What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

Discussions on alternate history, including events up to 20 years before today. Hosted by Terry Duncan.
ljadw
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Re: What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

Post by ljadw » 02 Jun 2019 08:29

German truck production in 1940
In Germany : 87245, of which 13,126 were exported
In the occupied countries : 15531
Average truck payload : 2,4 tons
1941 :
In Germany : 84,727 of which 13,262 were exported
In the occupied countries : 39,574
Average payload : 2,5

In 1942 :
In Germany : 83,822 of which 5,721 were exported
In the occupied countries : 37,163
Average payload : 2,7

Paul Lakowski
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Re: What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

Post by Paul Lakowski » 02 Jun 2019 23:22

Krupp built LKA-I & LKA -II that were described..... "It was developed from the LKA-I by fitting a larger turret." , so the 3.5 ton LaS was designed around the same time as training vehicle. With superstructure & turret becomes 5.4 ton Panzer-IA with 4m hull and 5.8-5.9ton Panzer-1B with 4.45m hull .

A later model [Panzer-1C] increased all round armor from 13mm to 20mm [30mm front]; reaching 8 tons. Further an wider model [Panzer-1F]was built with all round 50mm [80mm front] ; that weight in at 21 tons. These were all essentially the same vehicle with increases in hull size and armor thickness. Doesn't appear to be a 'deal breaker'.

The Krupp Panzer II prototype is development of Panzer I LKA and appears to be similar sized with 4.4m length and 2.1m width. In principle there's no reason a larger Panzer I could not have been built with 20mm gun turret ; like the Panzer-II turret or Sdkfz-222 turret.

As to the Pz-II with the 37mm turret- it too could be designed from the start large enough to adopt a 37mm gun two man turret -similar to many 1930s European tanks. Prototypes for Pz-III & Pz-IV would continued to select one tank for production when war breaks out.

The Wehrmacht will force the Panzerwaffe to accept such a vehicle because they have NO TIME and have NO CHOICE. There will be no guarantee to delay war until the 1940s . As per Groner's 'TASKS FOR THE WEHRMACHT ' , Germanys neighbours will not sit ideally by and just let her rearm.

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Re: What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

Post by Richard Anderson » 03 Jun 2019 03:36

Paul Lakowski wrote:
02 Jun 2019 23:22
Krupp built LKA-I & LKA -II that were described..... "It was developed from the LKA-I by fitting a larger turret." , so the 3.5 ton LaS was designed around the same time as training vehicle. With superstructure & turret becomes 5.4 ton Panzer-IA with 4m hull and 5.8-5.9ton Panzer-1B with 4.45m hull .
Sorry, but there is some confusion here. LKA was the Krupp designation for their design submitted to the Heereswaffenamt under the 1932 RFP for a light tank armed with two MG that went to Rheinmetall, Krupp, Henschel, MAN and Daimler Benz. The Krupp LKA prototype was based on its Landsverk experience and was Fgst.Nr. 8000. It was in mild steel and had no superstructure. The Krupp design was selected for a Versuchserie (development series) of five vehicles Nr. 8001-8005. It was then accepted for manufacture as an instructional vehicle, still without superstructure, with 150 built by Krupp, MAN, Rheinmetall, Henschel, and DB. The final tank design selected was the Krupp chassis with DB superstructure and turret. All were designated as LaS. It was later improved with a much more powerful and refined motor as the Ausf B.
A later model [Panzer-1C] increased all round armor from 13mm to 20mm [30mm front]; reaching 8 tons. Further an wider model [Panzer-1F]was built with all round 50mm [80mm front] ; that weight in at 21 tons. These were all essentially the same vehicle with increases in hull size and armor thickness. Doesn't appear to be a 'deal breaker'.
Um, Ausf C has nothing to do really with the earlier designs. C was the VK 6.01...built by Krauss-Maffei in 1942 and 1943. Ausf F was the VK 18.01, also built by Krauss-Maffei in the same time frame. C featured an 150 HP engine, a completely redesigned chassis and superstructure, and a 2cm gun in the turret. It barely fit in its 8+ ton weight. Ausf F...yeah, a 21 ton (mostly armor) tank with two MG.

Not a 'deal breaker', but rather the product of ten years of development work, an improved suspension, a compact engine nearly three times as powerful as in the Ausf A, and so forth, which were so valuable the Heer built 40 of the former and 30 of the latter.
The Krupp Panzer II prototype is development of Panzer I LKA and appears to be similar sized with 4.4m length and 2.1m width. In principle there's no reason a larger Panzer I could not have been built with 20mm gun turret ; like the Panzer-II turret or Sdkfz-222 turret.

