What if: UK/France/USSR/Poland anti-Hitler alliance in 1939

[Terry Duncan]

About the Allied military Mission to Moscow in August 1939 , the late historian Derek Watson wrote the following in Europe- Studies
" Molotov's Apprenticeship in foreign affairs.The Triple Alliance negociations in 1939 ''
''The Western Powers believed that wat still could be avoided and that, if it came, the USSR,........,could not function as a main military participant .''
If the USSR could not function as a main military participant in wartime, it would also useless as a deterrent to Germany to prevent war ,and thus ,negociations were a wast of time,and were not serious, but only appeatance .

Can you remind me how many aircraft and tanks the Red Army had at this time? Was it not somewhere close to as many as the rest of the world combined? It is, of course, possible that Watson could be wrong.

And if the negotiations were serious, Britain and France would have sent high ranked military, and not an admiral (Drax ) and a second rang general (Doumenc ) .

They should have sent high ranked military, but somehow Admiral Drax doesn't count? You seem to have a slim grasp on reality as Drax was a fairly important man at this time. The thing that put the Soviets off was that the delegation was sent by ship and they believed the delegation did not have the power to commit to things - something that would have applied to almost anyone sent from a western government.

Watson said also the following :the USSR had little faith......either that war could be avoided or in the Polish army .

Given this, would you say it was better to have allies or to have no allies?

This also proves that the talks in Moscow were only for domestic use ,a reply to the triumvirate of Lloyd George, Churchill and Attlee, the enemies of Chamberlain who wanted an alliance with the USSR .

Lloyd-George and Churchill had ceased being friendly many years before, and the former was known to somewhat pro-German whilst the latter was very much anti-German by 1939. Churchill was also quite friendly with Chamberlain, and when PM had intended that he run the war whilst Chamberlain took control of the home front aspects of the war, being unaware Chamberlain was quite so ill, and very much upset when he died.

The truth was, and Chamberlain knew it , that only a military alliance between the USSR and Poland could prevent war, and that if there was such an alliance, there would be automatically an alliance of France- Britain and the USSR .
There was nothing that Britain and France could do to prevent a war,they could only bluf.

Ok, please prove that Chamberlain thought in such a manner as you claim. Direct citations would be most useful.

It is worth noting that Chamberlain laid the foundations for the rearmament programs that served Britain so well in WWII and that in September 1939 he seems to have disproved your claim about bluff when he declared war, not even synchronizing it with the French for security. If Chamberlain believed he was bluffing why did he declare war?

Many of your claims run counter to what I would consider fairly common knowledge on this subject, so it really is up to you to support them as requested.

[MarkN]

Back to the original question posed: What if: UK/France/USSR/Poland anti-Hitler alliance in 1939

I'd argue there are two ways to look at this question.

First, what difference to history is likely to have been seen if Britain, France and Russia acted with a single voice. In otherwords, if Moscow joined in with a guarantee in March 1939. This is what the British and French would have preferred.

Second, what would the likely outcome be of a more formal military alliance, such as the one proposed by Moscow in August 1939.

Both assume that the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact doesn't happen - which is probably the biggest factor in determining how and when various events happen.

To the former, l'd suggest Hitler would have taken a lot longer to make up his mind what to do and when. The threat of going to war with the Red Army over Poland is a serious risk. And a risk to be undertaken in this alternate history without the military experience of first dealing with the west and knowing what the Heer are capable of.

But we cannot escape the reality that Hitler's ideology and designs on marching east are not flash in the pan. They were deep rooted and were going to be executed at some point. At this point of divergence in history l bow out. I see little value in trying to guestimate when and under what conditions Hitler would have given the order. I'm only comfortable opining that WW2 was going to happen along lines similar to how it actually played out. Just the initial moves and timelines being a bit different.

