What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

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Re: What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

#286

Post by ljadw » 15 Jul 2019, 16:27

Avalancheon wrote:
15 Jul 2019, 13:40
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
04 May 2019, 06:10
The lynchpin of this ATL is a slightly more powerful Operation Barbarossa that actually achieves its central strategic goal: destruction of the bulk of the Red Army west of the Dvina-Dniepr line. Contrary to common perception, the Ostheer largely failed at this task: the largest Red Army grouping (Southwest Front) retreated intact – though damaged – from the border battles, as did Southern Front and Northwest Front. Only Army Group Center succeeded.

Operational failure by AGS and AGN enabled Stavka to concentrate its entire first echelon of reserves (16th, 19th, 21st, and 22nd armies plus several mechanized corps) and most of the first wave of newly-mobilized forces against Army Group Center (24th, 28th, 29th, 30th, 31st, 32nd, 33rd, and 43rd armies at least). These forces reconstituted Western Front repeatedly and forced AGC into a costly and prolonged Smolensk battle that disrupted German planning and shook confidence in early victory. Relatively speaking, the Red Army contained AG’s South and North with little reinforcement. See maps from Glantz’s Stumbling Colossus below:
This is a fascinating thread. What TheMarcksPlan has written here is worthy of consideration.

If the Heer had been able to raise 20 additional motorised divisions for operation Barbarossa, then they certainly would have been able to destroy a greater proportion of the Red Army before it could withdraw behind the Dvina and Dnieper river. This would tear much larger holes in the Soviet front line that would be harder to fill with their reserve forces. In turn, this would enable the Germans to make faster progress through the USSR and more easily overrun their territory.
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
04 May 2019, 06:10
The Ostheer possesses 20 additional divisions (10 panzer and 10 motorized infantry) on June 22, 1941 in this ATL. Using the extra forces, Army Groups North and South encircle and destroy five armies during the Border Battles (up to July 10th) - forces that, in the OTL, impeded their advances for months. During July and August, the stronger AGS destroys the reconstituted Southwest and Southern Fronts without help from AGC; its prisoner haul includes reserves that fought AGC during the OTL Battle of Smolensk. AGN simultaneously advances against weaker opposition to reach Lake Ladoga at Schlusselberg by early August.
This seems quite achievable. Although depending on how you count them, it would more likely be four armys totally destroyed (with one badly damaged).

With two panzer groups at its disposal (one in Poland, one in Romania), Army Group South could conduct a double envelopment and totally destroy three armys. Panzer group 1 would strike to Zhytomir, and panzer group 6 would strike to Berdychiv. This would trap 6th, 26th, and 12th armys in a pocket, along with a number of reserve forces. 5th army would probably escape, albeit badly mauled.

With three panzer corps at its disposal (all in East Prussia), Army Group North could likewise conduct a double envelopment and totally destroy one army. Two panzer corps would strike to Daugavpils and Jakobpils, while one panzer corps would strike to Riga. This would trap 8th army in a pocket. 11th army would still escape, however.

Image

All things taken into consideration, this scenario would result in an even more lopsided victory for the Heer. These massive blows would shatter the Red Army and put them on a substantially worse footing than they were historically. The reserve forces sent to fill the huge gaps in their front lines would be more thinly spread, leading to worse outcomes in July and August.
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
04 May 2019, 06:10
AGC executes the Smolensk battle with little trouble, sealing the central pocket by July 20th and going over to a relatively peaceful operational pause until early August. During this pause, AGC is reinforced by one of AGN’s PanzerGruppe (6 mobile divisions) and by one of AGS’s mobile corps (2 Pz + 1 Mot.Inf divisions).
Army Group South cannot send any of its panzer corps to Army Group Center. Not in August, at any rate. The two Army Groups are essentially isolated from each other by the Pripyat marshs. Its a gigantic swamp with minimal infrastructure. They can't link up until the Kiev salient is liquidated. This is one small problem with your scenario.
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
04 May 2019, 06:10
On August 6th, AGC launches Operation Typhoon spearheaded by its three PanzerGruppe, encircling nearly half of the Red Army’s standing field forces around Vyazma and Bryansk. After another brief operational pause and further reinforcement by AGS mobile forces, AGC is poised to launch the final assault on Moscow by September 6th with overwhelming force. Stalin is forced to concentrate the bulk of his undertrained new forces to defend the capital.
August 6th is likely too soon to launch an attack on Moscow. Even with the battle of Smolensk having been settled more quickly. They would need more time to build up a supply stockpile, particularly fuel. Mid to late August is a more likely date for operation Typhoon. This would give the Red Army a bit more time to prepare for the battle of Moscow (but not enough to matter, in the end).
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
04 May 2019, 06:10
Meanwhile, the month of August sees AGN seal Leningrad's fate by linking up with the Finns on the Svir River via a drive through Tikhvin. AGS completes its destruction of the (slightly-smaller-than OTL) Kiev Kessel during early August, breaks out from its Dnepropretrovsk bridgehead to seize the Donbass in early September, and has cleared the Crimea but for the Sevastopol fortress.
The fall of Leningrad would be a major defeat for the Soviets, and a major victory for the Germans. It would greatly affect the balance of power in the northern sector, and have political and morale implications as well. Leningrad was regarded as Russias second capital city (after Moscow), and was the birthplace of the Soviet revolution. Its fall would be a blow to their prestige. Capturing the city would also allow the Germans to link up with the Finns, something they were never able to do in real life.

