One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign

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Re: One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign

Post by Huszar666 » 23 May 2022 08:44

Morning,

A lot of stuff I have to answer, please forgive me if I don't use quotes but only bullet points this tim

1, marching speed. It indeed does not make any difference if the Army in question is weak or strong. In contrast to attacking. Marching up to battle (be it pre-war in an allied country or in the war behind the front) could only made with a fixed speed (around 35km a day for Inf, 200km for mot, you can push it up to around 45 and 250km for a time, but no indefinitely, and only where the infrastructure doesn't suck ass. As in Moldova and the SU). I was referring only to marching up to the concentration area pre-war, NOT attacking the soviets after the war broke out.

2, if we talk operations, when and how many German troops could be amassed in Norther Moldova is the most central point. If we limit the concentration to 10 fast and 11 inf divisions (I know, you want to have more, but please let's see what could be made with the original amount), we have these possibilities:
A, depolyment starts only on the 12th June, 5th PzA gets priority. Till the 22th June it would be barely possible to concentrate the Army in the North, the very last division would still need one or two days to arrive and concentrate. The 11th Army's infantry only just begun to leave the Bucharest area, with the first rail-transport Div arriving fully around the 30th at the border.
B, As above, but the starting date is pushed up to the 2nd July. 5th PzA is concentrated fully, from 11th Army there is one Div concentrated, another rail-transported one is starting to concentrate (say, around 2/3 is already present) and a third, marching up on roads is still a couple of days (3-4) away.
C, To have meaningfull Inf forces in the North (be it 22nd June or 2nd July) you indeed have to start sending the divisions North much earlier - around 12th May to have everything there on time. Adding further 3 fast and 2 inf division would push the starting date back by another week, to not later than 5th May. Pushing 20+ divisions through bumper-to-bumper for 40+ days constantly would point everyone that is not blind that something big is up. Do remember, Rumania at that time was still neutral with every last ambassy extant. Sending troops North could not been sold as preparations against Turkey, for that you would need to concentrate in the South or more convincingly in Bulgaria. So for that ruse to work, you would have to send troops to the South, not to the North where the infrastructure was bad. I don't think, it would be impossible to send troops to the North (as instructors, etc) beginning in Mid-May (or even earlier), but that would be a gradual build-up not a massed rush. What would be a convincing amount that could be sold as instructors or border defence? North of Iasi (everything South of that line would not help you concentrate in the North) there were the Mountain Corps, parts of the Cavalry Corps and let's say another Army Corps (with a lot of Rumanian troops still marching up to the front as late as 30th June/2nd July). For less than 10 Divisions you don't need 10 Divisions of "instructors", but around 3 at most (one per corps). Much more and the game is up. I give you even two further for "Border Defence" but that is a bit of a strech. With 5 Divisions already there in Mid-May (or Mid-June), you only have to push 5th PzA (10-13 fast divisions) and the rest of 11th Army (6-8 inf div) through. That would lead us to:
C1: Movement starts only on the 12th June in earnest, kick off date is the 22nd June. You have around 9 fast divisions, plus the 5 inf in the North, the sixth inf still arrives on the 30th or so (or, if you want to have the other three fast divisions, not before the 3rd July)
C2: as above, but kick-off is the 2nd July. See point B, but with further 5 InfDiv. Please note, that if you want to have the further 3 fast ones, they could be barely concentrated, but you would not have any other inf div, just the already present 5. Pushing up the other infantry would still need around three further weeks (so you haven't saved much time by sending troops up North earlier. 10 days at most)
The real problem is the Infantry. They are just too slow to be deployed in a meaningfull timeframe, and with the infrastructure in place in Moldova you don't have much of alternate routes. Putting them on the railway isn't much of a choice either, because a, you would need upwards of two month for the 11 divisions and it would be b, obvious to everyone that you are concentrating in the North against the SU.
1,We agree that 5PG reaching operational freedom north of the Dniestr around Day 5 is plausible.
2, You argue that Soviet Motorized Corps counterattacks would prevent the trap closing in Galicia before SWF escapes, I argue that MC attacks barely slowed Ostheer's fast divisions. Schnelltruppen rapidly disengaged from such tank-tank battles (Dubno, Rassenai), leaving the infantry to fight them while the fast divs rushed on.
3, You question whether 5PG could have advanced 34km/day to reach Shepetivka and link up with PG1 (the required advance rate after crossing the Dniestr on D+5). I argue that 34km/day is an easily achievable rate for Ostheer spearheads in 1941, as the spearheads of AG's N/C advanced ~60km/day during June.
4, You argue that the ground for advance is not suitable for fast operations (did you argue this, or were you referring to deployment only?). I argue that the Second Jassy-Kishinev Offensive shows that massive mechanized forces traversed this ground rapidly during 1944. You respond - for reasons I don't quite understand but please explain - that Soviet movement is somehow different from German.

