What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

[MarkN]

I think the proper question would be were the economic shortcuts and improvisations accepted by the Germans as acceptable in wartime acceptable in peacetime? Those "improvements" required crippling the civilian economy, siphoning off the pension schemes of the German workers, enslaving over 8 million foreigners, and bringing the country to the brink of economic collapse over the course of four wartime years. Is that possible in the prewar peacetime years?

There seems to be a rather troubling - historically speaking - belief by some that Nazi Germany had legions of fit, able-bodied men sitting around unemployed doing nothing which, at the click if a finger, could be magic'd into fanatical uber-warriors overnight. Of course, those posters seem to be making little if, any effort, to tie their posts to historical reality.

Manpower was a serious concern to Nazi policy and decisionmakers. There simply wasn't enough to fulfill all the demands. The idea that an additional 500,000 or more could simply be taken out of industry or the economy and turned into fighting troops is nonsense. If it could have been done, they would have done it.

Making an effort to understand why they didn't do it would be more historically interesting than handwaving they could in an attempt to keep up the pretence of the fantasy scenarios.

[MarkN]

" If Nazi Germany had been as rational as assumed in this W/I, then would it been Adolf Hitlers Nazi Germany at all ?"

Indeed that is probably the biggest objection to most of these types of "what ifs".

The originator of this thread has made zero attempt to develop an answer to his own what if.

This thread had been all about getting others to do his research in ascertaining what would be needed to achieve a successful invasion of Russia in June 1941.

So far, the answer seems to be a completely different Heer with a completely different conceptual idea of how to wage war, completely different formation commanders who blindly follow instructions from the game controller, completely different general staff planners, a completely different military strategy, a completely different political leadership making completely different grand strategy as well as completely different industrial and economic strategy. It also requires the UK/US not to come up with THE bomb and the Russians to respond in exactly the way the game controller demands.

[TheMarcksPlan]

it is apparent wartime growth slowed considerably after the initial mobilization.

Wrong. The Wehrmacht inducted 2.5mil in the twelve months preceding Barbarossa, 3.1mil in the following 12 months, and 3.5mil in the next 12 months. https://www.feldgrau.com/WW2-Germany-St ... nd-Numbers

Even during 1944 the Germans were putting more men into uniform than in the 12 months prior to Barbarossa.

[TheMarcksPlan]

- " If Nazi Germany had been as rational as assumed in this W/I, then would it been Adolf Hitlers Nazi Germany at all ?"

This ATL doesn't require much, if any change in German/Nazi rationality. If I wanted to posit a perfectly rational Nazi state then I'd have them producing from 1938 or so with more production efficiency than they achieved in 1944. On those terms, Germany could have launched Barbarossa with scores of additional divisions and ten thousand medium tanks. My ATL is nowhere near that level.

Germany/Hitler responded with demonstrable rationality to the appearance of greater perceived threats. When they finally realized SU's strength after Stalingrad they took increasing steps towards full mobilization. Germany was still building the autobahns until 1943.

All this ATL requires is for Hitler/Germany to have made a better estimate of the SU's strength. The 1939 law on universal military training alone should have told Hitler that Stalin had at least 20mil soldiers to draw on; the publicly-available figures on SU's industrial output should have told Hitler that Stalin was capable of arming all these soldiers. Even within a worldview that sees slavs as inferior, 20-million well-armed slavs are a huge problem. So you don't need to change Hitler's racial outlook either. Indeed, Hitler's conduct of the Polish campaign - in which he committed ~80% of his forces at substantial risk to his Western rear, shows that Hitler's racial outlook didn't prevent him from taking Slavic armies very seriously.

In other campaigns - France for instance - Hitler was laser-beam focused on ensuring the troops went in with what they needed to accomplish the mission. In France he actually over-prepared as the Heer had stocks of ammunition sufficient for the much longer campaign that Hitler expected.