As to the Pz-II with the 37mm turret- it too could be designed from the start large enough to adopt a 37mm gun two man turret -similar to many 1930s European tanks. Prototypes for Pz-III & Pz-IV would continued to select one tank for production when war breaks out.
The Krupp designation LKA-II was to fill the RFP of July 1934 for the 10-ton 2cm armed tank. They based it on the LKA-I layout, but with a different suspension, an enlarged chassis, and a new engine. The experience of the one preceded the other, as did the RFP.

Again, nobody was interested in a too-small light tank with a too-big gun. Nor were they interested in a two-man turret in the preferred light and medium tanks designs (the Panzer III and IV). They were well-settled on that by 1934.
The Wehrmacht will force the Panzerwaffe to accept such a vehicle because they have NO TIME and have NO CHOICE. There will be no guarantee to delay war until the 1940s . As per Groner's 'TASKS FOR THE WEHRMACHT ' , Germanys neighbours will not sit ideally by and just let her rearm.
Uh, yeah, so it gets done with hand waving?
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Re: What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

Post by Paul Lakowski » 03 Jun 2019 05:43

Richard Anderson wrote:
03 Jun 2019 03:36

Sorry, but there is some confusion here.....
Yes great confusion since the details have little to do with what was being discussed , but it does require "thinking out side the box" in a "What if " forum, where -by definition -ABSOLULTY NOTHING DISCUSSED , EVER HAVE HAPPENED...because its a "what if"...simple enough to understand, no?

"The Wehrmacht will force the Panzerwaffe to accept such a vehicle because they have NO TIME and have NO CHOICE. There will be no Hitler guarantee to delay war until the 1940s . As per Groner's 'TASKS FOR THE WEHRMACHT ' , Germanys neighbours will not sit ideally by and just let her rearm."

Uh, yeah, so it gets done with hand waving?
We prefer to discuss what if questions.

So yes it ALWAYS HAS TO BE DONE WITH HANDWAVING -that should be obvious, or else nothing can change . In order to work-all it has to do- is to generally fit the mold and work within a frame work. As a rule the industry will invest what has to be done to fill their contracts. For me they instead allow a scale to determine comparative figures based on a annual AVF tonnage, Armor tonnage , gun tonnage etc. Focus on the technical Possibilities and ignore the rest.

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Re: What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

Post by Richard Anderson » 03 Jun 2019 06:45

Paul Lakowski wrote:
03 Jun 2019 05:43
Yes great confusion since the details have little to do with what was being discussed , but it does require "thinking out side the box" in a "What if " forum, where -by definition -ABSOLULTY NOTHING DISCUSSED , EVER HAVE HAPPENED...because its a "what if"...simple enough to understand, no?
Sure. :roll: The problem is the devil in this case is very much in the details.
"The Wehrmacht will force the Panzerwaffe to accept such a vehicle because they have NO TIME and have NO CHOICE. There will be no Hitler guarantee to delay war until the 1940s . As per Groner's 'TASKS FOR THE WEHRMACHT ' , Germanys neighbours will not sit ideally by and just let her rearm."
Sorry, but the Panzerwaffe does not EXIST until 15 October 1935 and its per-requisite for existence is the Panzer I and II, which were never intended as combat vehicles and were always intended as training vehicles. I know, a minor unimportant detail.
We prefer to discuss what if questions.
Do you think I hadn't noticed?
So yes it ALWAYS HAS TO BE DONE WITH HANDWAVING -that should be obvious, or else nothing can change . In order to work-all it has to do- is to generally fit the mold and work within a frame work. As a rule the industry will invest what has to be done to fill their contracts. For me they instead allow a scale to determine comparative figures based on a annual AVF tonnage, Armor tonnage , gun tonnage etc. Focus on the technical Possibilities and ignore the rest.
Sorry, but no, there is a distinct difference between hand waving and developing a reasonable POD. Declaring that the POD is the Heer (the "Wehrmacht" does not exist until 4 February 1938) suddenly deciding to scrap the orderly development of the new weapon systems and units it was just beginning to work on because somehow a deus ex machina told them they need to put a 2cm gun in their MG-armed test vehicle and a 3.7cm gun onto its follow-on, because they are going to have a war to fight in six years is handwaving built on top of hindsight.
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

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Re: What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 05 Jun 2019 07:43

Back to my ATL: <

Several fundamental facts about their potential enemies became increasingly apparent to Nazi leadership during 1938. First, the escalation of tensions around the Munich crisis had compelled Germany's Western adversaries to publicly commit enormous resources to rearmament. The U.S., for example, announced a naval expansion plan of unprecedented size. France and England embarked on their own rearmament plans with emphasis on air and naval forces. From the East came word of a new Soviet law requiring army training for all military-age males, implying a pool of tens of millions of men at Stalin's disposal.