1, possible, NOT probable. If we go with probable, I would say 7 days, just to be on the safe side
2, could prevent a Kessel. You would need the 11th Army on soviet soil to fight the 5 fast coprs in the rear of 5th PzA, or else they can close the Dniester after 5th PzA sped away, and the soviets can retreat along that river and escape the Kessel
3, 34km/day is the minimum speed to reach Shepitovka in time to close the Kessel (assuming a start on the 22nd, any time later and there would be zero chance for closing it). If reaching freedom of operation in 7 days, the needed daily advance would be around 60km, so it would be a very close thing
4, You misunderstood me there. Moldova is not suitable for a fast deployment, if you want to leave the neighborhood standing. The difference between German deployment in 1941 and a soviet attack in 1944 is manyfold. 1, the soviets did not use only one road (state 11A) to march up to a very narrow geographical region, but attacked from multiple directions on a "broad" front. 2, the soviets did not care about shooting or tearing up enemy territory, they were able to advance cross-country through fields if there was a need. Germany obviously did not want to flatten their ally's territory while moving up. 3, if we only look on main roads for advance, the soviets could use the border road (state 26/24A) and the intermediate road (state 24) for their drive South-West, but Germany could use neither for a deployment to the North

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Re: One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign

Post by Peter89 » 23 May 2022 09:46

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
22 May 2022 12:31
Huszar666 wrote:The Rumanians weren't told because it was feared that the information would get out. The Hungarians weren't told at all, and if I remember correctly, neither were the Italians.
Do you have a source on not telling Romania until June 12? Always curious about this.

Per GSWW v.4's discussion of Hungary (only good source I know - you have access to more in Magyar I'm sure), the Hungarians - at least the army - were eager to get in on Barbarossa. Halder was conducting a side-channel diplomacy trying to get Hitler to agree. Hitler - confident of winning anyway and not valuing the Hungarian Army much - told Halder he didn't want to have to make political concessions to Hungary for their involvement. Peter89 - might you add some Magyar sourcing on this too? It seems getting Hungary in would have been rather easy, but again I have just the one source. Something tells me this might be a touchy subject in Magyar-language sources, though.
Huszar666 wrote:
22 May 2022 15:34
don't really now about Rumania, but Hitler rated them even lower as us, the Italians, Croatians and basically everyone else save slaws. And was probably right in doing so. As he did not inform the Duce - one of his friends - Horthy (who he regarded as a pompous noble of a long gone time), telling Antonescu (who he regarded as slightly better than a cockroach) earlier than absolutely neccessary, I doubt very much. Please note that basically the complete Rumanian Generals Staff (as in all the Generals) were franco- and anglophiles, informing THEM earlier then absolutely needed would probably be equal as handing the operational plan directly to Churchill.
According to Számvéber: A keleti hadszintér és Magyarország, Hitler told Antonescu on the meeting of 12th June, that Germany would not ask for help, but expects that Rumania does everything in its power. I would say, no detailed plans were shared.
As for Hungary, only General Werth (chief of staff) and ambassador Sztójai were pushing for a Hungarian participation, everyone else (government and Horthy) were firmly against it. Werth and sztójai went so far as blatanly lying to everyone, Horthy, Hitler and Halder. Even after Barbarossa commenced and because of the slow progress of the 17th it became urgent for the Germans that Hungary would enter the war (funnyly, only a few weeks back we were even told not to send troops to the Carpathians since that would provoke the soviets) it was dismissed by the responsible people. Only after the bombing of Kassa (26th June) and a few other air attacks was the participation decided. Even so, the Carpathian Group entered Galizia only on the 1st July - one day after the soviet retreat started.
So no, getting Hungary into the war was everything but easy. Remember, we sat out Poland, and only attacked Jugoslawia after Croatia declared independence. We did not want to be dragged into another war, with re-armament starting barely 3 years prior and most of the Army and Airforce having obsolete and too few stuff.
It was some kind of wonder, that we DID enter the war. (funnyly, if we did not enter the war, Germany would have had better cards. No 2nd Army at the Don would mean, for example, that 6th Army would not have the forces to reach Stalingrad :D )
Typical whitewashing and deflection of responsibility.