What happened in the run up to Barbarossa was an anomalous departure from Hitler's generally solid level of preparation for military actions. It was part wishful thinking motivated by his desire and perceived need to turn west. Better info and analysis from intelligence services and especially from the OKH General Staff could have changed his outlook. Hitler ultimately listened to determined and well-supported analysis from his military professionals (postponement of the '39 French campaign is one very good example).

People point to the Winter War as the main reason for the "short war" approach being justified. Maybe there's some validity to that view for remote observers in Britain or the USA. For the Germans, however, there was absolutely no excuse for failing to see the correct lessons of the Winter War:
First, the Red Army fought a brutal, bloody campaign with repeated defeats, heavy casualties, and thousands of frostbite cases. Yet the Red Army FOUGHT - it did not collapse, it did not suffer significant defection, and very few prisoners were taken by the Finns. This was obviously an army that could take a punch. Second, the Red Army was not qualitatively excellent but its sheer size enabled it to do damage. Casualty ratio in the Winter War was ~5-1, a fact the Germans either knew or should have known quite easily. A 5-1 casualty rate for Germans in Russia might enable them to win a one-on-one fight (manpower ratio was ~2.5 to 1) but it would leave too few Germans to defeat the West. And besides, Hitler would have moved mountains to prevent losing millions of German men in the East.

All of these points should have been raised to Hitler by his military professionals.

[ljadw]

1 The claim that 80 % of the German army was committed in Fall Weiss is not correct : on September 1 54 divisions were in the east and 34 on the western border, wich is 60% /40 %
2 The claim that in September 1940 the situation for Germany was risky is not correct : all the French could do was the Saar offensive wshich was no threat for Germany
3 The claim that the German full mobilisation started only after Stalingrad has been debunked by Tooze and other historians .
4 The claim that Germany failed to see the correct lessons of the Winter War is wrong,as Germany had no intention to fight a Winter War, and when it was forced to fight such a war in 41/42 it did better than the Finns .

[ljadw]

If Hitler had a better picture of SU's strength, nothing would change , as this would not increase the strength of the Ostheer .
Besides, he had a reasonable picture of SU's strength ,which was that the SU had a potential of mobilising 20 million + men , but that everything depended on the possibility of mobilizing these men .

[Richard Anderson]

You do have to love the post-Trump world where simple facts, when misunderstood or not believed, become "wrong".

In point of fact, the Wehrmacht inducted c. 1,596,000+ men between 22 June 1940 and 22 June 1941, not "2.5mil", they also mobilized c. 4,629,000 men 26 August 1939-22 June 1940 and had earlier inducted c. 991,000 from the classes of 1915-1917 (it is impossible to be more precise, since we do not know how many of those inducted became casualties in the period in Poland, Norway, France and the Low Countries, North Africa, the Balkans, Greece, in the air, or at sea or exaclty how many were still released as part of the "working vacation"). The data are at Lexikon as JohnT pointed out. Furthermore, the data Jason published many years ago at Feldgrau are mostly derived from Müller-Hillebrand, which is the same source I used to calculate the growth rates year to year. As Jason pointed out, the numbers are not exact and often cover different periods of time. In any case, if you calculate the year over year growth rate you will find it slows, even as the numbers increase.

Note BTW, the figures for the growth from 1940-1941 included c. 370,000 noncombatants (OT, NSKK, RAD, Beamte) and foreigners (HiWi and Freiwilliger), from 1941-1942 a further c. 350,000, and 1942-1943 c. 750,000, while in 1943-1944 it was c. 1,000,000. Furthermore, the "German" total also includes Volksliste I-III and eventually even likely some Volksliste IV.

[Hanny]

Just as Germany could have built different stuff (e.g. battleships instead of tanks, more bombers and fewer fighters, more origami), so could Germany have produced more rolling stock. .....more this.........more that.....more the other...........

I have heard this exact same argument over a decade back. Could it be Darrin has learned to spell.................

