If there's no Yugoslav coup in early 1941, does Operation Barbarossa succeed?

[Peter89]

No. If anything the Yugoslav coup helped the German invasion of the Soviet Union because:

(1) It gave Germany a path around the Metaxas Line, which they were unable to breach in the OTL, and

The Germans circumvented the Metaxas line in 2 days...

Besides, the Greeks had to divide their units to the Epirus front, facing Albania and Italian troops, thus, unrelated to the German invasion of Yugoslavia.

[historygeek2021]

No. If anything the Yugoslav coup helped the German invasion of the Soviet Union because:

(1) It gave Germany a path around the Metaxas Line, which they were unable to breach in the OTL, and

The Germans circumvented the Metaxas line in 2 days...

Besides, the Greeks had to divide their units to the Epirus front, facing Albania and Italian troops, thus, unrelated to the German invasion of Yugoslavia.

The Germans circumvented the Metaxas Line in the OTL by going through Yugoslavia. If there is no coup in Yugoslavia then Hitler has no excuse to violate the terms of Yugoslavia's accession to the Tripartite Pact, which stipulated that Germany would not be allowed to send troops through Yugoslavia.

Since Yugoslavia was the main route for the German invasion of Greece in the OTL, then literally everything in that campaign is related to the German invasion of Yugoslavia.

[TheMarcksPlan]

Since Yugoslavia was the main route for the German invasion of Greece in the OTL, then literally everything in that campaign is related to the German invasion of Yugoslavia.

What are you ultimately arguing, though? That the Greeks (and British) will actually stop 12th Army?

I could see this delaying the campaign by maybe a week? Maybe the Germans lose a thousand more men?

In the longer term, having a Yugoslav ally rather than a roiling insurgency in the Balkans seems like a net benefit to Germany.

[historygeek2021]

Since Yugoslavia was the main route for the German invasion of Greece in the OTL, then literally everything in that campaign is related to the German invasion of Yugoslavia.

What are you ultimately arguing, though? That the Greeks (and British) will actually stop 12th Army?

I could see this delaying the campaign by maybe a week? Maybe the Germans lose a thousand more men?

In the longer term, having a Yugoslav ally rather than a roiling insurgency in the Balkans seems like a net benefit to Germany.

In the OTL the Germans attacked Greece on April 6, and the Metaxas Line surrendered on April 10 due to being cut off by Germany forces moving through Yugoslavia. The German forces directly opposing the Mataxas Line made little progress during this time. The main problem for Germany is that a slow advance through the Metaxas Line gives the Greeks and British time to realign their other forces, which were deployed mainly against Albania. If the Greeks are able to set up another defensive position in the interior of the country, the weeks of delay compared to the OTL could start to add up.

In the longer term, Yugoslavia would not be much of an ally. Most of its population and leadership were pro-British and/or pro-Russian. Germany wouldn't be able to exploit it economically as in the OTL, and eventually Yugoslavia would enter the war on the Allied side (maybe not until 1944 or 1945, but eventually they would). In the meantime, it would be a valuable location for British and Soviet intelligence operations against Germany.

In past threads you argued that the conquest of Yugoslavia was advantageous for Germany because it secured its southern flank, so what has caused you to change your mind?

[History Learner]

No. If anything the Yugoslav coup helped the German invasion of the Soviet Union because:

(1) It gave Germany a path around the Metaxas Line, which they were unable to breach in the OTL, and
(2) It eliminated a pro-Allied and pro-Soviet country that could have turned against Germany at any time.

Without the Yugoslav coup, Germany would have been forced to invade Greece solely from Bulgaria, where they were blocked by the Metaxas Line. While Germany would likely have broken through, it would have taken longer than in the OTL, allowing the Greeks and British to fall back from their forward positions in Albania and form another defensive line further south, dragging out the Greek campaign for potentially weeks longer than in the OTL, and potentially postponing the assault on Crete indefinitely, giving the British a bomber base within range of the Ploesti oil fields.