What actually happened:
- The germanophile Hungarian officiers were informed of the German intentions to use Hungary as a staging ground and to incorporate the country into their logistical network (it was strictly a military, and not a political channel) see DIMK 849.
- Sztójay (the ambassador in Berlin) informed Bárdossy (the PM) and Horthy on the dawn of 22 June about the invasion and that Hitler wrote a letter to Horthy, see DIMK 859., 862.
- This letter contained NO indication from Hitler that he wanted Hungarian participation in the war
- After this, the government sent troops to Subcarpathia, on top of those already stationed there, so the Germans could not have objected this move prior to Barbarossa
- On June 23 Molotov told to Kristóffy (the ambassador in Moscow) that if Hungary stays out of the conflict, Russia will support further Hungarian claims in Transsylvania; this became the famous Kristóffy-telegram, sent to Bárdossy, see DIMK 867.
- The same day, a cabinet meeting was held, on which Bárdossy proposed the termination of diplomatic relationships with the Soviet Union, which the cabinet approved
- On June 24 another cabinet meeting was held, on which Bárdossy put the question of war and peace to a vote: the Ministry of Defence voted FOR the war
- On June 26, two separate air attack happened, one near Tiszaborkút (Subcarpathia) and another against Kassa. The first was clearly a Soviet attack, the second one is debatable, but it wouldn't matter: the political and military elite wanted a casus belli like Kassa, because in the meanwhile, Slovakia declared war on the SU (25 June), Romania was already in war (22 June), thus: the Hungarians had to decide whether they bet on the Germans or the Soviets in order to keep the territorial gains; and they did the former, see Ignác Romsics: Ki bombázta Kassát? (Who bombed Kassa?)
- On June 27 another cabinet meeting was held, where the cabinet approved the motion about the DOW against the Soviet Union
- When Kristóffy handed over the DOW to Molotov, Molotov replied: if there was indeed such an attack, it will be investigated and compensated; let's consider this DOW never happened. Kristóffy wired back to Budapest, but the answer was that an ambassador's job is not to give advice but to obey commands, see Végzetes Esztendők (Fateful Years) p 83.

(DIMK is the rough equivalent of DGFP)

It was not a wonder that Hungary entered into the war, and it was not the Germans who pressed Hungary into the war: it was the Hungarian elite itself. The Soviets tried everything to ameliorate the Hungarian relations, but it didn't matter. In fact, Hungary got back 56 battalion flags on 20 March 1941 by the Soviets, which were held in Russia since the 1848-1849 War of Independence.

