It is not because you disagree with an opinion by him that it is a lie.He has the right to his convictions.And it is no reason for calling for the burning of his books.ljadw wrote: ↑17 Aug 2019, 13:09Did YOU read Hitler beyond evil and Tyranny ?
Of course not .
It is worse than everything Irving has written '
P 41
"How do we assign evil to a bona fide messiah who was dedicated to the defeat of perceived evil and the enthronement of perceived good ? "
Saying that Hitler was a messiah is nazi propaganda .
Also on P 41
Stolfi said that the British government was also evil for its food blockade of Germany,which was extended after the close of WWI ( this is a lie : it was not extended after the close of WWI ) that resulted in the deaths through starvation of 800000 non combattants ( an other lie )
P 42
The Churchill inspired expulsion of the Germans from eastern Europe resulting in the deaths of 2 million of them .
2 more lies : the expulsion was not inspired by Churchill and there were no 2 million deaths .
P 43 :Hitler's action resulted in the deaths of more than 4,5 million Jews ( lie again ) while Churchill's action in the creation of 14,5 million German refugees ( lie again )and 2 million deaths ( repetition of lie is also a lie ).
8 lies on 3 pages .
Besides,the tu quoque argument is : excusing Auschwitz by assumed allied war crimes .
One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign
Re: One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign
Re: One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign
Stolfi said that the food blockade was extended after the close of WWI: this is a lie . The truth is that the food blockade stopped when the war was over in June 1919 .
And the best thing to do with nazi propaganda is to burn it .
And the best thing to do with nazi propaganda is to burn it .
Re: One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign
A soldier who refuses to execute an order in wartime risks to be shot . A lot of German soldiers were shot for this . In May 1940,Guderian,who was a 4 star general, refused to obey an order. He did the same in December 1941 .Aida1 wrote: ↑17 Aug 2019, 10:55Really.For that type of disobedience one never gets shot.You are massively exaggerating here.ljadw wrote: ↑17 Aug 2019, 10:34For his disobedience Guderian should have been court-martialed and shot : the first requirement for an officer is to obey, not to do what he want .Aida1 wrote: ↑17 Aug 2019, 09:44When you read what Guderian and Hoth wrote about this,you know that in Barbarossa ,they would have wanted to do things differently at some points and it was not only the not going for Moscow.Even in 1940, Guderian had to do some disobedience to do what he wanted.What is now called Blitzkrieg was certainly not the accepted doctrine of the German army.Not everybody was on the same page where that is concerned.MarkN wrote: ↑16 Aug 2019, 21:01On the contrary????
Was that theory advocated by the panzerwaffe? Yes or no?
Did practise of that theory help deliver military success in Western Europe in 1940? Yes or no?
Did practise of that theory help deliver military failure in Eastern Europe in 1941? Yes or no?
Did the practise of that theory produce any meaningful success after1942? Yes or no?
Did l mention Guderian in this discussion?
:roll:
Guderian was also a soldier and should give the example . What would have happen if an officer of Guderian's staff refused to execute an order from Guderian ?
Re: One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign
If you are that ignorant that you don't know about the existence of the Historical Division and Halder's role in it, it is not on me to teach you the essentials of WWII.Aida1 wrote: ↑17 Aug 2019, 11:00And we are supposed to take your word for that as usual.Nothing sourced.Everything in a book is wrong because you say so without refuting all that is said in it point by point as you should do.ljadw wrote: ↑17 Aug 2019, 10:52In July 1941 Keitel told Bock that Hitler now hoped on a Japanese intervention to save him .Aida1 wrote: ↑17 Aug 2019, 09:25You always make these blanket statements that are historically incorrect and one is supposed to accept them at face value.
That is a historical fact .
In July 1941 the combat readiness of PzGr 2 was down to 42 % . That is a historical fact .
After the war Halder wrote Hitler als Feldherr ( a pack of lies ),Guderian wrote Panzerleader ( a pack of lies ) Manstein wrote Verlorene Siege ( a pack of lies ) all with the aim to blame Hitler for the defeat .
This is a historical fact .
All all three filled their pockets with the money/estates they received and accepted from Hitler .
This also is a historical fact .
After the war ,as head of the Historical Division, Halder created the myth of the clean Wehrmacht. That also is a historical fact .
Re: One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign
So it was not a lie as he undoubtedly meant that it was continued after november 11 1918 which was the de Facto end of the war.You are mispresenting what he stated.And books are not burnt anymore.
