What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

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TheMarcksPlan
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Re: What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 12 Jul 2019 11:58

MarkN wrote:"Dramatic shifts" is more accurate than "slightly stronger". But was an additional 2p mech divs sufficiantly dramatic? Methinks not.
I want to highlight this response to illustrate my larger point. This is mostly for the rest of the audience, as MarkN fancies himself an interlocutor too fancy to dig deeply into argument.

MarkN thinks "dramatic shifts" in forces ratios require "dramatic" shifts in initial Barbarossa strength. This is a simplistic view and, at the broadest level, the whole point of the thread is to challenge that idea and suggest that actually Barbarossa was decided by a very slim margin.

That's the point of my AGC counterfactual about removing Hoth's Panzergruppe and its 7 divisions. Removing Hoth's forces would mean only a ~5% delta to Barbarossa's nominal/manpower strength, but IMO it's obvious that without PzGr3, Army Group Center fails to encircle large formations aside from, perhaps, the Bialystok salient. If Western Front retreats to the Smolensk area without having lost ~500k soldiers then Barbarossa probably never gets into Russia proper.

Honest question - does anybody have an argument against the idea that AGC's campaign would have been totally different with only one Panzergruppe?

If not, does anybody have an argument that the other army groups would have failed to encircle/destroy their opposition if they too had possessed two mobile armies capable of independent deep operational thrusts?

Yes, the Germans needed to dramatically change attrition rates on the Eastern Front for Barbarossa to have succeded.
No, the Germans were not so far from achieving the operational conditions for dramatic change that one can't postulate a feasible ATL in which such dramatic transformation occurs.

Give any German army group the ability to thrust two operationally-independent mobile armies into its enemy's rear in 1941 and I would bet heavy odds they will encircle and destroy their enemy before the latter realizes what is happening and/or is authorized to run away. It happened EVERY TIME the German army attempted this maneuver throughout over two years of war, until the material/numerical odds were so far against the Heer that no operational sophistication would compensate.

In 1941 the Germans caught the SU in the midst of transformation from a peasant backwater and second-rate power into one of the world's two greatest militaries. The Germans nearly succeeded at foreclosing this transformation by destroying Soviet strength amplifications piecemeal as they entered the battlefield. It was a fortuitous moment for Hitler and one in which the fate of much of humanity hung in the balance. Lucky for us and them, Hitler was too vain, lazy, stupid, and deluded to command what needed to be done - what could have been done - to consolidate his rule. Hitler's generals followed his lead and were lazy, vain, stupid in their planning for Barbarossa. But history could have been very different.
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Re: What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

Post by MarkN » 12 Jul 2019 12:29

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
12 Jul 2019 11:58
... the whole point of the thread is to challenge that idea and suggest that actually Barbarossa was decided by a very slim margin.
So why don't you make an argument, a credible arguement, why everbody should accept your claim that Barbarossa was decided by a very slim margin.
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
12 Jul 2019 11:58
Honest question - does anybody have an argument against ...
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
12 Jul 2019 11:58
does anybody have an argument that...
Why should anybody have an argument against ideas that you are creating in your head?

Earlier you wrote:
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
06 Jul 2019 22:27
The historical record of Red Army and Ostheer performance during panzer Kesselschlachten is all I need.
That's not an argument, that's a hand wave to deliberate avoid making a credible argument.

Moreover, you contradict yourself on that very point...
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
12 Jul 2019 11:58
Give any German army group the ability to thrust two operationally-independent mobile armies into its enemy's rear in 1941 and I would bet heavy odds they will encircle and destroy their enemy before the latter realizes what is happening and/or is authorized to run away. It happened EVERY TIME the German army attempted this maneuver throughout over two years of war, until the material/numerical odds were so far against the Heer that no operational sophistication would compensate.
...as opposed to...
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
10 Jun 2019 13:07
Truth is that the vast bulk of the Red Army survived the border battles. Only one of the fronts suffered encirclements, the largest (Southwest Front) did not. Red Army had ~2.7mil men serving in its active first echelon forces; only ~300k of these fell into German hands at Minsk-Bialystok.
Why should l spend my time, or any other poster for that matter, on highlighting the errors of your what if when you've already done it yourself.

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Re: What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

Post by Richard Anderson » 12 Jul 2019 16:02

Paul Lakowski wrote:
11 Jul 2019 22:25
Why don't we have a "like' button, along with the "ignore" button?
Because this isn't Facebook, where one person's opinions are just as good as another person's facts? Because that is the way the site owner likes it?
MOST of us are done with the "talking heads" on this and other threads. They long ago either- gave up the idea of "discussing" topics - or decided no one else was entitled to an opinion other than their own.
If "discussing" topics means that opinion trumps fact (pun intended) I too will be happy as well to be done with "talking heads" that argue their imagination outweighs reality and refuse to discuss the possible ramifications of the changes in their what if.