Btw, I would like to see a reference which mentions that Hitler regarded Antonescu "slightly better than a cockroach", otherwise it's just a disgusting ethnic slur.

Also, I would like to call into question the impenetrable nature of the Axis allies' intelligence, or that of Germany. Do we have any evidence that would support the claim that the Romanian general staff fed informations to the British? Or that Barbarossa was a secret before Churchill? Or that Romania was more penetrable to Allied intelligence than, let's say, Hungary?
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Re: One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 23 May 2022 10:04

Huszar666 wrote: I was referring only to marching up to the concentration area pre-war, NOT attacking the soviets after the war broke out.
Huszar666 wrote:4, You misunderstood me there. Moldova is not suitable for a fast deployment, if you want to leave the neighborhood standing.
Thanks for clarifying.
Huszar666 wrote:If we limit the concentration to 10 fast and 11 inf divisions (I know, you want to have more, but please let's see what could be made with the original amount)
I'm fine with 21 divs total. The overall reinforcement of AGS (Poland and Romania), is the more critical factor. We can make either wing of the double envelopment stronger. Probably want to keep the ID:mech ratios more similar north and south, so say 13 ID's and 8 fast divs in Romania.

Now we add 5 fast div's to the northern wing. Because we're gunning for a double envelopment instead of whatever Reichenau planned OTL, they're all pushing east from June 22nd - 14 fast divs instead of OTL's 4 (five sat in Poland until June 26 OTL). You raised the concern about highways and Isayev points out in his Dubno book that few Panzerstrasse ran east from AGS's Poland sector. So probably not all cross the border on June 22.

But AGS did not efficiently use its road capacity in late June. Compare AGS's fast div distribution on June 27 to AGC's:

Image

Image

PG2 has 5 fast divs echeloned on one highway; AGS has no more than two. The southern highway - 11PzDiv in Ostrog is farthest along it - has been cut by the Dubno-Brody counterattack. In ATL, my earlier-mentioned southeastwards armored thrust from AGS's salient protects that highway and PG1's right flank, intercepting the Dubno counterattack (if Stavka makes the same move as OTL, which they probably would). Dubno battle happens farther south. On the northern highway (13th Panzer in Rowno), PG1's left flank also hasn't been protected and 14 PzDiv. is fighting for control there. As with the flank protection south of Dubno, here we'd use 1 extra fast div to protect that highway and move other fast divs along it. We should have at least 8 fast divs moving east in echelon, with others on the flanks (to follow once ID's catch up).

So echeloned along the main east-west routes through Volhynia, with their core advance protected on the flanks, PzGr1 could be in Shepetivka and Korzed (next big towns along the route) by June 28. Note that PG1 reaching Shepetivka on June 28 (~210km) means only ~30km/day. PG1 can thrust 90km beyond Shepetivka before hitting the benchmark 300km limit for truck logistical support (and can stretch beyond it with declining supply/effectiveness). Though the OP drew an arrow to Shepetivka, I've always said the linkup could happen farther east such as around Berdichev.

That sets up the following scheme on June 28 (OKH map):

Image

Green is the ATL "front lines." Southern pincer is poised to break out over the Dniestr, northern has advanced as far east as Shepetivka (again, that's conservative). The Dniestr-Shepetivka gap is ~160km, requiring 80km advances by each pincer to close the trap. Even if that takes three days (27km/day), SWF isn't escaping. But we probably also have enough fast divs for an outer encirclement farther east.

There are infinite numbers of ways it could go (depending on RKKA), but if PG1 advances in this manner - if it's stronger and seeking a double envelopment - then closing the trap is straightforward.

