What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

[MarkN]

All I need is for the extra divisions to perform as average German mobile divisions performed in Barbarossa.

They failed. Your fantasy scenario will almost certainly fail for exactly the same reason(s).

If the extra divisions aren't combat-ready until summer 1942 (as with OTL divisions in the excerpt) it wouldn't matter to the outcome: with Moscow, Leningrad, everything in the south up to Vornezh-Rostov line gone, ...

BARBAROSSA failed before Moscow and failed to take Leningrad. Part of the reason for that is described by the evidence you posted: offensive burnout. The very same offensive burnout will be suffered by your additional 20 mech divs because you had them at the same start point.

[TheMarcksPlan]

You have repeatedly handwaved that your fantasy scenario

I tried to respond substantively to you. I will not play the game of rebutting these insults. They are easy for anyone to make from any position against anyone else of any position, yet they require so much more effort to rebut than to make.

You go back on ignore moving forward.

[ljadw]

Finally, the parlous state of German forces in early 1942 owed largely to Hitler's ridiculous decision during Barbarossa to cut army production. My ATL plans for at least a two-year campaign; those cuts don't happen.

Hitler's decision to cut army production, which was decided already before the start of Barbarossa ( on June 20 ), was not ridiculous .Hitler's opinion,which was shared by the OKH,was that Barbarossa could succeed only in a very short campaign .Russia had to be defeated in the Summer,as there was sufficient supply to do it, army production after the Summer would not help the Ostheer,and would only delay the transfer of the Schwerpunkt of the armament to the LW and the KM .I would take time to change the direction of the armament ,a lot of time , thus it was logical to decide it at the start of the fighting .If the decision was taken in the Autumn only, the increase of the LW and KM production could only happen in 1942 , and Germany was in a hurry : its biggest opponent was general time .
Hitler said the following on June 20 :
" Durch Einschränkung der Heeresrüstung können Fertigungsstätten und Arbeitskräfte freigemacht werden.Diese freigemachten Betriebsmittel sind über den Reichsminister für Bewaffnung und Munition in erster Linie für das erweiterte Luftwaffenprogramm zur Verfügung zu stellen ........"
Resources and workers can be liberated by an decrease of the production for the army .These resources must be made available for an increased LW program . "
Source : Vabanque P 28 note 89
And on June 30 ,it was decided that the LW production should be quadrupled ( Same source : note 88 )
The only thing one could blame the Germans for is that they took their wishes for reality and that, as Barbarossa could be won
only in the Summer, they were convinced that it should be won in the Summer, and that already before Barbarossa,they prepared the long war against Britain and the USA.
But, the reason for this,was that they had no choice.They could do nothing against the US : they were condemned to a defensive strategy in the West and an offensive strategy in the East .US could destroy the German cities,but Germany could not destroy the American cities. To remain defensive was an assured receipt for defeat .

[Richard Anderson]

Finally, the parlous state of German forces in early 1942 owed largely to Hitler's ridiculous decision during Barbarossa to cut army production. My ATL plans for at least a two-year campaign; those cuts don't happen.

Hitler's decision to cut army production, which was decided already before the start of Barbarossa ( on June 20 ), was not ridiculous .

I guess I really should pay more attention to posters on ignore, otherwise I wouldn't miss gems like this.

Yes, the order was made on 20 June 1941 to re-prioritize production. However, the actual cuts and its effects were almost non-existent. Monthly production averages for every category of Heer equipment year-over-year 1941-1942 increased rather than decreased. Monthly averages:

Lt Inf Wpns 154.9/192.4
Hvy Inf Wpns 378/815
Hvy Pak 0/176
Art 178/199
Lt Flak 795/1,526
Hvy Flak 199/348
Tanks 271/350
StuG 46/69

[ljadw]

About the ATL of the MarcksPlan of a war of attrition of at least 2 years against the USSR : he should remember what happened in WWI : in WWI,Germany was fighting / compelled to fight a war of attrition of 3 years against Russia,which ended with the defeat of Russia and the Treaty of Brest-Litowsk. A year later followed the Treaty of Versailles which sealed Germany's defeat .
Why would the result of the ATL be different from the OTL in WWI ?
IOW:why would a defeat of the SU in 1943 result in German domination of Europe ?