For example, one factor in this what if is "lower funding prewar for the Luftwaffe" as those funds get prioritized to the Heer. Specifically, the apparently wasteful Ju 88 program is scrapped. Okay, so then what is the result? For one, 12 Kampfgeschwadern and around 24 Gruppen either get wiped off the Luftwaffe order of battle of 22 June 1941 or they get replaced by some other aircraft. If wiped off, then yes, roughly the strength of a division in flying personnel and about the same in support personnel are "saved" as is the manufacture of around 3,250 aircraft, but also 450 supporting aircraft are removed from the Ostheer order of battle. If replaced, then 3,250 of some other more obsolescent aircraft or some other new aircraft need to be produced, so there is no actual "savings".

So which is it and what are the possible effects? And, yes, I know, no "Battle of Britain" is also stipulated, so no threat of SEELÖWE, so what effect on the campaign in the Med? Crete? Et cetera and et cetera.
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

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Re: What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

Post by MarkN » 12 Jul 2019 16:25

Richard Anderson wrote:
12 Jul 2019 16:02
If "discussing" topics means that opinion trumps fact (pun intended) I too will be happy as well to be done with "talking heads" that argue their imagination outweighs reality and refuse to discuss the possible ramifications of the changes in their what if.
I'm looking forward to the promised "housekeeping" in the recently locked thread. It may give some insight as to what direction forum staff are taking. Is at a housekeeping of historically unsound content or just a housekeeping of off-topic words? I'm also wondering if it will give us a hint as to why that particular thread was pounced upon in isolation. It's hardly unique, is it?

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Re: What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

Post by Richard Anderson » 12 Jul 2019 19:09

Indeed, especially given that in the past I have been told directly by moderators that they do not police lying or falsified data, no matter how many times I or others point it out.
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

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Re: What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

Post by paulrward » 12 Jul 2019 19:55

Hello All :

I will be making my comments based on the posting number and the author:


# 244 - Mr. MarkN
As one can see from the map, single line tracks remain in Soviet hands to move supplies to/from Murmanak and Archangel. They were not "cut off".
Your yellow lines are thus, to a large extent, quite disingenuous.
The raw fact is, a single track train line is MUCH less efficient than a two track line. You are constantly shunting onto spurs to allow trains to move in the opposite direction, and the material handling capabilities on these lines were limited at best. While the Soviets were not cut off from Murmansk, they had trouble moving material until they began to double sections of the line in summer of 1943.
It would be helpful if you quantified just how much capacity was restricted rather than just hand waving and then falsly claiming an absolute.
Actually, it is hard to say how much the Soviet Rail system was impacted historically, because not only did the Germans seize the rail lines during their advance, they also seized the rolling stock. How much ? I have not been able to find out. But, it is a historical fact that one of the things the Soviets pleaded for, and got, via the Vladivostock route in 1943 were large quantities of U.S. Steam locomotives. They apparently had somehow lost a lot of theirs..........

And, Mr. MarkN, had the Germans taken Moscow, they would probably taken large numbers of locomotives and rolling stock, as Moscow was not only the Rail Nexus, it was the Rail Maintenance Hub of the Soviet Union. Thus, lots of spare parts, equipment, and the mechanics needed to maintain the Soviet Rail System were right there in Moscow.

Here is a little quote from Wikipedia ;
After two years of war with Germany, much of the Soviet rail system was in ruins. At the time, much effort had been put into rebuilding the track; however, the hasty nature of the construction meant that it could not support locomotives with axle-loadings of more than 18 tonnes. Around 16,000 engines were destroyed by the various bombings, and the remaining intact engines were either too weak or too heavy. The factories did not have the equipment to produce locomotives, so it was decided to order more from America.
You can read all about it here:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_l ... e_class_Ye


# 246 - Mr TheMarcksPlan

Yes, supplies came into Leningrad over Lake Ladoga on the 'Road of Life'. Which didn't stop the inhabitants of Leningrad from resorting to cannibalism. And, while North-South movements of forces might not be important, the movement of the supplies to keep these forces in operation WAS important. Especially fuel. Finally, as to rebuilding wrecked or damaged rail facilities: The soviets did that mainly in summer, not in winter. The logistics of fixing a rail line in winter are just too difficult to overcome, in terms of feeding a workforce and getting the repair supplies to the job site.



# 247-248 The Provenance of my quote was the Internet. But, as Abraham Lincoln so aptly said, " You can't believe everything you read on the Internet ." ( I got that from the Internet, also )



# 252 - Mr. Hanny
I would prefer some maths, over a map. A double track rail line has the same logistical forward lift as 1600 MTV at 200 miles use.
How about at a THOUSAND MILES use ? That is the advantage of rails - low coefficient of friction, high transport density, snd much higher speed due to day and night travel . I will leave it for you to do the maths.
Your last map shows that Germany has pushed well past Moscow around a hundred miles or so?
Actually, no..... The maps I posted have some scale distortion. If you would take the time to go to Google Earth, you will find that the Soviet Rail Ring around Moscow is between 3 and 6 miles from the center of the city. There is a second, much less dense ring some 50 miles from the city center, but it was single track in 1940, and wasn't doubled until post war. So, if you take Moscow in 1941, you have the Rail Ring.


