%
September 1,556/15.8%
October 2,201/8.1%
November 2,470/18.5%
December 2,036/13%

Thanks for the data. Source?

One obvious blindspot of this data set is what I'm calling "attritional velocity" - how quickly were the establishment strengths being cycled via attrition. We can't tell from each datum - avg. op. strength and sortie loss rate - what total losses are. For that we'd need total sorties.

I must again emphasize the logical and commonsense absurdity of doing this analysis while ignoring total losses. Am I alone in realizing how foolish this is?

Compare those

I don't see in your post any attempt to connect data to a point via analysis. What's your point and your analysis?

[TheMarcksPlan]

From 6/1/1940 to 5/31/1944, 2,848,000 people were added to the essential economic sectors, whereas 7,555,168 were sent to the military and other security organizations. That's almost 3 persons sent to the military et al. for every 1 sent to the essential economic sectors.

Thank you. A very concise, revealing metric for evaluating Ostheer's drain on total German resources - military and production.

I would slightly amend/revise it to "That's almost 3 persons sent to the military et al. for every NET 1 sent to the essential economic sectors." That emphasizes how the big action in Germany's production and manpower war was at the margins: There were 42mil potential workers/soldiers; the picture changes enormously based on the marginal allocations of the last few million to field armies, factories, or the civilian sector.

[Peter89]

Again, discussions are easier when you ask what I'm saying rather than strategically telling me what I'm saying.

Okay, so please just tell me what do you mean by "3-4x LW strength". It seems to be a cornerstone of your argument, so please help me understand it.

[Peter89]

The essential prerequisite to TMP's argument has always been the successful conclusion to Hitler's Russian campaign.

What is a "successful conclusion of the Russian campaign"?

[KDF33]

What is a "successful conclusion of the Russian campaign"?

From my reading of TMP, either shrinking Stalin's holdings to a small, Vichyfied rump state, or totally occupying the Soviet Union in conjunction with Japan.

[KDF33]

Yes and I am keen to read how the additional manpower can be smelted into aluminium.

The additional manpower would obviously mine the bauxite and operate the smelters.

[Peter89]

What is a "successful conclusion of the Russian campaign"?

From my reading of TMP, either shrinking Stalin's holdings to a small, Vichyfied rump state, or totally occupying the Soviet Union in conjunction with Japan.

I meant what does it mean for the "3-4x Luftwaffe" theory?

From what I've read here, TMP envisioned an all-out Axis attack in late 1942 or in 1943 into the ME and Mediterraneum (despite allocating those very resources to bolster "his Soviet campaign"). I'd just want to know what kind of area would Germany / Axis cover at the imagined end of the Soviet campaign, and how would that campaign effect the Luftwaffe?

How would it effect its resource base?
How would it effect its losses and production?
How would it effect its training program?
How would it effect its combat readiness?

[Michael Kenny]

I'd get more "refutals" if I posted on r/ShitWehraboosSay but they'd be even lower quality.

That sounds like a great site, can you post up a link?

https://old.reddit.com/r/ShitWehraboosS ... rict_sr=on

[Tom from Cornwall]

Ha,

And I thought it was a joke…I feel strangely soiled!

Regards

Tom

[Peter89]

I'd get more "refutals" if I posted on r/ShitWehraboosSay but they'd be even lower quality.

That sounds like a great site, can you post up a link?

https://old.reddit.com/r/ShitWehraboosS ... rict_sr=on

And I thought this thread has more connection to reality than Babylon 5 remastered... and now you ruin it.

Thank you, by the way.

[Richard Anderson]

The sources were already given.

Let us look at October 1943. The Germans executed 3,910 fighter sorties by their count against eight USAAF attacks on German and Austrian targets, including the Schweinfurt attack. They lost (MIA, missing, and 60% damage, i.e., the same as the USAAF Cat E) 141 aircraft, so a loss rate (loss per sortie, the standard measure of attrition in air combat) of 3.6%. They began the month with 1,646 1E fighters and 392 2E fighters on strength in the entire Luftwaffe, of which 1,080 and 243 respectively were serviceable, a rate for the day fighter force of 64.9%. They ended the month with 1,722 1E and 322 2E on strength of which 1,193 and 223 were serviceable, a rate for the day fighter force of 69.3%. The Jagdwaffe claimed 317 definite HB shot down and 95 probables. The "attritional [sic] velocity" was positive by 6 aircraft on strength and by 93 aircraft serviceable. Number of 1E aircrew on hand 30 September 1943 was 2,334, of which 1,447 were operationally ready and 316 were partly ready. By 31 December 1943, crew on hand were 2,395, of which 1,441 were operationally ready and 291 were partly ready. While on hand increased marginally, 61, both operationally ready and partly ready had decreased.

Luftwaffe - "Yay! We're winning the air war! But we need more pilots."

Those same eight attacks, seven by Eighth AF and one by Ninth, using Eighth AF B-24's, consisted of 1,776 HB credit sorties and the loss of 163 aircraft, for a loss rate of 9.2%. Bad enough to cause the "bombing halt" (which wasn't really a halt, but that is neither here nor there). The ETOUSA began the month with 931 1st line HB and ended the month with 1,104, a positive "attritional [sic] velocity" of 173 aircraft on strength. The Eighth AF monthly average of HB on hand in operational tactical units went up from 656 to 763, a positive gain of 107. Fully operational in tactical units went from 535 to 705, a gain of 170. Number of crews assigned went from 820 to 1,085, a positive gain of 265. Number of operational crews went from 479 to 636, a positive gain of 157. Effective strength for combat went from 417 to 578, a positive gain of 161.

Luftwaffe - "Yay? Are we winning the air war? We need more aircraft and pilots."

Average serviceable strength of the Luftwaffe 1E fighter force from 30 September 1943 through 30 June 1944 was 1,123. It went from 1,080 at the beginning to 980 at the end, a negative "attritional [sic] velocity" of 100 aircraft. Eighth AF effective strength for combat averaged 417 in October 1943 and grew to 1,855 in June 1944, a positive "attritional [sic] velocity" of 1,438 aircraft.

Luftwaffe fully operational crew strength went from 1,447 30 September 1943 to 1,325 6 June 1944, a negative "attritional [sic] velocity" of 122. Eighth AF HB crews available went from 409 to 2,034, a positive "attritional [sic] velocity" of 1,625.

[TheMarcksPlan]

Okay, so please just tell me what do you mean by "3-4x LW strength". It seems to be a cornerstone of your argument, so please help me understand it.

Summarized here. Note it's 4x LW aircraft production, which bumps up to >5x the Wallies-facing production (no Ostfront). I discuss the fuel budget for 4x the pilot training at 1942 levels here.

Obviously there are many other factors relevant to the ATL analysis besides LW AC/pilot output. One of these is ATL attrition ratios. For convenience, I am so far assuming OTL attrition ratios through early 1944. As I've discussed elsewhere, these attrition ratios were unfavorable to the Wallies and were viable only against a very weak opponent (as was Germany OTL). Due to better ATL training (and other factors), assuming OTL attrition ratio is a conservative parameter because LW qualitative improvement is likely ATL.

-----------------------------

What do I mean by strength?

As you can see, I've so far only sketched the production and training flows. How the ATL cashes out in LW operational strength would be a matter of how the Wallies respond. There are several possible Wallied responses:

• 1. Wallies feed their OTL aircraft/pilot assets into the Battle of Germany as in OTL, losing up to 5x as many AC to German fighters as OTL. In this case, the Wallies run out of heavy bombers rapidly (before 5x losses actually), as I've discussed elsewhere.
• 2. The Wallies abandon or dramatically scale back the CBO. Many possible sub-variations of this case.

LW operational strength is higher in Case 2 than in Case 1.

But we don't need a firm conclusion on the issue because in either case the CBO has been stopped. We should be outcome focused.

--------------------------------

What is the argument that the Wallies could have maintained the CBO against 5x the aerial opposition?

What is a "successful conclusion of the Russian campaign"?

Summarized here. Stalin either (1) makes peace in Fall '42, accepting a rump Vichy'd state behind the Urals or (2) a dramatically smaller Ostheer (~60 divisions) pursues the war into Siberia, perhaps eventually linking up with Japan.

[TheMarcksPlan]

The sources were already given.

Can anyone tell me where Richard cites his sortie and German fighter loss data? He's being peevish.

Let us look at October 1943. The Germans executed 3,910 fighter sorties...

Richard you're doing that thing again where you throw up a bunch of (uncited) data and think it makes an argument.

While data is necessary, it's not sufficient. You need to connect your data to some kind of analysis that tells us why the Wallies would not have sustained more losses against more German fighters. I suspect you're not making an argument because you know there is no such argument reasonably in the cards. But I'm open to being proven wrong.

[Tom from Cornwall]

Hi TMP,

You say in post 584:

I have specified no ATL shift to 1E fighters, only a general 4x delta to LW production for each LW production category (5x delta to RLV resources because no Ostfront).

And also that

As you can see, I've so far only sketched the production and training flows.

So, depending on German aviation production priorities how can you be sure that:

4x LW aircraft production

produces:

5x the aerial opposition?

Wouldn’t that depend on the particular choices the Nazi leadership made? Say it’s autumn 1942 and, as I mentioned before, according to your ATL the Nazi leadership are busy planning a 1943 “Mesopotamia”campaign. Wouldn’t that suggest a shift to maritime aviation, long-range bombers and transport as well as a continuing need to sustain a highly mobile, expeditionary and tactical Air Force which would create different production priorities than one solely focussed on a notional future threat to the Reich?

A maritime aviation arm increased in strength through 4x production would be (and probably would have been in reality) a highly valuable addition to the campaign against the Anglo-Americans in both the Atlantic and Middle East but wouldn’t have contributed to a defensive campaign against HBs over the Reich.

Or am I missing something, whether necessary, sufficient, essential or just blindingly obvious. It definitely happens.

Thanks, BTW, as I hadn’t previously known that the Condor had the “Flying Clog” as a rival and was replaced by the Ju 290. Interesting.

Regards

Tom