I have several objections to this postAvalancheon wrote: ↑15 Jul 2019, 13:40This is a fascinating thread. What TheMarcksPlan has written here is worthy of consideration.TheMarcksPlan wrote: ↑04 May 2019, 06:10The lynchpin of this ATL is a slightly more powerful Operation Barbarossa that actually achieves its central strategic goal: destruction of the bulk of the Red Army west of the Dvina-Dniepr line. Contrary to common perception, the Ostheer largely failed at this task: the largest Red Army grouping (Southwest Front) retreated intact – though damaged – from the border battles, as did Southern Front and Northwest Front. Only Army Group Center succeeded.
Operational failure by AGS and AGN enabled Stavka to concentrate its entire first echelon of reserves (16th, 19th, 21st, and 22nd armies plus several mechanized corps) and most of the first wave of newly-mobilized forces against Army Group Center (24th, 28th, 29th, 30th, 31st, 32nd, 33rd, and 43rd armies at least). These forces reconstituted Western Front repeatedly and forced AGC into a costly and prolonged Smolensk battle that disrupted German planning and shook confidence in early victory. Relatively speaking, the Red Army contained AG’s South and North with little reinforcement. See maps from Glantz’s Stumbling Colossus below:
If the Heer had been able to raise 20 additional motorised divisions for operation Barbarossa, then they certainly would have been able to destroy a greater proportion of the Red Army before it could withdraw behind the Dvina and Dnieper river. This would tear much larger holes in the Soviet front line that would be harder to fill with their reserve forces. In turn, this would enable the Germans to make faster progress through the USSR and more easily overrun their territory.
This seems quite achievable. Although depending on how you count them, it would more likely be four armys totally destroyed (with one badly damaged).TheMarcksPlan wrote: ↑04 May 2019, 06:10The Ostheer possesses 20 additional divisions (10 panzer and 10 motorized infantry) on June 22, 1941 in this ATL. Using the extra forces, Army Groups North and South encircle and destroy five armies during the Border Battles (up to July 10th) - forces that, in the OTL, impeded their advances for months. During July and August, the stronger AGS destroys the reconstituted Southwest and Southern Fronts without help from AGC; its prisoner haul includes reserves that fought AGC during the OTL Battle of Smolensk. AGN simultaneously advances against weaker opposition to reach Lake Ladoga at Schlusselberg by early August.
With two panzer groups at its disposal (one in Poland, one in Romania), Army Group South could conduct a double envelopment and totally destroy three armys. Panzer group 1 would strike to Zhytomir, and panzer group 6 would strike to Berdychiv. This would trap 6th, 26th, and 12th armys in a pocket, along with a number of reserve forces. 5th army would probably escape, albeit badly mauled.
With three panzer corps at its disposal (all in East Prussia), Army Group North could likewise conduct a double envelopment and totally destroy one army. Two panzer corps would strike to Daugavpils and Jakobpils, while one panzer corps would strike to Riga. This would trap 8th army in a pocket. 11th army would still escape, however.
All things taken into consideration, this scenario would result in an even more lopsided victory for the Heer. These massive blows would shatter the Red Army and put them on a substantially worse footing than they were historically. The reserve forces sent to fill the huge gaps in their front lines would be more thinly spread, leading to worse outcomes in July and August.
Army Group South cannot send any of its panzer corps to Army Group Center. Not in August, at any rate. The two Army Groups are essentially isolated from each other by the Pripyat marshs. Its a gigantic swamp with minimal infrastructure. They can't link up until the Kiev salient is liquidated. This is one small problem with your scenario.TheMarcksPlan wrote: ↑04 May 2019, 06:10AGC executes the Smolensk battle with little trouble, sealing the central pocket by July 20th and going over to a relatively peaceful operational pause until early August. During this pause, AGC is reinforced by one of AGN’s PanzerGruppe (6 mobile divisions) and by one of AGS’s mobile corps (2 Pz + 1 Mot.Inf divisions).
August 6th is likely too soon to launch an attack on Moscow. Even with the battle of Smolensk having been settled more quickly. They would need more time to build up a supply stockpile, particularly fuel. Mid to late August is a more likely date for operation Typhoon. This would give the Red Army a bit more time to prepare for the battle of Moscow (but not enough to matter, in the end).TheMarcksPlan wrote: ↑04 May 2019, 06:10On August 6th, AGC launches Operation Typhoon spearheaded by its three PanzerGruppe, encircling nearly half of the Red Army’s standing field forces around Vyazma and Bryansk. After another brief operational pause and further reinforcement by AGS mobile forces, AGC is poised to launch the final assault on Moscow by September 6th with overwhelming force. Stalin is forced to concentrate the bulk of his undertrained new forces to defend the capital.
The fall of Leningrad would be a major defeat for the Soviets, and a major victory for the Germans. It would greatly affect the balance of power in the northern sector, and have political and morale implications as well. Leningrad was regarded as Russias second capital city (after Moscow), and was the birthplace of the Soviet revolution. Its fall would be a blow to their prestige. Capturing the city would also allow the Germans to link up with the Finns, something they were never able to do in real life.TheMarcksPlan wrote: ↑04 May 2019, 06:10Meanwhile, the month of August sees AGN seal Leningrad's fate by linking up with the Finns on the Svir River via a drive through Tikhvin. AGS completes its destruction of the (slightly-smaller-than OTL) Kiev Kessel during early August, breaks out from its Dnepropretrovsk bridgehead to seize the Donbass in early September, and has cleared the Crimea but for the Sevastopol fortress.
Leningrad would be a logistical hub for them, enabling them to ship supplys back and forth by rail. That is a game changer in the far north. The Germans could send trains up to Salla and Kuusamo, and resupply their troops. The Finns would be able to push from Petrozavodsk to Pindushi, thus cutting the Kirov railway. This would be easy, taking into account all the divisions that would be freed up after the siege. The liquidation of the Leningrad pocket would considerably shorten the Finnish front lines.
It isn't clear how Army Group South is is supposed to liquidate the Kiev salient by itself. Without assistance from Army Group Center, they would be forced to conduct either a frontal attack against Kiev itself (which was fortified), or a single envelopment through Kremenchuk. Neither approach will enable them to create an actual pocket. This would lead to the escape of a significant number of Soviet troops.TheMarcksPlan wrote: ↑04 May 2019, 06:10Meanwhile, the month of August sees AGN seal Leningrad's fate by linking up with the Finns on the Svir River via a drive through Tikhvin. AGS completes its destruction of the (slightly-smaller-than OTL) Kiev Kessel during early August, breaks out from its Dnepropretrovsk bridgehead to seize the Donbass in early September, and has cleared the Crimea but for the Sevastopol fortress.
The Red Army would likely have well over 2 million soldiers by this point, given the failure to create a pocket at Kiev. But in spite of this, they would still be in a desperately vulnerable position, caught between a rock and a hard place. Too much to defend with too few troops. They would undoubtedly lose both battles.TheMarcksPlan wrote: ↑04 May 2019, 06:10With only ~2 million men at the front in early September – many of them woefully undertrained - the Red Army can perhaps defend the capital if it abandons the fights around Leningrad and the far-eastern Ukraine. But of course Stalin can't accept that option. Leningrad falls with a massive prisoner haul in October, Moscow follows with a bigger haul in November. AGS pushes its weakened foes to the Don and takes Kharkov, Kursk, Voronezh, and Rostov by the onset of the worst weather in early December. Rundstedt is poised for Hitler’s next primary strategic goal of taking the Caucasus.
The fall of Leningrad would yield about 400-500,000 prisoners. The fall of Moscow would probably yield even more prisoners. By this point, the Soviet Union would be in utter chaos. Most of their major population centers, agricultural areas, resources and infrastructure would be in German hands. The Red Army would be in tatters.
A winter advance towards the Caucasus is unfeasible. The terrain and weather would not permit it, nor would the logistical situation. Army Group Souths advance would likely terminate in Rostov. They would have to wait out the winter until they could resume their advance.TheMarcksPlan wrote: ↑04 May 2019, 06:10Rundstedt begins the Caucasus campaign during January, planning to reach Baku by October 1942 unless Soviet collapse enables a quicker advance. AGC and AGN resume their advance in the spring, occupying the Volga basin and cutting off or capturing Murmansk and Archangel in conjunction with the Finns. By early 1943 at the latest, Stalin – should he retain power – will be left with a population of only ~50 million aside from the dubiously loyal Central Asian republics. Perhaps as important, he will have virtually no oil production and only the Vladivostok lifeline to his Western Allies. Japan plans to sever that lifeline as the desperate Red Army rushes forces westward. The USSR will have lost all major agricultural regions, preventing any hope of evacuating most residents of the occupied territories with the retreating armies.
All in all, though, this scenario would be an unmitigated disaster for the USSR. Their ability to militarily resist the Germans would be greatly diminished by the end of 1941. Out of all the alternate Barbarossa scenarios that have been proposed on this website, yours would come the closest to achieving the Archangel-Astrakhan line. A Nazi victory of this scale would be utterly chilling.
It would not only give them permanent hedgemony over Europe, but would also put them in a position to execute their genocidal schemes. Not just the Holocaust, but Generalplan Ost as well. They would have no real need to gain the cooperation and compliance of the Slavs, and could rule them in the same brutal and merciless fashion they did with the Jews.
Basically, this entire scenario would result in a more extreme version of the Anglo-American Nazi war. A hellish grimdark dystopia.TheMarcksPlan wrote: ↑04 May 2019, 06:10By the spring of 1943, Hitler can dictate harsh terms to the USSR and pivot all of his forces west, or can advance into the Urals and Central Asia with a significantly smaller Ostheer. The repeated Kesselschlacht of ’41 and ’42 have meant the Ostheer faced a much less numerous and competent Red Army after the Border Battles and has suffered far fewer casualties. The Wehrmacht has ~1 million more men at its disposal in May 1943 than in OTL and can spare at least a million more from Ostheer. Peace in the East or not, Hitler has sufficient forces to annihilate any incursion into Europe, a fact the West knows and accepts.
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TheMarcksPlan, you have written a detailed, plausible, and very interesting project. Despite several small flaws, it is a very good work of alternate history. Your scenario should be developed further.
1 A faster German progress would not depend on more mobile German divisions, but on the possibility that the Soviet Union already had collapsed .First the collaps of the SU and than the advance to the Volga, not the opposite .
2 The Ostheer did not fail in the Summer of 1941, the SU succeeded . Besides what the Ostheer did was irrelevant, everything depended on the Soviets .
3 Typhoon in August was out of the question . If it was possible, it would have been done . And it would fail . Even if it would succeed, the result would be meaningless .
4 More mobile German forces will not automatically result in more Soviet losses,because the Soviets could always retreat faster than the Germans could advance .
5 There is no proof that the fall of Leningrad would result in a mass prisoner haul : there were no 500000 Soviet soldiers in Leningrad .
6 The same for Moscow : a battle for Moscow depended on the Soviets only = on their willingness to fight for Moscow west of the city, or to fight in the city .
It is all wishful thinking : the collaps of the SU was only possible by a combination of political and military events
military : if it was possible to defeat the standing Soviet forces between the border and the DD line . This depended on the soviet willingness to send their armies to that region .
political : if this defeat resulted in the collaps of the SU and in the impossibility to raise new armies .And we know that this did not happen : between June 22 and June 30 the regime succeeded into mobilizing 5 million + men . Which proves that the collaps would not happen . A few days later, Hitler was already panicking and hoped on a Japanese intervention .This while he had forbidden to inform Tokyo about Barbarossa .