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Except - this is not a "road trip" from Warsaw directly to Moscow and the answer is absolutely central to the Wehrmacht's failure to reach Moscow.TheMarcksPlan wrote: ↑17 Aug 2019 09:27...which means .93t/km on the road.Paul Lakowski wrote: ↑17 Aug 2019 08:04ROBERT FORCZYK reports VS [Verbrauchssatz] was the standard unit of fuel measured. This was the volume of fuel needed to move the entire division 100km on road , which 125cbm fuel or 93 tons.TheMarcksPlan wrote: ↑17 Aug 2019 01:27Came across figures for 19th PzDiv's POL consumption in liters from June 16 to October 31: 4,222,680 gasoline, 1,013,110 diesel, 200,060 oil. From its war diary as cited by Stahel in Battle of Moscow, pg. 103.
Using 7.5 lbs/gal(imp) density, that's ~4,100 tons. Maybe it'd be 5,000t if we included its share of GTR fuel consumption?
I had settled at 10,000t per extra division earlier in the thread; that's perhaps excessive especially given the earlier conclusion to the fighting.
...which would mean ~900t for the ~1,000km from Bialystok to Moscow.
...which is obviously too low.
...which obviously raises the question of tactical/operational vs. strategic fuel consumption.
...which means this answer is obviously besides the point.
...except insofar as it relates to the extra fuel consumption of moving farther into Russia, but only assuming equal or lesser tactical/op movements.
Jentz has a reported [PANZER TRUPPEN VOL-I pp 208] listing km driven by the units panzers. The rank and file tank was 11,000-12,500km, while the command tanks were only 3200 km. This suggests tactical movement is 3-4 km for every operational km driven.
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Yeah you're right. For some reason I had read your post as purporting to quantify actual campaign fuel burn, which was poor reading by me.Paul Lakowski wrote:Except - this is not a "road trip" from Warsaw directly to Moscow and the answer is absolutely central to the Wehrmacht's failure to reach Moscow.
I remember the command/fighting mileage delta - thanks for the exact cite.
I would guess that the ratio under-represents the operational/tactical fuel burn delta. German command vehicles stayed closer to the fighting troops than merely being in the same operational space...
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...and so on.TheMarcksPlan wrote: ↑04 May 2019 05:10Introductory Post
The lynchpin of this ATL is a slightly more powerful Operation Barbarossa that actually achieves its central strategic goal: destruction of the bulk of the Red Army west of the Dvina-Dniepr line. Contrary to common perception, the Ostheer largely failed at this task: the largest Red Army grouping (Southwest Front) retreated intact – though damaged – from the border battles, as did Southern Front and Northwest Front. Only Army Group Center succeeded.
Operational failure by AGS and AGN enabled Stavka to concentrate its entire first echelon of reserves (16th, 19th, 21st, and 22nd armies plus several mechanized corps) and most of the first wave of newly-mobilized forces against Army Group Center (24th, 28th, 29th, 30th, 31st, 32nd, 33rd, and 43rd armies at least). These forces reconstituted Western Front repeatedly and forced AGC into a costly and prolonged Smolensk battle that disrupted German planning and shook confidence in early victory. Relatively speaking, the Red Army contained AG’s South and North with little reinforcement. See maps from Glantz’s Stumbling Colossus below:
The Ostheer possesses 20 additional divisions (10 panzer and 10 motorized infantry) on June 22, 1941 in this ATL. Using the extra forces, Army Groups North and South encircle and destroy five armies during the Border Battles (up to July 10th) - forces that, in the OTL, impeded their advances for months. During July and August, the stronger AGS destroys the reconstituted Southwest and Southern Fronts without help from AGC; its prisoner haul includes reserves that fought AGC during the OTL Battle of Smolensk. AGN simultaneously advances against weaker opposition to reach Lake Ladoga at Schlusselberg by early August. AGC executes the Smolensk battle with little trouble, sealing the central pocket by July 20th and going over to a relatively peaceful operational pause until early August. During this pause, AGC is reinforced by one of AGN’s PanzerGruppe (6 mobile divisions) and by one of AGS’s mobile corps (2 Pz + 1 Mot.Inf divisions).
On August 6th, AGC launches Operation Typhoon spearheaded by its three PanzerGruppe, encircling nearly half of the Red Army’s standing field forces around Vyazma and Bryansk. After another brief operational pause and further reinforcement by AGS mobile forces, AGC is poised to launch the final assault on Moscow by September 6th with overwhelming force. Stalin is forced to concentrate the bulk of his undertrained new forces to defend the capital. Meanwhile, the month of August sees AGN seal Leningrad's fate by linking up with the Finns on the Svir River via a drive through Tikhvin. AGS completes its destruction of the (slightly-smaller-than OTL) Kiev Kessel during early August, breaks out from its Dnepropretrovsk bridgehead to seize the Donbass in early September, and has cleared the Crimea but for the Sevastopol fortress.
With only ~2 million men at the front in early September – many of them woefully undertrained - the Red Army can perhaps defend the capital if it abandons the fights around Leningrad and the far-eastern Ukraine. But of course Stalin can't accept that option. Leningrad falls with a massive prisoner haul in October, Moscow follows with a bigger haul in November. AGS pushes its weakened foes to the Don and takes Kharkov, Kursk, Voronezh, and Rostov by the onset of the worst weather in early December. Rundstedt is poised for Hitler’s next primary strategic goal of taking the Caucasus.
Rundstedt begins the Caucasus campaign during January, planning to reach Baku by October 1942 unless Soviet collapse enables a quicker advance. AGC and AGN resume their advance in the spring, occupying the Volga basin and cutting off or capturing Murmansk and Archangel in conjunction with the Finns. By early 1943 at the latest, Stalin – should he retain power – will be left with a population of only ~50 million aside from the dubiously loyal Central Asian republics. Perhaps as important, he will have virtually no oil production and only the Vladivostok lifeline to his Western Allies. Japan plans to sever that lifeline as the desperate Red Army rushes forces westward. The USSR will have lost all major agricultural regions, preventing any hope of evacuating most residents of the occupied territories with the retreating armies.
By the spring of 1943, Hitler can dictate harsh terms to the USSR and pivot all of his forces west, or can advance into the Urals and Central Asia with a significantly smaller Ostheer. The repeated Kesselschlacht of ’41 and ’42 have meant the Ostheer faced a much less numerous and competent Red Army after the Border Battles and has suffered far fewer casualties. The Wehrmacht has ~1 million more men at its disposal in May 1943 than in OTL and can spare at least a million more from Ostheer. Peace in the East or not, Hitler has sufficient forces to annihilate any incursion into Europe, a fact the West knows and accepts.
I will articulate this ATL further in following posts but I’m going to do it with unconventional chronology: First, I’ll describe the ATL early battles because this truly is the heart of the project. In subsequent posts I will trace the concept backward and forward in time to explain the following:
The forum is still waiting for "First, I’ll describe the ATL early battles because this truly is the heart of the project."
Across at least 2 threads, TheMarcksPlan had written reams and reams of text. Some of it is creating ever more fantasy to remove the historical impediments to his narrative, some of it clearly is nothing more than diversion and distraction.
Nowhere is there a substansive description of how the early battles would be fought in his fantasy narrative. There is a lot of handwaving stating they would all be a resounding success for the Heer - such as that evidenced in the quote above. There are also demands that other posters do his research and work for him. But no attempt by TheMarcksPlan to substantiate the claims derived from his imaginary Heer and imaginary Red Army.
TheMarcksPlan fantasy natrative is explicitly based around a fantasy Heer. A fantasy Heer that did not exist in reality. A fantasy Heer that he has imagined with greater force numbers, greater personnel numbers, equipment that did not exist, logistic support that did not exist, applying a military strategy opposite to historical reality and performing tactical operations contradicting the historically dominant panzerwaffe doctrine.
Similarly, TheMarcksPlan has a fantasty Red Army opposing the fantasy Heer in his fantasy border battles. This can be teased out from his claim that 600,000 troops of Southwestern Front would be removed from the orbat in the first border encirclement. Historically, there were simply not enough troops present, nowhere near, for that claim to be valid. Moreover, his fantasy narrative timeframe doesn't provide a large enough window for enough troops to arrive in the pocket between 22 June and the fantasy encurclement closing. QED, TheMarcksPlan fantasy narrative is based upon fantasy STAVKA employing a completely different strategy with a completely diffetent deployment of Red Army forces to historical reality.
TheMarcksPlan claims, "...the ATL early battles [are] the heart of the project.". Indeed. Whether it is or is nor possible for the Heer to have more troops, more formations, more equipment, more reseources and logistic support and different doctrine and tactics is completely irrelevant if, even with all those changes and add-ons, there is no credible description of how they succeed.