One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign

[TheMarcksPlan]

Historically, they mobilised 8 Armys in late June, 13 Armys in July, and 14 Armys in August. But then they only mobilised 3 Armys in September, and 5 Armys in October. It is evident that after the initial panic of the invasion had worn off, the Soviets slowed down the rate of their force generation.

While I can't see any way around the fundamentals-based reasoning I laid out above, I also can't fully/directly explain the differences between June-August force generation and Sept-Oct. Is there any evidence that it was a decision to pump the brakes on mobilization? I'm open to being convinced that was so but, again, I just can't see how it was.

I do see feasible, even convincing, reasons for the force generation differentials:

• Earlier mobilizations proceeded from existing stocks of equipment, which were far bigger than those generated by Soviet industry during the first months of Barbarossa.
• Periodicity in Soviet mobilization: IIRC they inducted troops based on class callups twice annually, producing mid-year and year-end waves of new forces (so we see massive new armies in December).
• Pre-war versus wartime mobilizations: The June-August new armies resulted mainly from prewar callups that faced different resource constraints than wartime callups. The prewar SU had ~190mn people and didn't need (or thought it didn't need) so many war workers; the wartime SU was always trading RKKA callups against industrial output (see again my discussion of GKO 675).

The mid-September timing of GKO 675 probably does, in fact, reflect desperation to increase RKKA personnel in the midst of unfolding defeats (Kiev, Leningrad being cut off in the preceding week). Nonetheless, it arguably made little practical difference because the 625k men it feasibly made available in December '41 (assuming 3-month lag from call-up to battle) came at the price of lower Soviet munitions production. Because the Dec. '41 RKKA probably had too many men and too few guns/shells/tanks, it probably would have been better to leave these men in factories and fight a more materially-intensive Battle of Moscow. Indeed, RKKA returned at least a million men to industry after the Battle of Moscow, which indicates they reached the same conclusion.

[historygeek2021]

It is literally impossible that the "suggestion" of this train by another source (which Schmelzig obviously and rightly doubts) was correct.

The author doesn't express any doubt about the figure for that train. He simply states that that it was suggested that a single train delivered 21,000 tons of rubber and then moves on. This is either a typographical error for the tonnage or there are serious problems with this author, who simply repeats things others said without analysis or explanation. Given the other problems we've identified with this article, I can't help but wonder if one of his graduate students wrote this article to prank him and he didn't bother to read it before having it published.

[TheMarcksPlan]

The author doesn't express any doubt about the figure for that train. He simply states that that it was suggested that a single train delivered 21,000 tons of rubber and then moves on.

You're missing the structure of the analysis. Schmelzing is proposing, amidst acknowledged statistical/evidentiary indeterminacy, a floor of 23,500 tons imported from/via Russia. Whether the megatrain existed is not determinative of the validity of that floor.

The megatrain's existence is sufficient largely to corroborate his floor, but is not necessary to the argument.

You're making a logical error in trying to show negation of an argument by negating a sufficient condition. Even if that condition is negated, other sufficient evidence - conservatively interpreted by Schmelzing - exists to corroborate his argument (see below, especially Treue's daily figures, which are independently sufficient, and the India-sourced quantities which are nearly so).

Schmelzing's suspicion of the megatrain is apparent in that the sum of his other sources (Treue's, India) already exceed the sum he posits (23,500 tons). Were he confident that each mentioned suggestion were fully valid, his figure would approach 50,000t. Note also his citation of Treue ("It is known that") versus citation of the megatrain ("it has been suggested"). Any attentive reader should infer the relative confidence placed in these sources.

It's not a well-written piece of analysis but the logic is clear once you entangle the components and relate them to the conclusion.

We reach this volume as follows: it is known that up until June 21, 1941, the eve of Operation Barbarossa, natural rubber imports from Russia ran at 300 tons per day (Treue 1955, 182). In fact, it has been suggested that a single train hours before the launch of Operation Barbarossa delivered a final 21,000 tons of natural rubber across the Russo-German border (Goralski and Freeberg 1987, 66). Lower estimates that have been provided are merely covering transitvolumes for supplies sourced in Japan, China, and Manchuria (Cf: Ericson 1995, 401, 405; Medlicott 1952, Vol. 1, 669) and should thus be treated merely as minimum bounds for overall imports. After the successful negotiation of the two German-Russian trade agreements from February 1940 and January 1941, from April 1940 substantial Russian rubber supplies originating from East Asia and India and elsewhere entered the Reich from the East (Ericson 1995; Schwendemann 1995). One account focusing on Indian-sourced rubber imports from Russia between April 1940 and June 1941 puts the overall figure at 15,000 tons (Schwendemann 1995, 162). Other reports speak of overall daily volumes of no less than 300 tons per day in 1941. A conservative estimate for imports by railway from Russia between January and June 1941–which assumes that the daily figures suggested by Treue (1955) for March 1941 represent peak figures that were only met by 50 percent in the preceding months –yields 23,500 tons–a number in line with fragmentary evidence presented in other accounts (Cf: Goralski and Freeberg 1987, 66; Treue 1955, 182). This figure also assumes that a further 6,000 tons of natural rubber already destined for the Reich in mid-March 1941 did not reach the German border in time before the outbreak of war and was consequently lost.2

I see this kind of thing on AHF a lot. I'll say "X is true because A and B, and maybe C justifies X also." Then we'll get pages of arguments aiming to disprove C and arguing that, therefore, X is not true. This rubber argument is a case in point, with Schmelzig's article being C and my pre-Schmelzig points (France, reserves) being A and B.

[historygeek2021]

I'm not missing anything. I'm just pointing out one of the many absurdities in an incoherent article that doesn't explain the very thing it sets out to address.

[Huszar666]

Ah, I understand. Germans were (and are) evil, so they are by default stupid - like all those supervillains in movie history - and lost the war, because they were (and are) evil and so by default stupid.
Oh, I forgot, Hitler was in reality an English plant, his one and only aim was to destroy every last potential power in Europe! This is why he didn't invade the UK in 1940 and this is why he lost the Eastern Campaign voluntarily.

Sorry, Marcksplan, you posted numbers but obviously did not bother to think for a minute HOW and WHY those numbers came to be. Maybe a decline in workforce has something to do with khmmm... mobilisation? Or because the available workforce was shifted constantly between different fields of industry? No, that can not be! Germans were evil and stupid and did that on purpose!

Seriously?

[TheMarcksPlan]

Ah, I understand.

You obviously don't.

The ideas you attribute to me are (aside from Hitler being evil) core to what I argue against. I could explain but I get the feeling it wouldn't be productive. If you present some evidence that you've read the OP and my summary of this thread's main ideas (here), maybe we can have a productive exchange. Otherwise you're probably going on ignore.

[per70]

Historically, they mobilised 8 Armys in late June, 13 Armys in July, and 14 Armys in August. But then they only mobilised 3 Armys in September, and 5 Armys in October. It is evident that after the initial panic of the invasion had worn off, the Soviets slowed down the rate of their force generation.

While I can't see any way around the fundamentals-based reasoning I laid out above, I also can't fully/directly explain the differences between June-August force generation and Sept-Oct. Is there any evidence that it was a decision to pump the brakes on mobilization? I'm open to being convinced that was so but, again, I just can't see how it was.

I would argue that counting mobilised armies is a poor proxy for measuring the Soviet force generation.

Replacements came in roughly three categories:
- march battalions that brought depleted frontline units up to strength
- individual divisions that brought depleted frontline armies up to strength
- fully formed armies

Counting mobilised armies only take account of the third variant.

Generally, it would seem that new armies were created when the Soviets needed to split existing armies in order to cover a new axis of advance. See for instance the decision to split the defence of the southern approached to Leningrad on Aug 30 into two armies (the 42nd and 55th). This addition of the 55th Army did not add any extra troops to the defence of the city.

Another example from the same timespan would be the creation of the 40th Army from existing units, which were ordered to assemble and defend against Guderians southern drive towards Kiev.

Secondly, new armies were created when old armies were lost. See for instance 6th (i) and 12th (i) army, which were lost at Uman. In the aftermath; two new armies; 6th (ii) and 12th (ii) were created. Had the original 6th and 12th survived the encirclement, it is possible that the infantry divisions used to form the second iteration would instead be used to strengthen the first iteration.

And thirdly, new armies were sometimes created in the rear and brought up as fully formed units.

But again; this last variant was not the only one.

[historygeek2021]

Historically, they mobilised 8 Armys in late June, 13 Armys in July, and 14 Armys in August. But then they only mobilised 3 Armys in September, and 5 Armys in October. It is evident that after the initial panic of the invasion had worn off, the Soviets slowed down the rate of their force generation.

While I can't see any way around the fundamentals-based reasoning I laid out above, I also can't fully/directly explain the differences between June-August force generation and Sept-Oct. Is there any evidence that it was a decision to pump the brakes on mobilization? I'm open to being convinced that was so but, again, I just can't see how it was.

I would argue that counting mobilised armies is a poor proxy for measuring the Soviet force generation.

Replacements came in roughly three categories:
- march battalions that brought depleted frontline units up to strength
- individual divisions that brought depleted frontline armies up to strength
- fully formed armies

Counting mobilised armies only take account of the third variant.

Generally, it would seem that new armies were created when the Soviets needed to split existing armies in order to cover a new axis of advance. See for instance the decision to split the defence of the southern approached to Leningrad on Aug 30 into two armies (the 42nd and 55th). This addition of the 55th Army did not add any extra troops to the defence of the city.

Another example from the same timespan would be the creation of the 40th Army from existing units, which were ordered to assemble and defend against Guderians southern drive towards Kiev.

Secondly, new armies were created when old armies were lost. See for instance 6th (i) and 12th (i) army, which were lost at Uman. In the aftermath; two new armies; 6th (ii) and 12th (ii) were created. Had the original 6th and 12th survived the encirclement, it is possible that the infantry divisions used to form the second iteration would instead be used to strengthen the first iteration.

And thirdly, new armies were sometimes created in the rear and brought up as fully formed units.

But again; this last variant was not the only one.

Can you recommend any sources on this?

[TheMarcksPlan]

I would argue that counting mobilised armies is a poor proxy for measuring the Soviet force generation.

Absolutely, thanks. Even a poor proxy contains signal besides noise, so was going with that. But the other force generation channels change the picture significantly.

Askey gives a table for replacement flows, which may (can't recall) merely replicate data from Lopukhovsky's The Price of Victory:



The replacement flow definitely revises the picture one gets from an armies-only accounting: June-July sees more armies but September-Oct sees ~1mil more replacements. That's ~10 armies-worth of trained manpower, which brings the two periods much closer. That leaves August as the peak for these two channels (new armies and replacements) - 14 armies and 627k replacements.

As stated upthread, it still makes sense to me that we'd see a peak in new force deployments during June-August (due to greater prewar stocks of equipment and trained men than SU generated immediately after Barbarossa), but the tail-off in armies+replacements is less dramatic than when viewing armies only. I still can't see any evidence that the SU relented on mobilization at any point in 1941 (absence of evidence not being proof of absence, of course).

Does anybody have data on the new division flow, excluding those contained in new/reformed armies?

[Huszar666]

You obviously don't.

The ideas you attribute to me are (aside from Hitler being evil) core to what I argue against. I could explain but I get the feeling it wouldn't be productive. If you present some evidence that you've read the OP and my summary of this thread's main ideas (here), maybe we can have a productive exchange. Otherwise you're probably going on ignore.

Of course. You don't argue by posting numbers without thinking about what they mean, why they came to be, just to prove your point that the Germans lost the war because they were stupid=evil.
You don't promote your idea that it was possible to rise another PzArmy if not for the Germans being evil=stupid.
You don't put you imaginary rearming date so early that is has no connection to reality.
You don't use dubious and/or questionable and/or irrelevant sources and material to sweep away every other opinion on the matter.
You don't ignore posts that goes against your fantasy. You don't "threaten" other to ignore them.
You do nothing of the sort.

Does anybody have data on the new division flow, excluding those contained in new/reformed armies?

Try to dig through the Russian wikipedia on divisions and armies. On armchairgeneral there was a link somewhere to a Russian "Lexikon der Wehrmacht" style site.
I did dig through them a few years back, I would recommend the same for you too.

Fact is, that there was no need for a 5th PzArmy before around December 1940, when the planning against the SU gained speed.
Fact is, that you can not increase production on a day's notice.
Fact is, that the German working force was constantly shifted around, since there was not enough workers to cover every last needed, wanted or speculated field.
Fact is, that the German Army relied heavily on captured equipment already (that was only marginally useable in the east, see French motor vehicles).

As for "new force generation" for the German part, I for myself see this possible:
1, make Florian Geyer a frontline division
2, rise a third cavalry division out of captured French (and Polish) cavalry horses and material
3, "Create" a mixed horsed-motorised-bicycle division out of surpulous units that were disbanded in winter 1940 (the Seelöwe-Radfahrabteilungen, for example) plus some new risings
4, maybe, if we are really generous, convert ONE normal infantry division into a motorised division. By stripping the garrison divisions in the West of their (captured) last motor vehicles, mobilising another batch of civilian vehicles (oh, does that influence the economy in ANY way?) and a bit of extra production beginning in March 1941 or so.

You probably noticed, that I didn't include any armoured units. Well, if you want some, you can use the around 700 Pz Is, 300 Pz IIs, and a bit of Pz IIIs and such parked around the Reich that were not part of the Feldheer.
http://www.niehorster.org/011_germany/a ... -06-22.htm
Surely, the training units would not miss them, they are not needed to replace losses (for the larger types), they have an enormous combat potential and you could put barely-trained conscripts into them.
Because there was exactly zero chance to build MORE tanks after realising in DECEMBER 1940 that maybe another PzArmy would be nice to have. Stuff and troops don't grow on trees, you know?

So, you have at best one CORPS of let's call it "fast" troops, with barely any armour to support, and not a fully armoured PzArmy. If Germany had that extra corps, I would have put it with HGr North, the 4th PzGroup really needed that extra "fast" potential.

But it's your fantasy, do ignore me.

PS: If you manage to build more tanks somehow nonetheless, under no circumstances you should use them to bring up the existing PzDivisions to the desired 3 batallions per divisions. Do not get rid of the captured tanks, the Pz Is and IIs still running around. Do not fill up the "heavy" platoons with the missing Pz IVs. Do not retire the barely-usable Pz 35s (and probably sell them to allied or neutral countries in exchange for raw materials)

[TheMarcksPlan]

There's an AHF/online template for What If replies:

• 1. Read lightly or not at all
• 2. Due to (1) or personal limitations, fail to understand/address arguments.
• 3. Call something a fantasy

The template can be applied by anyone with IQ >70.

It is TMP policy to ignore these posts and, if they persist, their authors.

[per70]

Can you recommend any sources on this?

I'm not sure if there's one source that deals with this exclusively. You've probabably already read Glantz's Colossus Reborn.

The site Huszar666 probabably hintet at is very helpful if you want to dig into the details. Especially the OOB's given for every month.
http://www.teatrskazka.com/Raznoe/Boevo ... /1941.html
PS: I think you can find the same information in excel-format on soldat.ru

This thread also gives a fair amount of data on the topic: viewtopic.php?f=79&t=149565

@TheMarcksPlan note that Art suspected that the table on reinforcements reproduced by Askey is inaccurate and too high.

[Avalancheon]

Thats not really the case. After the French campaign was finished, Hitler was already eyeing the Soviet Union. On July 31, 1940, he instructed his Generals to begin planning for an invasion of Russia. Among other things, he ordered the Heer to be expanded to 180 divisions, and the number of panzer divisions to be doubled.

Planning is not proof of intention .
And 180 divisions was to low for a possible successful Barbarossa .

It goes without saying. Hitler was making a contingency for war with the Soviets. He wasn't actually deadset on going to war with them in July.

BTW, the 180 division figure was the mark set by Rustungsprogramm B, in August. The Germans eventually decided to expand the Heer beyond this figure.

Thats not really the case. After the French campaign was finished, Hitler was already eyeing the Soviet Union. On July 31, 1940, he instructed his Generals to begin planning for an invasion of Russia. Among other things, he ordered the Heer to be expanded to 180 divisions, and the number of panzer divisions to be doubled.

Starting planning for a campaign doesn't mean an immediate intention to start said campaign. And says nothing about the date of the campaign and the neccesary troops.

Obviously, you are right. Just because a nation plans for a certain operation does not mean they will inevitably carry it out. But we know from the testimonys of Halder, Jodl, etc that after the fall of France, Hitler was considering an autumn campaign against the Soviet Union. This was completely impractical because of the weather and lack of preparations. They wouldn't even have time to raise the new divisions outlined in Rustungsprogramm B. The Generals were able to dissuade their Fuhrer from this ill-advised plan, and convince him to delay the invasion to the spring of 1941.

The SU really entered the picture as an "immediate" threat - on should tackle within a year - after Molotov's visit in November. The preliminary planning wasn't done till December.
The short-term need for 5th Panzer Army can only be realised AFTER the threat is realised and AFTER the preliminary planning is finished. Simply put: you won't realise you need something if there is no need to have it, and only after you know what, where and how far do you want to do.

The first part of your statement is true. Hitlers resolve to go to war with the Soviets had wavered after his Generals had stonewalled him. He was open to settling the disputes through diplomacy, until the clear failure of the Berlin conference in November.

The second part of your statement is not necessarily true. Hitler had already ordered the number of panzer divisions to be doubled in July of 1940. As for the planning of the invasion. The Marcks plan was finished by August 5. The Lossberg plan was finished by September 15.

So, assuming, the need is realised in December 1940 you can't start implementing the solution for a few month at least (since the procution pipeline has to be strengthened, material prepared, and stuff produced). I don't think ramping up the production earlier than March 1941 would be possible, way to late for the 5th Panzer Army to be ready in Late June 1941.
At best, you would be able to have one or two new mot Divisions, but not much more.

ATLs and What-Ifs are a nice thing, but you have to anchor it in reality - i.e. possibilities, intentions and informations.

The need for additional panzer and motorised divisions could have been realised earlier than that. It would necessarily require more accurate information to be supplied to the OKH and OKW staffs, and more realistic planning on the size of the invasion force they required. In this ATL, the Heer presumably enters the year of 1940 with a larger panzerwaffe than what they historically had (due to not making cuts to the panzer program in 1939). Thus, after the conclusion of the French campaign, they already have enough tanks available to form the 25 panzer divisions required for the invasion of Russia in this ATL.

[PunctuationHorror]

It's always awesome to see people who just do not even bother to read the very first post in a thread they're commenting on.

---
Stumbled upon this: monthly German truck production

[TheMarcksPlan]

The need for additional panzer and motorised divisions could have been realised earlier than that. It would necessarily require more accurate information to be supplied to the OKH and OKW staffs, and more realistic planning on the size of the invasion force they required.

I disagree re OKH/W staff planning for the eventual use of the ATL added forces. Hitler decided on the rough size of the army during Summer 1940, with the August Rustungsprogram B setting 180 as the goal and then further refinement afterwards. The August target came after an initial decision to reduce the army, pursuant to which many divisions were actually disbanded.

No firm operational plan existed when Germany picked 180 divs as the target (Marcks/Lossberg studies being only studies that differed significantly from the plan executed). As the 180-div target wasn't tethered to an operational plan, there's no reason to assume a 185-div (or 200-div) target would need to be justified by an operational plan.

Likewise the choice of 20 panzer divs.

The force structure chosen in Summer 1940 reflected the broad strategic/political/economic situation as perceived by Hitler. He thought Germany could defeat the SU relatively easily; he therefore did not demand of Germany nor its occupied territories particularly intense measures. He gave generous unemployment benefits to Western Europe at a time when there were millions of unemployed who could have been "nudged" into the German economy by the absence of such benefits (as happened later) and/or by other measures (all the way up to forced recruitment a la the later STO).

The Heer leadership was completely unworried about the Barbarossa armaments program (until perhaps spring '41). At no point did OKH object to cuts in ammo/weapons output, nor argue that it should receive a greater share of resources (though internally some Heer voices were saying so).

The Luftwaffe actually got Hitler to release 22,000 soldiers to its factories in March 1941. Hitler's Fatal Miscalculation by Klaus Schmider.

The OTL standard for Barbarossa was "what is good enough?" The ATL standard is "what is the strongest army Germany can create?"

In this ATL, the Heer presumably enters the year of 1940 with a larger panzerwaffe than what they historically had (due to not making cuts to the panzer program in 1939). Thus, after the conclusion of the French campaign, they already have enough tanks available to form the 25 panzer divisions required for the invasion of Russia in this ATL.

I no longer see the OP as setting the minimal conditions but yeah, keeping the OP narrative Germany could have had 30+ panzer divisions quite easily.

It's always awesome to see people who just do not even bother to read the very first post in a thread they're commenting on.

---
Stumbled upon this: monthly German truck production

Thanks!