# 257 Mr. MarkN
So why don't you make an argument, a credible arguement, why everbody should accept your claim that Barbarossa was decided by a very slim margin.
Well, the Germans advanced some 700 miles from Poland, and came within 20 miles of Moscow. That means they got within 3 % of their goal. That's a very slim margin, in my book. But, your mileage may differ......


Additional Note : Getting a 97 % on a Final Exam is normally considered fairly good. But getting the Silver Medal in Warfare is just sad.....



# 256 - Mr TheMarcksPlan
In 1941 the Germans caught the SU in the midst of transformation from a peasant backwater and second-rate power into one of the world's two greatest militaries. The Germans nearly succeeded at foreclosing this transformation by destroying Soviet strength amplifications piecemeal as they entered the battlefield. It was a fortuitous moment for Hitler and one in which the fate of much of humanity hung in the balance. Lucky for us and them, Hitler was too vain, lazy, stupid, and deluded to command what needed to be done - what could have been done - to consolidate his rule. Hitler's generals followed his lead and were lazy, vain, stupid in their planning for Barbarossa. But history could have been very different.

This is an excellent summary. But to it we must add, that for the first few days after Barbarossa began, Stalin was hiding in his Dacha, and when they came to him, desperate for orders, he at first thought they had been sent to kill him. He kept making mistakes all through the summer and fall of 1941, with abortive attacks and failed schemes, and almost succeeded in destroying his entire army, an army he had already intellectually decaptitated with the Tukhachevsky Purges and then had demoralized with the wreched performance of his troops in the Winter War with Finland.



As for the effect of the Germans taking Moscow in December, 1941 :


Imagine, if you can, the Germans manage one, last heroic push, they breach the Soviet lines in front of Moscow, and, as Soviet troops, disorganized and panicking, begin to disintegrate, the Germans pour into the city. The citizenry of Moscow try to flee on foot, in cars, in buses, and the mobs jam the roads. The NKVD are frantically shooting everyone they can for cowardice, the regular soldiers begin shooting back, Stalin and his henchmen abandon the city on his special train, and, within a day or two, the Germans have seized a wrecked, ruined Moscow. The entire bureacracy of the Soviet Union is disrupted, the leadership is on the run, and the Army is without direction.

And that is as far as the exhausted Germans, out of supply and on the end of their logistical tether, can go. So, the Germans hunker down in the ruins of buildings, using pieces of carpets to cover window openings, burning furniture for warmth, and just try to hang on. Food is scarce, but there are a few russian prisoners....... Meanwhile, the Soviet army, pushed back, has stabilized a line about 20 miles east of Moscow, but now it is the Russian soldiers who are living in the snow, with little food or fuel, no air cover, no artillery shells for their guns, and an increasingly fatalistic hopelessness about the future. Meanwhile, Stalin is desperately trying to run a war while fending off both a rebellious Zhukhov and a conniving Beria, both of whom have decided they might be better off WITHOUT Uncle Joe .......

" Wait when the wind sweeps the snowdrifts....."




Some final notes about Lend-Lease : About 50% of the Lend Lease to Russia went via the Pacific Route. But this was stricktly NON MILITARY supplies, due to the war between the US and Japan.

About 25% went through Persia. BUT, this route didn't open up until late summer of 1942. And, it was long and circuitous, with few rail roads.

The remaining 25% went through Archangelsk, and when that was closed, through Murmansk. But, the total shipments in 1941 were less than 400,000 tons, with a lot of that being non military goods. This will impact the Russian War effort.



How important was the Lend Lease to Russia ? - Just ask Khruschev :
I would like to express my candid opinion about Stalin's views on whether the Red Army and the Soviet Union could have coped with Nazi Germany and survived the war without aid from the United States and Britain. First, I would like to tell about some remarks Stalin made and repeated several times when we were "discussing freely" among ourselves. He stated bluntly that if the United States had not helped us, we would not have won the war. If we had had to fight Nazi Germany one on one, we could not have stood up against Germany's pressure, and we would have lost the war. No one ever discussed this subject officially, and I don't think Stalin left any written evidence of his opinion, but I will state here that several times in conversations with me he noted that these were the actual circumstances. He never made a special point of holding a conversation on the subject, but when we were engaged in some kind of relaxed conversation, going over international questions of the past and present, and when we would return to the subject of the path we had traveled during the war, that is what he said. When I listened to his remarks, I was fully in agreement with him, and today I am even more so.

If you take away the Soviet Rail Nexus of Moscow, a lot of that Lend lease will end up sitting in depots, waiting for efficient distribution, instead of getting to the troops. And, that could make a big difference in 1942.


Respectfully :

Paul R. Ward

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Re: What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 12 Jul 2019 20:59

paulrward wrote:The raw fact is, a single track train line is MUCH less efficient than a two track line. You are constantly shunting onto spurs to allow trains to move in the opposite direction, and the material handling capabilities on these lines were limited at best. While the Soviets were not cut off from Murmansk, they had trouble moving material until they began to double sections of the line in summer of 1943.
Sure, two tracks way better than one.
But still the Soviets managed to move all of the Murmansk material via a single track between fall 41 when Petrazovodsk fell and summer 1943.
As they managed to move most of early Lend Lease with a single track, I suspect they'd find a way to manage army supply with a sans-Moscow rail network.
paulrward wrote:magine, if you can, the Germans manage one, last heroic push, they breach the Soviet lines in front of Moscow
Do you have a mechanism for making this happen though? I can't tell whether you're agreeing that slightly stronger Barbarossa forces could have enabled taking Moscow or just theorizing on the consequences of Moscow's fall. What's your proposal?