In any event, Germany was defeated by the overwhelming material superiority of the Soviet Union backed by the United States and Britain. An extra week or month would not have changed the outcome. The Soviet Union raised more armies in 1941 than Germany could ever hope to defeat. Look at this compilation of Soviet armies raised over the course of 1941 from David Glantz's Barbarossa:

Red Armies 1941.png

Germany had no idea the Soviets would be able to field this many armies in 1941. The OstHeer was hopelessly outmatched.

After initial success in fighting off the Italian invasion of their territory, by early 1941 the Greeks were in dire straights. Simple economics-in terms of forces and industry behind them-painted the picture well enough but so too had their own success undone them; the Greek Army was over-extended outside of its prepared defenses and starting to suffer a crippling ammunition shortage. The Italians were already rushing in serious reinforcement while the Germans would be joining them on another route; there is no serious prospect of serious Greek resistance holding up the Axis. Likewise, the threat of Crete was more apparent than real, it is simply beyond the ability of the RAF to actually threaten the oil fields of Ploesti given force and technological issues.

Outside of that, there's a lot to benefit the Germans here. Martin Van Creveld's book Hitler's Strategy 1940-1941: the Balkan Clue argues that the Balkans engendered Hitler's decision in March to cancel the planned two-pronged attack by AGS into Ukraine then under planning. As a result, 12th Army was diverted to the Balkans for an expanded operation against Greece and, as fate would have it, Yugoslavia. This left the less capable and prepared 11th Army to take their place, with no pincer taking place. Instead, a broad front advance was undertaken which ultimately failed to achieve the encirclements seen elsewhere in Operation Barbarossa and gave AGS a staggered start.

[TheMarcksPlan]

In past threads you argued that the conquest of Yugoslavia was advantageous for Germany because it secured its southern flank

I can see the superficial contradiction. Here I'm assuming that Yugoslavia is revealed as a dependable "ally" along the lines of Bulgaria - not useful on the Eastern Front but cooperative and essentially an economic captive. OTL the coup revealed Yugoslavia as a foe; my view is that it's good that happened when it did instead of, say, in the middle of Barbarossa.

Maybe that's not the right reading of the ATL...

In any event, Germany was defeated by the overwhelming material superiority of the Soviet Union backed by the United States and Britain.

Went back upthread...

I agree that a week or even months of different timing wouldn't have changed this picture fundamentally. The "winter beat the Germans" people imagine that Russians are impervious to cold - in fact the Battle of Moscow may have gone closer to Bagration had the RKKA not been stymied by snow. Not arguing that's the likely outcome, just that it's at least as likely as German victory absent the cold.

All of this is, of course, subject to my proviso that Germany was overwhelmed because it half-assed Barbarossa.

(1) It gave Germany a path around the Metaxas Line, which they were unable to breach in the OTL,

Just trying to drill down on your argument here. Does the Metaxas Line hold absent Yugoslavia? I suspect not but I'm not coming into this discussion as I do when I express a strong viewpoint (i.e. with maps, figures, research).

The right-hook through Yugoslavia took ~half the German forces IIRC, including all the mechanized divisions. To the extent that the line was difficult for 12th Army (again, mostly ignorant on that story), it seems that a decent counterfactual analysis would have to consider what happens if we double German overall strength assaulting the line and add armor.

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi maltesefalcon,

You post, "The actual battles in Yugoslavia only lasted 11 days in April."

Yes, but this does not tell us the possible time delay imposed.

Firstly, German troops had to spend time deploying against Yugoslavia.

Then there are the 11 days you mention.

Secondly the Yugoslav Campaign drew German forces into Greece and Crete.

Thirdly, these German forces either became diverted by occupation duties or had to spend more time returning to face the USSR.

Finally there are the losses, which go well beyond the battle casualties. Several mechanized formations suffered considerable non-battle attrition on their vehicle parks. One lost an entire battalion of tanks sunk on a ship while returning north through the Adriatic. On top of this, the German airborne arm was crippled as a major deployable factor beyond Axis lines for the rest of the war.

Cheers,

Sid.

[ljadw]

The Germans circumvented the Metaxas Line in the OTL by going through Yugoslavia. If there is no coup in Yugoslavia then Hitler has no excuse to violate the terms of Yugoslavia's accession to the Tripartite Pact, which stipulated that Germany would not be allowed to send troops through Yugoslavia.