As to the latter view, it is my opinion that the Russian proposal had nothing to do with protecting Poland, deterring Germany or preventing war per se. It smells to me entirely of a Communist Muskovy attempt to trick Britain and France into supporting their territorial ambitions. Feeding the bear in such a manner is not going to to change the onset of WW2 into a damp squib and 20 million souls saved. Again, whilst it just changes the dynamics of the initial moves, it wouldn't prevent WW2 breaking out. Again, l bow out at this stage as l see no value in trying to argue whether the Nazis or Communist Muskovy get the first genocide in, who kills the most etc etc. However, it is my opinion that the consequences of this would have been infinitely more significant than the former. I, for one, would look back on this alternate history with a completely different perspective. Britain and France politically and militarily supporting Russian territorial expansion is not a minor irrelevancy to be brushed under the carpet.

Hitler was set on expanding Lebensraum in the east.

Communist Muskovy was set on returning the Baltics, some or all of Poland, some or all of Finland, some or all of Romania back to their control.

The collision was inevitable.

The timing of that collision was probably delayed by the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. An agreement that allowed the Germans to attack Poland comfortable in the knowledge that they would not have to go to war with the Red Army. An agreement that allowed Communist Muskovy to march into eastern Poland and gave them a free hand in the Baltics and the opportunity to attack Finland. The pair conspired to carve up, occupy and oppress the people's of eastern Europe.

It also gave Muskovy one other thing which is hardly ever mentionned. By conspiring to allow Germany to attack Poland, the likely outcome was a subsequent Germany v Britain/France conflagration. Remember the guarantees offered and historically honoured? That too played perfectly into Muskovy's hands. Unfortunately for Muskovy, Germany didn't weaken itself against France and leave itself open to an attack in the rear.....

Germany wanted to attack Poland. Muskovy gave it a free hand for very selfish reasons of its own. Muskovy understood war was inevitable and believed the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact would give them a significant advantage. The wanted Germany at war with Britain and France.

I believe the above does not require to be evidenced as it is based upon commonly known historically realities. The latter opinion about Muskovy intentions going into the Pact are all my own thoughts which others may find common ground with or may not.

[ljadw]

That Chamberlain was bluffing did not mean that he would not declare war .Chamberlain declared war because the public opinion forced him, otherwise he would not declare war . If there was no DOW on September 3, Chamberlain was out as PM .
I know that Chamberlain laid the foundations for Britain's rearmament, but British rearmament was defensive,it had as aim to protect Britain against an improbable German air attack, it had as aim to protect the communications with the Empire, it had as aim to protect the Dominions, but it had not as aim to intervene on the continent : the rearmament resulted in 2 ID, while there were 6 in 1914 .The rearmament had not as aim to protect Poland ; in 1925 Austen Chamberlain said that no British government would risk the bones of a British grenadier for the Polish Corridor and he supported German territorial revisionism in Eastern Europe ,as long it would happen without war . Halifax said the same in November 1937 .
Britain had not the intention and not the forces to intervene in Eastern Europe .
What most people today are unable to understand is that Britain did not fight for Poland or the statu quo in Eastern Europe , but for a principle : the principle that a country could not start a war against another country. After 1918,starting a war was a crime for the British public opinion ,it was not so before 1914 .
Britain had 2 divisions, with that force it could not and not the intention to help Poland . It could only threaten Germany ,and Hitler was not impressed, as he knew that Britain had only 2 divisions .
In 1938 Chamberlain wrote in a letter to his sister Ida : there is nothing we can do to help CZ, unless starting a war of revenge which will ruin Europe.
A year later the situation remained the same .

[MarkN]