But still cannot count

[Hanny]

From DRZW volume VI, I have a figure of 667,292 cubic meters (448,000t) for the entire Ostheer from mid-October 1941 through March 1942:

From Volume 6 of The German Reich in the Second World War I have a figure of 455,000 tons fuel (POL?) for October 1941 until March 1942 (Eastern Front only).

Except that the tons figure, neither of them, you used are to be found in the book, because neither are correct.

https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=SDf ... q=supplies for army group cente smolensk&f=false

Please stop inventing numbers that have no bassis in basisy.


Why do you not use the following? "With the available amounts of fuel,it is mathematically impossible to execute Blau successfully".Colonel Pollex OKW logistics planer for Blau argueing targuing.

Vol 6 is online here https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=e9z ... 92&f=false

Please stop misrepresenting books and their contents. The board rules require you to support your claims, you have yet again, invented something thats is not in the books you say is in the book, please stop doing that.

So far I have accepted, for the purposes of argument, the absolute highest estimate (355,000t) provided in this thread. I doubt these estimates and don't trust their authors but it serves the argument to show that even the worst-case-scenario isn't a prohibitive fuel delta for 20 extra mobile divisions.

When you use terms like analytical rigour, i dont think you know what that means. 355k is the result of using German QM manuals, you may not trust them numbers but that is immaterial. Yours is the highest estimate by far btw, according to how maths works, not how you want it to work.

I showed you that 355k is a prohibitive fuel cost. In the second half of 41 the Heer consumed 1.8 million tons of fuel on the EF, 9890 tons a day. A Pzr/Mot ( with 930 tons fuel for 5 days) consumed around 70 tons a day in ops. The logistical burden of a extra 20 such would be 20*70*182=254800tons, the on hand stocks it started with adds, 20*860=17200, total of 272000 without whats in the supply chain. Extra 20 Pzr/Mot would require a 15% increase in fuel in 41.



In the theoretical there is no constant daily time period, there are bounds of advance of 75klm a day by the Pzrs, there are constant daily advances by rail, there are turn arounds by trucks of these occur in different amounts of time units, see trucks the post contents, the first 5 bounds are ok as that can occur in a 24 time period, by bound 20 it requires 4 times the trucks as it takes 4 times the bound to get the same 200 delivered, trucks cannot drive 1300 klm in 24 hours, a huge disconnect in truck bounds to rail bounds and pzr bounds. The only time constant is the RR from which all supply comes, at day 20 its supplying forces 600 odd klm away who are at moscow. Fuel for moscow 200 per bound consuming 355k, in 20 days was to show it to be impractical by day 20 the pzrs are at Moscow, while the RR is no where near enough.

You made a different calculation arriving at a fuel cost of 659,707 tons. Which is the fuel requirement to move 16500klm. When i used your numbers, told you i was using your numbers, to show how insane/impractical and its implications, you got pissy and claimed i cant count.

[Hanny]

The figures from DRZW are more credible than anything produced here. Per those figures, this thread's highest estimate would mean 20 divisions burn 80% of what the entire Ostheer burned over five months of fighting. Admittedly that fighting was mostly defensive (the first 7 weeks were not), but that defensive was quite fluid and involved many counter attacks. 80% is obviously wrong; incremental fuel burn would have been closer to the 60,000t estimate at the lower end of the thread so far.

DRZW is acounting forn consumption only.

This is mathamatcily wrong. DRZW book contains a delivery of x amount of fuel by train, by day and over time, the time being a different year than 41, and those consuming it a different number than the theroritical just moving force in 41. In the 355k theoritical it is a constant value. Consumption and demand are two rather different things but you appear to not understand the difference.

1.000,000 gallons per 75km, 13,333gals/km, 40.7t/km. Moscow is ~1,000km from Bialystok, call the overall advance 1,500km to be safe. At 40.7t/km that's 61,000t fuel consumed: 0.7% of Germany's 1941 fuel budget.

Which is (1500/75) 200*1000000=200000000 gallons, which is 659,707 tons, not 61k tons.

Again you invented a number value to suit your argument.


You keep claiming things that are mathematically wrong. Your own 200k is now over three times the 60k you started with and only short of the 355k because the 355k includes petrol in the supply chain and with the formation to start with, while yours does not. And yours comes with at an extra cost of 2.8 million tons of oil and an increase in refinaring of 50% odd percent, and extra foreign debt of +50% to purchase it, if it can be and it cant because it does not exist to be bought. Requiring another 250000 workers in the refineries, 135k of them skilled.

The article you prefer are from a different time period. German stocks ( 500,000 tons of fuel) for campaign were gone by end of 41, and they are now reliant on what comes from production only and the RR was in chaos in that period. What did not change was a standard unit of train fuel. What has changed is how many tons you claim came on them.

German fuel trains, had a standard net weight of 450 tons,https://www.hgwdavie.com/blog/2018/3/9/ ... r-19411945 of which there were 2 types, both contain c450 tons of fuel, one is different in that its all in jerry cans, around 30 tons variance could occur.

( problem with using averages, Only five fuel trains reached the Ninth Army between 23 October and 23 November, but this dwarfed the number arriving at the Second Army, which received only one fuel train.)

As for credibility, credibility is 2986 tons delivery a day, for every formation, the book you just used says its more like 750,000 tons on the number of standard rail wagons.

The logistical burden of a extra 20 such would be 20*70*182=254800tons, the on hand stocks it started with adds, 20*860=17200, total of 272000 without whats in the supply chain. Extra 20 Pzr/Mot would require a 15% increase in fuel supply in 41. Using the 2nd pzr as an example of actual consumption.

Effect of increasing fuel cost on EF by increasing Pzr/Mot by 20 formations using 450 ton standard train loads.

Moscow is ~1,000km from Bialystok, call the overall advance 1,500km to be safe.
At 40.7t/km that's 61,000t fuel consumed: 0.7% of Germany's 1941 fuel budget.

Wrong its 8% of the standard train deliveries.
Wrong its 14% of the 448k deliveries.

Your extra fuel burden cost of 20 more Pzr/Mot to mid March would have looked like this.
Supplies delivered til March 1942 using standard train loads.
Example 1) 11 standard trains a day 11*450=5000 a day.
OTL 5000 tons a day.
5 months at 5000 a day. 150*5000=750000 tons.
OTL 153 Divs *5000 =32 tons per day per Div.

ATL
5 months at 5000 a day. 150*5000=750000 tons.
OTL 173 Divs *5000 =28 tons per day per Div

Example 2) 448000 tons deliverd.
OTL 5 months at 2986 a day.
5 months at 2986 a day. 150* 2986=448000tons
OTL 2986/153 = 19 tons a day per Div.

ATL
5 months at 2986 a day. 150* 2986=448000tons
OTL 2986/173 =17 tons per day per Div

Note in your ATL you get 17 tons a klm, your latest hand waving game of HOI fails and you press play new game.

Second Panzer Army burned 111,645t POL during 1941 (I'm using 2PzGr because its composition was fairly uniform throughout the campaign whereas the other PzGr of AGC were highly variable).
2PzGr had 9.5 mobile divisions but also consistently had at least an infantry corps attached to it during operations. As you can see from the posts, the infantry armies actually didn't burn much less fuel than the PzGr.

AGC 519000 tons for 53 Divs for 180 days.
OTL AGC consumed 2883 tons a day, at 53 Divs, thats 54 tons a Div per day. ATL AGC consumed 2883 tons a day, at 73 Divs, thats 39 tons a Div per day.

Effect of 20 extra Pzr/Mot per day is to reduce fuel by 30% for AGC.

Since the XII Inf Corps was detatched inside a week, being held up at Brest livotsk and detached from from Pzr group, fuel consumption was principly for Pzr/mot formations.

