One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign

[HistoryGeek2019]

I believe this ATL helps overall with Germany's logistics in Russia. German planners correctly identified that they could adequately supply their forces in western Russia - basically west of the Dnieper-Dvina line. Hence, it made sense for Germany to seek to destroy the entire Red Army west of this line, because that is where Germany could sustain adequate logistics. When sizeable portions of the Red Army escaped to the east (basically everywhere except AGC), this led to the enormous strain on German logistics where there weren't nearly enough rail lines to supply their armies in the east.

Thus, anything that would help encircle more Soviet armies in the early phases of Barbarossa, as in this ATL, would help Germany's overall logistical situation in the east.

This is not correct :the escape of portions of the Red Army to the east did not influence the outcome of Barbarossa .What decided the outcome of Barbarossa was the ability of the Soviet regime to mobilize very quickly its reserves and to send them to the front : between June 22 and June 30 5,3 million men were mobilised .Without this, the Soviet regime would collaps .Besides, the situation of AGC was not better than the situation in the north or the south of the front .
To encircle more Soviet armies west of the DD line would not help Germany .

They were both factors. In the long-run, the Soviet Union's massive and rapid mobilization was the key to its ultimate victory in the war, as Germany lacked the manpower to match it.

Nevertheless, the successful withdrawal of Soviet troops in all fronts other than Belarus bought the Soviets precious time to deploy their reserves. Had Southwestern Front been encircled per this ATL, the Soviets would have been thinly stretched in July and August.

[TheMarcksPlan]

Had Southwestern Front been encircled per this ATL, the Soviets would have been thinly stretched in July and August.

Exactly.
And we can repeat the initial dual encirclements of the Border Battles, as AGS has two Panzergruppe with which to form a kessel.
There could have been a Kessel in Galicia around, say, the city of Ternopil, followed by another Kessel around Zhitomir or Vinnitsya. And/or farther east.
During 1941, the Germans attempted encirclements with 2 PzGr on four occasions: Minsk/Bialystok, Smolensk, Kiev, and Vyazma.
They succeeded in all four of these attempts.
There is no reason to believe the Ostheer would have failed to create a Kessel had AGS possessed two PzGr, either during the Border Battles or in subsequent operations farther east in Ukraine.
Anyone opposing this viewpoint has to argue that the Red Army would have stopped the armored penetrations and/or that its foot-mobile forces would have retreated fast enough to escape encirclement even in the event of armored penetration to operational depths.
I can't see a credible historical argument for either position. During the early days Stalin refused to authorize retreats. During the latter days of Barbarossa, he wouldn't be able to authorize such retreats without accepting massive strategic losses of industrial/agricultural assets.

[ljadw]

I believe this ATL helps overall with Germany's logistics in Russia. German planners correctly identified that they could adequately supply their forces in western Russia - basically west of the Dnieper-Dvina line. Hence, it made sense for Germany to seek to destroy the entire Red Army west of this line, because that is where Germany could sustain adequate logistics. When sizeable portions of the Red Army escaped to the east (basically everywhere except AGC), this led to the enormous strain on German logistics where there weren't nearly enough rail lines to supply their armies in the east.

Thus, anything that would help encircle more Soviet armies in the early phases of Barbarossa, as in this ATL, would help Germany's overall logistical situation in the east.

This is not correct :the escape of portions of the Red Army to the east did not influence the outcome of Barbarossa .What decided the outcome of Barbarossa was the ability of the Soviet regime to mobilize very quickly its reserves and to send them to the front : between June 22 and June 30 5,3 million men were mobilised .Without this, the Soviet regime would collaps .Besides, the situation of AGC was not better than the situation in the north or the south of the front .
To encircle more Soviet armies west of the DD line would not help Germany .

They were both factors. In the long-run, the Soviet Union's massive and rapid mobilization was the key to its ultimate victory in the war, as Germany lacked the manpower to match it.

Nevertheless, the successful withdrawal of Soviet troops in all fronts other than Belarus bought the Soviets precious time to deploy their reserves. Had Southwestern Front been encircled per this ATL, the Soviets would have been thinly stretched in July and August.