Re: One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign
Do not take me for a fool.I perfectly know about the us army historical division and the texts written for it by German officers.I read probably more of them than you.All of them of a purely military nature and sometimes very interesting.Nothing to do with a socalled clean Wehrmacht myth.As usual you make blanket statements without specifics.ljadw wrote: ↑17 Aug 2019, 16:17If you are that ignorant that you don't know about the existence of the Historical Division and Halder's role in it, it is not on me to teach you the essentials of WWII.Aida1 wrote: ↑17 Aug 2019, 11:00And we are supposed to take your word for that as usual.Nothing sourced.Everything in a book is wrong because you say so without refuting all that is said in it point by point as you should do.ljadw wrote: ↑17 Aug 2019, 10:52In July 1941 Keitel told Bock that Hitler now hoped on a Japanese intervention to save him .
That is a historical fact .
In July 1941 the combat readiness of PzGr 2 was down to 42 % . That is a historical fact .
After the war Halder wrote Hitler als Feldherr ( a pack of lies ),Guderian wrote Panzerleader ( a pack of lies ) Manstein wrote Verlorene Siege ( a pack of lies ) all with the aim to blame Hitler for the defeat .
This is a historical fact .
All all three filled their pockets with the money/estates they received and accepted from Hitler .
This also is a historical fact .
After the war ,as head of the Historical Division, Halder created the myth of the clean Wehrmacht. That also is a historical fact .
Re: One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign
Ridiculous.German officers were trained to use their intiative and that could even go to the extent of disobedience although there you took a risk of it did 'not work out well.Guderian had good reasons to disobey when he did.ljadw wrote: ↑17 Aug 2019, 16:14A soldier who refuses to execute an order in wartime risks to be shot . A lot of German soldiers were shot for this . In May 1940,Guderian,who was a 4 star general, refused to obey an order. He did the same in December 1941 .Aida1 wrote: ↑17 Aug 2019, 10:55Really.For that type of disobedience one never gets shot.You are massively exaggerating here.ljadw wrote: ↑17 Aug 2019, 10:34For his disobedience Guderian should have been court-martialed and shot : the first requirement for an officer is to obey, not to do what he want .Aida1 wrote: ↑17 Aug 2019, 09:44When you read what Guderian and Hoth wrote about this,you know that in Barbarossa ,they would have wanted to do things differently at some points and it was not only the not going for Moscow.Even in 1940, Guderian had to do some disobedience to do what he wanted.What is now called Blitzkrieg was certainly not the accepted doctrine of the German army.Not everybody was on the same page where that is concerned.MarkN wrote: ↑16 Aug 2019, 21:01
On the contrary????
Was that theory advocated by the panzerwaffe? Yes or no?
Did practise of that theory help deliver military success in Western Europe in 1940? Yes or no?
Did practise of that theory help deliver military failure in Eastern Europe in 1941? Yes or no?
Did the practise of that theory produce any meaningful success after1942? Yes or no?
Did l mention Guderian in this discussion?
:roll:
Guderian was also a soldier and should give the example . What would have happen if an officer of Guderian's staff refused to execute an order from Guderian ?
Re: One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign
It was a lie : he said that the food blockade continued after the end of the war . What he meant is irrelevant .He knew very well that WWI ended in June 1919 .
Re: One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign
The Historical Division was used to innocent the WM of Auschwitz and the defeat .Aida1 wrote: ↑17 Aug 2019, 17:30Do not take me for a fool.I perfectly know about the us army historical division and the texts written for it by German officers.I read probably more of them than you.All of them of a purely military nature and sometimes very interesting.Nothing to do with a socalled clean Wehrmacht myth.As usual you make blanket statements without specifics.ljadw wrote: ↑17 Aug 2019, 16:17If you are that ignorant that you don't know about the existence of the Historical Division and Halder's role in it, it is not on me to teach you the essentials of WWII.Aida1 wrote: ↑17 Aug 2019, 11:00And we are supposed to take your word for that as usual.Nothing sourced.Everything in a book is wrong because you say so without refuting all that is said in it point by point as you should do.ljadw wrote: ↑17 Aug 2019, 10:52In July 1941 Keitel told Bock that Hitler now hoped on a Japanese intervention to save him .
That is a historical fact .
In July 1941 the combat readiness of PzGr 2 was down to 42 % . That is a historical fact .