2nd Pzr Group 111645 tons. 180 days.
OTL Pzr group consumed, 65 tons a day (111645/180/9.5) it went 2000 klm* without having any INF re attached untill attacking Moscow. We know that the QM report lists the amount of KLM spent on fuel resupply as being 199,384 klm, 309,982 klm of munitions, and 67,073 for spare parts.

AGC consumes 2883 a day, Pzr/Mot consume 43% of POL, extra 20 formations consume 90% of AGC daily deliveries.
9.5 a day *65=617
19.5 a day *65 =1267
20 extra:39.5 a day *65=2567

God forbid any of the extra 20 should be required to fire a shot in anger. 153 formations, consumed, Toppe: 571663 tons in 1941;(average 20.5 tons a formation for 153 but 18 tons for 173) So an average reduction of 10% in munitions expenditure in 41. Or increased munitions production of 74620 tons, and cost to deliver for consumption of it are required for the proposed increase.


*TABLE 1 OBJECTIVES ACHIEVED BY THE SECOND PANZER GROUP
JUNE TO DECEMBER, 1941
TIME ROUTE OR AREA DIRECTION DISTANCE
June 22-July 16 (25 days) Brest to Smolensk east 400 miles
July 17-August 24
(39 days) Yelnya (static) 0 miles
August 25-September 22
(29 days) Roslavl to Lochvitz south 300 miles
September 23-0ctober 1
(9 days) Lochvitz to Yanopol north 200 miles
October 2-December 5
(35 days) Yanopol to Skopin east 300 milees

[Hanny]

So 20 additional divisions would burn ~200,000t additional tons of POL or 2.4% of Germany's 1941 oil production.

Wrong, your conflating POL which is derived from oil as being interchangeable with aviation fuel etc, trucks dont run on crude oil, planes dont fly on petrol and so on.

You start with crude oil, from it at roughly a 2:1 ratio you get petrol and other usful stuff. 20*65*180=234000 tons.

To produce 234000 tons of petrol, requires 468000 tons of oil. To move it from where its refined, to where its being conusmed, means 1800klm of rail journey, 10 hours a day at 30kl,so 6 times that are locked up in the supply chain. 6*234000=1404000 tons of petrol, to produce that you needed 2*1404000 =2,808,000 tons of oil. How much more rolling stock does that require?, how much more infrastructure on rail lines?.

Or if you prefer petrol figure you used, now needs to increase by 56%. Or the 20 extra Pzr/mot formations now require to 90% of the days allocation.

German production of petrol and Aviation fuel/total.
1941 970,000 1,494,400 2,464,400

200k of 970k is not 2.4%, its 20%.

Not a single use of maths on your part has been correct, they are all wrong and all wrong in your favour. When you post things like "Me too! I'm not even going to address your bad faith argumentation style", i dont think you realise we can all see how dishonest and mathematically wrong own posts content are.

[Hanny]

2 I like to see the proof that Germany decided to quintiple its production of railway rolling stock and that this was successful :FYI Germany had 28630 locs, do you say that it was planning to to produce 112000 locs ?

You'll notice that I don't respond to your posts very often. It's because of stuff like this. I can't believe I have to say this but there's a difference between production (rate) of locos and their total stock.
This abysmal kind of intellectual error has been repeated over and over in this thread - you and Hanny are repeat offenders.
It literally hurts my head to explain this.

The source is DRZW volume 6, pages 880-2.

Asking a question is a valid learning method when presented with a claim that is not supported by your knowledge of the topic. Second as per the forum rules you are entitled to a support cite for the claims, he gave it, but has lied to you.

Note he refuses to answer your question, but posts a cite, if you have that book, you will find he has misrepresented its contents. If you dont here it is online, https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=e9z ... 92&f=false which if you read from before the page he posted from, you will see undermines everything he has written on other matters, and that the pages he used do not support what he posted, he again simply lied to you, whilst claiming others are committing intellectual errors.

[Hanny]

This should be obvious from the fact that Germany implemented a plan to quintuple its production of rolling stock in early 1942. Economic conditions in early 1942 were barely different from in 1940 (indeed in many ways they were worse). The source is DRZW volume 6, pages 880-2.