As I've said in this thread, the Battle of Moscow wasn't actually close in anything but geographic terms. To take Moscow, the Germans need to have weakened the Red Army in earlier battles. To hold Moscow over the winter, they need to have weakened it to a very large extent.

This is why my 8-division ATL sees taking Moscow as less important than taking Leningrad and advancing to the Don in the south. "Ukraine first, Leningrad second, Moscow third" was the right strategic conception IMO; Hitler just lacked the confidence to stick to it.
paulrward wrote: Meanwhile, the Soviet army, pushed back, has stabilized a line about 20 miles east of Moscow, but now it is the Russian soldiers who are living in the snow
It's not like the Red Army commuted to the battle from Moscow apartments though. They lived in the snow OTL.
paulrward wrote:Stalin is desperately trying to run a war while fending off both a rebellious Zhukhov and a conniving Beria, both of whom have decided they might be better off WITHOUT Uncle Joe
I try not to speculate about the fall of the regime but there's little evidence that Moscow's loss would have forced it. Stalin did evacuate most of the government and much of the citizenry, telegraphing that he doubted his ability to defend the capital. Yet the regime was solid as ever.
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Re: What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 12 Jul 2019 21:10

MarkN has said many things since my last reply; I'm just going to highlight one assertion as representative of the quality of his posting:
MarkN wrote:Moreover, you contradict yourself on that very point
MarkN thinks it is a contradiction to (1) assert that German double-panzer-pincer envelopments were always successful and (2) to assert that Germany failed to encircle RKKA during most of the Border Battles.

Everyone sees the obvious logical error here, right?
Only one of the border battle operations involved double-panzer-pincers; it succeeded and the others failed.
Rather than being a contradiction it is Exhibit A in support of my case.

MarkN's failure of logic might represent a deficit of innate capacity, it might represent a deficit of attention to the ATL, it might represent his confirmation bias that anyone who disagrees with him is wrong.

Whatever explains his failures, they're tiresome.

So when he says something like this:
MarkN wrote:So why don't you make an argument, a credible arguement, why everbody should accept your claim that Barbarossa was decided by a very slim margin.
...allow yourself to realize that this is the refuse of a mind that is not functioning well in this thread.
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Re: What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

Post by MarkN » 13 Jul 2019 08:33

paulrward wrote:
12 Jul 2019 19:55
As one can see from the map, single line tracks remain in Soviet hands to move supplies to/from Murmanak and Archangel. They were not "cut off".
Your yellow lines are thus, to a large extent, quite disingenuous.
The raw fact is, a single track train line is MUCH less efficient than a two track line. You are constantly shunting onto spurs to allow trains to move in the opposite direction, and the material handling capabilities on these lines were limited at best. While the Soviets were not cut off from Murmansk, they had trouble moving material until they began to double sections of the line in summer of 1943.
I'm pleased you've now accepted that your absolute statement "cut off" was disingenuous. Shame you had to post it in the first place and mislead others. It's also more a shame that you are continuing with more disingenuous statements.

The raw fact is that undertanding the capacity of a rail network is infinitely more complex than a single v multi track comparison. Moreover, even if you did boil it down to that, the drop off would not be as dramatic as you presume.

You have not demonstrated that there would be any loss whatsoever in supplies to/from Murmansk etc by the loss of the Moscow ring. It may be the case, but without a study of the actual volumes being carried set against the potential capacities - all you have is hand waving. Hand waving that you have made no attempt to evidence as the hand waving is being used in lieu of evidence to promote your preconceived narrative.
paulrward wrote:
12 Jul 2019 19:55
It would be helpful if you quantified just how much capacity was restricted rather than just hand waving and then falsly claiming an absolute.
Actually, it is hard to say how much the Soviet Rail system was impacted historically, because not only did the Germans seize the rail lines during their advance, they also seized the rolling stock. How much ? I have not been able to find out. But, it is a historical fact that one of the things the Soviets pleaded for, and got, via the Vladivostock route in 1943 were large quantities of U.S. Steam locomotives. They apparently had somehow lost a lot of theirs..........
Do you have any evidence of a link between the request for more rolling stock as being connected to war losses. Or is thus just a connection you have assumed to promote your preconceived narrative?