That Chamberlain was bluffing did not mean that he would not declare war .Chamberlain declared war because the public opinion forced him, otherwise he would not declare war . If there was no DOW on September 3, Chamberlain was out as PM .
I know that Chamberlain laid the foundations for Britain's rearmament, but British rearmament was defensive,it had as aim to protect Britain against an improbable German air attack, it had as aim to protect the communications with the Empire, it had as aim to protect the Dominions, but it had not as aim to intervene on the continent : the rearmament resulted in 2 ID, while there were 6 in 1914 .The rearmament had not as aim to protect Poland ; in 1925 Austen Chamberlain said that no British government would risk the bones of a British grenadier for the Polish Corridor and he supported German territorial revisionism in Eastern Europe ,as long it would happen without war . Halifax said the same in November 1937 .
Britain had not the intention and not the forces to intervene in Eastern Europe .
What most people today are unable to understand is that Britain did not fight for Poland or the statu quo in Eastern Europe , but for a principle : the principle that a country could not start a war against another country. After 1918,starting a war was a crime for the British public opinion ,it was not so before 1914 .
Britain had 2 divisions, with that force it could not and not the intention to help Poland . It could only threaten Germany ,and Hitler was not impressed, as he knew that Britain had only 2 divisions .
In 1938 Chamberlain wrote in a letter to his sister Ida : there is nothing we can do to help CZ, unless starting a war of revenge which will ruin Europe.
A year later the situation remained the same .

Very, very little of that accords with what is commonly understood to be historical reality.

[Terry Duncan]

What most people today are unable to understand is that Britain did not fight for Poland or the statu quo in Eastern Europe , but for a principle : the principle that a country could not start a war against another country. After 1918,starting a war was a crime for the British public opinion ,it was not so before 1914 .

I am not sure where you get your information, but if pressed, most people in the UK would likely say that Britain went to war because Hitler attacked Poland, not to support Poland as such. If you asked what the principle was behind the war, most would say it was to stop large nations attacking small nations without consequences. Sadly there was no support for war over the Sudetenland (Chamberlain did ask but only New Zealand was up for supporting such a war, and it was almost universally unpopular with the people) or the rest of the Czech lands, but after that annexation, any further move by Hitler would have seen war. Almost nobody would say that Britain went to war to save Poland.

[Terry Duncan]

Very, very little of that accords with what is commonly understood to be historical reality.

MarkN. Try to not comment on the nature of the posts but rather address the 'points' contained within them. Whilst I agree that the contents are, to say the least, 'unorthodox', it is best to respond with rebuttals where possible (and yes I was not sure where to start either!). As to what ljadw believes to be correct, we can only ask for supporting evidence and sources.

[MarkN]

Very, very little of that accords with what is commonly understood to be historical reality.

MarkN. Try to not comment on the nature of the posts but rather address the 'points' contained within them. Whilst I agree that the contents are, to say the least, 'unorthodox', it is best to respond with rebuttals where possible .....

In ljadw's case that is a complete and utter waste of time. Moreover, it normally only serves to provide a platform for even more garbage to be aired. The post you refer to is a perfect example of that: a comlete load of nonsense thrown back at your attempt to politely and seriously rebut his/her previous dose of nonsense.

As to what ljadw believes to be correct, we can only ask for supporting evidence and sources.

Which, at best, is only ever going to be something tangental that has still needed to be twisted out of all sensible recognition. In other words, useless. Again, just look at his last evidence as an example:

About the Allied military Mission to Moscow in August 1939 , the late historian Derek Watson wrote the following in Europe- Studies
" Molotov's Apprenticeship in foreign affairs.The Triple Alliance negociations in 1939 ''
''The Western Powers believed that wat still could be avoided and that, if it came, the USSR,........,could not function as a main military participant .''
If the USSR could not function as a main military participant in wartime, it would also useless as a deterrent to Germany to prevent war ,and thus ,negociations were a wast of time,and were not serious, but only appeatance .
And if the negotiations were serious, Britain and France would have sent high ranked military, and not an admiral (Drax ) and a second rang general (Doumenc ) .
Watson said also the following :the USSR had little faith......either that war could be avoided or in the Polish army .

Watson writes one thing. ljadw twists into into something else. Then uses his/her invented twist to evidence the nonsense.

From the same post.