What about earlier SWF retreat from June 27? I can't see them getting back further than this (additional green line drawn in):

Image

...and even then they're still screwed. They have to start running on June 24 or so to have any chance of getting out, which doesn't seem feasible (Stalin's still ordering them to take Lublin).
Huszar666 wrote: C1: Movement starts only on the 12th June in earnest, kick off date is the 22nd June. You have around 9 fast divisions, plus the 5 inf in the North, the sixth inf still arrives on the 30th or so (or, if you want to have the other three fast divisions, not before the 3rd July)
This actually seems fine for my plan. We don't need everything north of Iasi on June 22. March most of the ID's and 3 fast divs up there, swing most of the fast divs from south of Iasi through Bessarabia to whichever points on the Dniestr seem promising. As shown in my sketch, we can have several points of armored breakout from the Dniestr and several rings of encirclement northwest of it. All these thrusts are within 300km of the border for the Romanian and northern pincers (that's the benefit of a salient, after all).
Huszar666 wrote:1, possible, NOT probable. If we go with probable, I would say 7 days, just to be on the safe side
June 28th (my sketch map) is the seventh day. Breakout on June 29th - inner encirclement June 30 - outer prong (if necessary) July 2/3.
Huszar666 wrote:2, could prevent a Kessel. You would need the 11th Army on soviet soil to fight the 5 fast coprs in the rear of 5th PzA, or else they can close the Dniester after 5th PzA sped away, and the soviets can retreat along that river and escape the Kessel
No Panzer Group leader would be so incompetent as to leave an infantry-armor gap so wide that SWF could escape through it. Ok, maybe Guderian would be. But Manstein or Reinhardt will command 5PG.


--------------------------------------

Having thought about the detailed design more (thanks again for the opportunity to discuss), PG1's lagging performance looms larger than I initially realized. Having reached only Ostrog by June 28th, it advanced only ~25km/day. I always attributed this to SWF's greater relative strength but that's not necessarily true. Rundstedt/Reichenau held 5 of 9 fast divisions in Poland for the first 5 days. These divisions could have shielded the spearhead's flanks, intercepting counterattacks that in OTL would cut the main highways used by Kleist's weakened eastwards push. A different campaign goal (double envelopment) or even better generalship would have enabled PG1 to advance much faster, which makes a Galician Kessel much easier than I'd previously thought. Indeed, it has me reconsidering HistoryGeek2021's arguments that the pre-Balkans plan for 12th Army would have created such a Kessel.
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Re: One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 23 May 2022 10:44

Peter89 wrote:It was not a wonder that Hungary entered into the war, and it was not the Germans who pressed Hungary into the war
This is certainly the narrative in GSWW, glad to see it matches the Magyar sources. Thanks.
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Re: One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign

Post by Huszar666 » 23 May 2022 18:22

Text deleted due to profanity. Please do not post obscenities here, it is against the rules and will lead to disciplinary actions.

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Re: One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign

Post by Huszar666 » 23 May 2022 18:37

In a (slightly) less pissed state of existence.

If you want to commit troops to Bessarabia, don't do it in half meassures. Finish off 9th Army early on, reach Odessa before 7th August with German troops till, say mid-July, free up the 4th Rumanian Army from the siege, deploy it South of the Dnieper while you assault the Perekop land brige way earlier than Septmber, take Sevastopol already in, say, September.
Let the Galizian Group be destroyed at Uman as in the OTL and the rest East of Kiew.
With Sevastopol in your hand in, say September (and thus the 11th Army being mostly free), the 4th Rumanian Army in a fighting form East of the Dnieper and the 5th PzA at your disposal, you will be able to hold on Rostow and maybe clear the Donbass.

If you are planning a two-year-campaign to begin with, the destruction of the Galizian Group a few weeks earlier is a non-event.