paulrward wrote:
12 Jul 2019 19:55
And, Mr. MarkN, had the Germans taken Moscow, they would probably taken large numbers of locomotives and rolling stock, as Moscow was not only the Rail Nexus, it was the Rail Maintenance Hub of the Soviet Union. Thus, lots of spare parts, equipment, and the mechanics needed to maintain the Soviet Rail System were right there in Moscow.
Is this more yet more of your reengineering the historical record to fit in with your preconceived narrative or do you have some evidence that the Russians had done, and did not intend to do anything, to avoid that happening?
paulrward wrote:
12 Jul 2019 19:55
So why don't you make an argument, a credible arguement, why everbody should accept your claim that Barbarossa was decided by a very slim margin.
Well, the Germans advanced some 700 miles from Poland, and came within 20 miles of Moscow. That means they got within 3 % of their goal. That's a very slim margin, in my book. But, your mileage may differ......
The Heer as a body did not get to within 20 miles of Moscow, a handful of recce troops allegedly did so somewhat in advance of a flaky frontline. The Heer also got a handful of troops close to Leningrad, the actually got a lot more than that close by - but it didn't translate into taking the city. In 1942 they got a while corps into Stalingrad, but they still couldn't take it. Like TheMarksPlan, you seem to struggle with real warfare as opposed to moving counters over a map board.

paulrward wrote:
12 Jul 2019 19:55
Additional Note : Getting a 97 % on a Final Exam is normally considered fairly good. But getting the Silver Medal in Warfare is just sad.....
Additional note: your fixation on Moscow and claiming it as the goal is yet another falsehood. Unternehmen BARBAROSSA was a campaign to take the Heer to the Volga not Moscow. Geographically, they didn't get 97% of the job done, it was less than 50%....

Moreover, the Heer's concept if operations on how success would be achieved was based on destroying the bulk of the Red Army on the border. As posted by another poster earlier:
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
10 Jun 2019 13:07
Truth is that the vast bulk of the Red Army survived the border battles. Only one of the fronts suffered encirclements, the largest (Southwest Front) did not. Red Army had ~2.7mil men serving in its active first echelon forces; only ~300k of these fell into German hands at Minsk-Bialystok.
Unternehmen BARBAROSSA was not decided by a slim margin, the Heer fell short by a very, very long margin.

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Re: What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

Post by Hanny » 13 Jul 2019 10:31

paulrward wrote:
12 Jul 2019 19:55
The raw fact is, a single track train line is MUCH less efficient than a two track line. You are constantly shunting onto spurs to allow trains to move in the opposite direction, and the material handling capabilities on these lines were limited at best. While the Soviets were not cut off from Murmansk, they had trouble moving material until they began to double sections of the line in summer of 1943.
Another raw fact is the level of efficiency is irrelevant, if a single track can carry the load required, in the time required, having a double track and increasing efficiency is not relevant. As you finally rightly point out, ( despite claiming the reverse initially) Murmnask is not cut off, in 41 the LL arriving before end of year, was minuscule, less thanj 1% of all LL arrived there in 41, and was easy transported over the existing track, by 43 the volume of LL arriving was high, 25% of all LL to move that requiring expanding the track to a double line.
paulrward wrote:
12 Jul 2019 19:55
Actually, it is hard to say how much the Soviet Rail system was impacted historically, because not only did the Germans seize the rail lines during their advance, they also seized the rolling stock. How much ? I have not been able to find out. But, it is a historical fact that one of the things the Soviets pleaded for, and got, via the Vladivostock route in 1943 were large quantities of U.S. Steam locomotives. They apparently had somehow lost a lot of theirs..........
Only if you have not bothered to read on the subject would it become hard.

By end of year axis controlled 40% of the existing rail infrastructure, but SU had lost only 15% of its rail cars and locomotives. Again your conclusions presented, are based on not knowing, this is no way to proceed on a history forum German records show they captured 2,237 rail cars and 231 locomotives from the Soviets as of November 1 1941, this is basic info and common knowledge, as is that the SU started with roughly 24,200 locomotives, knowing that the SU moved twice the volume of freight than did the Germans in 41 by rail is also of interest.


paulrward wrote:
12 Jul 2019 19:55
How about at a THOUSAND MILES use ? That is the advantage of rails - low coefficient of friction, high transport density, snd much higher speed due to day and night travel . I will leave it for you to do the maths.
Im sorry, your very confused, the SU is coming to retake Moscow, it will do so from no more than 200 miles from a rail head, the 200 miles from it to the front will require 1600 lorries to duplicate the RR track.

Its your fantasy, ( your the one claiming short range stukas in airfileds 00s of miles from the railroads east of Moscow can reach it to bomb it, you know the LW with only 15% of its MTV, which brought all its fuel and munitions etc to it, still working by end of year) you do your own maths on that thank you.


We know how quickly the SU distributted the LL in 41, its roughly:
40 miles an hour average speed of train.

Distance from Murmansk to Moscow 900 miles.

LL Cargo over 2 months delivered 160000 tonns.

850 tons capacity pr train load.

Each 24 hours, 6 hours to load the 850 tonn load, 4 locomotives deliver 300,000 tons in 2 months, 2 locomotives every 24 hours, are all that is required. Your high density traffic turns out to be 2 locos a day for 2 months.

paulrward wrote:
12 Jul 2019 19:55

Actually, no..... The maps I posted have some scale distortion. If you would take the time to go to Google Earth, you will find that the Soviet Rail Ring around Moscow is between 3 and 6 miles from the center of the city. There is a second, much less dense ring some 50 miles from the city center, but it was single track in 1940, and wasn't doubled until post war. So, if you take Moscow in 1941, you have the Rail Ring.
The 1943 SU Army map you using shows both the inner and outer Moscow orbital rail, and extending further out along the spurs, passing cities that are 00s of miles from Moscow and in German control, thats not scale distortion, but what the map indicates.