After the war Halder wrote Hitler als Feldherr ( a pack of lies ),Guderian wrote Panzerleader ( a pack of lies ) Manstein wrote Verlorene Siege ( a pack of lies ) all with the aim to blame Hitler for the defeat .
This is a historical fact .
All all three filled their pockets with the money/estates they received and accepted from Hitler .
This also is a historical fact .
After the war ,as head of the Historical Division, Halder created the myth of the clean Wehrmacht. That also is a historical fact .
Christian Hartmann in ''Halder,der verhinderte generalstabschef " p 208 :Halder was one of the architects of the myth of the clean WM.
Halder ordered the German members f the HD to emphasize the ''decent '' form of the war conducted by the army and to blame the SS for the criminal operations .(Wette : the WM History,Myth and Reality P 236 .)
Manstein held the same antisemitic and racist views as Hitler ( Smelser and Davies :The Myth of the Eastern Front :the Nazi-Soviet War in American Popular Culture PP 97-98 ) .
And most of the texts written by the Germans for the HD were very biased and influenced by racist thinking .
Re: One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign
Not necessarily Stolfi. In various threads, they referred to Halder as a witness to the presence of logistic problems. And they were, but the links to Wagner are funny. Wagner talked about the ability of one base on July 15 and this is presented as the impossibility of attacking Moscow.ljadw wrote: ↑17 Aug 2019, 10:24On July 21 the combat readiness from PzGr 2 was down to 42 % .jesk wrote: ↑17 Aug 2019, 07:46Why guaranteed? Stolfi analyzed the issue even on the basis of one base near Minsk. But there the conclusions are limited. July 15 is already 2 base and in fact the supply is better.ljadw wrote: ↑17 Aug 2019, 07:40Von Bock was not ready : logistics would ensure that he failed .Bock was still 400 km away from Moscow.Besides,the capture of Moscow would not help the Germans, it would only hinder them .
Hitler knew that which you did not know. And you know what Hitler did not think about.Hitler had already given up in July : he knew that Barbarossa had failed .
And what Stolfi was writing should be publicly burned . Not one iota of what he said is correct .
The number of tanks fell to 42%, but the problems of the Russians are much greater. 50% of their army in July on the outskirts of Moscow - Volkssturm (Russian counterpart).
Re: One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign
You are doing serious work for the void. A lot of schemes, words. And against whom is all this? 20 Russian divisions on the approaches to Moscow, of which 10 - the people's militia?TheMarcksPlan wrote: ↑17 Aug 2019, 10:30All I can see is dozens of posts by Jesk, ljadw, and Aida1, all of whom I have set to ignore.
If you want to get something out of this forum, I recommend you set these members to ignore as well.
Re: One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign
At a July 13 meeting with Manstein and Kluge, Hitler first announced Italy and his desire to stop the advance until the situation on the Apennines clears up. But when he learned from Kluge that the 9th army could not resume the offensive, he immediately agreed with this. You must understand, Hitler, making unpopular decisions, tried to find allies among the generals. He showed this case as the generals argue among themselves, the Führer finds a compromise.
Re: One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign
He no doubt meant the de Facto end of the war which you know very well so you make false accusations.ljadw wrote: ↑17 Aug 2019, 18:20It was a lie : he said that the food blockade continued after the end of the war . What he meant is irrelevant .He knew very well that WWI ended in June 1919 .
Re: One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign
Which clearly illustrates you never read any of them as they were of a pure military nature and mostly about the western front ,Italy and north africa.ljadw wrote: ↑17 Aug 2019, 18:34The Historical Division was used to innocent the WM of Auschwitz and the defeat .Aida1 wrote: ↑17 Aug 2019, 17:30Do not take me for a fool.I perfectly know about the us army historical division and the texts written for it by German officers.I read probably more of them than you.All of them of a purely military nature and sometimes very interesting.Nothing to do with a socalled clean Wehrmacht myth.As usual you make blanket statements without specifics.ljadw wrote: ↑17 Aug 2019, 16:17If you are that ignorant that you don't know about the existence of the Historical Division and Halder's role in it, it is not on me to teach you the essentials of WWII.Aida1 wrote: ↑17 Aug 2019, 11:00And we are supposed to take your word for that as usual.Nothing sourced.Everything in a book is wrong because you say so without refuting all that is said in it point by point as you should do.ljadw wrote: ↑17 Aug 2019, 10:52
In July 1941 Keitel told Bock that Hitler now hoped on a Japanese intervention to save him .
That is a historical fact .
In July 1941 the combat readiness of PzGr 2 was down to 42 % . That is a historical fact .
