What if: UK/France/USSR/Poland anti-Hitler alliance in 1939

[TheMarcksPlan]

Why i botherd when the book you linked contains "Stalin’s spies also told himthat German war games had revealed to the German general staffthe logistical problems of waging a prolonged war against the Soviets, and, in parallel, he ordered that Hitler’s military attachébe taken deep into the Soviet rear to be shown the mass production of T-34 tanks" it thus bothers me, as the war games envisaged winning in 3 months, and were designed to avoid a prolonged war, and there is again no record in the Germans records of knowledge the existence of the T34, and you link has them in mass production before production even started, thats just two examples of re writting history to make stalin look good.

Everything in the quotes text is true.

Wagner's logistics study had indeed shown the difficulty of deep invasion; this alone should have forced planning a longer war. Problem is that Halder never told Hitler or OKW about the study; he absurdly said the spiritual would have to overcome the material re logistics. Stalin's spies had the right info; they just couldn't know that Halder would be so incompetent as to ignore the info.

Similarly, that Nazi officials saw the t34 factories doesn't mean that upper echelons got wind of it. Everyone was working towards the Fuehrer and he wanted a quick war.

He was right to be worried, stalin was also talking with Hitler, resulting with their economic pact, and Stalin thought when NC allowed AH to take sudentaland, UK and Germany had agreed to let AH expand now to the east unopposed by the west, so expecting a war he carved up Poland to gain space, because in war space is also time. So Molotov in and friends with AH, and now Stalin hopes AH will now strike West not east.

Nonresponsive to the point. The West refused to work with Stalin, said basically our way or the highway. Stalin didn't want to fight Hitler while Britain/France dawdled and felt he had a powerful chip that commanded a price. He was a monster, he was playing cynically to get his best deal, but OF COURSE he was. NC needed to grow the fuck up and deal.

Re politics and public opinion, NC's political ideology was far to the right of the British public on the odiousness of the SU. To say his politics interfered with working with Stalin isn't to say his perception of public opinion interfered. It's to say he was ideologically anti-communist to such an extent that he made a world-historically stupid decision.

[Hanny]

Everything in the quotes text is true.

It claims the T34 mass production was shown to Germans, this is denied by all German accounts. It claims the number of Divisons, amount of tanks and aircraft were given to the allies, yet there are no such records in the allies account of the meeting. If the claims were true then the evidence would be presenht in both sides acounts. They are not, they are only present in modern Russian accounts.

I agree with you that Hitler/OKW had no reason specifically to know of the T34 before Barbarossa; I disagree that there was no reason to up-gun before then. Halder's diary doesn't mention the T34 but it does mention Hitler's apprehension of huge Soviet tanks, almost certainly referring to the KV and other prototypes used against the Finns.

Having already agreed the source used for T34 is incorrect you now change to it being correct.

Wagner's logistics study had indeed shown the difficulty of deep invasion; this alone should have forced planning a longer war.

The book is referring to the Paulus study war games that showed the Heer reaching Moscow quickly, but not being able to be supplied there. Wagners seperate and different study, using twice the size of force levels, was that any attack had to achieve its goals in 3 months to a depth of 300 miles,as by then all supplies would be exhausted and an operational pause of 2 months would be required and another 300 operational bound performed.

Problem is that Halder never told Hitler or OKW about the study; he absurdly said the spiritual would have to overcome the material re logistics.

AH commissioned both studies to be conducted. He ignored the logistical constraints by giving orders to live of the land and decided the war would be won before logistics became a problem.

Nonresponsive to the point. The West refused to work with Stalin, said basically our way or the highway. Stalin didn't want to fight Hitler while Britain/France dawded and felt he had a powerful chip that commanded a price. He was a monster, he was playing cynically to get his best deal, but OF COURSE he was. NC needed to grow the fuck up and deal.

That Stalin was willing to give Germany all it wanted and more in an economic treaty ( the grain amount meant agreed was higher than the harvest and was met by drawing down national stocks) while at the same time offering to join the west against Germany is exactly the point. NC was a grown up and made a deal, with Poland against German aggression. Polands government were grown ups, they chose not to trust stalin but trust the Uk and France instead. UK and France agreed to move against Germany if it invaded poland.