[TheMarcksPlan]

About the ATL of the MarcksPlan of a war of attrition of at least 2 years against the USSR : he should remember what happened in WWI : in WWI,Germany was fighting / compelled to fight a war of attrition of 3 years against Russia,which ended with the defeat of Russia and the Treaty of Brest-Litowsk. A year later followed the Treaty of Versailles which sealed Germany's defeat .
Why would the result of the ATL be different from the OTL in WWI ?

There's a placed called France...

IOW:why would a defeat of the SU in 1943 result in German domination of Europe ?

In addition to France, the other difference between WW2 and WW1 is that WW1 had already happened.
I believe that the Anglosphere could have deployed 400 divisions, all motorized and all supported by overwhelming artillery and air support, and that such forces would guaranteed Allied victory. German qualitative edge could not compensate for a West that was determined to take Berlin regardless of the cost.

Here's where WW1 come in:
Britain had absolutely no appetite to repeat the millions of casualties incurred in WW1, let alone the substantially higher amount required to defeat a Germany that, after defeat/impotence of the SU, controls the continent.
I also don't believe that US had the appetite for such an adventure. Early-war US planning agreed that if the SU collapsed, "Europe First" would be abandoned. I simply cannot imagine the US returning to a focus on Germany in 1945 unless - as I've said many times - the US is willing to drop scores of A-bombs on the Germans and abide whatever inconceivably evil and ruthless steps Hitler would take if faced with A-bomb attacks on Germany.

That's my judgement of the history but obviously we're so far from OTL in this scenario that it's difficult to say.
If you - anyone else - wants to argue that there's a feasible ATL in which the SU falls and the US/UK land hundreds of divisions in Europe I'd be interested to read that.

[TheMarcksPlan]

@ljadw

Just another point on this.
To the extent that the Anglosphere could have beaten Germany via a combination of massive land war and A-bombs, it's reliant on the A-bomb deus ex machina ("Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic" https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clarke%27s_three_laws).

At the broadest level of this discussion, the A-bomb victory of the West over Germany isn't that interesting to me because it would still mean that the world allowed the triumph of evil through diplomatic/moral blundering - only to be saved by magic. It's also contingent in that Germany could have had at least a deterrent against A-bombs (dirty bomb) but for the miscalculation of one brilliant scientest (Heisenberg) and his communications with Speer (arguably an intentional deception of Speer, but again history can't rely on the moral fortitude of one actor).

So yes, there is a feasible ATL in which the Anglosphere "beats" Germany without the SU, but it's one in which millions more people die, including millions more innocents held hostage in vaporized cities and/or executed by the Nazis when the A-bombs start to fall.

[ljadw]

The A Bomb is not a magic, but a FACT: it happened in the OTL, and Germany was not nuked, only because it capitulated before the A Bomb was ready .
ONE A Bomb on Berlin, or on Rastenburg or Berchtesgaden and the regime would collaps, if not, there would be sufficient A Bombs and sufficient targets .

[ljadw]

What you are proposing is a long war of 2 years ; such a war did happen in the OTL and at the end of 1942 this war had cost Germany already 2 million losses , BEFORE Stalingrad .
If ,following your ATL, Germany would have won in the East in the Summer of 1943, it would be a deadly wounded Germany : it would not have the strength to AND occupy the conquered territories of the East, occupy and defend Europe from the North Cape to the Pyrenees and from the Pyrenees to Turkey AND have a strong LW/Air Defense to protect its cities and economy : the war with Britain/US would continue and Germany could not afford such a war and would lose it .
Besides, the German cities were already attacked BEFORE the Summer of 1943 .The return of the LW from the East ( only 30 % fighters ) would not save the German cities .
Germany could not afford a loss of 2 million men in the East and still continue a war against the West .

[ljadw]

That's my judgement of the history but obviously we're so far from OTL in this scenario that it's difficult to say.
If you - anyone else - wants to argue that there's a feasible ATL in which the SU falls and the US/UK land hundreds of divisions in Europe I'd be interested to read that.

