One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign

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Peter89
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Re: One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign

Post by Peter89 » 20 May 2021 21:14

Peter89 wrote:
06 Oct 2020 16:23
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
06 Oct 2020 15:34
Peter89 wrote:Germany was not able to sustain the continent without food imports.
This was true OTL but not necessarily true ATL. To understand why you'd have to consider why domestic European food production fell so much. This was a matter of fertilizer, fuel, and manpower (Romania and Finland's drafts, for example, massively decreased food production). All of those conditions are at least partially rectified by SU's defeat: fertilizer instead of explosives, Russian/MidEast oil, no need for Finnish/Romanian/Hungarian armies.

You also seem unaware of - ignorant of - the adaptability of agricultural production to wartime needs. I.e. you can't look at 1938 European imports and say "that's what Europe always needs." Just look up statistics on UK ag. production.
Forgive me, but I am not keen to discuss systematic starvation as a legitimate tool for a prolonged war.

Find another way or another debate partner.
To clarify what I meant here: I personally don't like to discuss inhumane actions by any belligerents with a systematic view. By that I mean I don't like when people discuss the plans for deliberate targeting of civilians with nukes, to perpetrate mass rapes as acts of rightful revenge, or, like in this case, deliberate and systematic starvation of people to get more food. For me, it is simply not a topic of discussion "if we starve 30 million people to death, then we'll have enough food for two more years", or "if we bomb 30 orphanages then we can wreck their manpower supply" or "if we rape 30 more women, then we can restore the pride of our village". It's not because I'd brand anyone as a follower of the respective ideology, it's a personal preference.

Just to make it super clear, I do not think that TMP is a Nazi or tries to spread Nazi views.


My disagreement with his views are not of personal nature.

Written in agreement that we'll not continue this childish tone any longer.
“And while I am talking to you, mothers and fathers, I give you one more assurance. I have said this before, but I shall say it again, and again and again. Your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars." - FDR, October 1940

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Re: One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 20 May 2021 22:36

Peter89 wrote:
20 May 2021 21:14
Peter89 wrote:
06 Oct 2020 16:23
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
06 Oct 2020 15:34
Peter89 wrote:Germany was not able to sustain the continent without food imports.
This was true OTL but not necessarily true ATL. To understand why you'd have to consider why domestic European food production fell so much. This was a matter of fertilizer, fuel, and manpower (Romania and Finland's drafts, for example, massively decreased food production). All of those conditions are at least partially rectified by SU's defeat: fertilizer instead of explosives, Russian/MidEast oil, no need for Finnish/Romanian/Hungarian armies.

You also seem unaware of - ignorant of - the adaptability of agricultural production to wartime needs. I.e. you can't look at 1938 European imports and say "that's what Europe always needs." Just look up statistics on UK ag. production.
Forgive me, but I am not keen to discuss systematic starvation as a legitimate tool for a prolonged war.

Find another way or another debate partner.
To clarify what I meant here: I personally don't like to discuss inhumane actions by any belligerents with a systematic view. By that I mean I don't like when people discuss the plans for deliberate targeting of civilians with nukes, to perpetrate mass rapes as acts of rightful revenge, or, like in this case, deliberate and systematic starvation of people to get more food. For me, it is simply not a topic of discussion "if we starve 30 million people to death, then we'll have enough food for two more years", or "if we bomb 30 orphanages then we can wreck their manpower supply" or "if we rape 30 more women, then we can restore the pride of our village". It's not because I'd brand anyone as a follower of the respective ideology, it's a personal preference.

Just to make it super clear, I do not think that TMP is a Nazi or tries to spread Nazi views.


My disagreement with his views are not of personal nature.

Written in agreement that we'll not continue this childish tone any longer.
Thank you very much, Peter. I am perhaps too sensitive from being called Wehraboo so many times on this forum, and am liable to react to such accusations (in your case wrongly perceived) in a low manner.

My way of dealing with the stomach-churning aspects of Axis victory ATL's is simply not to think about it, other than it would be very bad. To consider whether a thing could have happened is not to consider whether it should have happened. For political reasons that forum rules bar me from stating, I nonetheless consider it important to consider alternate outcomes. And as I said over PM, any ATL in which the Germans do any better has disgusting non-military implications.

That said, I will respect the preferences of those who simply don't want to discuss these scenarios.
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Re: One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 15 Jun 2021 05:29

I last left off the main ATL narrative at the end August here.

Capitalizing on early destruction of SW Front and better rail logistics, Ostheer finished August by executing Vyazma-Bryansk and taking the western Donbas:

Image

AGN's progress was in line with OTL but, at the end of August, is facing far weaker opposition than OTL due to RKKA having lost ~1.5mil more men than OTL so far.

I also introduced a spreadsheet to track certain quantitative/qualitative factors:
  • Earlier destruction of Soviet forces implies lower casualties for Ostheer in subsequent stages
  • Soviets might ameliorate this by stripping Siberia earlier
  • Soviets probably forced to deploy forces with even worse training than OTL, due to greater losses. These early-deployed forces have lower casualty-infliction rates.
  • Soviets begin to run out of weapons as the campaign proceeds.
The spreadsheet, as shared, contains very conservative estimates of the quantitative impacts of these factors on German casualties. Nonetheless, by early September, German casualties are already ~100k lower than OTL.

With that setup, here's the overall scheme for ATL September 1941:

Image

September involves three main battles:
  • AGC surrounds Moscow in a massive Kessel
  • AGN traps Volkov Front in a Kessel along Ladoga by linking up with the Finns.
  • AGS, previously operating south of the Donets, sends one PzGr north to link up with AOK 6 and surround Kharkov. The rest of AGS pushes to Rostov and into the Don Bend.
In all of these battles RKKA is ~30% weaker than OTL and Ostheer significantly stronger.

--------------------------------------------------------

With Moscow and Rostov taken, the Don bend nearly cleared, and Leningrad cut off from land/Ladoga links, we have the setup for the fall/winter campaign. Over the next 3-4 months, Ostheer will push to a line roughly as follows:

Image

...which will be the rough frontline for the '42 campaign to finish the SU.

This is is a minimal/conservative projection: I could see Ostheer pushing over the Don to a north-south line roughly Gorkiy (Nizhniy Novgorod) - Stalingrad (Volgograd), for example.

Most of the advance from my Stage 4 line to the May '42 line can be via slower advances that will nonetheless capture many RKKA, as always happened even absent Kessels. By May '42, RKKA will have yielded ~2.5mil more PoW than OTL.

Ostheer's casualties - net of lower recuperations flows due to lower casualties - will be ~300k lower than OTL.

Leningrad will fall by ~January '42 absent the millions of tons sent over Lake Ladoga in OTL. Until then, it's screened with weak forces while the rest of AGN pushes the front eastwards.

A winter offensive into the Caucasus (yellow lines) will be Ostheer's only blitzkrieg during this time. Having taken Rostov in September, AGS should be logistically ready to launch this offensive no later than January: it will have had at least three months to repair rail bridges etc. Maikop should fall during January, Grozny during February. Ostheer probably can't force the Caucasus passes during winter, however. Rather, it will have another 2-3 months to rebuild rail infrastructure between Rostov and Grozny for the Spring '42 push to Baku and through the Caucasus.

--------------
TMP bookmark: ATL September '41 - April '42 operations
https://medium.com/counterfactualww2
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Re: One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 15 Jun 2021 06:41

Demographic analysis of Soviet strength, following ATL Barbarossa

The counterfactual centers on weakening the SU sufficiently in '41 to finish it off in '42 (assuming it doesn't collapse). It would have worked. Soviet working population declines by at least 35% due to several factors analyzed below.

1. Population and labor force lost to additional occupation

Between the ATL and OTL winter lines resided ~50mil Soviet citizens prewar. With reference to this table from The Population of the Soviet Union: History and Prospects [1946]:

Moscow-Gorkiy region (aka "Old Industrial Center): 22mil
Eastern Ukraine (unoccupied in '41): ~5mil
Voronezh and environs ("Central Black Soil"): 12.1mil
Rostov+Don Bend+Stalingrad ("Lower Volga and Don"): 5.4mil
North Caucasus: 6.5mil
Northeast (area between Leningrad and Vologda): 3.2mil
Leningrad: ~2mil (using the wartime figure rather than prewar)

Sum: 56.2mil

Assumption: 50mil - reduced due to uncertainty about Soviet statistics generally, partial occupation of some listed regions.