Leningrad would be a logistical hub for them, enabling them to ship supplys back and forth by rail. That is a game changer in the far north. The Germans could send trains up to Salla and Kuusamo, and resupply their troops. The Finns would be able to push from Petrozavodsk to Pindushi, thus cutting the Kirov railway. This would be easy, taking into account all the divisions that would be freed up after the siege. The liquidation of the Leningrad pocket would considerably shorten the Finnish front lines.
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
04 May 2019, 06:10
Meanwhile, the month of August sees AGN seal Leningrad's fate by linking up with the Finns on the Svir River via a drive through Tikhvin. AGS completes its destruction of the (slightly-smaller-than OTL) Kiev Kessel during early August, breaks out from its Dnepropretrovsk bridgehead to seize the Donbass in early September, and has cleared the Crimea but for the Sevastopol fortress.
It isn't clear how Army Group South is is supposed to liquidate the Kiev salient by itself. Without assistance from Army Group Center, they would be forced to conduct either a frontal attack against Kiev itself (which was fortified), or a single envelopment through Kremenchuk. Neither approach will enable them to create an actual pocket. This would lead to the escape of a significant number of Soviet troops.
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
04 May 2019, 06:10
With only ~2 million men at the front in early September – many of them woefully undertrained - the Red Army can perhaps defend the capital if it abandons the fights around Leningrad and the far-eastern Ukraine. But of course Stalin can't accept that option. Leningrad falls with a massive prisoner haul in October, Moscow follows with a bigger haul in November. AGS pushes its weakened foes to the Don and takes Kharkov, Kursk, Voronezh, and Rostov by the onset of the worst weather in early December. Rundstedt is poised for Hitler’s next primary strategic goal of taking the Caucasus.
The Red Army would likely have well over 2 million soldiers by this point, given the failure to create a pocket at Kiev. But in spite of this, they would still be in a desperately vulnerable position, caught between a rock and a hard place. Too much to defend with too few troops. They would undoubtedly lose both battles.

The fall of Leningrad would yield about 400-500,000 prisoners. The fall of Moscow would probably yield even more prisoners. By this point, the Soviet Union would be in utter chaos. Most of their major population centers, agricultural areas, resources and infrastructure would be in German hands. The Red Army would be in tatters.
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
04 May 2019, 06:10
Rundstedt begins the Caucasus campaign during January, planning to reach Baku by October 1942 unless Soviet collapse enables a quicker advance. AGC and AGN resume their advance in the spring, occupying the Volga basin and cutting off or capturing Murmansk and Archangel in conjunction with the Finns. By early 1943 at the latest, Stalin – should he retain power – will be left with a population of only ~50 million aside from the dubiously loyal Central Asian republics. Perhaps as important, he will have virtually no oil production and only the Vladivostok lifeline to his Western Allies. Japan plans to sever that lifeline as the desperate Red Army rushes forces westward. The USSR will have lost all major agricultural regions, preventing any hope of evacuating most residents of the occupied territories with the retreating armies.
A winter advance towards the Caucasus is unfeasible. The terrain and weather would not permit it, nor would the logistical situation. Army Group Souths advance would likely terminate in Rostov. They would have to wait out the winter until they could resume their advance.

All in all, though, this scenario would be an unmitigated disaster for the USSR. Their ability to militarily resist the Germans would be greatly diminished by the end of 1941. Out of all the alternate Barbarossa scenarios that have been proposed on this website, yours would come the closest to achieving the Archangel-Astrakhan line. A Nazi victory of this scale would be utterly chilling.

It would not only give them permanent hedgemony over Europe, but would also put them in a position to execute their genocidal schemes. Not just the Holocaust, but Generalplan Ost as well. They would have no real need to gain the cooperation and compliance of the Slavs, and could rule them in the same brutal and merciless fashion they did with the Jews.
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
04 May 2019, 06:10
By the spring of 1943, Hitler can dictate harsh terms to the USSR and pivot all of his forces west, or can advance into the Urals and Central Asia with a significantly smaller Ostheer. The repeated Kesselschlacht of ’41 and ’42 have meant the Ostheer faced a much less numerous and competent Red Army after the Border Battles and has suffered far fewer casualties. The Wehrmacht has ~1 million more men at its disposal in May 1943 than in OTL and can spare at least a million more from Ostheer. Peace in the East or not, Hitler has sufficient forces to annihilate any incursion into Europe, a fact the West knows and accepts.
Basically, this entire scenario would result in a more extreme version of the Anglo-American Nazi war. A hellish grimdark dystopia.

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TheMarcksPlan, you have written a detailed, plausible, and very interesting project. Despite several small flaws, it is a very good work of alternate history. Your scenario should be developed further.
I have several objections to this post
1 A faster German progress would not depend on more mobile German divisions, but on the possibility that the Soviet Union already had collapsed .First the collaps of the SU and than the advance to the Volga, not the opposite .
2 The Ostheer did not fail in the Summer of 1941, the SU succeeded . Besides what the Ostheer did was irrelevant, everything depended on the Soviets .
3 Typhoon in August was out of the question . If it was possible, it would have been done . And it would fail . Even if it would succeed, the result would be meaningless .
4 More mobile German forces will not automatically result in more Soviet losses,because the Soviets could always retreat faster than the Germans could advance .
5 There is no proof that the fall of Leningrad would result in a mass prisoner haul : there were no 500000 Soviet soldiers in Leningrad .
6 The same for Moscow : a battle for Moscow depended on the Soviets only = on their willingness to fight for Moscow west of the city, or to fight in the city .
It is all wishful thinking : the collaps of the SU was only possible by a combination of political and military events
military : if it was possible to defeat the standing Soviet forces between the border and the DD line . This depended on the soviet willingness to send their armies to that region .
political : if this defeat resulted in the collaps of the SU and in the impossibility to raise new armies .And we know that this did not happen : between June 22 and June 30 the regime succeeded into mobilizing 5 million + men . Which proves that the collaps would not happen . A few days later, Hitler was already panicking and hoped on a Japanese intervention .This while he had forbidden to inform Tokyo about Barbarossa .

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Re: What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

#287

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 16 Jul 2019, 00:08

Avalancheon wrote:This is a fascinating thread.
Thanks. I appreciate your engagement with the idea and your identification of potential weaknesses and revisions.
Avalancheon wrote:Army Group South cannot send any of its panzer corps to Army Group Center. Not in August, at any rate. The two Army Groups are essentially isolated from each other by the Pripyat marshs. Its a gigantic swamp with minimal infrastructure. They can't link up until the Kiev salient is liquidated. This is one small problem with your scenario.
AFAIK the Pripyat Marshes end west of the Dniepr. Between the Dniepr and the Desna there are more marshes - as in much of western SU - but not the continuous block of the Pripyat. TBH I'm not certain of the ability of forces to traverse the alternately solid/marshy ground east of the core Pripyat and west of the Desna. In any event, it's not essential to the success of AGC's mission, IMO, that AGS send 3 mobile divisions. During the OTL battle of Kiev, AGC (2nd Army) pushed southeast from the north towards Gomel through the East-of-Pripyat-Desna region we're discussing. That AGC was able to push southeast doesn't, of course, mean that AGS would be able to move northwest from its positions (e.g. road structure might favor AGC's move), but it at least suggests the territory was traverseable by large forces.
Avalancheon wrote:Mid to late August is a more likely date for operation Typhoon. This would give the Red Army a bit more time to prepare for the battle of Moscow (but not enough to matter, in the end).
Fair.
My reasoning is that Wagner's pre-war logistics study envisioned a 2-week operational pause at Smolensk. If AGC closes the Smolensk pocket by July 20, liquidates it a week later, then August 10-11 is maybe the date. It is of course far too speculative to nail down dates for the Moscow push; late August or even early September allows the Heer enough time to get to Moscow before December.
Avalancheon wrote:Leningrad would be a logistical hub for them, enabling them to ship supplys back and forth by rail. That is a game changer in the far north. The Germans could send trains up to Salla and Kuusamo, and resupply their troops. The Finns would be able to push from Petrozavodsk to Pindushi, thus cutting the Kirov railway. This would be easy, taking into account all the divisions that would be freed up after the siege. The liquidation of the Leningrad pocket would considerably shorten the Finnish front lines.
Exactly. In addition, capturing Leningard by November/December 1941 means the Baltic is completely secure. OTL Baltic was dangerous for German shipping, especially in the Gulf of Finland. With the Baltic secure, Germany can supply further penetrations in the north and even center via the sea, relieving their over-burdened rail communications.

Once Leningrad falls, Finland is free - and confident enough - to pursue its "Greater Finland" strategy. Superficial histories will say that the Finns wouldn't advance past where they got to, but in fact they planned to annex the entire Kola peninsula and Karelia all the way to at least Lake Onega. Putting the Finnish army back into the offensive augments German forces by ~15% and presents a huge threat to SU: either they concede Murmansk and Archangelsk to Mannerheim or shift scarce forces north to deal with the renewed Finnish threat.
Avalancheon wrote:It isn't clear how Army Group South is is supposed to liquidate the Kiev salient by itself. Without assistance from Army Group Center, they would be forced to conduct either a frontal attack against Kiev itself (which was fortified), or a single envelopment through Kremenchuk. Neither approach will enable them to create an actual pocket
This again relies on the ability of large German forces to operate north of Kiev and east of the Pripyat Marshes. A Google Maps image of the contemporary terrain indicates large agricultural tracts and roads stretching about 40 miles north of Kiev along the Dniepr. https://www.google.com/maps/place/Kyiv, ... !4d30.5234 Today there is a large dam/reservoir covering much of that area; it didn't exist in 1941.

I'd envision a drive by the northern wing of AGS from due west of Korosten. In OTL 1943-44, the SU drove due west from the Dniepr to Korosten; this advance would be follow the same path. Having reached the Dniepr in that region, the Desna and its lowlands is next is probably at least as big an obstacle. But that's true of the entire course of the Desna, including its upper reaches that 2nd PzGr crossed in September during the Kiev battle. A German general remarked that capturing an intact bridge over the Desna was "worth a whole division" for this reason. So the Desna is a formidable obstacle but even if it slows the advance for a week, I don't see Stalin agreeing to evacuate Kiev at any point in August, given that he refused such action in September.

If you're right that there's no feasible route for AGS to cross the Dniepr/Desna north of Kiev, then yes we need a different sketch of the campaign. Not a fatal flaw IMO (as you seem to agree). The threat of single envelopment from Kremenchung, combined with the "extra" divisions pushing out of the Zaporizhy bridgehead (or similar bridgehead) would force retreat or a loss similar to OTL Kiev. If retreat occurs, then AGS is strong enough to destroy the extracted forces in the open plain between the Dniepr and Donets rivers. Basically, with two Panzergruppe, there's no way for Southwest/South fronts to escape encirclement except to run like hell all the way to the Don or further. Stalin would be unlikely to authorize that, and in any event such retreat would mean the loss of plant/workers/harvest in Eastern Ukraine before it could be evacuated. Such losses (e.g. the tank factory at Kharkov and Ukraine summer grain) would be on the order of losing ~500k soldiers.
Avalancheon wrote:The Red Army would likely have well over 2 million soldiers by this point, given the failure to create a pocket at Kiev. But in spite of this, they would still be in a desperately vulnerable position, caught between a rock and a hard place. Too much to defend with too few troops. They would undoubtedly lose both battles.
Right - I'm anticipating your points as I go through your reply... And to repeat, a much-earlier retreat from Kiev and left-bank Ukraine also has serious economic/demographic implications that SU could ill afford.
Avanlancheon wrote:A winter advance towards the Caucasus is unfeasible. The terrain and weather would not permit it, nor would the logistical situation. Army Group Souths advance would likely terminate in Rostov. They would have to wait out the winter until they could resume their advance.
This is a valid argument, one that I considered addressing in my OP but... well I didn't set out to write a book.
You're right that AGS's logistics situation by the time it reached Rostov in November was abysmal, perhaps the worst of any portion of Barbarossa (which is saying a lot). Kleist's panzers were getting nothing and there was no chance of moving further absent much better logistics. The lack of a Dniepr rail bridge was a huge impediment.
In the background of my ATL are several unarticulated revisions to German logistical planning to address this. Germany could have, for instance, pre-fab'd sections for a future bridge over the Dniepr instead of assuming that the RKKA would be destroyed in an afternoon and they wouldn't need heavy rail supply east of the Dniepr. Whether that's a temporary rail bridge or a pontoon bridge between improvised rail heads, it's far better than the no-plan OTL disaster.

A strategically sound Barbarossa plan would have immediately recognized that (1) the most important economic objectives lay in the south (ore at Nikopol and Krivoy Rog, coal in DonBas, oil in Caucasus), (2) that these objectives were the furthest from the front, and (3) that heavy investment in rail infrastructure would have benefits for the conduct of military operations and for the long-term exploitation of the resources. Accordingly, Germany planning should have moved mountains to upgrade connections in the south. OTL German experience was of a constant need to upgrade their communications with Ukraine, as I describe in a bit further in a recent thread: viewtopic.php?f=55&t=243100

The other idea re winter offensive past Rostov:
With Germans taking Moscow, Stalin/Stavka is laser-beam focused on retaking the capital during the winter. The south gets shortchanged on reinforcements and supplies; even a logistically-hamstrung German attack can push aside the weak defense.

But yeah, I agree the "Winter Blau" coda to Barbarossa isn't a condition of German victory in this ATL and it's at the farthest end of speculation I'm willing to defend as to my ATL course of operations.

The core of the concept is that German encirclement/destruction of more Red forces in June/July/August would have changed the course of history, and that such outcome is a matter of 10-20 divisions.
Avalancheon wrote:Basically, this entire scenario would result in a more extreme version of the Anglo-American Nazi war. A hellish grimdark dystopia.
Yep.

It seems obvious to me that Britain had no stomach to finish the fight via land invasion and the dozen or more "Paschendaeles" necessary to achieve victory, if possible.
America as well. The JCS agreed in 42 that if Russia collapsed the US would go on the defensive in Europe and pivot to Japan. That pivot would, IMO, have been permanent. Unless...

...unless we're willing to use the A-bomb to such an extent that Germany gives up. Before giving up, I'd expect Hitler to (1) threaten to execute all Allied POW if more A-bombs fall, (2) move millions of Europeans into German cities such that bombing Germany means killing them as well, (3) deploy gas and bio weapons against London. Maybe most Germans, horrified at killing actually-human Western Europeans, rebel and kill Hitler in that scenario. Either way, Germany will have murdered/starved/worked-to-death another ~20mil in the East by the time it's all over. And of course if the Nazi regime endures even as long as the SU then who knows what horrors would await.
MarkN wrote:TheMarksPlan offers no substance to his premise that an additional 20 mech divs would have made the difference necessary to achieve the tactical objective
@Avalancheon: Not sure of your experience with this poster but, to me, his rhetorical strategy is simply to ask you to repeat the entire argument and then pretend it didn't happen. Glad you see the "tactical" (operational/strategic) implications of the extra divisions.
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Re: What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

#288

Post by Michael Kenny » 16 Jul 2019, 01:19

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
16 Jul 2019, 00:08
Once Leningrad falls, Finland is free - and confident enough - to pursue its "Greater Finland" strategy. Superficial histories will say that the Finns wouldn't advance past where they got to,..................
Nothing superficial about the Finns reluctance. They were told in no uncertain terms than any such advance would mean an immediate declaration of War by The USA. That is what was holding them back.

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Re: What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

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Post by TheMarcksPlan » 16 Jul 2019, 02:07

Michael Kenny wrote:
16 Jul 2019, 01:19
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
16 Jul 2019, 00:08
Once Leningrad falls, Finland is free - and confident enough - to pursue its "Greater Finland" strategy. Superficial histories will say that the Finns wouldn't advance past where they got to,..................
Nothing superficial about the Finns reluctance. They were told in no uncertain terms than any such advance would mean an immediate declaration of War by The USA. That is what was holding them back.
No one - Mannerheim included - would believe that the US would declare war on Finland in 1941 if they step beyond the Svir River. MAYBE that's a credible story for 42-44; it's facially absurd re the effects of Leningrad falling in 41.

Furthermore, if it looks like Russia is certainly doomed in 42-43, a US declaration of war has little to no meaning. US is unlikely to march to Berlin, let alone to Helsinki.
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Re: What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

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Post by Michael Kenny » 16 Jul 2019, 02:36

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
16 Jul 2019, 02:07


No one - Mannerheim included - would believe that the US would declare war on Finland in 1941 if they step beyond the Svir River. MAYBE that's a credible story for 42-44; it's facially absurd re the effects of Leningrad falling in 41.
Kietel sent a letter to the Finns on 21 August 1941 asking them to cross the Svir to link up with the Germans and Mannerheim refused. There were 2 US Memorandums to The Finns in October 1941 that warned against any action from Finland against US aid en route to Russia or action against the Murmansk railroad would lead to 'an immediate crisis in Finnish -American relations'.

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Re: What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

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Post by TheMarcksPlan » 16 Jul 2019, 03:16

Michael Kenny wrote:
16 Jul 2019, 02:36
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
16 Jul 2019, 02:07


No one - Mannerheim included - would believe that the US would declare war on Finland in 1941 if they step beyond the Svir River. MAYBE that's a credible story for 42-44; it's facially absurd re the effects of Leningrad falling in 41.
Kietel sent a letter to the Finns on 21 August 1941 asking them to cross the Svir to link up with the Germans and Mannerheim refused. There were 2 US Memorandums to The Finns in October 1941 that warned against any action from Finland against US aid en route to Russia or action against the Murmansk railroad would lead to 'an immediate crisis in Finnish -American relations'.
Right. The Finns weren't going to step into creating Greater Finnland until/unless they were assured of victory. When Keitel sent his letter in late August the Germans had been stuck at Smolensk and the Dniepr for weeks; the Japanese simultaneously concluded that the Germans were having a rough go of it and scaled back their provocations along the Manchurian border. When the U.S. warned in October things were looking no better.

All I'm saying is you can't take the statements of any government at face value - now or then - you have to look at what informed their strategic calculations. For further reading on the topic, see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greater_F ... uation_War and references.

Nobody can say for certain what Finland would have done in the event Germany was clearly winning. Recall that Mannerheim was much less deluded about Barbarossa than Hitler, having actually fought the Soviets and learned the right lessons (maybe they're not great qualitatively but they will throw forces at you at an unmatched scale). Mannerheim and the Finnish right were playing the pragmatic game of waiting to see what it could get/keep. It's indisputable that Finnland's rulers wanted "Greater Finland;" the only question is under which conditions they feel confident to take it. IMO a prostrate SU convinces Mannerheim to move, US whining notwithstanding. Recall that the UK was actively bombing Finland but it refused to withdraw from the war.
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Re: What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

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Post by EKB » 16 Jul 2019, 07:46

Richard Anderson wrote:
14 Jul 2019, 02:25
I recommend H.G.W. Davie, "The Influence of Railways on Military Operations in the Russo-German War 1941–1945", JSMS (Volume 30, Issue 2, 27 April 2017) for a realistic assessment of the actual events as opposed to the ongoing fantasy worldviews in this thread.

Not directly related, but did you see this one?

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10 ... ccess=true

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10. ... ccess=true

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Re: What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

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Post by TheMarcksPlan » 16 Jul 2019, 09:36

Avalancheon wrote:Your scenario should be developed further.
Thanks again and I'd certainly welcome any contributions to developing it further.

When I started the scenario, the motivating thought was "What is the minimum condition for a successful Barbarossa?" Like how close was the world to irrevocable disaster in 1941?

This thread is sort of a first stab at that; I'm more than open to other conceptions. As I've said upthread, the process of articulating the operational scenario has convinced me that Barbarossa+20 divisions is very clearly a German win. Therefore I'm very interested in the question of the minimum conditions for a successful Barbarossa. If the bar for Barbarossa success is lower than 20 divisions, it's easier to chart the ATL path economically and more interesting - and chilling - historically.

The 20-division ATL involves a northern double-pincer that is arguably extraneous: if AGS destroys Southwest front at the border and destroys its subsequent reincarnation somewhere in Ukraine (either at Kiev or farther east after an orderly withdrawal from that city) then I still don't see how the SU recovers. The forces needed to reconstitute Southwest/South Fronts alone would likely lead to loss of Moscow/Leningrad; failure to reconstitute a Ukrainian defense would lead to industrial/demographic/morale losses about as serious as the loss of a front. So one candidate for a "minimal Barbarossa" is +14 divisions and AGS reinforcement only.

But does AGS really need 14 divisions to execute the encirclement from Romania and southern Poland? I can see a good argument that 10 divisions would have sufficed: Southwest Front needed all of its strength to prevent total collapse against Kleist's 9 mobile divisions OTL; doubling the mechanized forces puts a huge strain on Kirponos' ability to prevent local penetrations from becoming operational rout and encirclement. So maybe 10 divisions is a possible candidate. That could be a thread topic in itself.

IMO it's hard to see the Germans attempting a Romania-Poland encirclement with a small panzer army like the OTL six divisions in Hoepner's 4th PzGr. A strike from Romania is fairly isolated and therefore needs to be able to counter a strong Russian response on its own - six divisions doesn't seem sufficient if Stavka moves most of its reserves against it. So if we'd want to investigate a smaller force delta we'd have to look either at a border encirclement by AGS west of Pripyat (as I've sketched upthread) or else a force delta somewhere besides AGS, AGN being the only real possibility.

For AGN to execute a double envelopment, we'd probably need only another six or so mobile divisions. Consider this the "AGN only" version of my original 20-division ATL. In your response to that ATL, I noticed that you think 11th army would likely survive while 8th army wouldn't. Here's the map again:

Image

You seem to envision a strike northwards to Riga that traps 8th army against the Baltic, while 11th army retreats in decent order across the Dvina.
My conception is different: a double-envelopment from the left and right flanks of AGN, with the pincers meeting west of the Dvina in Lithuania. OTL German forces achieved a remarkable pace of advance through this territory; quick penetration and encirclement seems likely IMO given that historical record. Mannstein's corps reached the Dvina in 4 days, for example. SU Infantry would be hard pressed to retreat faster than that advance even if they started running on the first day, let alone to beat a faster advance by mechanized forces twice as strong.

Supposing that Leeb traps/destroys the bulk of 8th/11th armies in this pocket, allow me to very roughly sketch the ATL hypothesis:

That leaves Northwest Front with only 27th army (plus rump 8th/11th) to defend the Dvina. Stavka probably will transfer forces from Western Front's right flank northward to cover this front (or will assign reserves otherwise committed against AGC, which functionally amounts to the same thing). Playing out the next month or so, I don't see the terrain between the Dvina and Volkhov rivers as favoring another kessel in AGN's sector. So probably one of AGN's PzGr cooperates with AGC to encircle/destroy forces on Bock's left flank around Nevel (OTL this was attempted but failed - insufficient forces to seal the pocket). With Bock's left flank cleared, Ostheer can capture Velikie Luki and its environs without difficulty and Bock can move forces from his flank to his front to face Timoshenko's counterattacks. Meanwhile, Leeb can concentrate all of his forces on the drive north of Lake Ilmen.

Long story short, the +6-division ATL should see AGN capture Leningrad, along with Leningrad and Volkhov Fronts (~500k men) during late fall. As discussed above, the Finns are freed to pursue their offensive ambitions in this scenario. If everything else proceeds as OTL, Germany suffers significantly fewer losses in 1941 than OTL and the SU significantly more. It probably holds its front over the winter without crisis. Come spring, the availability of Baltic ports/supplies, combined with greater reinforcements*, should arguably allow Germany to pursue another offensive in the north/center in addition to Blau (e.g. taking Moscow and/or Archangelsk). Which means Blau isn't wrecked by SU forces redirected from the Moscow region.

*Any ATL supposing stronger Barbarossa forces must also, IMO, assume preparation for a multi-year campaign in which Germany is mobilizing for this longer land war instead of assuming a quick campaign. Thus no drastic cuts to ammunition production during 41, no withholding of men/material for Hitler's delusions about panzers in India etc. More favorable 1941 attrition rates and land acquisitions combine with greater supplies/arms/manpower for the 42 Heer, leading to decisive operational and strategic success that year.

...anyway that's just a sketch of an argument that a mere 6 extra divisions would have been sufficient for Barbarossa to succeed (plus preparation for a long war). I'm far from convinced of the case for that ATL, however. This kind of ATL might see significantly greater success on the Eastern Front but insufficient success to deter Allied invasion in the west to prevent Russian collapse. More people (especially UK/US troops) die in this ATL, but Hitler's still dead at the end of the war. Or it might not make that much difference even in the East. But that's the kind of question I'm interested to discuss. The lowest success condition I could imagine is Germany+6 divisions; 20 divisions seems clearly to decide the war in Germany's favor.
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Re: What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

#294

Post by Lars » 16 Jul 2019, 10:17

TheMarcksPlan, I appreciate the way you go about this what-if :"What is the minimum condition for a successful Barbarossa?", and I really think you should look into if the same result cannot be achieved by far less (as in far, far less) ressources by strengthening the German railroad transportation.

I know I owe you a detailed response on van Cleveld on railroads but van Cleveld's book can be ordered on Amazon. It is worth a go.

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Re: What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

#295

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 16 Jul 2019, 10:22

Lars wrote:
16 Jul 2019, 10:17
TheMarcksPlan, I appreciate the way you go about this what-if :"What is the minimum condition for a successful Barbarossa?", and I really think you should look into if the same result cannot be achieved by far less (as in far, far less) ressources by strengthening the German railroad transportation.

I know I owe you a detailed response on van Cleveld on railroads but van Cleveld's book can be ordered on Amazon. It is worth a go.
Thanks and like I said I'm open to that argument; I just don't see the top-level fundamentals at this point. I will order a copy of the book for sure; I just have a huge list of other stuff to read and, like, a day job. ;)
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Re: What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

#296

Post by MarkN » 16 Jul 2019, 12:43

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
16 Jul 2019, 00:08
Not sure of your experience with this poster but, to me, his rhetorical strategy is simply to ask you to repeat the entire argument and then pretend it didn't happen.
You have presented several scenarios and made hand wave statements that they would be successful, that they would achieve the outcome you desire, and then expect everybody to accept your premises.

I have not asked you to restate your scenario, l've encouraged you to argue/demonstrate why anybody should believe that the outcomes will be as you state.

The Heer were supremely confident that their plan would succeed. They had convinced themselves they would be successful based upon the very same hand waving you are using: our Knesselsclacht tactic will always be successful. When they tested it with a series of TEWT exercises, the plan failed, but they chose to ignore this. You are choosing to ignore anybody who dares question your fantasy.

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Re: What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

#297

Post by Orwell1984 » 16 Jul 2019, 14:38

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
16 Jul 2019, 03:16
Recall that the UK was actively bombing Finland but it refused to withdraw from the war.
One raid is hardly likely to make a difference and IMO makes it a stretch to say the UK was "actively" bombing Finland as this implies there was a sustained or even semi-regular campaign against the country, not a one-off mission by the RN.

The UK conducted one raid on a Finnish target, the port of Petsamo in 1941 and this wasn't even the sole target of the raid as they also bombed the Norwegian port of Kirkenes
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_EF_(1941)

The raid was a fiasco and not repeated so hardly likely to make a huge impact on Finnish decision makers.

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Re: What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

#298

Post by Avalancheon » 16 Jul 2019, 14:44

MarkN wrote:
15 Jul 2019, 15:57
It might have credibility if the proposal was based upon realistic changes in decision-making and credible arguments rather than hand waves.

The Heer fell short of achieving the objectives they themselves set. The fell a long, long way short. The reasons they failed are numerous, interwoven and complex. There is no "magic bullet" solution how to give Germany victory, because there is no simple, single element of the complex issue to change from failure-bringer to success-bringer.
The timeline created by TheMarksPlan proposes certain changes to the structure of the Ost Heer, in order to give them a better chance of achieving the goals outlined in Directive 21. Namely, the destruction of the Red Army and the conquest of the Soviet Union. Thats what the discussion is about.

Your approach is very caustic. By characterising these changes as a 'magic bullet', you are able to sneer at them and dismiss them. From the outset, you seem to reject the possibility that the Germans could have done any better than they did historically.

Your statement is very problematic. First, you are making a claim that there was no path to victory for Germany against the Soviet Union. Second, you are reinforcing this declaration by stating that no simple, single change could have turned operation Barbarossa from a failure to a success.

Your first claim is highly improbable and uncorroborated. Your second claim, likewise, is uncorroborated and is a false dilemma.
MarkN wrote:
15 Jul 2019, 15:57
The Heer ground to a halt before they even got half way to their geographical objective. They fell short after having failed to achieve their principle tactical objective - destruction of the majority of the Red Army at the border.
The Germans did fall short of achieving the objectives stated in Directive 21. They dramatically underestimated the manpower reserves of the Red Army, and the political stability of the USSR. No one though they could endure a surprise attack by the Heer, which was the best army in the world. Initially, not even Britain and America had confidence in the Soviets ability to survive.

To restate. Yes, there was undeniably a gap between what the Germans thought they could achieve in 1941, and what they actually ended up achieving. But that doesn't change the fact that they waged a very, very impressive campaign against the Soviet Union. Nor does it imply that there was some unbreachable obstacle that would inherently and inevitably prevent them from conquering the USSR.
MarkN wrote:
15 Jul 2019, 15:57
TheMarksPlan offers no substance to his premise that an additional 20 mech divs would have made the difference necessary to achieve the tactical objective - he just hand waves that they will. TheMarksPlan assumes his 'attrition ratios' are fixed and undeniable to justify his belief that, after Smolensk, the Heer has sufficient combat power to press on. Anybody can spit out loss ratios from their own head that fit their own desired end state.
TheMarcksPlan already did substantiate his scenario, you simply didn't comprehend it very well. You ought to reread the original post, specifically, this part:

''Using the extra forces, Army Groups North and South encircle and destroy five armies during the Border Battles (up to July 10th) - forces that, in the OTL, impeded their advances for months. During July and August, the stronger AGS destroys the reconstituted Southwest and Southern Fronts without help from AGC; its prisoner haul includes reserves that fought AGC during the OTL Battle of Smolensk. AGN simultaneously advances against weaker opposition to reach Lake Ladoga at Schlusselberg by early August.''
MarkN wrote:
15 Jul 2019, 15:57
TheMarksPlan recognises that to create and support this additional 20 mech divs, a series of very significant strategic decisions have to be altered from what were historically done. Quite unrealistic.
This is the only valid criticism you have made so far. His scenario for how these extra 20 mobile divisions come into existence seems quite speculative, and not very well developed. And ultimately, it is the premise for which his entire timeline rests on. That is the one major weak point of his project.
MarkN wrote:
15 Jul 2019, 15:57
In brief, there is no credible argument that an additional 20 mech divs would make a difference - one is expected just to accept the premise, and the decision-making process required to deliver that additional force and it's support is quite unrealistic.
Is the suspension of disbelief required from you really so great? The destruction of the 3rd, 10th, and 4th armys (along with reserve forces) during the battle of Bialystok-Minsk tore open a massive hole in the Soviet front in Belorussia. That gap could only be filled by throwing in strategic reserves to stabilise the front.

This scenario would involve a similar catastrophe happening in the Ukraine. The destruction of the 6th, 26th, and 12th armys (along with reserve forces) during a battle somewhere around Zhytomir and Berdychiv would put the Soviets in a much worse position. Their strategic reserves would have be deployed to both the Ukraine and Belorussia, which means the front is thinner and weaker.

The rest of the timeline follows logically and incrementally from this background. It is not an unrealistic progression of events.

ljadw wrote:
15 Jul 2019, 16:27
I have several objections to this post
1 A faster German progress would not depend on more mobile German divisions, but on the possibility that the Soviet Union already had collapsed .First the collaps of the SU and than the advance to the Volga, not the opposite .
2 The Ostheer did not fail in the Summer of 1941, the SU succeeded . Besides what the Ostheer did was irrelevant, everything depended on the Soviets .
Why should anyone believe this? Because you say so?
ljadw wrote:
15 Jul 2019, 16:27
3 Typhoon in August was out of the question . If it was possible, it would have been done . And it would fail . Even if it would succeed, the result would be meaningless .
In the original timeline, yes. But in this alternate timeline, that may not be the case.
ljadw wrote:
15 Jul 2019, 16:27
4 More mobile German forces will not automatically result in more Soviet losses,because the Soviets could always retreat faster than the Germans could advance .
This is complete nonsense. The Red Army cannot simply conduct endless retreat after endless retreat. You know why? Because it would mean losing all their population centers, agricultural areas, resources and infrastructure that much quicker. If the Soviets didn't put up any fight at all in 1941 and just ran away, there is nothing stopping the Germans from marching all the way to Moscow, and on to Maxim Gorky. The Red Army would then have no meaningful ability to wage war against the Heer.
ljadw wrote:
15 Jul 2019, 16:27
5 There is no proof that the fall of Leningrad would result in a mass prisoner haul : there were no 500000 Soviet soldiers in Leningrad .
Leningrad had about 25 divisions within the city during September 1941, plus a large number of sailors at the port and Kronstadt. 300-400,000 men is probably a more realistic estimate.
ljadw wrote:
15 Jul 2019, 16:27
6 The same for Moscow : a battle for Moscow depended on the Soviets only = on their willingness to fight for Moscow west of the city, or to fight in the city .
More nonsense. You subscribe to the totally ridiculous idea that the Red Army could simply copy what the Imperial Russian Army did in 1812, and engage in a headlong retreat from the invaders without suffering any consequences. This is wrong on every conceivable level.
ljadw wrote:
15 Jul 2019, 16:27
It is all wishful thinking : the collaps of the SU was only possible by a combination of political and military events
military : if it was possible to defeat the standing Soviet forces between the border and the DD line . This depended on the soviet willingness to send their armies to that region .
political : if this defeat resulted in the collaps of the SU and in the impossibility to raise new armies .And we know that this did not happen : between June 22 and June 30 the regime succeeded into mobilizing 5 million + men . Which proves that the collaps would not happen . A few days later, Hitler was already panicking and hoped on a Japanese intervention .This while he had forbidden to inform Tokyo about Barbarossa .
TheMarksPlan already outlined his preconditions for what victory against the Soviet Union involves:

''Let me try to restate the "30,000ft" view: the main point is that Germany can win* the war if Barbarossa (1) captures Moscow, Leningrad, and sets up Army Group South at the gates of, or somewhat into, the Caucasus and (2) permanently removes another ~2 million Red soldiers from the map. IMO there is no purely operational path to such an outcome (e.g. the Moscow/Kiev debate doesn't change the fundamentals), but there is operational+economic/mobilization path that is feasible and in line with the views of many contemporaries.''

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Re: What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

#299

Post by Richard Anderson » 16 Jul 2019, 16:33

EKB wrote:
16 Jul 2019, 07:46
Not directly related, but did you see this one?
Yes, nothing really new there, he's continuing the late Ian Daglish's work and various other "over the battlefield" studies...I played around a bit with it too in Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall. The problem is the photos he's working from are pretty poor quality, so he's doing a lot of inferring.
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American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
Artillery Hell

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Re: What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

#300

Post by MarkN » 16 Jul 2019, 16:34

You wrote in your post:
Avalancheon wrote:
16 Jul 2019, 14:44
You ought to reread ...
Given that you proceed by repeatedly misrepresenting my stated position, perhaps you should follow your own advice.
Avalancheon wrote:
16 Jul 2019, 14:44
By characterising these changes as a 'magic bullet', you are able to sneer at them and dismiss them.
The "no magic bullet" is TheMarcksPlan's comment which l have agreed with and taken forward.
Avalancheon wrote:
16 Jul 2019, 14:44
From the outset, you seem to reject the possibility that the Germans could have done any better than they did historically.

Your statement is very problematic. First, you are making a claim that there was no path to victory for Germany against the Soviet Union. Second, you are reinforcing this declaration by stating that no simple, single change could have turned operation Barbarossa from a failure to a success.

Your first claim is highly improbable and uncorroborated. Your second claim, likewise, is uncorroborated and is a false dilemma.
I have not rejected the possibility of the German's doing better. I guess you made that up for some unknown reason.

All manner of people have tried to find the "magic bullet" for the past 80 years. Nobody has found it. If you disagree with TheMarksPlan that there was no magic bullet, because you know what it is, then crack on and tell us all what it is.

In the absence of any knowledge of a magic bullet extant, l will continue with my belief that there was not one too.
Avalancheon wrote:
16 Jul 2019, 14:44
TheMarcksPlan already did substantiate his scenario, you simply didn't comprehend it very well. You ought to reread the original post, specifically, this part:

''Using the extra forces, Army Groups North and South encircle and destroy five armies during the Border Battles (up to July 10th) - forces that, in the OTL, impeded their advances for months. During July and August, the stronger AGS destroys the reconstituted Southwest and Southern Fronts without help from AGC; its prisoner haul includes reserves that fought AGC during the OTL Battle of Smolensk. AGN simultaneously advances against weaker opposition to reach Lake Ladoga at Schlusselberg by early August.''
I comprehended it well enough. It is a scenario with assumed outcomes. There is ZERO attempt to explain why the assumed outcomes should be considered valid.

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