Germany would lose in all cases, for the simple reason that no country could dominate Europe : the SU could not dominate Eastern Europe, why should Germany dominate the whole of Europe .
Case 1: Britain gives up in June 1940 and there is no war with the SU : Germany is losing
Case 2 : Britain gives up in June 1940 and there is war with the SU : Germany loses . Whatever the result of Barbarossa .
Case 3 : Britain gives up after the defeat of the SU : Germany loses
Case 4 : Britain continues the war : Germany loses ,even in the SU remains neutral, even if the SU is defeated .
In the OTL :Germany lost to a coalition of UK/US and the SU. . It would also lose against the SU, without UK and US, against UK and the SU,without US, against UK and US without the SU .
Even in Case 1 ( the most positive for Germany ) ,Germany would still lose ,because in this case, Germany would be obliged to have,for generations, a WM with a manpower of 3,2 million men = 4 % of its population: US could not have for generations armed forces of 14 million men, thus Germany also could not afford it . After the war, the USSR never had a standing army of 8 million men .
In Case 1 ,Germany would need 70 divisions to occupy its conquered territories and 30 divisions in Germany, = 1,5 million men at least, + the Ersatz army + the LW + the KM . SS and police are not included .
It was not possible for demografic reasons, for economic reasons, for trade reasons : without trading with continental Europe and Britain, Germany would become impoverished and the occupation would make the populations of France, Britain,etc impoverished and they could not buy German products .
The exploitation of the occupied territories in the east (cases 2,3 and 4 ) would ruin Germany .

[John T]

Sorry but I tried to read this thread from the beginning but had to stop at page 3
Too much "It did not happen, it could not happen", personal insults(both sides) and arrogance.
OTOH It made me curious what would happen if I started a W/I where Max Aitken moved to Berlin in 1910
and Herman Göring(or should it been Milch?) to London in 1920 and the two had the others role during ww2.


So bear with me if this has been covered.

Your assumption that motorized corps would be able to encircle larger soviet forces are reasonable but not fully automatically.

For the initial encirclement, the logistics would come from German initial deployment so no big difference from the situation in France 1940.
Thereafter you amended the scenario to include a better prepared German logistics, and then the details went on.
Personally I spent the last couple of years to understand Swedish rail,
and it is interesting to find a US Army manual who obviously mixed up gross and net weight!

To mess into the details I can only add a few issues on logistics,
what about building the simplified steam engine BR 52 from 1938 ?

And if we scrap the Z-plan early enough, the engineers wasted on designing ships that was never commissioned could spend their brains on other pressing needs.
Like design and build a series of "Kriegsbinnenshiffe" , riverine / costal vessels usable on soviet waterways.
I'm thinking of something similar to the post war soviet Volgo-Balt class.
Built as bulk, RoRo or tanker configuration.
I don't know how damaged soviet waterways where and how much effort would been needed to restore those for German use but this is just one of those measurements Germany could have don to mitigate the supply situation.
the alternate cost is small and they can be used domestically and in western Europe too,
limiting strains on the German domestic railway system.
Of course of no use in winter except as fixed supply points.
(They are usefull in a seelöve scenario too)

thats for logistics.

The other major assumption you do is the Soviets inability to recover the added lost manpower -
(if this has been discussed just point to the pages in this thread I shall look at)
The thing I have not seen is an analysis on the Soviet losses.
The retreating units where reshaped into fighting units, do you have any numbers on these? when? how reequipped, how many?

And if they where lost, I think the simple rifleman could be replaced quickly.
But how did the Soviets manage officers training - the US 100 day wonders or just promotion from corporal to major with no theoretical training?

[Yuri]

And if they where lost, I think the simple rifleman could be replaced quickly.
But how did the Soviets manage officers training - the US 100 day wonders or just promotion from corporal to major with no theoretical training?

Kurs (School) of Junior Lieutenants (platoon commander) - 6 months - 180 days (infantry). Tankers/gunners/chemists - 9 months. These courses were attended (as a rule) by soldiers and sergeants who showed the appropriate ability and have an education of 7 or 8 classes or more.

[ljadw]

Sorry but I tried to read this thread from the beginning but had to stop at page 3
Too much "It did not happen, it could not happen", personal insults(both sides) and arrogance.
OTOH It made me curious what would happen if I started a W/I where Max Aitken moved to Berlin in 1910
and Herman Göring(or should it been Milch?) to London in 1920 and the two had the others role during ww2.