Since Yugoslavia was the main route for the German invasion of Greece in the OTL, then literally everything in that campaign is related to the German invasion of Yugoslavia.

If Hitler had no excuse, he would invent an excuse .
And, it is so that both invasions were unrelated .Hitler did not attack Yugoslavia because there was a war between Greece and Italy: if there was no war between Greece and Italy, Hitler would still have attacked Yugoslavia because of the anti German coup in Belgrade which happened after the visit of the chief of the OSS.

[TheMarcksPlan]

The German forces directly opposing the Mataxas Line made little progress during this time. The main problem for Germany is that a slow advance through the Metaxas Line gives the Greeks and British time to realign their other forces

Per the official US Army campaign history, ~8 German divs participated in the initial into Greece (inc. through Yugoslavia), of which only 3 directly assaulted the Metaxas line.

In addition PzGr1 stepped off into Yugoslavia on these forces' right flank; ATL they'd go into Greece if needed. Kleist had 5 divs (inc. 2pz, 1mot).

So ATL the Metaxas line has to check up to 13 divisions instead of three, ~600 tanks instead of none. LW also focuses here instead of Yugoslavia.

US Army summary:

The frontal attack on the Metaxas Line, undertaken by one German infantry and two reinforced mountain divisions of the XVIII Mountain Corps, met with extremely tough resistance from the Greek defenders. After a three-day struggle, during which the Germans massed artillery and dive bombers, the Metaxas Line was finally penetrated.

Might you be reading continued resistance along the Metaxas Line, after its penetration, as the line having held for longer? Per US Army:

Some of the fortresses of the line held out for days after the German attack divisions had bypassed them and could not be reduced until heavy guns were brought up.

...this is analogous to the fortress at Brest-Litovsk holding out for days in Barbarossa but having no impact on AGC's ability to overrun Belarus and destroy Western Front.

------------------------------

The Greeks fought valiantly - even Hitler said so publicly - but a poorly-equipped and outnumbered force had no chance against the world's strongest army; three days is three days.

[Steve]

A possible occupation of Greece had been factored into the planning for Barbarossa. In November 1940 Hitler issued Directive No. 18 which ordered the army to prepare for using Bulgaria to occupy the Greek mainland north of the Aegean. Directive No. 20 issued in December 1940 considered occupying all of Greece if it became necessary. Hitler told Goebbels that if the British had not intervened in Greece he would not have hastened to help the Italians.

Hitler heard of the coup in Yugoslavia on the 27th and immediately called a meeting. General Halder while on his way to the meeting in a car sketched out an invasion plan which he presented to Hitler. Later that day plans for the invasion of Greece and the preliminary build up for Barbarossa were ordered to be revised. The British apparently encouraged the plotters to stage the Yugoslavia coup but exactly how much involvement they had is a moot point.

When Barbarossa was launched Hitler’s bet that he could destroy the Soviet Union in three months was not thought a bad bet. Both the USA and the UK just like Hitler expected the USSR to collapse. The Germans made an assessment of the size of the Red Army and they succeeded in destroying that size army. That the Soviets had built up over the years massive reserves which they were able to deploy and replace the army destroyed in the summer and autumn of 1941 was not anticipated. Hindsight is a wonderful thing.

[TheMarcksPlan]

That the Soviets had... massive reserves... was not anticipated. Hindsight is a wonderful thing

"That the 12 beers Bob drank would endanger his drive home was not anticipated. Hindsight is a wonderful thing."

[ljadw]

A possible occupation of Greece had been factored into the planning for Barbarossa. In November 1940 Hitler issued Directive No. 18 which ordered the army to prepare for using Bulgaria to occupy the Greek mainland north of the Aegean. Directive No. 20 issued in December 1940 considered occupying all of Greece if it became necessary. Hitler told Goebbels that if the British had not intervened in Greece he would not have hastened to help the Italians.

Hitler heard of the coup in Yugoslavia on the 27th and immediately called a meeting. General Halder while on his way to the meeting in a car sketched out an invasion plan which he presented to Hitler. Later that day plans for the invasion of Greece and the preliminary build up for Barbarossa were ordered to be revised. The British apparently encouraged the plotters to stage the Yugoslavia coup but exactly how much involvement they had is a moot point.