After the war Halder wrote Hitler als Feldherr ( a pack of lies ),Guderian wrote Panzerleader ( a pack of lies ) Manstein wrote Verlorene Siege ( a pack of lies ) all with the aim to blame Hitler for the defeat .
This is a historical fact .
All all three filled their pockets with the money/estates they received and accepted from Hitler .
This also is a historical fact .
After the war ,as head of the Historical Division, Halder created the myth of the clean Wehrmacht. That also is a historical fact .
Christian Hartmann in ''Halder,der verhinderte generalstabschef " p 208 :Halder was one of the architects of the myth of the clean WM.
Halder ordered the German members f the HD to emphasize the ''decent '' form of the war conducted by the army and to blame the SS for the criminal operations .(Wette : the WM History,Myth and Reality P 236 .)
Manstein held the same antisemitic and racist views as Hitler ( Smelser and Davies :The Myth of the Eastern Front :the Nazi-Soviet War in American Popular Culture PP 97-98 ) .
And most of the texts written by the Germans for the HD were very biased and influenced by racist thinking .
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Re: One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign
The only real practical evidence I have about needed large numbers of troops to control occupied land is that of WWI, where just over one million men were left in the east leading up to the Spring Offensive in 1918, and that was in a situation where the majority of the population in many areas were actively pro-German and puppet pro-German governments had been set up and no frontline troops were required as the Russian army was now starting to engage in civil war.TheMarcksPlan wrote: ↑16 Aug 2019, 03:52In Barbarossa Germany had only a few security divisions and, with its allies, was able to maintain adequate security. The allies alone probably could have maintained security in an expanded occupation zone.
Plus partisan activity was sensitive to the course of the war and was lower when it looked like the Germans would win. Few men like to fight voluntarily for lost causes after all. So greater German success means less security burden.
I appreciate that this isn't your specialty interest area but I'd still want to see evidence of a claim before crediting it.
The battle of Minsk-Bialystok does seem very disproportionate compared to other battles, and if we take the entire opening of Barbarossa up to early dec 1941, Wikipedia gives the losses as over 1,000,000 for the Germans and 4,973,820 for the Soviets.TheMarcksPlan wrote: ↑16 Aug 2019, 03:52Is there any evidence that's true? AGC reported only ~12,000 casualties in the Minsk/Bialystok battle.
It's surely true that Germany lost more men than expected in Barbarossa, but that's largely because they expected large-scale fighting for 6 weeks or so.
AG's North and South had minimal Kessel fighting for the first few months.
The Ostheer had ~300,000 replacements ready when it launched Barbarossa, those were sufficient to cover the first couple months' losses.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Barbarossa
Whilst not favourable for the Soviets, the figures balance out with the Germans losing more men than they could replace, and we know the Soviets did make good their losses more than adequately.
To be fair, the Soviets do not have to win with parity when they have so many more men that the Germans. The same applies to the western front too, the allied forces there never won with equal numbers either. To paraphrase Slim, in the case of using a sledgehammer to crack a nut, if you only have a sledgehammer and do not need anything of the nut to remain afterwards, then the sledgehammer is perfectly sufficient for the job.TheMarcksPlan wrote: ↑16 Aug 2019, 03:52There's no situation in which the Soviets win with numerical parity. If you look at the 1942 campaign, the German qualitative edge was arguably higher than in 1941.
In early 1942 the Soviets were suffering their lowest levels of equipment due to the factories moved east not being online yet and only having limited facilities left to supply them. By the end of 1942 this had changed completely.
Quite possible for early Barbarossa, but by late November they had the information from their spy network that Japan had no intention of fighting the Soviets again after the two earlier debacles. This would leave all those nice Siberian divisions to hold the line, and there is no reason Stalin is forced to launch Typhoon if the Germans have been doing slightly better. You still have the 'nuts' of Leningrad, Moscow, Sevastapol, and even Stalingrad to deal with, and if the Soviets adopt a more defensive posture and just use their numbers to absorb attacks, that will inevitably mean the Germans have a harder task as their will be no predictable disasters like Kharkov.TheMarcksPlan wrote: ↑16 Aug 2019, 03:52These are smart dudes but obviously they weren't considering the 1941 facts.
Plus Germany wasn't really fighting a two-front war in 1941-43. At most it's a "1.1 to 1.5 front" war depending on where in that period we are.
The SU arguably had a greater portion of its forces watching Japan in 1941 than did Germany watching England.