The other point is your wishful thinking ignores, is that Stalin did not have to have Poland mil acess agreement, he just had to publicly, agree to move against Germany if it invaded Poland, along with UK and France, not export all the goods it ended up exporting to Germany, which was vast.Instead like a good communist he invaded Poland to share the joys of communism with them, they have been less than impressed with that, and now over 900,000 live in the Uk.

[Hanny]

About the triumvirate Churchill, Lloyd George, Attlee :
On April 3 1939 Churchill said in the Commons : ''......The worst folly,....,would be to chill and drive away any natural co-operation which Soviet Russia in her own deep interests feels it necessary to afford .''
Lloyd George said : ''...Russia is the only country whose arms can get there .....If Russia has not been brought into this matter because of certain feelings the Poles have that they do not want the Russians there,it is for us to declare the conditions,and unless the Poles are prepared to accept the only conditions with which we can successfully help them, the responsibility must be theirs . ''
Source : Origins of the SEcond World War (A.Taylor ) PP 276-277 .
And about the fact that the reason for the mission to Moscow was domestic, Taylor writes the following on P 277 :

''This criticism by the opposition pushed Chamberlain towards negotiation with Moscow,but at the same time it increased his reluctance .The British government would be discredited either way,whatever the outcome .If the negotiations failed, they would be blamed;if they succeeded, Churchill, Lloyd George and the Labour party would be vindicated .''
'' The British were guaranteeing the rights of small nations.How then could they override Polish objections to being involved with Soviet Russia ? ''

The only who could prevent war and if there was war could help Poland were the Soviets, but their intervention depended on the Poles . And even if Poland consented, the Soviets would not intervene .
On P 278 Taylor writes the following :
''The British government were striving to preserve the peace of Europe, not to win a war . ''
And on P 280 '' If British diplomacy seriously aspired to alliance with Soviet Russia in 1939,then the negotiations towards this end were the most incompetent transactions since Lord North lost the American colonies .''
Britain asked Soviet assistance if a neighbour of the SU was attacked ( Neighbour means Poland ).The Soviets asked British help if they felt threatened by Germany, Poland, Romania, etc ...
It is obvious that an agreement was impossible and that the negotiations were only appearance .Thus not real .

Taylor was not in possession of all the facts, the 30 year rule had not elapsed and he had no access to classified material, hence he had no idea what the diplomatic exchanges were. What he did have is hansard https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hans ... ituation-1 is the records of the speachs you cherry picked from, if you read the debate you will see that no one knew what Russia had offered in the debates. There is no record SU military numbers offered in the de classified political records.

Here something more from churchills speech "When this Parliament met only five divisions were contemplated for the Continent. Then the number was raised to 19, and now it is raised to 32".

"The attitude of His Majesty's Government towards Russia appears to me also to be well conceived. Russia is a ponderous counterpoise in the scale of world peace. We cannot measure the weight of support which may be forthcoming from Soviet Russia".

[MarkN]

The West refused to work with Stalin, said basically our way or the highway.

Quite the contrary. Britain and France were happy to negotiate and find a mutually accwptable approach. They were not, however, stupid enough to simply accept Muskovy's demands. And rightly so.

And please remind us which party called a halt to the discussions and wwho they immediatly crawled into bed with.

[ljadw]

About the triumvirate Churchill, Lloyd George, Attlee :
On April 3 1939 Churchill said in the Commons : ''......The worst folly,....,would be to chill and drive away any natural co-operation which Soviet Russia in her own deep interests feels it necessary to afford .''
Lloyd George said : ''...Russia is the only country whose arms can get there .....If Russia has not been brought into this matter because of certain feelings the Poles have that they do not want the Russians there,it is for us to declare the conditions,and unless the Poles are prepared to accept the only conditions with which we can successfully help them, the responsibility must be theirs . ''
Source : Origins of the SEcond World War (A.Taylor ) PP 276-277 .
And about the fact that the reason for the mission to Moscow was domestic, Taylor writes the following on P 277 :

''This criticism by the opposition pushed Chamberlain towards negotiation with Moscow,but at the same time it increased his reluctance .The British government would be discredited either way,whatever the outcome .If the negotiations failed, they would be blamed;if they succeeded, Churchill, Lloyd George and the Labour party would be vindicated .''
'' The British were guaranteeing the rights of small nations.How then could they override Polish objections to being involved with Soviet Russia ? ''

The only who could prevent war and if there was war could help Poland were the Soviets, but their intervention depended on the Poles . And even if Poland consented, the Soviets would not intervene .
On P 278 Taylor writes the following :
''The British government were striving to preserve the peace of Europe, not to win a war . ''
And on P 280 '' If British diplomacy seriously aspired to alliance with Soviet Russia in 1939,then the negotiations towards this end were the most incompetent transactions since Lord North lost the American colonies .''
Britain asked Soviet assistance if a neighbour of the SU was attacked ( Neighbour means Poland ).The Soviets asked British help if they felt threatened by Germany, Poland, Romania, etc ...
It is obvious that an agreement was impossible and that the negotiations were only appearance .Thus not real .

Taylor was not in possession of all the facts, the 30 year rule had not elapsed and he had no access to classified material, hence he had no idea what the diplomatic exchanges were. What he did have is hansard https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hans ... ituation-1 is the records of the speachs you cherry picked from, if you read the debate you will see that no one knew what Russia had offered in the debates. There is no record SU military numbers offered in the de classified political records.

Here something more from churchills speech "When this Parliament met only five divisions were contemplated for the Continent. Then the number was raised to 19, and now it is raised to 32".

"The attitude of His Majesty's Government towards Russia appears to me also to be well conceived. Russia is a ponderous counterpoise in the scale of world peace. We cannot measure the weight of support which may be forthcoming from Soviet Russia".

I know, but the essence of what he was writing remains unchallenged ;there is no record of the number of divisions the Soviets offered, and there is no proof that they could mobilize 100 divisions .
What was needed was NOT a mission to Moscow, but a mission to Warsaw to ask the Poles if they would accept that the Red Army would enter Poland to help them against Germany . This mission never took place as everyone knew what the Polish answer would be : it would be : NEVER .
As long as Britain and France had no positive answer from Poland, there was no need to go to Moscow .You can't expect Stalin to say : I will go with my army to Warsaw to help Poland against the Germans, when he knew that Poland would shoot on every Soviet soldier who entered Poland . And even if the Polish answer was positive, the answer from Stalin would be negative .
The key was not in Moscow but in Warsaw .

[ljadw]

Why i botherd when the book you linked contains "Stalin’s spies also told himthat German war games had revealed to the German general staffthe logistical problems of waging a prolonged war against the Soviets, and, in parallel, he ordered that Hitler’s military attachébe taken deep into the Soviet rear to be shown the mass production of T-34 tanks" it thus bothers me, as the war games envisaged winning in 3 months, and were designed to avoid a prolonged war, and there is again no record in the Germans records of knowledge the existence of the T34, and you link has them in mass production before production even started, thats just two examples of re writting history to make stalin look good.

Everything in the quotes text is true.

Wagner's logistics study had indeed shown the difficulty of deep invasion; this alone should have forced planning a longer war. Problem is that Halder never told Hitler or OKW about the study; he absurdly said the spiritual would have to overcome the material re logistics. Stalin's spies had the right info; they just couldn't know that Halder would be so incompetent as to ignore the info.

Similarly, that Nazi officials saw the t34 factories doesn't mean that upper echelons got wind of it. Everyone was working towards the Fuehrer and he wanted a quick war.

He was right to be worried, stalin was also talking with Hitler, resulting with their economic pact, and Stalin thought when NC allowed AH to take sudentaland, UK and Germany had agreed to let AH expand now to the east unopposed by the west, so expecting a war he carved up Poland to gain space, because in war space is also time. So Molotov in and friends with AH, and now Stalin hopes AH will now strike West not east.

Nonresponsive to the point. The West refused to work with Stalin, said basically our way or the highway. Stalin didn't want to fight Hitler while Britain/France dawdled and felt he had a powerful chip that commanded a price. He was a monster, he was playing cynically to get his best deal, but OF COURSE he was. NC needed to grow the fuck up and deal.

Re politics and public opinion, NC's political ideology was far to the right of the British public on the odiousness of the SU. To say his politics interfered with working with Stalin isn't to say his perception of public opinion interfered. It's to say he was ideologically anti-communist to such an extent that he made a world-historically stupid decision.

Chamberlain was not an ultra right Tory ; he distrusted the Soviets as did most British politicians .The ultra right Chamberlain did implement a lot of social reforms ,while Winston loathed them .
And the West did not refuse to work with Stalin : it was Poland that refused to work with Stalin .

[MarkN]

From the minutes of the 15 August 1939 meeting, published in 1954, Shaposhnikov proposed:

First alternative
If the aggressor bloc attacks England and France. In this case, the U.S.S.R. will engage a force equal to 70 per cent, of those armed forces which Britain and France will engage directly against Germany. I will explain: for example, if Britain and France deploy directly against Germany 90 infantry divisions, then the U.S.S.R. will deploy 63 infantry divisions, 6 cavalry divisions and a corresponding force of artillery, tanks and aircraft; in round figures, about 2,000,000 men. In this case the support of Poland is considered essential, and this support should be afforded by Poland with all her strength by virtue of the Treaties between that country, France and Great Britain. Poland must concentrate 40-45 divisions of infantry for the main battle on her own Western frontier and against East Prussia. The British and French Governments must obtain from the Polish Government the necessary permission for Soviet troops and Air Forces to move over and operate in her territories in Wilno corridor; and, if possible, permission for them to operate across Lithuania towards the East Prussian frontier; and also, if the situation so demands, for them to operate in Galicia.
...
Second alternative.
If aggression is directed against Poland and Roumania. In this case, Poland and Roumania must employ all their forces to resist the attack. Poland must protect Roumania. Poland and Roumania may be attacked not only by Germany but also by Hungary. Germany can put up to go divisions in the field against Poland. France and Britain must immediately declare war on the aggressor. The U.S.S.R. can only intervene when France and Great Britain have obtained the agreement of Poland, and, if possible, of Lithuania, and also of Roumania, for the rights of passage of Soviet troops through the Wilno Gap, in Galicia, and in Roumania, and also for the operations in these areas. Under these conditions the U.S.S.R. will engage forces equal to ioo per cent. of those armed forces which Britain and France engage directly against Germany. For example, if France and Britain put go infantry divisions into the field against Germany, the U.S.S.R. will put into the field 90 infantry divisions, 12 cavalry divisions and the corresponding ' artillery, aircraft and tanks.
...
Third alternative plan
This alternative which [sic] considers the case when the principal aggressor uses the territory of Finland, Estonia and Latvia, to direct attacks upon the U.S.S.R. In this case France and Britain must immediately declare war against the aggressor or aggressor bloc. Poland, bound by agreement with Britain and France, must enter the war against Germany, and grant rights of passage to Soviet troops through the Wilno Gap and into Galicia, in accordance with agreements which should be reached between the British, French and Polish Governments. I have indicated before that the U.S.S.R. will deploy 120 infantry divisions, 16 cavalry divisions, 5,000 heavy guns and howitzers, 9,000 to 10,000 tanks and 5,500 aircraft. France and Great Britain must, in this case, engage the equivalent of 70 per cent of the forces which the U.S.S.R. will engage; and immediately begin active operations against the principal aggressor.

As long as Britain and France had no positive answer from Poland, there was no need to go to Moscow

That's a very narrow view to take. Negotiations did not have to be limited to having Polandvs aquiecence.

[Terry Duncan]

I know, but the essence of what he was writing remains unchallenged ;there is no record of the number of divisions the Soviets offered, and there is no proof that they could mobilize 100 divisions .

ljadw.