So bear with me if this has been covered.

Your assumption that motorized corps would be able to encircle larger soviet forces are reasonable but not fully automatically.

For the initial encirclement, the logistics would come from German initial deployment so no big difference from the situation in France 1940.
Thereafter you amended the scenario to include a better prepared German logistics, and then the details went on.
Personally I spent the last couple of years to understand Swedish rail,
and it is interesting to find a US Army manual who obviously mixed up gross and net weight!

To mess into the details I can only add a few issues on logistics,
what about building the simplified steam engine BR 52 from 1938 ?

And if we scrap the Z-plan early enough, the engineers wasted on designing ships that was never commissioned could spend their brains on other pressing needs.
Like design and build a series of "Kriegsbinnenshiffe" , riverine / costal vessels usable on soviet waterways.
I'm thinking of something similar to the post war soviet Volgo-Balt class.
Built as bulk, RoRo or tanker configuration.
I don't know how damaged soviet waterways where and how much effort would been needed to restore those for German use but this is just one of those measurements Germany could have don to mitigate the supply situation.
the alternate cost is small and they can be used domestically and in western Europe too,
limiting strains on the German domestic railway system.
Of course of no use in winter except as fixed supply points.
(They are usefull in a seelöve scenario too)

thats for logistics.

The other major assumption you do is the Soviets inability to recover the added lost manpower -
(if this has been discussed just point to the pages in this thread I shall look at)
The thing I have not seen is an analysis on the Soviet losses.
The retreating units where reshaped into fighting units, do you have any numbers on these? when? how reequipped, how many?

And if they where lost, I think the simple rifleman could be replaced quickly.
But how did the Soviets manage officers training - the US 100 day wonders or just promotion from corporal to major with no theoretical training?

About the Soviet waterways : in 1943 non -military transports on waterways from the occupied eastern territories to the Reich were 536000 tons and from the Reich to the occupied eastern territories 1,9111,000 tons .
Why the difference of almost 1|4 ? I don't know .

[ljadw]

The operations against the Dutch by AG B in May 1940 resulted into the Dutch capitulation after 5 days . Bock committed only one PzD ,and it is not so that with more PzD ,the Dutch would have capitulated earlier or that more Dutch would have been taken POW.
Besides if more mobile divisions would be committede for Typhoon ,or for Barbarossa, Typhoon and Barbarossa would have started later .
And,last point : more mobile divisions would need the help of more ID ,and more ID were not available .
Guderian himself was forced to admit this : he blamed Kluge for the failures of his own encirclments, saying that the ID from Kluge were advancing too slowly, implying that without the ID ,the mobile divisions were almost powerless .

[TheMarcksPlan]

Sorry but I tried to read this thread from the beginning but had to stop at page 3
Too much "It did not happen, it could not happen", personal insults(both sides) and arrogance.

I'm afraid that was the goal of certain posters here. I'm going to post a new thread on a slightly revised concept and ignore the folks who made this thread so fruitlessly long.

Your assumption that motorized corps would be able to encircle larger soviet forces are reasonable but not fully automatically.

Agreed. It's at least possible the RKKA exerts good operational skill and C2 to blunt the penetrating spearheads, then retreats in time to avoid encirclement. I just don't think that's the likely outcome, especially not with Stalin's firing squad in the back of generals' minds.

what about building the simplified steam engine BR 52 from 1938

Doesn't have to be from that early but yes, that should have happened.

At the highest level, why did Germany undertake rationalization projects like standardized/simplified locomotives, weapons, etc.? Because they realized they needed to, because they were losing and therefore the performance pressure from leadership was greatly amplified.

There is much room to posit earlier rationalization and simplification, as well as earlier mobilization of resources. The man hours required for producing a Panzer III decreased by 50% between 1940 and 1943, for example, due to adoption of flow production and simplification of its parts. Early in the war the military had far too much say in the build standards of its weapons, demanding the highest possible quality despite serious and unjustifiable impacts on quantity (see Overy's work for more on this). As usual for this period, the German military (especially the Heer) was completely incompetent in matters or strategy.

If we posit earlier rationalization/mobilization/simplification steps then we'd see German production numbers during early war coming closer to the numbers reached late in the war - as was true of UK and SU.