(even a two-year campaign is selling the thing short. To deprive the SU of its industrial and economic base, you will have to take the industrial centers East of the Urals, and that would mean a third year of campaign. At least)

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Re: One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign

Post by Richard Anderson » 23 May 2022 18:53

Huszar666 wrote:
23 May 2022 18:22
OOOOOHHHH. FOR FUCKS SAKE!!!! I LOST A WHOLE BUNCH OF STUFF BECAUSE I TIMED OUT AND DIDN'T SAVE!!!! FUUUUUUUUUUCK!!!!
I haven't even clicked "Submit'" for fucks fuck fucking fuck.
I only spent two hours on writing the shit.
I have found that if you simply resubmit when getting that error message that it will actually post. The other alternative that sometimes works for me is to back arrow on my browser once to get back to the submission and then resubmit. The last option when that error comes up is just highlight all in the post a reply window, control c to copy it all and then paste it into a new window and submit.

Sadly, despite all that it sometimes blows up in your face. :cry:
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Re: One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign

Post by Takao » 23 May 2022 19:59

If you spend longer than 15 minutes on a response...Before submitting, highlight and copy your response text.

That way, if anything goes wrong, you just reload and paste.

Learned that the hard way, as you have.

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Re: One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 23 May 2022 22:28

Husazr666 wrote:the two-prong attack out of Rumania and into Bessarabia is less viable than the original idea of a massed thrust due North.
What I drew up has been the rough idea all along; I've just never shown more than a single arrow pointing north as the broad general idea. With 20+ divisions, it was always going to be impossible to put them at the "peak" of the northern R border. They push to the Dniestr on a ~100mi arc running from south of Iasi. The "two prongs" north of Dniestr could be one or four.

We wouldn't plan the operation along set lines - too much depends on unknowable (future) factors from the German viewpoint. AGC's first "lunge", for example, hadn't resolved where the pincers would close after kickoff. They just knew it was "somewhere east of Poland" and that the broad operational concept was promising due to the Bialystok salient.

Same general concept here. The Galician salient means that even on conservative projections for both advances, AGS is able to seal a pocket somewhere along latitudes between Shepetivka and Berdichev.

My condolences on your loss. Happens to all of us some time. I use a Word document for longer posts.
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Re: One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 23 May 2022 23:44

Huszar666 wrote:502nd PzK, attacking from around Iasi could not REACH the Dniester South of Kamaniets-Podolski before the 2nd July or so
That's not the plan. Let's put it on a map - always easier that way (at least for dumb guys like me).

First let's say our 21 divs are in 7 corps:

3 Mot. Korps ("MK") - 501, 502, 503 MK's
4 Armee Korps ("AK") holding ID's - 601, 602, 603, 604 AK's

Here's a rough sketch of cis-Dniestr operations (thrust orientations only, details subject to roads):

Image

Still only 12 divs north of Iasi.

South of Iasi, 604 AK advances (perhaps with help from neighbors) to set up a blocking position between Prut and Dniestr around Chisinau. The Romanian divisions in the area can advance behind it (they don't even need to fight yet, just move) and then join the blocking position. As needed, 503 MK can help 604 fight its way forward before detaching and heading in a more northerly direction.

603 AK forces the Prut and follows the fast divs through Bessarabia. 602 AK probably helps here too (again, rough sketch and the enemy has a say).

502 & 503 MK's traverse Bessarabia with secure flanks. 501 MK is focused on the northern push, with the option to join 502 and 503 if that doesn't develop promisingly.

Let's keep in mind our "grand-operational" goal here: to enable trans-Dniestr operations from June 28 or so. The above sketch - 6 days for 21 German divisions to move 20-70 miles - remains extremely conservative. In all likelihood a bridgehead over the Dniestr is established within a few days, given OTL patterns, but again we're being conservative.