Nazi leadership was, of course, aware of these developments, as the scale and power of the potential coalition arrayed against them became clearer. Goeirng spoke openly of a future war pitting Germany against France, Britain, the USSR, and the USA [happened OTL in 1938]. <br/>

What ensued from these ominous rumblings abroad was an informal "strategic review" of sorts, in which Hitler conferred with his principal commanders and staff - Goering, Raeder, the newly-installed Halder - to plan for how to confront such forces, were they ever arrayed against Germany. The results of this strategic review were sobering and clarifying for Hitler: Germany could not realistically plan to defeat a unified West in the air and at sea unless it obtained a much larger economic base through conquest. Germany could, however, realistically plan to defeat all of its continental enemies on land if it focused its production on the army and avoided a two-front war. <B><s></s>In the event of war, Germany must adopt a strategic defensive posture at sea and in the air, while going to the offensive on land.<e></e></B> Goering and Raeder resisted these conclusions initially, but the sheer economic logic and disparity of resources forced each man to confront reality. Goering, at least, would be given greater control via the Four Year Plan to shepherd Germany's transformation into an army-focused economy for the foreseeable future.

From the fall of 1938, all long-term economic planning proceeded in line with the strategic goal of ensuring German dominance of a continental land war in the first stages of any global conflict. Accordingly, Admiral Raeder's plans for a massive surface fleet were abandoned - though still announced to keep Britain off balance economically. Too much work had already been done on battleships Bismarck and Tirpitz, along with several heavy cruisers, to reverse course. But another heavy cruiser (Seydlitz), an aircraft carrier (Graf Zeppelin), and all plans to begin procurement of weapons and machinery for larger ships were cancelled. Goering agreed to curtail plans for 7,000 Ju-88 two-engine bombers, cutting his own Luftwaffe budget and refocusing funding towards tactical bombers and fighters. With the stronger Heer being planned, Hitler felt secure cutting all spending on frontier defenses once the outline of the West Wall had been completed by the end of 1938. Thereafter, the West Wall would be primarily a propaganda tool to dissuade hasty French intervention should Germany move against the rump Czech state or Poland.

These cuts saved billions of RM during 1938-39, all of which went to a doubling of production and investment for motorized vehicles. German spending on motorized vehicles increased from less than 5% of military spending to about 10%, with investments made to increase that figure in the future. Planning envisioned production of 500 medium tanks per month by 1941, plus another 500 assault and self-propelled guns (annual production cost of ~1.2bn RM). In addition, production of trucks and half tracks similarly expanded and planned for expansion, with a goal of eventually equipping 30 panzer divisions and 30 mechanized infantry divisions.

Hitler and his inner circle also planned to address their coalition's economic imbalance by integrating hordes of "volunteer" labor from across Europe in newly-conquered and/or allied lands. To that end, Hitler appointed Fritz Sauckel as "Plenipoentiary for Labor" from early 1939, tasking him with recruiting labor from allies and planning to induct unskilled workers from Central Europe.

The ATL course of the early war plays out largely like the OTL, except that Germany has more armor when it invades Poland and France. Hitler holds a couple panzer divisions in reserve during the invasion of Poland to ensure against attacks on his weaker West Wall. The Battle of France involves at least 1,000 additional German tanks and supporting vehicles, allowing Hitler to capture the bulk of the BEF around Dunkirk before turning his remaining armored forces loose on France. Hitler makes only a half-hearted attempt to subdue Britain from air, saving his air resources for Barbarossa. Instead of drafting thousands of industrial barges into Wehrmacht service for Operation Sealion, Hitler releases these to industry its efforts to increase military production.