The length of the Moscow outer ring is 363 miles in a rough circle, the diameter of a circle that size is 115 miles, so no you are again still in error as the rail lines are being shown around 120 miles from the nearest recon units approach to Moscow, but generally its more like 150, and the German conversion of rail is where exactly as it not on the map, i know where it it is you should find out for yourself raher than just wish the Heer to Moscow and beyond.
paulrward wrote:
12 Jul 2019 19:55
Well, the Germans advanced some 700 miles from Poland, and came within 20 miles of Moscow. That means they got within 3 % of their goal. That's a very slim margin, in my book. But, your mileage may differ......
Moscow was not the goal. Moscow is "no great importance" AH in planning Barborrossa.

Wagner pointed out the Heer was going to consume 32000 tons a day of food/fodder/POl and munitions, and that 32000 ( leaving nothing for anything else like replacements) was the max the german rail could deliver. By Nov he had lost the use of 70% of the locomotives and 50% of the trucks.

Custer reached the indian villages, by your yardstick he lost by a slim margin.

paulrward wrote:
12 Jul 2019 19:55
Additional Note : Getting a 97 % on a Final Exam is normally considered fairly good. But getting the Silver Medal in Warfare is just sad.....
Answering the wrong question in any exam is always bad.
paulrward wrote:
12 Jul 2019 19:55

As for the effect of the Germans taking Moscow in December, 1941 :
My what a vivid imagination, using the tried and tested AH i want therfore i can have method of warfare no less, its only in the imagination that this can occur. The German logisticians had warned it was impractical, and the wargames conducted showed the Germans could arrive in Moscow, but be exhausted and out of supply and be thrown back at will.
paulrward wrote:
12 Jul 2019 19:55
How important was the Lend Lease to Russia ? - Just ask Khruschev :
But, the total shipments in 1941 were less than 400,000 tons, with a lot of that being non military goods. This will impact the Russian War effort.
That 400,000 tons, is actually 1941: 360,778t, of which 13,502t Persian Gulf, 193,229t Soviet Far East, 153,977t North Russia, so your under 400k is 160k through Murmansk.

Ok lets, in the cold war period SU was dismissive of LL.

Year - % of LL Aid Sent - % of LL Aid/Total Defense Expenditures

1941 - 0 - 0
1942 - 2 - 0
1943 - 14 - 5
1944 - 27 - 10
1945 - 36 - 10

Absolute total - 4%
paulrward wrote:
12 Jul 2019 19:55
If you take away the Soviet Rail Nexus of Moscow, a lot of that Lend lease will end up sitting in depots, waiting for efficient distribution, instead of getting to the troops. And, that could make a big difference in 1942.
Your expecting a lot from 20 million LL in 41. It takes 2 locos 2 months, to move the 160k tons of LL in Murmansk, to Moscow.

You could always try reading a book on lend lease, it might help preventing you from posting as you do, by end of 43 the SU truck park was still 97% SU made, stalingrad was planned, and prosecuted, using a single rail line for not only the strategic deployment, but the logistical support.


I await your attempts to answer the points i presented, there is no point inviting comment and then ignoring it because its too damn hard to answer.
Points that require your attention include but are of course not limited too:

When does the extra MTV, AFV, manpower, training schools for them come from, Fuel to move with, munitions to fight with come from and get to them, ( existing refineries took 6 months to provide the stocks, and will be depleted by Nov at historic force levels, etc for these extra formations take place/come from, how does industry expand the existing increase in actual history timeline ( doubled between France and Barbarossa) and also find the numbers for these extra formations, how will logistical requirements ( transport from rail to head to end user) of them be met by the grosstruppen, will that also expand in proportion, as the amount of logistics required increases at the front by the extra formations using more POL munitions, how much more road space is now required when existing road space was insufficient in the first place, ( from grosstruppen depots to Divisons using div assets) how much more rail capacity is required for these extra formations, and how will it be meet, ( A MOT Div requires around 90klicks of road space to contain its formations, the extra 20 sent means 1800 miles of road space are now not available when the formations are moving on them) when roughly half was ever meet in 41, how will the bulk of the Heer on foot now reach 00s of miles west of Moscow in the same amount of time when they could not reach Moscow. How much faster does the rail conversion now have to be to reach well past moscow in the same time.

You could start here https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/BigL/BigL-5.html
To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield.

paulrward
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Re: What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

Post by paulrward » 14 Jul 2019 00:10

Hello All :

To Mr. Hanny :

I wont nitpick every mistake you made, but here are just a few:



Your understanding of rail transport needs work. You should talk to an expert. If you have only a single line, the trains only go in one direction. That means, when two trains meet up, engine to engine, things either come to a halt ( best case scenario ) or get tragically funny in a Gomez Addams sort of way ( worst case scenario ) Remember, if you are taking trains to Murmansk, you are also feeding Murmansk, and taking them food, coal, and oil, etc. You aren't just hauling Lend lease out.