Are you serious? How many did they mobilise in 1941? If I recall correctly, one front numbered more than the German estimate of 170 divisions for the entire Soviet forces! Doesn't reality prove they could mobilise more than 100 divisions?

[ljadw]

That is comparing apples with oranges : in 1941 the Soviets mobilised more than 100 divisions ,fighting a defensive war in their own country .
There is no reason to believe that in 1939 they could mobilise such a force tot start an offensive war to advance to Berlin .
In 1939, the peace strength of the Red Army was 1,3 million men and a lot of them were tied in the Far East,and there were few reserves .
In 1941 the strength was 5, 7 million men with big reserves .
To have 100 mobilised divisions on war strength in 1939, a mass mobilisation would be needed , which would claim not weeks, but months .And Poland would not have months : Poland fought 5 weeks and in these 5 weeks the Soviets could not send 100 divisions .

[MarkN]

The West refused to work with Stalin, said basically our way or the highway.

Quite the contrary. Britain and France were happy to negotiate and find a mutually accwptable approach. They were not, however, stupid enough to simply accept Muskovy's demands. And rightly so.

And please remind us which party called a halt to the discussions and wwho they immediatly crawled into bed with.

Got dates muddled in my head.

The Anglo-French discussions with the Russians only came to an end AFTER the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact!!!

Also, reading the draft agreements proposed by the British and the later French one, they were offering almost everything Muskovy demanded. The key missing element was the right for the Red Army to occupy Poland before war broke put.

A key pointer methinks to Muskovy's real intent.

[MarkN]

That is comparing apples with oranges : in 1941 the Soviets mobilised more than 100 divisions ,fighting a defensive war in their own country .
There is no reason to believe that in 1939 they could mobilise such a force tot start an offensive war to advance to Berlin .
In 1939, the peace strength of the Red Army was 1,3 million men and a lot of them were tied in the Far East,and there were few reserves .
In 1941 the strength was 5, 7 million men with big reserves .
To have 100 mobilised divisions on war strength in 1939, a mass mobilisation would be needed , which would claim not weeks, but months .And Poland would not have months : Poland fought 5 weeks and in these 5 weeks the Soviets could not send 100 divisions .

Would you say Terry Duncan that, since your intervention and your 'engagement strategy', the historical accuracy, the historical relevance, the quality and relevance of the supporting evidence etc etc has improved?

Minutes of the Anglo-French-Soviet discussions, and the accompanying reports, were officially published in 1954. Erickson summarised these discussions in his book "The Soviet High Command" first published in 1962.

Here we are, in 2019, being told two completely different narratives by two separate posters. Are they denying the historical evidence, argueing it is somehow false or deliberately ignoring what does not fit into their preconceived alternate narrative?

[Hanny]

That is comparing apples with oranges : in 1941 the Soviets mobilised more than 100 divisions ,fighting a defensive war in their own country .
There is no reason to believe that in 1939 they could mobilise such a force tot start an offensive war to advance to Berlin .
In 1939, the peace strength of the Red Army was 1,3 million men and a lot of them were tied in the Far East,and there were few reserves .
In 1941 the strength was 5, 7 million men with big reserves .
To have 100 mobilised divisions on war strength in 1939, a mass mobilisation would be needed , which would claim not weeks, but months .And Poland would not have months : Poland fought 5 weeks and in these 5 weeks the Soviets could not send 100 divisions .

http://bcur.org/journals/index.php/Diff ... load/75/60

Under the universal conscription this law established, the size of the Soviet forces exploded, rising from 1.6 million men and 98 divisions in 1939 to 5.3 million men and 303 divisions by mid-1941

[Andy H]

Hi All

Some very interesting facts and non-facts being put forth here.

However, I'm putting a temp lock on the thread just why I do some housekeeping over the next few days.
Several Mods and Hosts have already raised some concerns as to the responses posted by certain members
and I suggest they take a breath before re-posting in this thread when re-opened. If they don't then be surprised
if a ban follows.
Argue with passion, insight and facts, not just opinions or falsehoods because you dislike an answer or worse, the poster.

Regards

Andy H