Nor will you even attempt to answer question put to you. So sad.
Will an expert, unlike you, know the difference between losses from all causes, in two years, and those in the entire war?.paulrward wrote: ↑14 Jul 2019 00:10Your understanding of rail transport needs work. You should talk to an expert. If you have only a single line, the trains only go in one direction. That means, when two trains meet up, engine to engine, things either come to a halt ( best case scenario ) or get tragically funny in a Gomez Addams sort of way ( worst case scenario ) Remember, if you are taking trains to Murmansk, you are also feeding Murmansk, and taking them food, coal, and oil, etc. You aren't just hauling Lend lease out.
If you are moving a train north from Archangelsk to Murmansk, NO trains can be moving south, unless you put them on shunt lines ( passing lines ) while the opposite direction train passes. And, if you go on Google Earth, you won't find many shunt lines on that track. Trains would be stopping and waiting. And waiting. And, with the well known reliability of Soviet rail equipment, they will be ...... waiting.....
You stated that the Soviets had only lost 15% of their rail cars and locomotives. However, the Soviets admit that, in the first two years of the war, they lost over 16,000 engines to bombing and other causes. This implies that the Soviet Union had 106,000 locomotives at the start of the war ? Sorry, but at the start of the war, the Soviet Union had only 25,000 locomotives and 600,000 rail cars of ALL types. This means that the Soviet Union, in the first two years of the war, lost 60 % of its pre war rail engines. This was why they were so desperate to get their hands on American Decapods.
Nope thats not how single track lines operated, more on that later. No 16000 is for the entire period of the war lost, not the first two years. No it does imply 106000 locomotives. So desperate for foreign locomotives,they dont ask for them till after kursk was fought and won, none sent till late 43 and none in use before 44.
You have just counted it as a round trip time, so you double the time to deliver, you trebbled the load unloading times the SU operated under, youv used average speed a quarter of what it was, and the question was is their the capacity in 41 to move it in a realistic manner. They actually carried more, a lot more, not less cargo. You ended with how the Germans operated, not how the Russian operated.paulrward wrote: ↑14 Jul 2019 00:10
1. Average speed of a current Russian Freight Train is 6.5 miles per hour, which is just slightly slower than it was during WW2. ( these are official Russian figures ) This is slower than a U.S. Freighter. During the war, the NKPS tried to run its trains at a standard 25 kmph ( about 15 mph )
2. By Rail, from Moscow to Murmansk, the shortest line is 1081 miles, almost all on a double track line from Archangelsk It is longer if you go through Leningrad ( 1299 miles ) but that was cut off in 1941. But, if Moscow falls, the Archangelski double track line becomes cut off, and now you are going to take a round about route of some 1321 miles, almost all on single track lines. ( Figures direct measurement from Google Earth )
3. A typical Soviet WW2 freight train comprised a number goods wagons or specialist wagons, and a brake van, and during a day’s travel it would have a number of different engines. Soviet trains were 120 axles long, which gave a gross weight of 1,200 tonnes for the rolling stock and cargo or a net weight of 650 tonnes of cargo. Typically this was 60 two-axle goods wagons, each carrying 10–15 tonnes of cargo, 40 men or eight horses.
4. The capacity of a particular line was the number of trains that could run down its length both up and down, usually given as 12 pairs of trains a day for single lines or 24 pairs of trains for double track lines for restored military railways.
So, to summarize, it is further from Moscow to Murmansk than you think, the Soviet trains run slower, they carry less cargo, and have to spend a lot of time stopped waiting for other trains to pass.
Just the simple math, 80,000 tons LL per month divided by 650 tons per train means 123 trains per month. And. moving at 15 mph for over 1320 miles, that implies a minimum travel time of 176 hours round trip. ( Thats with no loading time, unloading time, sit time at sidings waiting for oncoming trains to pass, or breakdowns. ) If you add a day for loading, another for unloading, that adds 48 hours, add in another
6 hours waiting on sidings, ( you have 4 trains per day each way, each train takes 3.5 days each way, that means 14 trains on the line going each way, or a train meets another train about every three hours. So, every three hours, you have to go to a siding. If there is a siding there. If not, you go to the siding you are close to, and wait. and wait. It works out to be about 230 hours per run, or about 9.5 days.
And this means that some of the Lend lease cargo is going to sit out in the open for a month before it gets hauled South. That's the effect of Moscow being taken by the Germans.
So, while the Lend lease of 1941 might be doable, the Lend lease of 1942 is going to start stacking up. This will be a problem.
Simple maths things then. http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewc ... odmilintel
U. S. S. R. railroads are of broad gauge. The capacity of a Soviet train, approximately 1,200 'short tons, is more than twice the capacity of a comparable train of Western European cars. Soviet troop trains average from 12 to 15 miles per hour.
c. Railroad capacity. The average daily capacity of main U. S. S. R. double-track lines is from 30 to 40 trains. Single-track lines averagr from 15 to 20 trains daily.
To iT'crease the capacity of railroad lines during operations, the Soviets operate lines one way only. Trains maintain visual distance. This mt::hod increases the capacity of even hastily repaired single.track lines to from 40 to 50 trains daily.
d. Military trains. Standard Russian military trains total 120 axles. However, trains on trunk lines may have from 166 to 172 axles. Cars are either 2- or 4-axle types, of 20· or 55- to 66-short ton capacities respectively.
1200 tons a train, 40 to 50 a day on single track line, is a daily capacity of 48000-60,000 tons a day in transit. Cargo is 26000 to 32000 in transit each day.
Here is an example of the speed of deliveries of LL, the Matildas and 3 months logistics for them, arrive in Murmansk on the 11th Oct, travail to kazan and inspected on the 14th by 15th they in service/training for the 15 day training period for the crews,in Moscow Kazan Tank school.
3/4 days from Murmansk to Moscow.
Your the only one using google, you should stop that.http://users.tpg.com.au/adslbam9//Railways1941.png is the 43 original map. Acording to the russians it was all built pre war and finished during 42-44. the map you posted shows towns 00s of miles past Moscow under German control.paulrward wrote: ↑14 Jul 2019 00:10Right. The 1943 map. A lot of that outer ring was single track line, with few shunt lines and no marshalling yards. These were all built during the war, starting in summer of 1942, after the front had stabilized, and continuing into the 1960s. In fact, some of lines were still single track as late as the 1990s, according to Google Earth.
Oh dear, the map shows what is present, your the one now claiming its wrong on what was present as well.
The question is your inability to read the map.
If. Having 70% of your rail inoperative gives you only 30% of your daily needs arriving at rail head, from there with half your trucks inoperative your only getting half of that close to the front, at the front, with half your trucks gone, you can only get half of that to the end user.paulrward wrote: ↑14 Jul 2019 00:10
Well, if the Germans occupy Moscow, they capture anything the Soviets fail to destroy. And, as for food, I have no doubt that several hundred thousand Russian civilians will be captured, which could dramatically lower the requirement for shipping rations to the German troops.....
00s of 000s of extra months means not more required, acording to the regs for civilains, but less, you have a basic disconnect with how to use maths to answer anything.
Was, not is, its not the 50s dont you know.
The cold war SU viewpoint point went right over your cold war head, the SU fought and won in 41/2 with very little LL playing a part on who will win, from late 43 to 44 it played a large part in how quickly the SU would win and where the rec Army would end up being.