When Barbarossa was launched Hitler’s bet that he could destroy the Soviet Union in three months was not thought a bad bet. Both the USA and the UK just like Hitler expected the USSR to collapse. The Germans made an assessment of the size of the Red Army and they succeeded in destroying that size army. That the Soviets had built up over the years massive reserves which they were able to deploy and replace the army destroyed in the summer and autumn of 1941 was not anticipated. Hindsight is a wonderful thing.

I would not use the word anticipate . A better word : face the possibility ,because ,if the Soviets had unknown reserves that could replace their losses, Barbarossa would fail and Germany would lose the war .The Germans told each other that they would easily win and all objections that it was maybe not that easy,were thrown away .They would win,because they had to win .

[Futurist]

A possible occupation of Greece had been factored into the planning for Barbarossa. In November 1940 Hitler issued Directive No. 18 which ordered the army to prepare for using Bulgaria to occupy the Greek mainland north of the Aegean. Directive No. 20 issued in December 1940 considered occupying all of Greece if it became necessary. Hitler told Goebbels that if the British had not intervened in Greece he would not have hastened to help the Italians.

Hitler heard of the coup in Yugoslavia on the 27th and immediately called a meeting. General Halder while on his way to the meeting in a car sketched out an invasion plan which he presented to Hitler. Later that day plans for the invasion of Greece and the preliminary build up for Barbarossa were ordered to be revised. The British apparently encouraged the plotters to stage the Yugoslavia coup but exactly how much involvement they had is a moot point.

When Barbarossa was launched Hitler’s bet that he could destroy the Soviet Union in three months was not thought a bad bet. Both the USA and the UK just like Hitler expected the USSR to collapse. The Germans made an assessment of the size of the Red Army and they succeeded in destroying that size army. That the Soviets had built up over the years massive reserves which they were able to deploy and replace the army destroyed in the summer and autumn of 1941 was not anticipated. Hindsight is a wonderful thing.

In addition to its vast reserves, what significantly helped the Soviet Union was its extremely huge amount of space that allowed it to buy several months' worth of extra time. The Nazis could not quickly overrun the Soviet Union like they could with France; had France was as large and its population as widespread as that of the Soviet Union, the Nazis might not have been capable of defeating France even with the successful Sickle-Cut encirclement maneuver.

[EKB]

the Yugoslav Campaign drew German forces into Greece and Crete.

Thirdly, these German forces either became diverted by occupation duties or had to spend more time returning to face the USSR.

On top of this, the German airborne arm was crippled as a major deployable factor beyond Axis lines for the rest of the war.

Tentative air transport capability was another example of Germany not planning for a long war. For the Crete landings in May 1941, the Luftwaffe managed to muster less than five hundred, obsolete, Junkers 52 tri-motors. This is despite the absence of large-scale ground combat for German troops in Western Europe, Italy or the Soviet Union.

As with railways in the East, the weakness of German air transport logistics was exposed when they opened other battle fronts. Steady attrition and a spike in loss rates for the Junkers 52 in Norway, the Netherlands, Crete, North Africa, and the Stalingrad crisis put the brakes on massed airborne and air supply operations.

The German Air Ministry might have put more effort into developing the Focke-Wulf 200 as a heavy transport.

[ljadw]

Hi maltesefalcon,

You post, "The actual battles in Yugoslavia only lasted 11 days in April."

Yes, but this does not tell us the possible time delay imposed.

Firstly, German troops had to spend time deploying against Yugoslavia.

Then there are the 11 days you mention.

Secondly the Yugoslav Campaign drew German forces into Greece and Crete.

Thirdly, these German forces either became diverted by occupation duties or had to spend more time returning to face the USSR.

Finally there are the losses, which go well beyond the battle casualties. Several mechanized formations suffered considerable non-battle attrition on their vehicle parks. One lost an entire battalion of tanks sunk on a ship while returning north through the Adriatic. On top of this, the German airborne arm was crippled as a major deployable factor beyond Axis lines for the rest of the war.

Cheers,

Sid.

The Yugoslav campaign did not drew German forces in Greece : the attack on Greece was planned and decided in December 1940,non related to the coup in Yugoslavia .