After the Fall of France, the army drafts 350,000 men above the OTL level, substituting these men's labor with greater drafts of Polish, French, Italian, and other foreign labor. The million additional foreign workers, combined with economies of scale in army production, easily compensate for the loss of these men. German production rates are in line with OTL levels except for ~15% higher wheeled vehicle production, a doubling of tank production, and higher U-boot production. On the whole, this ~15% increase in German armaments production comes at the expense of domestic consumption, exports to allies, and increased use of foreign labor. Hitler gambles that the German public and his allies will accept the slightly greater sacrifices demanded, especially after the victories in the East.

The additional draftees and production fill out 20 additional mobile divisions, deployed for Barbarossa as detailed in my last ATL post.

**Note: I haven't decided yet whether - or to what extent - this ATL incorporates qualitatively superior mechanized divisions in addition to quantitative. IMO it's feasible that Germany launches Barbarossa with ~3,000 additional Panzers/StuG's, including a heavier skew towards Pz III/IV and long-barreled guns on the IV. It's probably sufficient that the Ostheer has the 20 additional divisions of similar quality to the OTL mechanized forces. But even stronger panzer forces, including more StuG support for the infantry, would tip the attrition balance further in Ostheer's favor.
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Re: What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

Post by Richard Anderson » 05 Jun 2019 17:07

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
05 Jun 2019 07:43
Back to my ATL: <

Several fundamental facts about their potential enemies became increasingly apparent to Nazi leadership during 1938. First, the escalation of tensions around the Munich crisis had compelled Germany's Western adversaries to publicly commit enormous resources to rearmament. The U.S., for example, announced a naval expansion plan of unprecedented size. France and England embarked on their own rearmament plans with emphasis on air and naval forces. From the East came word of a new Soviet law requiring army training for all military-age males, implying a pool of tens of millions of men at Stalin's disposal.
Sorry, you can of course just go right on with your ATL, but I'm afraid that in addition to my remarks to Paul Lakowski regarding starting from a reasonable POD, I have to remark it also helps if the POD/ATL fits actual historical fact.

The United States did not, "for example, announced a naval expansion plan of unprecedented size" as a reaction to the "escalation of tensions around the Munich crisis". That would be a difficult feat in real life, because the 1938 Naval Expansion Act was enacted 17 May 1938, four months before the Munich affair came to crisis. It was also simply an expansion of the 1934 Naval Expansion Act (the Vinson-Trammel Act) and the Naval Act of 1936.

Nor did England "[embark] on their own rearmament plans with emphasis on air and naval forces" as a result of Munich, its rearmament began in 1934. British rearmament expenses in FY 1934 (ending 1 March 1934) totaled 37.2 million pounds. By the end of FY 1938, six months prior to Munich, it was 182.2 million pounds...and the increase from FY 1937 to FY 1938, 78 million pounds, was only fractionally less than that from FY 1938 to FY 1939, 90.9 million pounds. The year-over-year increase was actually no different than previous years and was a decrease from that of the previous two years (14.5% 1934-1935, 42.5% 1935-1936, 71.7% 1936-1937, 74.9% 1937-1938, 49.9% 1938-1939).

Finally, the "new Soviet law requiring army training for all military-age males" was enacted by the Soviets on 1 September 1939, so it is difficult to see how "word" of it could have been heard in Germany a year earlier? In any case, the 1 September 1939 act simply amended the terms of service of the 13 August 1930 act...and ended deferment on religious grounds.

The problem with too many historical what ifs is the same problem found in too many historical novels...the authors too often resort to bad history in order to make them really cool and salable.
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

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Re: What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 06 Jun 2019 03:37

Richard Anderson wrote:The United States did not, "for example, announced a naval expansion plan of unprecedented size" as a reaction to the "escalation of tensions around the Munich crisis".
FFS you are exactly a type of pedantic bore that makes certain internet fora unpleasant. "around the Munich crisis" doesn't mean "the exact date of the Munich SETTLEMENT." The indisputable point is that Hitler's post-Anschluss, pre-war ('37-'38) territorial demands obviously and demonstrably increased the pace and scale of world rearmament. England announced further rearmament plans during 1938, as did France. Hitler needn't have had - couldn't have had - perfect insight into the pounds and francs of things to see that his enemies were responding to German aggression and a coalition against him was forming.