Per Harrison's Soviet Planning in Peace and War, p.72, ~20% of the population of occupied SU fled or was recruited into RKKA before occupation.

Net Population Loss Due to Occupation: 40mil.

2. Lower evacuation rates due to faster ATL advances

Evacuations required time, rail logistics, planning, and/or road logistics. ATL German advances reach the OTL line of furthest advance (mid-November's frontline) in roughly half the time (end of August or early September). Evacuations could conceivably be halved or more due to transportation difficulties. SU did not have excess rail capacity; it was already using 50% or more for evacuations.

In addition, the decision on whether to evacuate was based in part on perceptions of likely Soviet success and loyalty to the regime, all of which would decline in this ATL. For a discussion of human factors and the decision to evacuate, see To the Tashkent Station: Evacuation and Survival in
the Soviet Union at War
by Rebecca Manley. Here is an excerpt discussing, with first-hand accounts, that many evacuated unwillingly under official orders. Clearly many would not have evacuated, had the authorities been unable to assemble the required transport.

Quantifying the impact of this factor is speculative, but it could be on the order of half of the OTL evacuees or up to 8mil.

3. Additional permanent RKKA casualties.

As discussed in the operational narratives and as in my proposed (conservative) quantification via spreadsheet, RKKA would lose ~2.5mil more PoW's in this ATL.

In addition, stronger German forces (+5 divs but also more ammo and supplies) would kill/cripple more RKKA.

Net additional losses during first 11 months of war: 2.5-3mil

4. Summary of Demographic Losses, ATL vs. OTL

Our three factors so far are:
  • ~40mil lost to additional occupation
  • 0-8mil lost to lower evacuation from OTL-occupied territories
  • ~2.5mil-3mil additional RKKA dead/captured/disabled
Let's look at the lower bound for each factor. Our baseline Soviet population at the beginning of '42 is 130mil (Harrison, Soviet Planning, p.72). Of this population, 55mil were workers (including military) in '42 (Harrison, Accounting for War, Table I.11).
  • Losing 40mil reduces Soviet population by 30.7% - working population is now 38.1mil.
  • For now let's ignore reduced evacuation.
  • Additional RKKA losses come directly from working population, which is now 35.6mil.
Even on the lower bounds for all our parameters, Soviet working population declines 35.3%.

If we allow a significant non-zero parameter for lower evacuations, Soviet labor force could easily be 40% lower.

--------------------------------

A smaller workforce means lower output. Whether economic output's delta might exceed the labor force delta (it probably would, IMJ) will be another topic for analysis.

----------------------------

TMP bookmark: ATL Barbarossa and Soviet Labor Force
Last edited by TheMarcksPlan on 15 Jun 2021 08:52, edited 1 time in total.
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Re: One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 15 Jun 2021 08:27

Economic Impact of ATL Barbarossa

The biggest economic impact is loss of labor force, addressed in my last post. This post will show why economic damage would exceed even the diminution of labor force.

1. Labor Productivity

A. Agricultural land factor

Economic output would decline in proportion to labor force and productivity. We just looked at labor force loss; would ATL Barbarossa impact productivity? There is enormous ground to believe it would: agricultural land losses would render the biggest labor sector less productive.

In another thread I analyzed Soviet agricultural geography in terms of total output and geography. I inferred a total sown acreage distribution from published statistics and used productivity differentials that aligned well with Soviet figures.

TL;DR: Because Soviet lands lost in the ATL (Central Black Earth region, North Caucasus, Lower Don/Volga) were >30% more productive than available substitutes farther east (Siberia, Kazakhstan), total Soviet agricultural productivity would decline by at least 10% relative to OTL.

Because Soviet agriculture occupied 47% of labor in 1942 (Harrison, Accounting for War, App.I), a 10% decline in productivity would require 11% more workers to maintain (already abysmal) nutritional standards. I.e. ~10% of the non-agricultural workforce would have to shift to agriculture.

As I've discussed elsewhere, [i[Hunger and War[/i] and other books demonstrate that the SU could not afford to cut calories any more. Addressing the shortfall caused by the ATL conquests would be absolutely necessary to avoid collapse.

Combined with at least -35% delta to labor force overall, shifting ~10% of the non-ag workforce towards agriculture (or starving) would push the SU towards being 40% weaker in '42.

B. "Chaos" factor.

In The Soviet Homefront, 1941-45, Barber and Harrison observe significant productivity declines in all non-armaments sectors and explain:
There were several identifiable causes of depressed productivity. In
industry and transport important factors were the loss of economic
coordination... p.178
That book and others describe extreme dislocation of transportation, power, and raw materials - as one would expect with 50% of rail capacity devoted to evacuations and with millions being called into the army and new jobs.

ATL conditions would amplify this chaos. In addition, Barber and Harrison (p.163-7) describe problems with work discipline, including absenteeism and unpermitted job-leaving. They discuss morale as a causal factor. Morale will be worse in this ATL, especially after Moscow/Leningrad fall.

While it's impossible to quantify likely effects, it's another factor pushing us towards my estimate of 40% lower Soviet warmaking capacity.

2. Loss of Lend Lease Aid

A. Murmansk railway in 1941

My winter line includes the Axis cutting the Murmansk railway at Belomorsk. As I've discussed with cites elsewhere, the Finns halted their attack short of Belomorsk due to political pressure from America, not due to moral scruples about conquering further territory (this should be obvious to anyone who can read a map of Finland in 1939 vs. 1942). Finland's halt was sub silentio; they didn't inform Hitler of their decision and pretended they tried to take Belomorsk.

In this ATL the political calculation is entirely different: Germany is far stronger and SU far weaker. After AGN destroys Volkhov Front and seals off Leningrad, the Finnish Army will have little to do except to take Belomorsk. It therefore cannot pretend to attack it and must choose between openly defying the US and Germany.

Given that the U.S. is far, is still non-belligerent when the Finnish Army is freed by German success on the Svir, and that Germany is much stronger, Finland in all likelihood takes Belomorsk during October-December. Alternatively, Germany could attack Belomorsk from Finnish territory. Either precludes most LL aid during winter '41-'42, as most American aid went via Murmansk:

Image

...and nearly all British aid did as well.

...combined with lower labor force, lower productivity, and lower LL aid, SU's warmaking potential for '42 is now easily 40% lower.

B.Vladivostok in early '42

The SU's ATL weakness will not go un-noticed in Tokyo. Rather than proposing an attack on Vladivostok, I'll propose a more minimal ATL alteration that flows directly from ATL conditions: Hitler will, through a combination of carrot and stick, cause Japan to shut down Allied-originating and/or Allied-financed imports to Vladivostok.

Carrot: Hitler will offer to supply Japan with excess army goods once the SU is defeated (via Trans-Siberian railroad). Say thousands of MG34's and hundreds of obsolete tanks (PzI/II/III-37/38t), which could all be decisive in China. They're surplus to Germany after SU's fall.

Stick: Hitler will not declare war on the U.S. unless Japan agrees. In this ATL, unlike OTL, Hitler is not desperate and strategically deranged in December '41. His war is going to plan; he has no reason to trade the "no separate peace" agreement with Japan for his DoW. He can wait.

Japan is in the process of its Kantokuen buildup for a possible '42 attack on the SU. While it can't invade the SU during winter '42 it also has no reason to fear a large Soviet offensive into Manchuria. It therefore agrees to Hitler's terms, announcing a functional - though not legal - blockade of Vladivostok in February/March '42. It is highly unlikely that SU responds with war but obviously that only makes things worse for SU. The loss of food and raw materials via Vladivostok during winter '42 further degrades the Soviet economy and food situation.

In early '42 the Persian Corridor is too low-capacity, and its shipping burden too great, to substitute for much - if any - of the OTL flows through Murmansk and Vladivostok.

Again, we're now easily at 40% lower Soviet warmaking capacity.

3. Loss of OTL-evacuated capital

In all likelihood, labor would be the bottleneck to Soviet output in ATL '42. However, the more rapid ATL Barbarossa would also prevent some capital evacuations that might become localized bottlenecks. Losing the Kharkov or Leningrad tank plants, for example.

----------------------------------------------------

My last post showed a -35% ATL delta to labor force size being a likely lower bound. This post shows that additional economic factors - agricultural land loss, other productivity factors, LL losses, and additional capital losses - are all but certain to push that figure up to 40% in terms of economics and warmaking potential.

Total RKKA size at OTL armaments density could not exceed 60% of OTL. If more men went under arms, massive sacrifices to already-low armament standards would have been required.

Applying that rate to the Ostheer-facing RKKA gives us only ~3.3mil men in May '42 (versus 5.5mil OTL): RKKA would be outnumbered by the Axis. Other force dispositions were possible but would invite disaster against Japan/Turkey. To be discussed further in my '42 narrative, which might inaugurate a new thread.

----------------
TMP bookmark: ATL Barbarossa's economic impact
https://medium.com/counterfactualww2
"The whole question of whether we win or lose the war depends on the Russians." - FDR, June 1942

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Re: One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign

Post by ljadw » 16 Jun 2021 11:36

The usual wishful-thinking to make a German victory possible.
There is no proof that the loss of the Ukraine would decrease the Soviet agricultural production , as the average Soviet citizen was not feed by Sovchozes and Kolchozes,but was feeding himself .Every one in the SU, in Britain, in Germany ,etc became a peasant during the war .Before the war there was a strong private sector in the Soviet agriculture,and he became more important during the war .As Moskoff said : the Soviet population was feeding themselves .

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Re: One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 16 Jun 2021 11:39

ljadw wrote:There is no proof that the loss of the Ukraine would decrease the Soviet agricultural production
Thank you for your contribution.
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Re: One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign

Post by ljadw » 16 Jun 2021 13:33

The loss of Ukraine did not result in famine in 1942 in the non occupied parts of the SU, neither was there famine in Russia 50 years later when Ukraine became independent .The reasons are very simple : people were feeding themselves and the other regions took over the role of Ukraine .

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Re: One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign

Post by Peter89 » 16 Jun 2021 13:50

ljadw wrote:
16 Jun 2021 13:33
The loss of Ukraine did not result in famine in 1942 in the non occupied parts of the SU, neither was there famine in Russia 50 years later when Ukraine became independent .The reasons are very simple : people were feeding themselves and the other regions took over the role of Ukraine .
...not to mention food imports? :roll:
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Re: One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign

Post by ljadw » 17 Jun 2021 06:39

The importance of food imports is very much exaggerated :as Moskoff said : people were feeding themselves .You can't feed 170 million people by importing food .

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Re: One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign

Post by ljadw » 17 Jun 2021 06:56

Group A : military ,received rations from the government and LL food . There is no proof that LL food was the most important
Group B : city inhabitants, received rations from the government,which were insufficient to survive .They survived because of the black market and of the food they produced themselves .Those who had no money to buy food on the black market or could not produce food simply died . This was also the case in France, Belgium and other countries .
Group C : the inhabitants of the country (60 % ) received NO rations from the government ,but still survived .Why ?Because after giving a lot of food to the government, they had still enough food to survive and to feed group B .
Those who now are claiming that LL food saved the Russian population have no idea how it was to live ,to survive during a war and do not know that 80 years ago the situation in most countries was totally different from today : most people in Europe were peasants or had ties with peasants and most produced their own food .The father of my neighbor never went to a butcher during the war (there was only one butcher in the town) or even before the war .The same for the baker .And he was not an exception .There were no big stores outside the big cities and the peasants normally did not go to the big cities, especially during the war .

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Re: One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign

Post by Peter89 » 17 Jun 2021 07:36

ljadw wrote:
17 Jun 2021 06:56
Group A : military ,received rations from the government and LL food . There is no proof that LL food was the most important
Group B : city inhabitants, received rations from the government,which were insufficient to survive .They survived because of the black market and of the food they produced themselves .Those who had no money to buy food on the black market or could not produce food simply died . This was also the case in France, Belgium and other countries .
Group C : the inhabitants of the country (60 % ) received NO rations from the government ,but still survived .Why ?Because after giving a lot of food to the government, they had still enough food to survive and to feed group B .
Those who now are claiming that LL food saved the Russian population have no idea how it was to live ,to survive during a war and do not know that 80 years ago the situation in most countries was totally different from today : most people in Europe were peasants or had ties with peasants and most produced their own food .The father of my neighbor never went to a butcher during the war (there was only one butcher in the town) or even before the war .The same for the baker .And he was not an exception .There were no big stores outside the big cities and the peasants normally did not go to the big cities, especially during the war .
Why do you think there were food imports if everyone was well-fed?
“And while I am talking to you, mothers and fathers, I give you one more assurance. I have said this before, but I shall say it again, and again and again. Your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars." - FDR, October 1940

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Re: One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 17 Jun 2021 08:11

Peter89 wrote:everyone was well-fed?
For chrissakes, Peter. Don't go along with someone just because they're on your "side." Grain production declined by over 50%, thousands of valuable war workers died from starvation - many dying on the factory floor.

To believe that losing the Ukraine didn't harm Soviet food supply is like believing that losing France didn't harm the Allies. Pure lunacy.

The SU was not well-fed during the war; some people need to be set to ignore.
only the Soviet Union witnessed mass civilian deaths from starvation [during the war].
-Hunger and War by Filtzer et. al.
https://medium.com/counterfactualww2
"The whole question of whether we win or lose the war depends on the Russians." - FDR, June 1942

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Re: One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign

Post by ljadw » 17 Jun 2021 11:30

Peter89 wrote:
17 Jun 2021 07:36
ljadw wrote:
17 Jun 2021 06:56
Group A : military ,received rations from the government and LL food . There is no proof that LL food was the most important
Group B : city inhabitants, received rations from the government,which were insufficient to survive .They survived because of the black market and of the food they produced themselves .Those who had no money to buy food on the black market or could not produce food simply died . This was also the case in France, Belgium and other countries .
Group C : the inhabitants of the country (60 % ) received NO rations from the government ,but still survived .Why ?Because after giving a lot of food to the government, they had still enough food to survive and to feed group B .
Those who now are claiming that LL food saved the Russian population have no idea how it was to live ,to survive during a war and do not know that 80 years ago the situation in most countries was totally different from today : most people in Europe were peasants or had ties with peasants and most produced their own food .The father of my neighbor never went to a butcher during the war (there was only one butcher in the town) or even before the war .The same for the baker .And he was not an exception .There were no big stores outside the big cities and the peasants normally did not go to the big cities, especially during the war .
Why do you think there were food imports if everyone was well-fed?
Where did I say that everyone was well-fed ?
Besides : what is well-fed ?

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Re: One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign

Post by ljadw » 17 Jun 2021 11:48

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
17 Jun 2021 08:11
Peter89 wrote:everyone was well-fed?
For chrissakes, Peter. Don't go along with someone just because they're on your "side." Grain production declined by over 50%, thousands of valuable war workers died from starvation - many dying on the factory floor.

To believe that losing the Ukraine didn't harm Soviet food supply is like believing that losing France didn't harm the Allies. Pure lunacy.

The SU was not well-fed during the war; some people need to be set to ignore.
only the Soviet Union witnessed mass civilian deaths from starvation [during the war].
-Hunger and War by Filtzer et. al.
Official stats are not very reliable .Neither are horror stories .
Besides : what was the reason for the'' starvation'' of ''valuable '' ( another meaningless word ) workers ?
If you say that it was the loss of Ukraine, you must prove that before the war it was the opposite : that these valuable workers did not die because they were eating Ukrainian food .
Other reasons are possible : weather, transport problems, harshness of the war .
And again : YOU are saying that the Soviet population was not well fed (something totally meaningless ),while I did not say that they were well-fed .
Last point : if they were not well-fed, why did only a few of them die from starvation ?
Saying that because of an unknown number of Soviet civilians died from hunger ( and probably other causes ) while the overwhelming majority did not die from hunger (and probably other causes ) and that this is proving that everyone had hunger, is nonsense as is talking about ''mass civilian deaths from starvation .''The truth is that it does not prove that people were well-fed or that they were not well-fed .
It is even possible that more people were better fed than people who had less food .

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