Except those pages do not do as you claim.

https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=e9z ... 92&f=false


What is being referenced is that by 42 the nazis were looting everything not nailled down in the east, and needed large numbers of rail wagons to transport the those it wanted to exterminate, and using a couple of 000s trains a day to loot the east, the effect of 5000 odd trains on the eastern front, tranfered from the Germany domestic industrial, meant output fell as 25% less volume of coal ect could be moved in 1Q of41, it also had to move a huge increase in fuel demand to where it was being conumed in 2Q of 41,so had to increase the rail locos numbers. In Nov of 41, 130 train wagon loads of winter equipment sat in siddings in Poland, AH chose to send more POL munitions instead, as he could not have both. Also since all fuel stocks had been consumed and the Russians were not defeated, more rolling stock was required to transport oil from Rumania, who doubled its export to over 3 million tons of oil compared to the year before, 1.5 million t for extra oil from Rumania to central Germany had to be imported to make up for the lost SU oil imports that ended when it was invaded. That require rolling stock. Krauch was the man who was responsible for all that planning.

Fuel production in tons aviation
1940 591,200
1941 970,000
1942 1,365,200

Just to move the increased aviation fuel required an extra 33333 fuel wagon jouneys.

German locos/freight in use by year.
Year SLocomotives/Freight Cars
1941 30.011 824.185
1942 32.243 885.906
1943 36.329 973.045

German captured SU of same.
Locomotives acquired/total:
1941=1391/30011
1942=2127/32243
1943=4533/36329


Freight cars acquired/total:
1941=42924/824185
1942=43032/885906
1943=51969/973045

Your x4 production of rolling simply does not exist in that books contents.

[Hanny]

Kurs (School) of Junior Lieutenants (platoon commander) - 6 months - 180 days (infantry). Tankers/gunners/chemists - 9 months. These courses were attended (as a rule) by soldiers and sergeants who showed the appropriate ability and have an education of 7 or 8 classes or more.

In 41/2 Officers were produced from officer training school after a three to seven month course, 2nd lt being the 3 months course. In 42 the first full years cadets graduated, 564,000 newly minted officers and specialist. By 43 there were 310 training schools, by end of war over 2 million had graduated from the schools. During Kursk the Geramans achieved a 4:1 ratio, looks like winning a war of attrition in armour loses, but in SU armour training schools there are 12600 tanks with crews crews awaiting completion of training, by end of years its 18,600. Germany had nothing like that.

What defines the limits of combat value? Say a German division takes 100% casualties in their combat elements- this was reached in various duration within Barbarossa.

I can't think of specific division for which this was true but wouldn't be surprised if, after replacements, some lost 100+% of their rifle strength. But is your question pursuant to an ATL-specific point or just general curiosity?

Given that a Germans expectency of becomming a casualty on the eastern front in 41, 2 months service, and that the majority of those were in rifle coys, which was why ID went from 9 to 6 Bttns, Even Art went down bya third, because industry could not build enough replacemnts and it was not possible to replace them on the EF ata rate they were lost at, because of impossobility to keep numbers up, let alone combat effiecency as a formation lost expert personnel ( experience gained in 39-40 personnel replaced with fresh from replacment army would produce areducced effiecency, for instane efficiency reduced by 20% is 80%, brought up to full strength by fresh trained who for arguments sack half as good as veterans, means the formation is 90% not 100% despite having the same number of personnel) are lost replaced by freshly trained.

Cult Icon has touched on another major flaw of the ATL. Pzrs lost 30% of strength in manoeuvring to combat, 3 such victories and the Div is not functional, just like in OTL, the ATL just makes this reality happen on a larger scale. In OTL 90% of all AFV were gone by Dec 191, resulting in a report by AGS of 30 April 1942 :'Owing to diverse composition, partial lac k of battle experience and gaps in their outfitting, the units available for the summer operation in 1942 will not have the combat effectiveness that could be taken for granted at the beginning of the campaign in the East.The mobile units, too, will not have the flexibility, the endurance, or the penetrating power they had a year ago."