You're right about the date of the Soviet law, my mistake and thank you for the correction. The exact date of the law doesn't change the fact that any sober review of the German strategic situation in 1938 mandated a focus on its continental enemies before attempting air and naval supremacy over all comers. It doesn't change the fact that the SU was a massive country with massive industrial resources (known to the Germans), war with which would require a massive army incompatible with a simultaneous buildup of offensive air and naval forces sufficient to overcome UK/USA.
Richard Anderson wrote:The problem with too many historical what ifs is the same problem found in too many historical novels...the authors too often resort to bad history in order to make them really cool and salable.
The problem with internet pedants is that often their primary motivation for participating in a forum is to obtain some transitory feeling of intellectual superiority. They will introduce new or overlooked facts simply for the purpose of showing their knowledge, even if they fail entirely to address the central question.

You, for instance, don't even express an opinion on whether German focus on its army during '38-'41 could have meant victory in Barbarossa. Apparently it's self-evident to you that this is "bad history" because - I don't know - the Munich settlement happened a few months after one of the Vinson Acts.

One suspects your pedantry runs all the way to "all alternative history is dumb." If so, you're invited to stop playing. If not, then what are the conditions for non-bad alternate history?
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Re: What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 06 Jun 2019 09:55

Paul Lakowski wrote:"The Wehrmacht will force the Panzerwaffe to accept such a vehicle because they have NO TIME and have NO CHOICE. There will be no Hitler guarantee to delay war until the 1940s . As per Groner's 'TASKS FOR THE WEHRMACHT ' , Germanys neighbours will not sit ideally by and just let her rearm."
I haven't followed all the back and forth between you and Mr. A, tbh.
To the extent you're proposing a different type of tank design, I don't see the need for it in my ATL. Remember, all I'm changing is a pre- and early-war shift towards Heer funding from KM and LW funding, plus some extra early war mobilization.
To that end, it seems much simpler to say that Germany has more tanks on 6.22.1941 than to say it has different tanks.
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Re: What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

Post by Hanny » 07 Jun 2019 07:49

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
05 Jun 2019 07:43
Back to my ATL: <

Several fundamental facts about their potential enemies became increasingly apparent to Nazi leadership during 1938. First, the escalation of tensions around the Munich crisis had compelled Germany's Western adversaries to publicly commit enormous resources to rearmament. The U.S., for example, announced a naval expansion plan of unprecedented size. France and England embarked on their own rearmament plans with emphasis on air and naval forces. From the East came word of a new Soviet law requiring army training for all military-age males, implying a pool of tens of millions of men at Stalin's disposal.

Nazi leadership was, of course, aware of these developments, as the scale and power of the potential coalition arrayed against them became clearer. Goeirng spoke openly of a future war pitting Germany against France, Britain, the USSR, and the USA [happened OTL in 1938]. <br/>

What ensued from these ominous rumblings abroad was an informal "strategic review" of sorts, in which Hitler conferred with his principal commanders and staff - Goering, Raeder, the newly-installed Halder - to plan for how to confront such forces, were they ever arrayed against Germany. The results of this strategic review were sobering and clarifying for Hitler: Germany could not realistically plan to defeat a unified West in the air and at sea unless it obtained a much larger economic base through conquest. Germany could, however, realistically plan to defeat all of its continental enemies on land if it focused its production on the army and avoided a two-front war. <B><s></s>In the event of war, Germany must adopt a strategic defensive posture at sea and in the air, while going to the offensive on land.<e></e></B> Goering and Raeder resisted these conclusions initially, but the sheer economic logic and disparity of resources forced each man to confront reality. Goering, at least, would be given greater control via the Four Year Plan to shepherd Germany's transformation into an army-focused economy for the foreseeable future.

From the fall of 1938, all long-term economic planning proceeded in line with the strategic goal of ensuring German dominance of a continental land war in the first stages of any global conflict. Accordingly, Admiral Raeder's plans for a massive surface fleet were abandoned - though still announced to keep Britain off balance economically. Too much work had already been done on battleships Bismarck and Tirpitz, along with several heavy cruisers, to reverse course. But another heavy cruiser (Seydlitz), an aircraft carrier (Graf Zeppelin), and all plans to begin procurement of weapons and machinery for larger ships were cancelled. Goering agreed to curtail plans for 7,000 Ju-88 two-engine bombers, cutting his own Luftwaffe budget and refocusing funding towards tactical bombers and fighters. With the stronger Heer being planned, Hitler felt secure cutting all spending on frontier defenses once the outline of the West Wall had been completed by the end of 1938. Thereafter, the West Wall would be primarily a propaganda tool to dissuade hasty French intervention should Germany move against the rump Czech state or Poland.

These cuts saved billions of RM during 1938-39, all of which went to a doubling of production and investment for motorized vehicles. German spending on motorized vehicles increased from less than 5% of military spending to about 10%, with investments made to increase that figure in the future. Planning envisioned production of 500 medium tanks per month by 1941, plus another 500 assault and self-propelled guns (annual production cost of ~1.2bn RM). In addition, production of trucks and half tracks similarly expanded and planned for expansion, with a goal of eventually equipping 30 panzer divisions and 30 mechanized infantry divisions.

Hitler and his inner circle also planned to address their coalition's economic imbalance by integrating hordes of "volunteer" labor from across Europe in newly-conquered and/or allied lands. To that end, Hitler appointed Fritz Sauckel as "Plenipoentiary for Labor" from early 1939, tasking him with recruiting labor from allies and planning to induct unskilled workers from Central Europe.

The ATL course of the early war plays out largely like the OTL, except that Germany has more armor when it invades Poland and France. Hitler holds a couple panzer divisions in reserve during the invasion of Poland to ensure against attacks on his weaker West Wall. The Battle of France involves at least 1,000 additional German tanks and supporting vehicles, allowing Hitler to capture the bulk of the BEF around Dunkirk before turning his remaining armored forces loose on France. Hitler makes only a half-hearted attempt to subdue Britain from air, saving his air resources for Barbarossa. Instead of drafting thousands of industrial barges into Wehrmacht service for Operation Sealion, Hitler releases these to industry its efforts to increase military production.

After the Fall of France, the army drafts 350,000 men above the OTL level, substituting these men's labor with greater drafts of Polish, French, Italian, and other foreign labor. The million additional foreign workers, combined with economies of scale in army production, easily compensate for the loss of these men. German production rates are in line with OTL levels except for ~15% higher wheeled vehicle production, a doubling of tank production, and higher U-boot production. On the whole, this ~15% increase in German armaments production comes at the expense of domestic consumption, exports to allies, and increased use of foreign labor. Hitler gambles that the German public and his allies will accept the slightly greater sacrifices demanded, especially after the victories in the East.

The additional draftees and production fill out 20 additional mobile divisions, deployed for Barbarossa as detailed in my last ATL post.

**Note: I haven't decided yet whether - or to what extent - this ATL incorporates qualitatively superior mechanized divisions in addition to quantitative. IMO it's feasible that Germany launches Barbarossa with ~3,000 additional Panzers/StuG's, including a heavier skew towards Pz III/IV and long-barreled guns on the IV. It's probably sufficient that the Ostheer has the 20 additional divisions of similar quality to the OTL mechanized forces. But even stronger panzer forces, including more StuG support for the infantry, would tip the attrition balance further in Ostheer's favor.
jeeze, what collection of errors, logical fallacies, hindsight arguments, and pure invention and distortion of facts. :oops:
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Re: What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 07 Jun 2019 14:53

Hanny wrote:jeeze, what collection of errors, logical fallacies, hindsight arguments, and pure invention and distortion of facts.
Cool argument bro.
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Re: What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

Post by Hanny » 07 Jun 2019 16:57

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
07 Jun 2019 14:53
Hanny wrote:jeeze, what collection of errors, logical fallacies, hindsight arguments, and pure invention and distortion of facts.
Cool argument bro.

Your the one wanting long 75 on Pz II/Iv in 41, because they just *know* they are going to need them....your the one wanted to increase MT production at a time when Opel halted production due to no fuel to run them in with etc, Your the one confused when 7000 JU 88 tactical variants was shelved by Goering, as Udet demanded the JU 88 become a heavy dive bomber, requiring 00s of million of the LW budget to bring them online as that, a year later.* As domestic fuel allocation allocation was down to 10% of pre war, your the one ignoring the force structure industry said it could equip, and taking 350k more out of the manpower pool to produce what the machine tools dont exist to produce it, and ignoring what the Heer pre Invasion of Russia planning said was the number of formations required, and adding 30 MoT/AD they dont have the ability to train to drive them or the ful to run them, or that 350k Germans in armaments production, cannot be replaced by other nations ( who are building the things to keep the Heer running in any event as so much of it is foreign made) and get the same output, its around 25% less, and now you have to feed them in Germany....