NO : that is not correct .
The forces of the South Western front could mainly escaped encirclment,while those of the Western front were mainly destroyed,but the result was the same for the Germans :the fight continued in the South , but also in the Center. AGC also could not advance .
Thus the ATL is wrong .
Even if the SW Front had suffered the same fate as the Western Front, there would be no possibility for Typhoon to start earlier . And even if Typhoon was successful, the war would go on .
The fact is that it was impossible in the Summer /Autumn of 1941 to go from Smolensk to the Volga or from Smolensk to the Urals (1877 km ) with mobile forces,even if the SU was already defeated .
The reason is that tanks were primitive,slow and vulnerable machines,fit for short distances . Not for an advance of more than 1000 km .
Even if the Soviets were thinly stretched , the Germans could not advance to Moscow/Volga / Urals in the Summer of 1941 .

[ljadw]

Had Southwestern Front been encircled per this ATL, the Soviets would have been thinly stretched in July and August.

Exactly.
And we can repeat the initial dual encirclements of the Border Battles, as AGS has two Panzergruppe with which to form a kessel.
There could have been a Kessel in Galicia around, say, the city of Ternopil, followed by another Kessel around Zhitomir or Vinnitsya. And/or farther east.
During 1941, the Germans attempted encirclements with 2 PzGr on four occasions: Minsk/Bialystok, Smolensk, Kiev, and Vyazma.
They succeeded in all four of these attempts.
There is no reason to believe the Ostheer would have failed to create a Kessel had AGS possessed two PzGr, either during the Border Battles or in subsequent operations farther east in Ukraine.
Anyone opposing this viewpoint has to argue that the Red Army would have stopped the armored penetrations and/or that its foot-mobile forces would have retreated fast enough to escape encirclement even in the event of armored penetration to operational depths.
I can't see a credible historical argument for either position. During the early days Stalin refused to authorize retreats. During the latter days of Barbarossa, he wouldn't be able to authorize such retreats without accepting massive strategic losses of industrial/agricultural assets.

More Kessels would not change the outcome. Without the help and protection of the ID the mobile divisions were powerless .
During the latter days of Barbarossa Stalin did authorize retreats .
You continue to fail to grasp the geographic and transport situation of the Western part of the USSR 78 years ago . 78 years !! There could be no Desert Storm in 1941.1941 is as far away from us as was Gettysburg in 1941 .

[TheMarcksPlan]

More Kessels would not change the outcome.

I appreciate that you state what the rest of my opponents leave unsaid: it doesn't matter how many Soviets the Germans encircle and capture/kill.
I hope that this obviously wrong statement of the premise behind a lot of my opposition's positions encourages those members to stop and think about just how many armies the SU could afford to lose during Barbarossa.

[ljadw]

It is also not so ,as has been claimed in post 103,that the Germans were bad in logistics.They were as good/bad as the others . The allied advance stagnated in August 1944 due to the German resistance and to logistic problems : the Red Ball Express failed to supply the advancing armies .Bagration did not result in the capture of Berlin,due to the German resistance and due to logistic problems .
No one would have done better than the Germans in the summer of 1941 ,because the outcome of Barbarossa depended on the Soviets, not on the Germans .And all attempts to change this by ATL will fail .

Ummm...The Red Ball Express was not conceived until August 25, 1944.

I know, but the reality is that the Red Ball Express failed to solve the logistical problems,because it was impossible to supply an advancing motorised army with trucks .

[ljadw]

More Kessels would not change the outcome.

I appreciate that you state what the rest of my opponents leave unsaid: it doesn't matter how many Soviets the Germans encircle and capture/kill.
I hope that this obviously wrong statement of the premise behind a lot of my opposition's positions encourages those members to stop and think about just how many armies the SU could afford to lose during Barbarossa.

Wars are not decided by encirclments .
Both the SU and Germany were industrial giants and this would decide the outcome of the war , not encirclments .
The USSR would only be defeated if/when the Germans were at the Volga/Urals .
And the Germans could only be at the Volga/Urals if/when the USSR would be defeated .
This means that the war could only be decided west of the DD line and that if the war continued east of the DD line,Germany had lost .
The war continued east of the DD line, NOT because the SW Front was not destroyed, but because the initial Soviet setbacks did not result in the collaps of the Soviet regime .

[ljadw]

More Kessels would not change the outcome.

: it doesn't matter how many Soviets the Germans encircle and capture/kill.