An other historian ( Michael Carley ) wrote the following in The Anglo-Franco-Soviet Alliance that never was and the unpublished British White Paper 1939-1940
"In a meeting with Maisky ,Halifax said : " The Poles oppose the participation of the USSR in any kind of general combination with them . ''
This also proves that the talks in Moscow were only for domestic use ,a reply to the triumvirate of Lloyd George, Churchill and Attlee, the enemies of Chamberlain who wanted an alliance with the USSR .
The truth was, and Chamberlain knew it , that only a military alliance between the USSR and Poland could prevent war, and that if there was such an alliance, there would be automatically an alliance of France- Britain and the USSR .
There was nothing that Britain and France could do to prevent a war,they could only bluf.
Stalin also knew it and both sides played a comedia dell''arte and both had no intention to negotiate seriously .

Carey writes one thing, ljadw then uses the quote claiming it's proof of something completely different. How does the Poles opposing USSR participation prove that the talks were arranged by Chamberlain for domestic consumption???? And then the floodgates open....

Serious, honest historical discussion is impossible with this poster as he/she does not take history seriously.

[Terry Duncan]

All I can say is that whilst I am trying to get the thread back on track, it is also under the eyes of more senior staff, and as this is not my board my powers are limited here whereas theirs are not, so if they feel someone is deliberately trying to sabotage the thread, the appropriate action will be taken.

[TheMarcksPlan]

In otherwords, if Moscow joined in with a guarantee in March 1939. This is what the British and French would have preferred.

This is what the West would have preferred of course, but the West was not willing to face reality and/or pay the price for what it wanted: There was NO WAY for the west to dictate the unfettered freedom of Eastern Europe without either Germany or Russia/SU having a say. They had to choose between Hitler and Stalin to some extent between the Oder and Dvina; instead they tried to pretend they didn't have to choose.

Britain and France, two countries who even for years after the WW2 would kill thousands of innocent people to maintain control over their colonies, were aghast with moral self-righteousness about giving in to Stalin's westward demands. Stalin was absolutely right in ridiculing France/UK for suddenly caring when white people faced foreign domination. None of this is to say that Stalin was a good guy, let alone Hitler. But the moral naivete of some views of this period of history ("The Good War" view) is frightening.

The moral hypocrisy is one thing - every one is a hypocrite to some extent. What's worse is moral self-righteousness that underlies strategic blindness and makes things worse for those to be protected under the claimed moral vision.

[ljadw]

Very, very little of that accords with what is commonly understood to be historical reality.

MarkN. Try to not comment on the nature of the posts but rather address the 'points' contained within them. Whilst I agree that the contents are, to say the least, 'unorthodox', it is best to respond with rebuttals where possible .....

In ljadw's case that is a complete and utter waste of time. Moreover, it normally only serves to provide a platform for even more garbage to be aired. The post you refer to is a perfect example of that: a comlete load of nonsense thrown back at your attempt to politely and seriously rebut his/her previous dose of nonsense.

As to what ljadw believes to be correct, we can only ask for supporting evidence and sources.

Which, at best, is only ever going to be something tangental that has still needed to be twisted out of all sensible recognition. In other words, useless. Again, just look at his last evidence as an example:

About the Allied military Mission to Moscow in August 1939 , the late historian Derek Watson wrote the following in Europe- Studies
" Molotov's Apprenticeship in foreign affairs.The Triple Alliance negociations in 1939 ''
''The Western Powers believed that wat still could be avoided and that, if it came, the USSR,........,could not function as a main military participant .''
If the USSR could not function as a main military participant in wartime, it would also useless as a deterrent to Germany to prevent war ,and thus ,negociations were a wast of time,and were not serious, but only appeatance .
And if the negotiations were serious, Britain and France would have sent high ranked military, and not an admiral (Drax ) and a second rang general (Doumenc ) .
Watson said also the following :the USSR had little faith......either that war could be avoided or in the Polish army .

Watson writes one thing. ljadw twists into into something else. Then uses his/her invented twist to evidence the nonsense.

From the same post.

An other historian ( Michael Carley ) wrote the following in The Anglo-Franco-Soviet Alliance that never was and the unpublished British White Paper 1939-1940
"In a meeting with Maisky ,Halifax said : " The Poles oppose the participation of the USSR in any kind of general combination with them . ''
This also proves that the talks in Moscow were only for domestic use ,a reply to the triumvirate of Lloyd George, Churchill and Attlee, the enemies of Chamberlain who wanted an alliance with the USSR .
The truth was, and Chamberlain knew it , that only a military alliance between the USSR and Poland could prevent war, and that if there was such an alliance, there would be automatically an alliance of France- Britain and the USSR .
There was nothing that Britain and France could do to prevent a war,they could only bluf.
Stalin also knew it and both sides played a comedia dell''arte and both had no intention to negotiate seriously .

Carey writes one thing, ljadw then uses the quote claiming it's proof of something completely different. How does the Poles opposing USSR participation prove that the talks were arranged by Chamberlain for domestic consumption???? And then the floodgates open....

Serious, honest historical discussion is impossible with this poster as he/she does not take history seriously.

Halifax knew that Poland would oppose any form of collaboration with the SU, thus that negociations with the SU for an intervention of the Red Army in Poland in case of a German attack,were useless . Notwithstanding this, Britain did send a military delegation to Moscow.
The only logical conclusion is that the reason was political, as elections were scheduled for November 1939 .
There was another theoretical possibility to prevent war : to station in peacetime French, British and Soviet forces in Poland. This would indicate to Hitler that France, Britain and the USSR were serious . But, as this was never contemplated and never done , it proves that it was in reality impossible .

[ljadw]

About the triumvirate Churchill, Lloyd George, Attlee :
On April 3 1939 Churchill said in the Commons : ''......The worst folly,....,would be to chill and drive away any natural co-operation which Soviet Russia in her own deep interests feels it necessary to afford .''
Lloyd George said : ''...Russia is the only country whose arms can get there .....If Russia has not been brought into this matter because of certain feelings the Poles have that they do not want the Russians there,it is for us to declare the conditions,and unless the Poles are prepared to accept the only conditions with which we can successfully help them, the responsibility must be theirs . ''
Source : Origins of the SEcond World War (A.Taylor ) PP 276-277 .
And about the fact that the reason for the mission to Moscow was domestic, Taylor writes the following on P 277 :

''This criticism by the opposition pushed Chamberlain towards negotiation with Moscow,but at the same time it increased his reluctance .The British government would be discredited either way,whatever the outcome .If the negotiations failed, they would be blamed;if they succeeded, Churchill, Lloyd George and the Labour party would be vindicated .''
'' The British were guaranteeing the rights of small nations.How then could they override Polish objections to being involved with Soviet Russia ? ''

The only who could prevent war and if there was war could help Poland were the Soviets, but their intervention depended on the Poles . And even if Poland consented, the Soviets would not intervene .
On P 278 Taylor writes the following :
''The British government were striving to preserve the peace of Europe, not to win a war . ''
And on P 280 '' If British diplomacy seriously aspired to alliance with Soviet Russia in 1939,then the negotiations towards this end were the most incompetent transactions since Lord North lost the American colonies .''
Britain asked Soviet assistance if a neighbour of the SU was attacked ( Neighbour means Poland ).The Soviets asked British help if they felt threatened by Germany, Poland, Romania, etc ...
It is obvious that an agreement was impossible and that the negotiations were only appearance .Thus not real .

[Hanny]

Soviet author of what? Your writing is very difficult to read.

Firstly, sorry for delay in repsonse i had my appendix out and have just returned home, unlike you i bothered to look at the books source for the point you wanted to make and quoted the source. Why i botherd when the book you linked contains "Stalin’s spies also told himthat German war games had revealed to the German general staffthe logistical problems of waging a prolonged war against the Soviets, and, in parallel, he ordered that Hitler’s military attachébe taken deep into the Soviet rear to be shown the mass production of T-34 tanks" it thus bothers me, as the war games envisaged winning in 3 months, and were designed to avoid a prolonged war, and there is again no record in the Germans records of knowledge the existence of the T34, and you link has them in mass production before production even started, thats just two examples of re writting history to make stalin look good.

Your linked book is full of such ex post fact reasoning ( long war) and inacurate details, but is perhaps typical of the state of current russian views on ww2 as say compared to a the great patriotic war as their version of ww2. progress of a sort i suppose.

Here's what Chamberlain wrote to his sister in a letter dated July 2, 1939:

Chamberlain was also extremely, and publicly, critical of the USSR during negotiations. He appears to have negotiated with Stalin mainly for domestic political purposes and without serious intent to see a deal reached.

In June, 1939, a public opinion poll showed that 84 per cent of the British public favoured an Anglo-French-Soviet military alliance.

NC "I must confess to the most profound distrust of Russia. I have no belief whatever in her ability to maintain an effective offensive, even if she wanted to. And I distrust her motives, which seem to me to have little connection with our ideas of liberty, and to be concerned only with getting everyone else by the ears."

He was right to be worried, stalin was also talking with Hitler, resulting with their economic pact, and Stalin thought when NC allowed AH to take sudentaland, UK and Germany had agreed to let AH expand now to the east unopposed by the west, so expecting a war he carved up Poland to gain space, because in war space is also time. So Molotov in and friends with AH, and now Stalin hopes AH will now strike West not east.

[Hanny]

This is why the boards has become a haven for revisionist, it has allowed this poster and others to post factually incorrect posts without comment, when people respond with indignation they instead are penalised.

That Chamberlain was bluffing did not mean that he would not declare war .Chamberlain declared war because the public opinion forced him, otherwise he would not declare war . If there was no DOW on September 3, Chamberlain was out as PM .

UK public opinion did not force the PM to declare war.

https://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/w ... t-in-1938/
Public opinion in 1938 seemed reasonably in favour of Neville Chamberlain and what was later to be termed appeasement when he returned with “peace in our time” after the September 1938 Munich Agreement. Opinion polls appear to show that the majority of the nation was in support of the stance taken by Chamberlain.


“Should Britain promise assistance to Czechoslovakia if Germany acts as it did towards Austria?” (Asked March 1938)


Yes: 33%
No: 43%
No opinion: 24%

“Hitler says that he has no more territorial ambitions in Europe. Do you believe him?” (Asked October 1938)

Yes: 7%
No: 93%

“Which of these views comes closest to your views of Chamberlain’s policy of appeasement?” (Asked February 1939)

It is a policy that will ultimately lead to a lasting peace in Europe: 28%
It will keep us out of war until we have time to rearm: 46%
It is bringing war nearer by whetting the appetite of the dictators: 24%
No opinion: 2%
Is the British government right in following a policy giving guarantees to preserve the independence of small European states? (Asked April 1939)

Yes: 83%
No: 17%


In autumn 1938 Fighter Command had just 25 squadrons, mostly made up of obsolete biplanes. By the eve of the Battle of Britain, there were 58, most of them Spitfires and Hurricanes. Denis Webb, a manager at the Supermarine company that built the Spitfire, wrote, “Chamberlain’s despised scrap of paper gave us a good return".

As NC wrote to his sister Ida in July 1940: “If I am personally responsible for deficiencies in tanks and guns, I must equally be responsible for the efficiency of the RAF.”

I know that Chamberlain laid the foundations for Britain's rearmament, but British rearmament was defensive,it had as aim to protect Britain against an improbable German air attack, it had as aim to protect the communications with the Empire, it had as aim to protect the Dominions, but it had not as aim to intervene on the continent

No one wins a war by only defending. UK expected and planned to deal with millions of civilian losses from airial bombing of urban areas if war came. Rearmament in the 30s began under NC here are selected point from the UK Official history for the period.https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/UK/ ... ion-2.html

Prioity was army last except in munition capacity, first was air power and then navy.

34 to 39 Army Budget 157 million. Navy 261 Million. RAF 250 million.

Uk trained skilled aircraft production operatives at 8% a year, giving it 180,000 and an output greater than Germany when war came, it created at the time the worlds largest aircraft factory to produce fighters, it was chamberlain who broke the trenchard bomber will always get through mind set of the RAF, and deterrence of Germany from a large bomber force will prevent war was replaced. NC from 34 won the war with RAF over what kind of RAF it would be and allocated the infrastructure to be in place to create its eventual size. That improbable German air attack, a pre requisite for invasion of the Uk was a real thing and was prevented by FC because it had RADAR pushed by NC, modern fighters and ground to air control systems. BC as an offensive deterant force was also present.

The Navy Of the two million tons of effective strength of the Navy at the end of 1938 about a quarter had either been newly built or brought up to date since 1935. By the end of 1938 some 545,000 tons of naval vessels were under construction and some 125,000 tons were in the process of being modernised and refitted.

At the end of 1918 armour was being produced at the rate of 44,000 tons per annum, and the five firms producing it were capable of turning out as much as 60,000 tons. As a result of the Washington Treaty, however, only three armour-making firms stayed in the business and the total capacity in the country fell to about 3,500 tons. This was just enough for such naval construction as went on between 1925 and 1931, but after 1931 a steep rise in requirements appeared probable (the official expectation was that under the new treaties new battleships might again come into the naval programme) and to meet it the Admiralty had to subsidise the erection of new armour-making plant in a number of steel-making plants for an additional 18,000 tons. Yet even this addition was insufficient to meet the needs and requirements of the 'D.R.C.' programme of 1935.65 Under that programme it was estimated that requirements would rise from some 22,000 tons in 1936 to about 42,000 tons in 1939. The Admiralty therefore instigated a number of further extensions in armour-making capacity in June 1936, and when these proved insufficient, still further additions in 1938. At the same time over 12,500 tons were purchased in Czechoslovakia.

All these schemes, needless to say, took a long time to mature. By the end of 1937 even the first of the additions, that of 18,000 tons, was not yet available in full; some of the capacity sanctioned in 1938 was not full in operation until well into the war; and of the Czechoslovak order only 10,000 tons had been delivered by the time war broke out. Yet by 1939 the supply position had greatly eased off. The shortages elsewhere, above all in gun mountings and fire control gear, were delaying construction to an extent which made it possible to scale down the demand for armour. In fact potential capacity was now much beyond the current need at its reduced level. The capacity available by mid-1938 could in wartime be worked up to about 62,000 tons per annum, and this was expected to cover the larger part of wartime demands as then envisaged.

: the rearmament resulted in 2 ID, while there were 6 in 1914 .The rearmament had not as aim to protect Poland ; in 1925 Austen Chamberlain said that no British government would risk the bones of a British grenadier for the Polish Corridor and he supported German territorial revisionism in Eastern Europe ,as long it would happen without war . Halifax said the same in November 1937 .

Austen Chamberlain won the nobel peace prize for preventing/averting war between France and Germany in 1925, AH was in jail at the time Nazi party was a fringe political power in Germany.

later he would say in HOP, in resposnse to AH announcing May of 35 he is bringing back conscription.
"If Germany will not join the family of nations, and if, instead of seeking to persuade, she seeks to extort or impose her will, then she will find this country in her path again [cheers] and with this country those great free Commonwealths which centre around it, and she will have met a force which will once again be her master. [Loud cheers.]


http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/cabi ... my%20plans The 2 Regular 4 Terr available to depoly anywhere in the world is what you refering to.


https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/UK/ ... ion-3.html
But Britain undertook to make ready for service wherever required a field army of thirty-two divisions.

This the thirty-two-division programme came into being. It was not formally approved by the Cabinet until 19th April 1939, but a series of measures, all designed to give it effect, were being taken and made public through late March and early April. On the 29th March the Prime Minister ( NC) announced the decision to bring the Territorial Army up to war establishment, and that done, to double its numbers.34 The twenty-six Territorial divisions thus formed, together with the six Regular divisions, made up the complement of the thirty-two-division force agreed with the French.

Britain had not the intention and not the forces to intervene in Eastern Europe .

Uk pre war deterence policy was Trenchrads bombing through BC, it had France and its large army , UK controlled the sea, so was able to get at Germany, it planned to employ 32 Divisions.

What most people today are unable to understand is that Britain did not fight for Poland or the statu quo in Eastern Europe , but for a principle : the principle that a country could not start a war against another country. After 1918,starting a war was a crime for the British public opinion ,it was not so before 1914 .

Fact free, wars of agression being a war crime came at Nurmeburg as a legal principle, general public had no such understanding that wars of aggression were crime in ww1 period. In the summer of 1939, Mass Observation asked interviewees “Do you think we ought to get it over with, or that anything is better than war?” Only two per cent of those questioned were eager for war, 43 per cent wanted to get on with it if it was going to come, but a third still thought that anything else was preferable.

In 1938 Chamberlain wrote in a letter to his sister Ida : there is nothing we can do to help CZ, unless starting a war of revenge which will ruin Europe.
A year later the situation remained the same .

http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/educ ... /source-3/
ranscript

15. The broad conclusions of this Note may be summarized as follows :-

(a) A German absorption of Czechoslovakia will enhance her military prestige, increase her war potential and probably enable her to dispose of stronger land forces against France and ourselves than she can do at present.

(b) So far as air power is concerned, Germany may be able to maintain her lead over the Franco-British Air Forces in air striking power. On the other hand, it is open to us, provided that we make the necessary effort, to catch her up, or at least greatly reduce her lead, in the matter of defence (both active and passive) against air attack. By so doing we shall have heavily insured ourselves against the greatest danger to which we are present exposed: indeed by substantially reducing Germany’s only chance of a rapid decision, we shall have provided a strong deterrent against her making the attempt.

(c) It follows, therefore, that, from the military point of view, time is in our favour, and that, if war with Germany has to come, it would be better to fight her in say 6-12 months’ time, than to accept the present challenge.

By then the RAF doubled in size, the Terr Army doubled in size and received modern equipment and the infrastructure to prosecute a long war was in place and had yet to produce the levels of output it was designed to do, when it did BC flattened Germany from one end to the other, its Army had a munitions advantge of the Germany. https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics ... tprint.pdf

[Terry Duncan]

Halifax knew that Poland would oppose any form of collaboration with the SU, thus that negociations with the SU for an intervention of the Red Army in Poland in case of a German attack,were useless .

Can Germany annex Poland without acquiring a border with the USSR?

The only logical conclusion is that the reason was political, as elections were scheduled for November 1939 .

Does that mean that any agreement reached would somehow not count?

There was another theoretical possibility to prevent war : to station in peacetime French, British and Soviet forces in Poland. This would indicate to Hitler that France, Britain and the USSR were serious . But, as this was never contemplated and never done , it proves that it was in reality impossible .

Maybe because despite the British history of 'half-arsed' military planning at the outset of wars, things like Churchill's WWI idea on taking Borkum, or Fisher's Baltic scheme, had shown that it was impossible to sustain such a force in the face of enemy opposition. If the deterrent failed, any troops deployed in such a manner would be cut off and soon struggling for supplies. Simply telling Hitler he was not going to be allowed to do as he pleased was a sufficient warning, he would either deliberately delude himself into believing nobody would intervene or he would not care if they did.

[Terry Duncan]

This is why the boards has become a haven for revisionist, it has allowed this poster and others to post factually incorrect posts without comment, when people respond with indignation they instead are penalised.

Nobody has been penalised here so far. I am simply trying to keep things inline before senior staff decide to impose sanctions. All I will say is that the situation is under observation. With regards the charge of 'factually incorrect information being posted', I am trying to give people the chance to support their views with some form of evidence, if they refuse to do so then staff action is inevitable. It is important that views can be challenged though, as we may learn why a certain view is held by someone, and we may even come across information we had previously been unaware of. Having said that, it is far from desirable that invented nonsense with nothing to support it be posted as historical fact, and as such is a violation of site rules that senior staff take a very dim view of.