* You got that from Tooze who got his maths wrong, see Murray The LW Strategy for defeat. Plan 6 called for 4200 Total combat airframes in 38, revised to plan 8, which called for 3700.
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Re: What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 07 Jun 2019 17:29

Hanny wrote:Your the one wanting
Hanny wrote:your the one wanted
Hanny wrote:your the one ignoring
Hanny wrote:Your the one confused
You're the one making second-grade spelling errors in a run-on sentence.
Hanny wrote:what the Heer pre Invasion of Russia planning said was the number of formations required
How'd that Heer projection go?
In any event, it was Hitler who determined the size of the army, deciding to increase it to 180 divisions after the fall of France.
Ever heard of the concept of "Working towards the Fuehrer?" Barbarossa planning is a paradigm of that. Had Hitler told his generals the Heer would be 200 divisions, they wouldn't have objected.
Hanny wrote:or that 350k Germans in armaments production, cannot be replaced by other nations ( who are building the things to keep the Heer running in any event as so much of it is foreign made)
So why was Germany able to draft many more men later? Did armaments production collapse in '42-44 when more Germans fought and more foreigners toiled?
Hanny wrote:force structure industry said it could equip
Obvious BS sentence (fragment). There was no single voice of industry telling Hitler how many divisions, LW squadrons, and KM forces "industry" could equip.
Hanny wrote:adding 30 MoT/AD they dont have the ability to train
20 divisions actually. I see no evidence that the Heer couldn't have trained additional men; it significantly expanded over '40-'41 despite an interval in which forces disbanded.
Hanny wrote:cannot be replaced by other nations ( who are building the things to keep the Heer running in any event as so much of it is foreign made) and get the same output, its around 25% less, and now you have to feed them in Germany....
You just need more foreigners than Germans, as my post says. ~500k foreigners for 350k Germans (I was going with Tooze's 30% lower productivity). And you have to feed them either way; no food is coming into or out of Europe by this point.
Hanny wrote:machine tools dont exist to produce it
German focus on army from '38 implies investment in tooling. Obviously. (Paid for by lower investment in tooling for LW and KM).
Hanny wrote:You got that from Tooze who got his maths wrong, see Murray The LW Strategy for defeat. Plan 6 called for 4200 Total combat airframes in 38, revised to plan 8, which called for 3700.
Plans were cut, especially in '39 - Tooze recognizes this as well. So do I. Doesn't negate '38 planning priorities, which dictated financial and tooling investment paths and, in particular, the ratio of these decisions between the armed services. Germany was building too many bombers with strategic roles and too many ships.
Hanny wrote: increase MT production at a time when Opel halted production due to no fuel to run them in
As with production resources, so with fuel. It wasn't that the Heer was literally out of fuel, it was that further production would have caused consumption to exceed anticipated allotments. Prioritize the Heer to a greater degree and the math changes.


Basically your/you're post addresses the ATL as if its central tenet - Heer prioritization over LW/KM - doesn't exist. Perhaps it is difficult for you to carry my modification in your head while you run through your list of facts. Perhaps alternate history is not for you; it requires a little more mental bandwidth than rattling off details.
The "ignore user" function is essential to AHF/internet sanity and I use it liberally. Feel free to raise another poster's point if I've ignored them.

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Re: What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

Post by Hanny » 08 Jun 2019 10:01

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
07 Jun 2019 17:29


How'd that Heer projection go?


Your not very good at critical thinking, the point was the Army set how many of x and y we will need to win, Armaments minister said if equipping that x and y in the time frame was practical, you otoh simple adding 20 MOT formations they said they did not require. This is one example of your hindsight based thinking, which also shows your 30 extra AD and 30 extra MOT Div to be a fantasy what if.

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
07 Jun 2019 17:29

In any event, it was Hitler who determined the size of the army, deciding to increase it to 180 divisions after the fall of France.
Ever heard of the concept of "Working towards the Fuehrer?" Barbarossa planning is a paradigm of that. Had Hitler told his generals the Heer would be 200 divisions, they wouldn't have objected.


Ever heard of reality?.

Reality is not your strong suit, AH asked for a LW production plan that required more aluminium production in the entire world, he had to settle for the reality of what was practicable to produce. Raising the force levels for Barbarossa meant reducing the manpower in armaments industry.
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
07 Jun 2019 17:29


So why was Germany able to draft many more men later? Did armaments production collapse in '42-44 when more Germans fought and more foreigners toiled?


Er i pointed out the millions of foreign pows post fall of France were not used in German armaments industry, because Germany agreed not to do so, when circumstances changed, t6hey were, you just changed it when the circumstances that drove it dont exist.
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
07 Jun 2019 17:29


Obvious BS sentence (fragment). There was no single voice of industry telling Hitler how many divisions, LW squadrons, and KM forces "industry" could equip.