[Hanny]

My ATL takes the flow of new formations during 1941 as set; the lead time for training a new cohort is at least six months so that seems like a reasonable parameter.

Except SU mobolised 14 million reservist on 22 June 1941. Inside 3 months the Divs was sent into action, enough trained manpower from day one to put another 300 Divisions in the field by end of 41, able to be fully replaced by if required with replacments. German Replacment Army in 41,could not to match that. Already your worse at guessing SU mobolization rates than were the OTL Germans. Quite a feat.

As I say elsewhere, Barbarossa caught the SU in transition from peasant backwater to superpower; Germany had a shot at wrecking that transition and nearly did so.

You write a lot of things that have no bassis in reality, this is two further examples of you contradicting the findings of Harrison https://www.amazon.co.uk/Economics-Worl ... /052178503 and Paul Kennedy: "The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to
2000.From the data of Table 4 it can be concluded that in 1938, the USSR was the most rapidly advancing industrial economy (second behind Japan) surpassing all Western economies. According to one source by 1938 the percentages of global industrial production were as follows: USA: 28.7%, USSR: 17.6%, Britain: 9.2%, France: 4.5%, Germany: 13.2%, Italy: 2.9% and Japan: 3.8%

Tooze who you completly misuse is not on your side:
http://ww2history.com/experts/Adam_Tooz ... in_the_war
http://ww2history.com/experts/Adam_Tooz ... W2_so_long

I emphasize better attrition rates against the SU but the point of attrition isn't to "bleed the SU white" in two years.My best estimate of the requirement for 20 divisions right now is 200,000t POL; cutting the LW's budget by 10% seems obviously worth it if - as argued in my operational analysis - those 20 divisions are sufficient to achieve victory for the Ostheer.

Given your inability to use maths to understand historical outcomes, your going to have a hard time with that, especially since it was Germany who was bled out, by Nov 41 the Heers losses meant it was was down to 65 ID and 6 Pzr equivalents of its start strength, as set out in DRZW volume VI, but you did not want to cite that, against a SU that was twice its start strength. Germany had advantages in 41, it just needed to about as twice as good as it was, and thats was beyond the economy to provide or the manpower aviable, 41 saw Germany invade with 15% of German males of mil age, against SU 3% of same, and win, by the time 15% of SU was in the field, Dec 41, the final outcome in the east was settled, only the final cost was yet unknown. But as the DRZW volume VI makes clear, in June 41 there were 134 combat ready formations on the eastern front out of 209, by March 42 it was 8 of 162 and the manpower replacement was all on the side of the SU.

Victory on the eastern front, Germany did not fail to win, ( but could have done better/won if AH had listened, the Wehrmacht was not committing war crimes its all the SS and not use, we only lost because they had the because we were technically superior etc, is the Halder post war narative that has been shown to be wrong since glasnost, and to be without merit, thats your argument) but instead, the Red Army succedded in winning, succeeded because its economy produced more from less, and it had more manpower, but also because it used both better than did Germany.

Fromm head of Germanys replacement Army in Oct 41, said to OKW head, von Brauchitsch, that the manpower shortage was so acute that 'the time had come to make peace proposals to Moscow'.

Stavka (Nov 41 ) calculated that the strength of the Red Army could be raised to 9 million in 1942, allowing for 3 million being taken prisoner and a million dead, there would still be enough men to field 400 divisions and provide 100% replacements, leaving the field army to be 5/6 million strong.


Why should anyone would think your Heer with around 10% less fuel, 12% less ammunition, and LW with less 80% of everything, is going do as well as they did in OTL?, let alone improve on that.

At the most basic you get 150 Divs at 100% of OTL. 15300 score with LW at 100%.
In ATL you get 173 at 90%. 15570 score with LW at 20%.