The goal being reach presents the below operational situation on June 28, which is impossible for SWF to escape:

Image
Huszar666 wrote:Finish off 9th Army early on,
Most of 9A is probably going to be diced up and destroyed in these operations on the way to the Dniestr. Because we're already assuming 7 days to advance 20-70 miles, that leaves plenty of time for tactical-size (~division) pockets to be created and liquidated during the cis-Dniestr advance.
Huszar666 wrote:If you are planning a two-year-campaign to begin with, the destruction of the Galizian Group a few weeks earlier is a non-event.
Path dependence... The strategic significance of the early Kessel is discussed extensively early in this thread.
Huszar666 wrote:(even a two-year campaign is selling the thing short. To deprive the SU of its industrial and economic base, you will have to take the industrial centers East of the Urals, and that would mean a third year of campaign.
AGC takes Gorkiy by December. The Central Urals are <1,000km east - closer to Gorkiy than is the 1941 border. Ostheer takes the Central Urals in Fall '42. They're not really mountains - worn down into hills - and they hold most of the remaining Soviet industry. That's game over for the SU as a significant factor, even if Stalin wants to be stubborn and fight on from Siberia (he probably won't though).

----------------------------------------------------

One of the benefits of a cis-Dniestr offensive that doesn't only/immediately head due north: You create the predicate for the Galician Kessel without telegraphing strategic intent. With >20 German divisions heading east/northeast, Stavka will fear - and must prepare for - a German dash across Southern Ukraine and to Odessa (as recommended by Huszar). This renders successful SWF escape from Galicia even less likely.

To amplify this strategic misdirection, I might suggest an additional German infantry corps added farther south of 604 AK on the above map (604 in red). This could come from elsewhere (we still haven't shifted everything available to Ostheer) or from AGS in Poland (which has +5 fast divisions to replace them and +10 on June 22). As we've used only 12 of the 19 ID's suitable for Barbarossa, it could be 2 more AK's. With this added thrust - even if weak - it looks to Stavka like a general offensive towards Odessa. Indeed, if things well up north (501 MK seizes a bridgehead quickly, meets up with PG1 rapidly to close the Galician Kessel), then OKH has the opportunity to make it so: turn 502 and 503 MK's east with the infantry following (inc. Romanian), take Odessa and environs rapidly.

This aligns with a big strategic goal - grabbing Ukrainian food before evacuations - that I discussed above.

In addition, the likely destruction of Soviet 9th Army by the cis-Dniestr offensive is something I hadn't pondered prior to now. That rips a hole in the Soviet OoB, mandating Stavka transfer reserves to Southern Front, which weakens SWF's resistance to Kleist's pincer (and/or helps AGC).
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Re: One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 24 May 2022 03:55

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
23 May 2022 23:44
To amplify this strategic misdirection, I might suggest an additional German infantry corps
Like this:

Image

...again this looks to Stavka - for at least several days - like a general offensive aiming beyond the Dniestr to Odessa and the rest of Ukraine. German strategic/operational intent to pivot north and encircle SWF is by no means clear.

For the Germans it creates an upside of doing both: (1) destroy SWF via a more rapid PG1 advance acting as a "hammer" on the "anvil" of a northerly advance from Romania that need not go far over the Dniepr (and therefore need employ <half of PG5), then (2) pivot most of PG5 eastwards to overrun Transnistria and isolate/capture Odessa. I won't rely on the upside case for my ATL but it's there.
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Huszar666
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Re: One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign

Post by Huszar666 » 01 Jun 2022 16:56

Sorry for the later reply, had no time last week. Will study your idea and will come back to it. Probably on the weekend or so.

Peter89
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Re: One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign

Post by Peter89 » 01 Jun 2022 18:41

Huszar666 wrote:
01 Jun 2022 16:56
Sorry for the later reply, had no time last week. Will study your idea and will come back to it. Probably on the weekend or so.
No need to excuse yourself, he can't answer anyway...
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Huszar666
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Location: Budakeszi

Re: One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign

Post by Huszar666 » 01 Jun 2022 19:02

No need to excuse yourself, he can't answer anyway...
Banned?

Richard Anderson
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Re: One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign

Post by Richard Anderson » 01 Jun 2022 19:29

Huszar666 wrote:
01 Jun 2022 19:02
No need to excuse yourself, he can't answer anyway...
Banned?
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