Obvious fact that show you have no fucking clue.

Reichsminsterium für Rüstung und Kriegsproduktion
On the basis of High Command directives, the detailed estimates of the number or quantity of each article are worked out by the technical branches concerned; they must be adjusted to the industrial, labour, and raw material potentialities of the nation.

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
07 Jun 2019 17:29

20 divisions actually. I see no evidence that the Heer couldn't have trained additional men; it significantly expanded over '40-'41 despite an interval in which forces disbanded.


Actually i referencing your post of
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
07 Jun 2019 17:29
In addition, production of trucks and half tracks similarly expanded and planned for expansion, with a goal of eventually equipping 30 panzer divisions and 30 mechanized infantry divisions.


So you add 20 for 41 and 60 later, the first 20 you say
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
07 Jun 2019 17:29
Planning envisioned production of 500 medium tanks per month by 1941, plus another 500 assault and self-propelled guns (annual production cost of ~1.2bn RM)
1000 a month is 12000 per annum, a 4 fold increase over OTL,and an average price of 10K e pop, whata bonus for AH, so many for so little cost.

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
07 Jun 2019 17:29


You just need more foreigners than Germans, as my post says. ~500k foreigners for 350k Germans (I was going with Tooze's 30% lower productivity). And you have to feed them either way; no food is coming into or out of Europe by this point.


Nope you need skilled armaments workers, not unskilled, and its which government feeds them thats the point over your head. Germany was dependent on cerial imports from SU, it being in cereal deficit before anymore peeps were conscripted from agriculture, do you think SU is going to do that when it spots Germany making 4 times the AFV and MOT to supply it?.
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
07 Jun 2019 17:29

German focus on army from '38 implies investment in tooling. Obviously. (Paid for by lower investment in tooling for LW and KM).


Implies you dont have a grasp of the topic, to make end products means having the machine tools to produce them from, you just expanded industrial end product by a factor or 4 for AFV, MOT by good knows how many, without the machine tools to do it with. Does the term lead time in production mean nothing to you?.
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
07 Jun 2019 17:29


Plans were cut, especially in '39 - Tooze recognizes this as well. So do I. Doesn't negate '38 planning priorities, which dictated financial and tooling investment paths and, in particular, the ratio of these decisions between the armed services. Germany was building too many bombers with strategic roles and too many ships.


You have misunderstood Tooze, 7000 JU 88 med bombers production run was replaced with junkers 88 dive bomber plan, because the Heer wanted more dive bombers for accurate fire support which the med bombers could not provide. There is no saving of 7000 Junkers, as you claim, and LW budget increased it did not decrease. Your simply in fantasy land.


TheMarcksPlan wrote:
07 Jun 2019 17:29


As with production resources, so with fuel. It wasn't that the Heer was literally out of fuel, it was that further production would have caused consumption to exceed anticipated allotments. Prioritize the Heer to a greater degree and the math changes.


Er, the planners had 7 months stocks for Barabarossa, actual consumption exceeded planned consumption, and you just added 20 MOT formations, they said in OTL by Nov POL consumption will exceed production, so your OTL of 30 formations increased to 50, which means a 60% increase in consumption, even if you can get it to them to use. Exactly where is the fuel for these 20 Divs coming from?, will the logistics fairy wave its wand and umpteen millions of barrells of oil just appear?
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
07 Jun 2019 17:29


Basically your/you're post addresses the ATL as if its central tenet - Heer prioritization over LW/KM - doesn't exist. Perhaps it is difficult for you to carry my modification in your head while you run through your list of facts. Perhaps alternate history is not for you; it requires a little more mental bandwidth than rattling off details.


Basicly Alt history requires first knowing what happened and why, and then what is inherently possible with/from different choices than those taken, you sadly are incable of doing that, which is why alternate history is not for you, or actual history for that matter. That Germany expanded its MOT elements so far from 38 to 41 was quite an achievement, you want to make it fantastical.
To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield.

ljadw
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Re: What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

Post by ljadw » 08 Jun 2019 12:37

The Führerbefehl from September 28 1940 mentionned a production of 1490 tanks in the period September 1940-April 1941 which meant a monthly production of 213 tanks, NOT 500.
In June 1940 the tank production was 150 .
About the POW ( some 1,2 million ): more than 60% was working in the agriculture sector .(end of October ) .

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