What matters is how many divisions the Soviets could mobilize and send to the front .
The decision did not lay in the hand of the Germans .

[ljadw]

About the myth of the Kesselschlachten: Briansk and Viazma did not result in a Soviet collaps . Thus the theory that more mobile divisions would result in more Kessels which would result in the collaps of the SU, is good for under the Greyhound bus .
The ATL from The MarcksPlan is founded on the belief that,if the US could defeat the Iraqi army by mobile warfare /encirclment battles, Germany could have defeated the USSR by the same methods . This is ignoring, is being unable to understand, being unable to admit that there was more than 60 years between Barbarossa and Desert Storm , that Iraq is not the SU, that the WM was not the US army, that the Red Army was not the Iraqi army .

[TheMarcksPlan]

60 years between Barbarossa and Desert Storm , that Iraq is not the SU, that the WM was not the US army, that the Red Army was not the Iraqi army .

Iraq is the USSR; the Wehrmacht and the US army are the same; the Red Army and the Iraqi army are the same; 2+2 = 5

[ljadw]

The following is from Stahel ''Operation Typhoon Hitler's March on Moscow October 1941 "'
P 92 ( note 39 )
''The QMG's Army Supply Department warned already in September that the fuel demands of the Ostheer's tanks and vehicles might prove '' insufficient to bring the eastern campaign to a conclusion in the Autumn .""
And on the same page with as source note 40 : Bock got only half of his daily supply requirements .
I am now waiting for TheMarcksPlan's explanation
1 how the Germans could have won in 1941
2 if not, how they would be able in 1942 to supply a big army east of Moscow,while they could not supply in 1941 a big army west of Moscow .
I am sure that TheMarcksPlan will not let us down .

[TheMarcksPlan]

The following is from Stahel ''Operation Typhoon Hitler's March on Moscow October 1941 "'
P 92 ( note 39 )
''The QMG's Army Supply Department warned already in September that the fuel demands of the Ostheer's tanks and vehicles might prove '' insufficient to bring the eastern campaign to a conclusion in the Autumn .""
And on the same page with as source note 40 : Bock got only half of his daily supply requirements .
I am now waiting for TheMarcksPlan's explanation
1 how the Germans could have won in 1941
2 if not, how they would be able in 1942 to supply a big army east of Moscow,while they could not supply in 1941 a big army west of Moscow .
I am sure that TheMarcksPlan will not let us down .

Ostheer doesn't take Moscow in 1941 in this ATL. I leave it for 1942.

[MarkN]

As with any war or historical topic, there's a Conventional Wisdom narrative and a more nuanced narrative.

This is code for: do not bother me with responses founded in historical facts, just tell me how my fantasy scenario will work.

[MarkN]

The other problem here is the Germans need to provide garrisons, guards, and general 'police' forces for all the land up to the Volga or where ever they do get to, which will cut down on front line troops and the ability to remain mobile. It is a long front, there is a massive conquered 'interior' that has many partisan forces conducting long term operations against supply lines, and of course the inevitable losses than need to be replaced.

The provisional estimate (made immediatly prior to the invasion) for the garrison of conquored CCCP after a successful BARBAROSSA was 60 divisions and a Luftflotte. It is not defined how the split between border security and internal security is made, nor how long it would stay at that level nor the types of divisions required.

TheMarcksPlan has either mislead himself or is deliberately trying to mislead others by mentionning 9 "security" divisions.

[ljadw]

The following is from Stahel ''Operation Typhoon Hitler's March on Moscow October 1941 "'
P 92 ( note 39 )
''The QMG's Army Supply Department warned already in September that the fuel demands of the Ostheer's tanks and vehicles might prove '' insufficient to bring the eastern campaign to a conclusion in the Autumn .""
And on the same page with as source note 40 : Bock got only half of his daily supply requirements .
I am now waiting for TheMarcksPlan's explanation
1 how the Germans could have won in 1941
2 if not, how they would be able in 1942 to supply a big army east of Moscow,while they could not supply in 1941 a big army west of Moscow .
I am sure that TheMarcksPlan will not let us down .

Ostheer doesn't take Moscow in 1941 in this ATL. I leave it for 1942.

And how will they be able to supply a big army east of Moscow in 1942, when they were unable to supply a big army west of Moscow in 1941 ? :roll: