One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign

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TheMarcksPlan
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Re: One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 01 Sep 2019 01:20

HistoryGeek2019 wrote:Uboats aren't going to save Germany in your ATL. They won't decrease the political will of the Allies to fight. They will increase the political will of the Allies to fight because one thing the Allies absolutely cannot accept is the threat of Uboats sinking commercial traffic in the Atlantic.
I raised the Uboat and other issues mostly in response to your point a few posts ago that Germany was doomed once the war started because of economic imbalance. My broad point is that factors such as Uboats allowed Germany time to beat Russia before facing the full force of the West. Once it beat Russia and controlled basically all of Europe, Germany controlled areas whose GDP exceeded the U.S.'s (though still smaller than the entire Anglosphere including colonies). At that point, Germany is close enough economically that its higher combat effectiveness and defensive stance make it possibly capable of withstanding any conventional Allied pressure.

Yes, the Uboats were done by 1944 but by then they'd served their purpose of buying time in the West.
And in the second half of 1945 the Type XXI boats would have restarted the Battle of the Atlantic with serious implications for the Anglosphere.
HistoryGeek2019 wrote:For purposes of your ATL, we're positing an Allied invasion of France no earlier than the OTL, and I'll even concede that it likely would have been later than OTL if Russia had collapsed in 1942 per your ATL.
Good clarification of the issues.
As I posted above somewhere, the Allies had ~1.5mil men in France on OTL D+19.
In an ATL where the Westheer can call on 200 divisions, that kind of force will be driven into the channel.
You like to point out that the Allies can diffuse German strength via landings elsewhere but, as we've seen, landing craft and forces committed to a theater were stuck there. So diversionary landings in Italy or the Balkans mean a weaker '45 cross-channel operation. And Germany would be wise, in that event, to merely contain diversionary expeditions while concentrating for a decisive defeat of cross-channel forces. If the Allies land in Italy in the summer, for example, but don't do a cross-channel invasion, then Germany easily pivot forces to destroy the Italian incursion over the winter, once the cross-channel threat has passed. That is to say, any diversionary attacks must be made in conjunction with Cross-channel if they are to survive and any such attacks would unacceptably weaken cross-channel (attacks on islands/Norway excepted).

So IMO we'd need a 1945 invasion at the earliest, and it needs to be ~3x stronger than OTL. Is that possible? As a theoretical matter yes but production of the requisite landing craft would have required cuts in other areas and/or more intensive mobilization in America.
More likely it's a 1946 landing with forces transferred from the Pacific. But by then we have a nightmare scenario of A-bombs and the predictably ghoulish Nazi response (Sarin gas etc.).

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Re: RE: The Russo-Finnish War Revisited.

Post by ljadw » 01 Sep 2019 10:52

Robert Rojas wrote:
31 Aug 2019 23:16
Greetings to both HISTORY GEEK 2019 and the community as a whole. Howdy H.G.2019! Well sir OR madam, in reference to your posting of Saturday - August 31, 2019 = 9:24am, I rarely find myself in agreement with citizen ljadw on most issues, but in this case, I will have to concur with his assessment on this matter as articulated within his posting of Saturday - August 31, 2019 - 10:24am. So, just to sate my curiosity, when you speak of a "MOBILE DIVISION", are you making reference to an over glorified TRUCK BORNE straight leg infantry division OR are you making reference to the classic "PANZER GRENADIER" division replete with half tracks, armored fighting vehicles (tanks and assault guns), self propelled artillery and combat engineers? Now, if it is the former, I cannot share in your enthusiasm for the tactical success (or lack thereof) of such an ad hoc formation against the well acclimatized Red Army Units now arriving in strength from the Siberian Far East. I suspect (rightly OR wrongly) that these road bound Germans will be slaughtered in detail when the Siberians descend upon them like wolves. This is also a lesson that the United States Army would have to relearn during the course of the Korean War some nine years in the future. Silly criticisms indeed. Well, that's my latest two cents, pfennigs or kopecks worth on this continuing saga into only where God knows where. In any case, I would like to bid you an especially copacetic day from sea to shining sea.

Best Regards,
Uncle Bob :idea: :|
We will have to disagree about the impact of the Siberian divisions, which was meaningless .

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Re: One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign

Post by jesk » 01 Sep 2019 19:02

Your alternatives ignore actual events. September 20, I see 17 divisions around Kiev.

Image

The Germans in this area appeared already on July 10. And after 2 months and 10 days there were still fights. Why is there no progress? Tactics surrounding the enemy took a lot of time. The occupation of the territory to the same depth could be achieved due to the advance of the 6th German army. An attack from the north of Guderian’s Panzer Group blocked the advance of the 6th Army. Surrounding, instead of pursuing the enemy, required three times more strength.
Problems at the tactical level. Ticks, surroundings, did not correspond to the scale of the eastern front. It was impossible to create a high density of defense and the importance of the destruction of enemy troops was significantly reduced. No matter how much strength receded, with the newly arrived reserves, the defense easily broke through. This is the meaning of Hitler’s ticks, he believed in the possibility of the Russians creating an insurmountable defense and sought to destroy the enemy in parts, avoiding a general battle. At the heart of Hitler's actions is a reassessment of the Red Army.

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RE: One More Panzer Group In Barbarossa - (Plans For A Two-Year Campaign) - MAYBE!

Post by Robert Rojas » 01 Sep 2019 22:28

Greetings to both citizen Jesk and the community as a whole. Howdy Jesk! Long time no talk to! I was wondering when you were going to make an appearance during the course of this hypothetical "discussion". Now, in light of your installment of Sunday - September 01, 2019 - 10:02am, old yours truly would really appreciate it if you could provide a tad bit more elaboration of "At the heart of Hitler's actions is a REASSESSMENT of the Red Army". I would assume (RIGHTLY or WRONGLY) that the all knowing Bohemian Corporal's intelligence staff was constantly reassessing the size, strength and disposition of the Red Army since the mighty Wehrmacht began its lurching advance into Soviet controlled territory on June 22, 1941. After all, did anyone really anticipate the phenomenon of FLOATING POCKETS in the rear areas of the advancing Wehrmacht? If anything, the unintended consequences of FLOATING POCKETS was also quite a boon to the fledgling partisan movement. Yes, there is nothing like having your enemy not only in front of you but also behind you as well. So much for vaunted Teutonic efficiency! Hopefully, I have not misconstrued or taken your entry out of its proper context. Well, that's my latest two cents, pfennigs or kopecks worth on this latest saga into DRANG NACH ÖSTEN - for now anyway. As always, I would like to bid you an especially copacetic day over in your corner of White Russia.

Best Regards,
Uncle Bob :idea: :|
"It is well that war is so terrible, or we should grow too fond of it" - Robert E. Lee

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Re: RE: One More Panzer Group In Barbarossa - (Plans For A Two-Year Campaign) - MAYBE!

Post by jesk » 02 Sep 2019 06:59

Robert Rojas wrote:
01 Sep 2019 22:28
Now, in light of your installment of Sunday - September 01, 2019 - 10:02am, old yours truly would really appreciate it if you could provide a tad bit more elaboration of "At the heart of Hitler's actions is a REASSESSMENT of the Red Army". I would assume (RIGHTLY or WRONGLY) that the all knowing Bohemian Corporal's intelligence staff was constantly reassessing the size, strength and disposition of the Red Army since the mighty Wehrmacht began its lurching advance into Soviet controlled territory on June 22, 1941. After all, did anyone really anticipate the phenomenon of FLOATING POCKETS in the rear areas of the advancing Wehrmacht? If anything, the unintended consequences of FLOATING POCKETS was also quite a boon to the fledgling partisan movement. Yes, there is nothing like having your enemy not only in front of you but also behind you as well. So much for vaunted Teutonic efficiency!
On July 2, von Bock expressed skepticism about the "boilers." He planned to move to Smolensk without surroundings. The remaining Soviet units in the rear were doomed, but Hitler kept the troops from moving forward. The allocation of small units to block the retreat of the enemy solved the problem.

https://e-libra.ru/read/363132-ya-stoya ... centr.html

In the afternoon, Halder called Graiffenberg. The High Command of the Ground Forces continues to show concern about our ability to control the eastern "cauldron." It even asks whether it is worthwhile to postpone the advance of the combined tank group in this regard. If this happens, the High Command of the Ground Forces [63] will lose the chance to take advantage of the successes we have gained with considerable blood, since the Russians will get extra time to strengthen their defensive positions on the Dnieper and along the Orsha – Vitebsk line! In my opinion, we already drag out an inadmissibly long time with the start of an attack.
I called Halder, who said that before going to the Fuhrer with a report, he would like to find out my position. I told him that there was nothing to worry about, because, firstly, tank groups could not pick up a single person from the troops stationed around the "boiler" without my permission. Secondly, the boiler is constantly decreasing due to the relentless pressure that the infantry units exert on it, and that the danger of a Russian breakthrough is becoming more and more ephemeral every minute. Thirdly, I am ready to send the 900th motorized brigade to strengthen the northeastern sector of our troops, which hold the front around the "boiler", and also in order to free the tank units of the Goth for the offensive. Fourth, the 4th Army sent its advanced units through Slonim to strengthen the encirclement in this sector. And fifthly, I took note of the desire of the High Command of the Ground Forces to use tanks to increase pressure on the "boiler", and ordered the combined tank group to attack with its internal wing west of Minsk in the direction of Nalibokskaya Pushcha if there is a threatening situation , which, however, I have not yet observed.
The situation with the eastern "cauldron" is significantly different from the situation with the small "cauldron" in the west. The surrounded Russian units still have not made serious coordinated attempts to break through. It is hoped that they will not have enough strength for this in the future. Of course, there is a danger of the enemy seeping through our positions, especially in the southwestern [64] sector of the front, where our troops are excessively stretched, but this, apparently, cannot be avoided. Next, I described my impressions of the trip along the Bialystok-Volkovysk road and the surrounding areas, where, in my opinion, the enemy suffered a heavy blow.
Halder said that he adheres to a similar point of view, and added that as a result of our success, the enemy will not be able to create an organized front against us. The Fuhrer is more skeptical. He asked:
“Where, then, are the prisoners?”

I said that 100,000 people is also good. Especially when you consider that every day there are more and more prisoners. Really the Fuhrer did not report about it? In addition, a lot of military equipment was seized.
I asked Halder, who today completely shares my point of view, to make sure that the tank divisions are no longer stopped. Halder inquired whether, theoretically, the enemy could stop the advance of our tank groups, and I replied, “No!” Today the High Command of the Ground Forces issued an order according to which an entire corps should attack through Pinsk in the direction of David Gorodok, which lies in the middle of the swamps. Thus, the High Command of the Ground Forces hopes to eliminate the threat to the inner flanks of the army groups "South" and "Center" from the wetland. Who knows when I will see this building now?

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Re: One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign

Post by MarkN » 05 Sep 2019 10:43

TheMarcksPlan fantasy scenario has 600,000 Red Army troops 'lost' to the orbat in his initial border encirclement by his fantasy HGS. From this flows a series of handwaves that the Heer would then be able to march all the way to the Volga and beyond. A fantasy narrative entirely predicated upon handwaved relative strength assumptions flowing from the initial 600,000 loss.

Historical reality had the total number of Red Army forces on the territory well below the 600,000 mark. Historically speaking, even if the encirclement had occured as per TheMarcksPlan fantasy scenario, the number of Red Army troops lost would be significantly less than 600,000.

What additional troops does TheMarcksPlan fantasy Red Army have in the pocket? Which formations? When did they arrive? How many managed to escape encirclement? On what basis did the fantasy Red Army commanders decide to deploy their troops in this manner?

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Re: One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 05 Sep 2019 21:54

MarkN wrote:the number of Red Army troops lost would be significantly less [sic] than 600,000
*fewer

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Re: One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign

Post by HistoryGeek2019 » 06 Sep 2019 05:59

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
05 Sep 2019 21:54
MarkN wrote:the number of Red Army troops lost would be significantly less [sic] than 600,000
*fewer
I hate to be that guy, but less is correct when stating that one number is less than another number.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Less-than_sign

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Re: One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign

Post by jesk » 06 Sep 2019 09:39

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
08 Aug 2019 10:15
What the extra forces do

Ten mobile divisions join Schobert's 11th Army (6 divisions) in Rumania. From there, they strike north/northeast as the second pincer enveloping Southwest Front in Ukraine, meeting somewhere between Shepetivka and Zhitomir. For reference:

Image

The "arrow" represents the added thrust. German generals were hoping to execute something like this during AGS's OTL battle by linking up with 11th army east of the Dniestr; AGS just didn't have to punch to make it happen. As the map shows, PzGr1 was near to the point of the arrow (dotted lines around Rovno and Ostrog on the map) by July 7 even with Southwest Front concentrating all of its reserves to stop it. In the ATL, Southwest Front's Kirponos would have to divert forces against the Romanian pincer and Kleist would make even better progress. The pincers would meet in early July and the battle would be over by mid-July at the latest. Three SU armies (6th, 12th, 26th) plus large reserves would be trapped.
Your thinking is limited by wedges and large arrows. But how can you explain the events in the Baltic states? Without pockets, the complete defeat of Soviet forces !?

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Re: One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign

Post by MarkN » 06 Sep 2019 22:32

TheMarcksPlan fantasy scenario has 600,000 Red Army troops 'lost' to the orbat in his initial border encirclement by his fantasy HGS. From this flows a series of handwaves that the Heer would then be able to march all the way to the Volga and beyond. A fantasy narrative entirely predicated upon handwaved relative strength assumptions flowing from the initial 600,000 loss.

Historical reality had HGM perform a double envelopment of Western Front forces massed upon the border and their rear support area. This battle was designed to encircle the whole of Western Front's geographical area and all of its formational elements. HGM managed to remove a little over 400,000 Red Army troops from the orbat. Over a third of Western Front managed to escape encirclement.

It is this battle that TheMarcksPlan is trying to replicate in his fantasy scenario. However, his fantasy narrative has HGS performing a far shallower encirclement of 3 armies not the whole of Southwestern Front. 3 Armies which, on 22 June 1941, historically totalled about 200,000 troops. And still, he wishes all to believe his handwave claim of 600,000 is credible. 400,000 is a lot less than 600,000. The historical HGM envelopment was significantly more ambitious geographically and tactically than TheMarcksPlan fantasy HGS envelopment.

If the Bialystok/Minsk encirclement is to be the metric with, for arguements sake, a 33% leakage factor, who were the other 700,000 troops which joined the 200,000 of 6., 12. and 26.Army in the pocket? Where did they come from? When were they moved to the border? What plan were the fantasy Southwestern Front / STAVKA commanders using for such a diversion from historical reality to occur? What effect would such an increase in Red Army forces have on the advancing Heer compared to historical reality? Isaev provides the historical details of which additional Red Army troops were in the (non)pocket.

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Re: One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign

Post by jesk » 07 Sep 2019 00:12

Alternatives +10; +20 divisions are all in the context of forces for encircling the enemy. Hitler also explained his actions. In an order on August 21, he admitted that the 6th German army could seize territory, but without capturing prisoners. Territory + destruction of troops = 6 army + troops of the Center group. Hitler's blurry formulas are repeated in TheMarcksPlan posts. 200, 400 or 600 thousand is not the point. It is a repetition that Germany lacks the strength to solve tasks. For what? To create circles around the Russians, but Hitler himself admitted that it is possible to capture territory without enemy soldiers without circles. Сan also argue with Hitler. Near Leningrad, as a result of parallel pursuit, hundreds of thousands of Soviet soldiers were captured.

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Re: One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign

Post by HistoryGeek2019 » 07 Sep 2019 02:58

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
06 Sep 2019 07:17
HistoryGeek2019 wrote:
06 Sep 2019 05:59
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
05 Sep 2019 21:54
MarkN wrote:the number of Red Army troops lost would be significantly less [sic] than 600,000
*fewer
I hate to be that guy, but less is correct when stating that one number is less than another number.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Less-than_sign
Had MarkN made a case for fewer PW's, and then said, e.g., "the 100k PW's in my more convincing narrative are less than the 600k PW's in your narrative" then I'd have no grounds for correction.
No, it would actually be correct to say, "the 100K PW's in my core convincing narrative are fewer than the 600K PW's in your narrative." Here "fewer than" refers to PW's. There are fewer PW's in his narrative than yours.

But when you say a "number" is less than another number, it is always less than, never fewer.

http://www.gmatpill.com/more-than-vs-gr ... ewer-than/

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Re: One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 07 Sep 2019 07:08

HistoryGeek2019 wrote:
07 Sep 2019 02:58
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
06 Sep 2019 07:17
HistoryGeek2019 wrote:
06 Sep 2019 05:59
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
05 Sep 2019 21:54
MarkN wrote:the number of Red Army troops lost would be significantly less [sic] than 600,000
*fewer
I hate to be that guy, but less is correct when stating that one number is less than another number.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Less-than_sign
Had MarkN made a case for fewer PW's, and then said, e.g., "the 100k PW's in my more convincing narrative are less than the 600k PW's in your narrative" then I'd have no grounds for correction.
No, it would actually be correct to say, "the 100K PW's in my core convincing narrative are fewer than the 600K PW's in your narrative." Here "fewer than" refers to PW's. There are fewer PW's in his narrative than yours.

But when you say a "number" is less than another number, it is always less than, never fewer.

http://www.gmatpill.com/more-than-vs-gr ... ewer-than/
You're ignoring the comparative rule for using less than.

2 apples is less than 10 apples, not fewer than 10 apples.
If you have an indeterminate quantity of apples somewhere between 0 and 9 apples, then you have fewer than 10 apples.

MarkN argues for some indeterminate quantity of PW of a magnitude between 0 and 600k. He therefore argues for fewer than 600k PW. Were he to argue for 100k PW then we're back in the comparative use of less than and it would be appropriate to say 100k is less than 600k.

This is all laid out in your GMAT link towards the bottom, though less clearly than I would like.

MarkN - I invite you to articulate a prediction of how many PW you think would be bagged, if any at all. I will respond to the substantive part of such an argument if you make it.

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Re: TheMarcksPlan historical disconnects

Post by jesk » 07 Sep 2019 08:18

MarkN wrote:
26 Aug 2019 11:56
Historical reality had the German military strategy for success predicated on defeating the bulk of the Red Army on the border. The failed to achieve this. Part of the reason why they failed was their inability to seal the pockets and prevent Red Army units retreating to fight another day.

As an exercise in relative numbers, TheMarcksPlan fantasy scenario is entirely predicated on every pocket being perfectly sealed after encirclement and no Red Army forces being able to escape snd fight another day.

I wonder what magic formula TheMarcksPlan's fantasy Germans have to prevent the historical "leakage", what changes to military tactics were required, what changes in military commanders were required and whether the certainty of this effort is credible.
It's foggy here. And for example, the words of Marshal Konev. When the defense breakthrough was successful and the advancing, not meeting resistance, move forward. There is no time to deal with enemy units that are behind. The maximum forces to capture enemy territory and the defeat of its reserves. More importantly, seizure of territory or destruction of enemy? Hitler for the ring, Konev for the territory.
Why did Russians at the end of the war abandon their surroundings and engage in them before? For example, the Korsun-Shevchenkovsky operation. When it was not possible to break into big depths, in order to get at least some kind of benefits, they were engaged in the liquidation of "pockets".


http://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian/konev_is2/text.html

On January 15, the city of Kielce was taken, most of the Nazi troops resisting at the approaches to it were defeated, and their remains were thrown into the forests north of Kielce. Subsequently, they merged with the remnants of other broken armies, retreating under the onslaught of the 1st Belorussian Front, into one rather large group consisting of several divisions. This group remained deep behind us behind the closed flanks of the 1st Ukrainian and 1st Belorussian fronts.
This is a characteristic feature of the Vistula-Oder operation, and indeed of the last period of the war. We no longer strived at all costs to create a double - external and internal - front around each such enemy group. We believed, and correctly believed, that if we were to develop the offensive at a fairly rapid pace, then even the fairly serious enemy forces cut off and remaining in our rear would not be afraid of us. Sooner or later, they will be defeated and destroyed by the second echelons of our troops.
So in the end it happened even with such a large group, about which I just said. She was defeated twice, trying to escape from the encirclement, and then, half-scattered, she wandered the forests behind our troops, until she was finally destroyed in small skirmishes.
The situation was more complicated with the mobile armored and mechanized enemy forces remaining in our rear. Arriving at the height of the offensive at the front command post on the outskirts of the city of Czestochowa, I listened to the excited report of one of my subordinates that a large enemy group of armored and mechanized troops was moving directly from our rear to Czestochow.
The situation was not one of the most advantageous: in front — our troops who had already gone west, beyond Czestochow, in the middle — the front command post of the front, and behind — the enemy’s tank corps. So this, in any case, looked in the initial report, although it, as always in similar circumstances, contained an increase. In fact, one enemy tank division was attacking us, overgrown with some disparate units that joined it. But she walked, it must be said, in a rather organized manner, decisively breaking through our rear.
The news was, of course, unpleasant, but it was not a surprise to me. We assumed that at high rates of our forward movement, such separate wandering boilers would remain in our rear. Moreover, they are logical in modern conditions, when the troops, maneuvering, have gaps between themselves, when the front of the advancing is incomplete and should not be continuous, because in modern warfare there is no need to go elbow to shoulder. It is only important that interaction is established within our units and formations, that there is a stable connection and that all of them are controllable at any moment of the battle.

Such a movement, so to speak, on parallel courses, with the overtaking of retreating German troops and the seizure of water lines in the depths of enemy defense, was also provided by us. We knew well that there were many rivers ahead with swampy peaty valleys, with viscous, marshy soil, especially not favorable for tank troops, and even in the conditions of a changeable Polish winter - today the thaw, tomorrow it freezes a little, then the snow, then again the thaw.

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Re: One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign

Post by jesk » 07 Sep 2019 08:39

Konev wrote: when troops maneuvering, have gaps between themselves, when the front of the advancing is incomplete and should not be continuous, because in modern warfare there is no need to go elbow to elbow, shoulder to shoulder.

Hitler 19 july 1941 in the directive №33, outlined the importance of shoulder to shoulder. A lot of sabotage.

The northeastern section of the Eastern Front. Progress in the direction of Leningrad should be resumed only after the 18th Army came into contact with the 4th Panzer Group, and its eastern flank was secured by the forces of the 16th Army. At the same time, Army Group North should seek to prevent the retreat of Soviet units to Leningrad, which continues to operate in Estonia. It is advisable to take control of the islands in the Baltic Sea as soon as possible, which can become strongholds of the Soviet fleet.

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