If you are moving a train north from Archangelsk to Murmansk, NO trains can be moving south, unless you put them on shunt lines ( passing lines ) while the opposite direction train passes. And, if you go on Google Earth, you won't find many shunt lines on that track. Trains would be stopping and waiting. And waiting. And, with the well known reliability of Soviet rail equipment, they will be ...... waiting.....


You stated that the Soviets had only lost 15% of their rail cars and locomotives. However, the Soviets admit that, in the first two years of the war, they lost over 16,000 engines to bombing and other causes. This implies that the Soviet Union had 106,000 locomotives at the start of the war ? Sorry, but at the start of the war, the Soviet Union had only 25,000 locomotives and 600,000 rail cars of ALL types. This means that the Soviet Union, in the first two years of the war, lost 60 % of its pre war rail engines. This was why they were so desperate to get their hands on American Decapods.


you stated :
We know how quickly the SU distributted the LL in 41, its roughly:

40 miles an hour average speed of train.

Distance from Murmansk to Moscow 900 miles.

LL Cargo over 2 months delivered 160000 tonns.

850 tons capacity pr train load.


1. Average speed of a current Russian Freight Train is 6.5 miles per hour, which is just slightly slower than it was during WW2. ( these are official Russian figures ) This is slower than a U.S. Freighter. During the war, the NKPS tried to run its trains at a standard 25 kmph ( about 15 mph )

2. By Rail, from Moscow to Murmansk, the shortest line is 1081 miles, almost all on a double track line from Archangelsk It is longer if you go through Leningrad ( 1299 miles ) but that was cut off in 1941. But, if Moscow falls, the Archangelski double track line becomes cut off, and now you are going to take a round about route of some 1321 miles, almost all on single track lines. ( Figures direct measurement from Google Earth )

3. A typical Soviet WW2 freight train comprised a number goods wagons or specialist wagons, and a brake van, and during a day’s travel it would have a number of different engines. Soviet trains were 120 axles long, which gave a gross weight of 1,200 tonnes for the rolling stock and cargo or a net weight of 650 tonnes of cargo. Typically this was 60 two-axle goods wagons, each carrying 10–15 tonnes of cargo, 40 men or eight horses.

4. The capacity of a particular line was the number of trains that could run down its length both up and down, usually given as 12 pairs of trains a day for single lines or 24 pairs of trains for double track lines for restored military railways.


So, to summarize, it is further from Moscow to Murmansk than you think, the Soviet trains run slower, they carry less cargo, and have to spend a lot of time stopped waiting for other trains to pass.

Just the simple math, 80,000 tons LL per month divided by 650 tons per train means 123 trains per month. And. moving at 15 mph for over 1320 miles, that implies a minimum travel time of 176 hours round trip. ( Thats with no loading time, unloading time, sit time at sidings waiting for oncoming trains to pass, or breakdowns. ) If you add a day for loading, another for unloading, that adds 48 hours, add in another
6 hours waiting on sidings, ( you have 4 trains per day each way, each train takes 3.5 days each way, that means 14 trains on the line going each way, or a train meets another train about every three hours. So, every three hours, you have to go to a siding. If there is a siding there. If not, you go to the siding you are close to, and wait. and wait. It works out to be about 230 hours per run, or about 9.5 days.

And this means that some of the Lend lease cargo is going to sit out in the open for a month before it gets hauled South. That's the effect of Moscow being taken by the Germans.

So, while the Lend lease of 1941 might be doable, the Lend lease of 1942 is going to start stacking up. This will be a problem.


The 1943 SU Army map you using shows both the inner and outer Moscow orbital rail
Right. The 1943 map. A lot of that outer ring was single track line, with few shunt lines and no marshalling yards. These were all built during the war, starting in summer of 1942, after the front had stabilized, and continuing into the 1960s. In fact, some of lines were still single track as late as the 1990s, according to Google Earth.

Trouble is, we're talking about 1941 - 1942. You can't run a train on a track that isn't built yet, no matter how good a communist you are.

Moscow was not the goal. Moscow is "no great importance"
Apparently the German General Staff didn''t know how to read a map. But, then again, they'd screwed up 27 years earlier, so, what else is new ?

Wagner pointed out the Heer was going to consume 32000 tons a day of food/fodder/POl and munitions,
Well, if the Germans occupy Moscow, they capture anything the Soviets fail to destroy. And, as for food, I have no doubt that several hundred thousand Russian civilians will be captured, which could dramatically lower the requirement for shipping rations to the German troops.....

Year - % of LL Aid Sent - % of LL Aid/Total Defense Expenditures

1941 - 0 - 0
1942 - 2 - 0
1943 - 14 - 5
1944 - 27 - 10
1945 - 36 - 10

Absolute total - 4%

Yes, but this included over 55,000 Studebaker deuce-and-a-halfs. Mr. Hanny, do you know what the slang term for a military truck is in the Russian Army ? An ex-Soviet soldier told me: ' Shtoodabakker ' .


