Czechoslovak defense strategy was to avoid being pinced and I think it is quite safe to assume they'd succeed in this. The fortification on the north was strong enough to protect "the corridor" for the Czechoslovak army to escape encircling, had the German attack went that far. First they'd need to get through, which is easier to be said than done. Even if they'd succeed, they would have very high casualties (possibly higher than what they are able to accept and would seek the armistice) and still would face the core of the Czechoslovak army, but now on a much shorter front, in another mountaineous terrain on Slovak border. Even if Germany won in 1938, which is far from sure thing, it would be severely damaged and in no shape to attack in the west.History Learner wrote: ↑26 Jan 2019 20:14The German plan for Czechoslovakia envisaged two pincers closing from the north and south, with massive paratrooper drops being dropped to cut internal Czech lines of communication. The Czechs themselves didn't envision the defenses lasting more then a few months. The fortified frontier was found by German examinations to be poorly suited to stop the exact sort of massed armored assault assisted by dive-bombers and artillery the Germans envisioned.
Czechoslovak army had some 350 panzers with cannons able to pierce any German tank, while majority of German panzers can't do the same to LT-35 (except about 100 of III and IV) models. Panzer I would have difficult time to get around gun fire of the light fortification pillboxes. Czechoslovak army had the tanks concentrated in the dedicated divisions, and were trained to use them at concentrated level. They'd use them to plug any holes in the fortification lines, would be interesting to see how this power vs. power would work. Nobody really knows.History Learner wrote: ↑26 Jan 2019 20:14While Germany's panzer divisions were made up mainly of Panzer I and II tanks in 1938 (and Panzer IIs still made up the majority in 1940), at least Germany had panzer divisions, grouped and organized in a logical manner. Compared to the four Panzer divisions Germany possessed in October of 1938 (with a fifth forming in November) France had... none.
Many of the "over 500 Messerschmitts" were the B models, with just two 7,65mm guns. All early Bf-109 had relatively weak Jumo engines. About 200 of them were allocated to Reich defense, 300 along with old Ar-68s and He-51s were designated to face 350 Avias B-534, obsolete biplane design, but having 4 MGs, much stronger engine, and thus performance gap not as big (especially better climb rate would be handy, as well as manoeuvrability), so the air superioriry over Czechoslovakia was not given, but had to be fought (with possibly substantial casualties)History Learner wrote: ↑26 Jan 2019 20:14The Moraine MS.406 was a decent enough fighter, but the numbers in service with the French Air Force in late 1938 were tiny, with each aircraft basically hand crafted. Yearly production in 1938 stood at a paltry 65 aircraft. [Goldstein, "The Munich Crisis," p.142] While you can argue that the 109D did not significantly outclass the MS.406, in September of 1938 Germany had over 500 Messerschmitts (along with about 60 early model Bf.110s and a smattering of 300 or so older biplane fighters), while France had just a few dozen Moranes - basically just an extended run of prototypes. It wasn't until late 1938 that the French began ordering new planes in large enough numbers for mass production, and the first production MS.406 didn't fly until January of 1939. In October of 1938 by far the most common French fighters the Germans would have faced would have been the obsolete Dewoitine D.500s and D.501s, which had fixed landing gear and open cockpits. Even then the French fighter squadrons were badly outnumbered, with only about 300 Dewoitines in frontline service as of August 1938. Similarly the RAF had only one operational Hurricane squadron (16 planes) at the time of Munich, as that type was also just entering service, with just four more squadrons forming. [Isby, "The Decisive Duel,"] This is ignoring the gross deficiency in the ADA's organization and training compared to the Luftwaffe.
There were three different Messerschmitt models, just rushed to service, causing a logistic nightmare with spare parts and main problem of Luftwaffe in 1938 it was drastically understaffed, and to get some squadrons operational, the training was reduced to minimum. While the Luftwaffe bombers looks like a formidable force with sheer numbers on paper, they only had about 500 squads. Given the terrible weather in October/November 1938, the casualties would be high, even further magnifying the sore point of Luftwaffe. They simply needed that extra year to be effective on new Bf-109Es and other equipment as it was a case in Poland.