As for the rest of your objections: They remind me of the German General Staff's objections to the Manstein Plan.



Respectfully :

Paul R. Ward

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Re: What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

Post by Richard Anderson » 14 Jul 2019 01:25

Obviously the Soviets were too stupid to build passing sidings...and actually lost 16,000 locomotives during the entire war. In 1941, they lost 2,000 locomotives out of 24,000 on hand (as of 1938)...and most of the 2,000 Polish locomotives and rolling stock they had seized in 1939. Meanwhile, The Germans did interesting things like setting up a new operating company or Haupteisenbahndirektion (Main Railway Direction, or HBD) in July 1941 using Reichsbahn staff and locals at Brest...only to have the SS come in during September and execute their entire printing staff and various other key personnel, throwing operations into chaos until they could find new personnel. I recommend H.G.W. Davie, "The Influence of Railways on Military Operations in the Russo-German War 1941–1945", JSMS (Volume 30, Issue 2, 27 April 2017) for a realistic assessment of the actual events as opposed to the ongoing fantasy worldviews in this thread.
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

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Re: What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

Post by ljadw » 14 Jul 2019 07:40

paulrward wrote:
14 Jul 2019 00:10



You stated that the Soviets had only lost 15% of their rail cars and locomotives. However, the Soviets admit that, in the first two years of the war, they lost over 16,000 engines to bombing and other causes. This implies that the Soviet Union had 106,000 locomotives at the start of the war ? Sorry, but at the start of the war, the Soviet Union had only 25,000 locomotives and 600,000 rail cars of ALL types. This means that the Soviet Union, in the first two years of the war, lost 60 % of its pre war rail engines. This was why they were so desperate to get their hands on American Decapods.


you stated :





Moscow was not the goal. Moscow is "no great importance"
Apparently the German General Staff didn''t know how to read a map. But, then again, they'd screwed up 27 years earlier, so, what else is new ?

Wagner pointed out the Heer was going to consume 32000 tons a day of food/fodder/POl and munitions,
Well, if the Germans occupy Moscow, they capture anything the Soviets fail to destroy. And, as for food, I have no doubt that several hundred thousand Russian civilians will be captured, which could dramatically lower the requirement for shipping rations to the German troops.....





As for the rest of your objections: They remind me of the German General Staff's objections to the Manstein Plan.



Respectfully :

Paul R. Ward
1 About the locs/railroad cars : the Soviets had a lot of reserve locs,thus ...It is also not correct to found your argument on raw figures.While it is so that at the end of August 1941 the Germans had captured 1000 loc ( 50% operational ) and 21000 waggons ,it is also so that the Soviets needed less waggons and locs during the war because civilian railroad transport was severely curtailed and because it lost in 1941 42 % of its rail network.
2 About Moscow : the traditional western argumentation is that the fall of Moscow would cause the collaps of the SU. This is not correct : the fall of the SU could only happen by the border battles between the border and the DD line ,and the collaps of the SU would result in the capture of Moscow . If at the end of 1941 the Germans still had to fight for Moscow, they were doomed .

3 About the Manstein plan : the objections of the general staff were well founded , and it is not correct to talk of objections,as the general staff was evolving in the direction of the Manstein plan .

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Re: What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

Post by MarkN » 14 Jul 2019 08:57

paulrward wrote:
14 Jul 2019 00:10
Your understanding of rail transport needs work. You should talk to an expert.
Considering the content of your posts, the accuracy, the quality and the relevance, it would seem to be you who is most in need of improving your understanding.

Hanny
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Re: What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

Post by Hanny » 14 Jul 2019 11:09

Richard Anderson wrote:
14 Jul 2019 01:25
Obviously the Soviets were too stupid to build passing sidings...and actually lost 16,000 locomotives during the entire war. In 1941, they lost 2,000 locomotives out of 24,000 on hand (as of 1938)...and most of the 2,000 Polish locomotives and rolling stock they had seized in 1939. Meanwhile, The Germans did interesting things like setting up a new operating company or Haupteisenbahndirektion (Main Railway Direction, or HBD) in July 1941 using Reichsbahn staff and locals at Brest...only to have the SS come in during September and execute their entire printing staff and various other key personnel, throwing operations into chaos until they could find new personnel. I recommend H.G.W. Davie, "The Influence of Railways on Military Operations in the Russo-German War 1941–1945", JSMS (Volume 30, Issue 2, 27 April 2017) for a realistic assessment of the actual events as opposed to the ongoing fantasy worldviews in this thread.
Ta https://www.hgwdavie.com/blog/2018/3/9/ ... r-19411945

The Reichsbahn ran trains at a wide variety of speeds, with its freight trains traveling at 50 km/hour, but this required complex signaling and track architecture, and it also needed strong track to withstand the buffeting from trains, as wear and tear increased exponentially, the faster the speed of the trains. The NKPS avoided these issues because it ran almost all its trains at a uniform speed, typically 25 km/hour.
To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield.

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