The ideal Axis strategy

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JAG13
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Posts: 689
Joined: 23 Mar 2013, 02:50

Re: The ideal Axis strategy

#136

Post by JAG13 » 01 Dec 2019, 17:55

pugsville wrote:
01 Dec 2019, 06:47
Turkish Foreign Policy During the Second World War: An 'Active' Neutrality
von Selim Deringil

page 121
" In the course of negotiations von Papen had to convince Ribbentropp that unlimited tranist facilities were a vain dream, and pointed out to his Minister that the Turks refused any obligation aimed against Britain"
...
"Turkish resistance to arms transit exasperated Ribbentrop who felt the Turks should know that Germany was in a position to 'blot out the Turkish state in a few weeks'"

page 129
"Moreover the Turkish side told the Germans that they that would refuse to breach their contract with Britain and no deliveries could be made till 1943"

This is septemeber 1941.
Yeah, and all that had Ribbentrop as its source... you clearly need to read on Ribbentrop.

The Turks were trying to stay out, and the solution was simple, if given a choice, they wouldnt be irrational.

pugsville
Member
Posts: 1016
Joined: 17 Aug 2011, 05:40

Re: The ideal Axis strategy

#137

Post by pugsville » 02 Dec 2019, 04:50

JAG13 wrote:
01 Dec 2019, 17:55
pugsville wrote:
01 Dec 2019, 06:47
Turkish Foreign Policy During the Second World War: An 'Active' Neutrality
von Selim Deringil

page 121
" In the course of negotiations von Papen had to convince Ribbentropp that unlimited tranist facilities were a vain dream, and pointed out to his Minister that the Turks refused any obligation aimed against Britain"
...
"Turkish resistance to arms transit exasperated Ribbentrop who felt the Turks should know that Germany was in a position to 'blot out the Turkish state in a few weeks'"

page 129
"Moreover the Turkish side told the Germans that they that would refuse to breach their contract with Britain and no deliveries could be made till 1943"

This is septemeber 1941.
Yeah, and all that had Ribbentrop as its source... you clearly need to read on Ribbentrop.

The Turks were trying to stay out, and the solution was simple, if given a choice, they wouldnt be irrational.
The Turks displayed extreme stubbornness and pushed very negotiation to the limit, the were pretty relentess in teh demands and positions regardless of who they were talking to.,

I see no evidence that supports them just rolling over.,


pugsville
Member
Posts: 1016
Joined: 17 Aug 2011, 05:40

Re: The ideal Axis strategy

#138

Post by pugsville » 02 Dec 2019, 04:53

JAG13 wrote:
01 Dec 2019, 17:49
pugsville wrote:
01 Dec 2019, 06:35
JAG13 wrote:
30 Nov 2019, 19:01


Lol! You are not serious, are you?

The UK first refused to take produce as payment for weapons demanding sterling instead, then demanded the Turks stop trading with Germany for weapons while refusing to buy the products they were selling to the Germans... then they finally agreed to give them a loan to buy weapons, but ONLY FROM THE UK, at which point they both, refused to sell them weapons since the UK lacked spare production and also refused to allow them to use the loan to buy from anyone else... cant tell you how thrilled the Turks were about UK support! :lol:

...and that was BEFORE Dunkirk.

Some weapons were promised in the end, mostly French, few arrived before the French collapse ended that particular soap opera.

Yeah, the Turks were very impressed on UK military prowess, kicked out of Norway, France, Greece, Libya and Crete, I am pretty sure the Turks would have been reassured that whatever few stragglers the UK could muster would make German/Soviet defeat a certainty...
Arms deliveries to the Turks. Yes more were promised and not delivered. But they dleeivered a greater percentages than teh German orders which were basically not delivered at all (pre war orders for me109s, submairnes)

Pre war amrs agreement 25 million pounds credit. A lot delivered after the Turks did not stand by the word of their treaty. Britian Delievred isgnificnat amounts of arms despite being desperate need for it;'s own defense.

2 Destroyers March 1941
2 Submarines in April 1942
2 minesweepers in dec 1939
2 minelayers in jan 1941
8 sub chasers in jan1941
10 MTBs june 1941
1000 mines April 1940
120 mines for submaines june 1941
500 depthcharges april 1940
82 torpedoes dec 1941

3 spitfires jan 1941
36 Blenheims may 1940
7 Lysanders april 1940
6 Avro Ansons may 1940
30 Fairly battles apr 1940
30 Hurricanes april 1940
30 Moprane Collenz 406a April 1940
1 Wellington jan 1941

24 240mm guns Aug 1939
190 25m ATG may 1940
24 Boffors AA guns 24 dec 1939
4 3.7 AA gun static may 1940
8 3.7 AA gun mobile April1940
24 155mm howitzers Aug 1939
12 105mm guns Aug 1939
18 pd guns may 1940
100 R,.35 tanks Aprl 1940
50 MkVIB light tanks feb 1940
12 Armored cars may 1940
200 Bots AT rifles sep 1939
5000 Hotchkiss LMGs sep 1939
1250 Vickers MGs feb 1940
25000 lebel rifles may 1940
500,000 grenades spring 1940
200 81mm Mortars spring 1940
400,000 gas marks.
Good, I see you finally looked at the sources I gave you, now put the "required" and "promised" columns as well to see how little it really was in context...

If the Brits didnt provide weapons TUrkey would need to go to the Germans for them, it wasnt "honor"...

Fun extra:

"One last thing needs to be recorded under the rubric 'material
assistance'. Much of the material sent to the Turks, the British
were embarrassed to discover, arrived in non-servicable condition.

There were several reasons for this. One was the British practice
of shipping aIl material of a kind together without reference to
associated items. Thus, British guns would arrive in Turkey on one
ship, with the vessel carrying the tractors required to move them
some distance behind. 259 Even worse, fragile items, such as range
finders, gyroscopes, and vision equipment, arrived in boxes not
marked "fragile" (kolay kiril.ir) and were often broken by Turkish
dockers.

Another problem with shipped material, was that in the haste
to get to the Turks those few things available, items were often
shipped incomplete. This was most catastrophically so in the case
of the Bristol Blenheims shipped to Turkey in 1939. First of all,
these Blenheims did not come with Beaufighter conversion kits. They
were Bombers, not Fighters as the Turks had wished. But even worse,
on arrival, it was discovered that these aircraft were not even
functional Bombers. Eighteen of the thirty lacked bomber seats,
bomb racks, and bomb winches. Twenty-eight had neither 250lb or
500lb bOmb racks. None of the aircraft had gun turrets, bomb
relea&es, sighting mechanism, machine-gun trigger sets, or oxygen
equipments. "It is most illogical and unsatisfactory" noted
Colville, "that when, at some sacrifice, we have agreed to provide
Blenheim aircraft to the Turks, we should risk making them largely
ineffective by refusing to supply part of the essential
equipment. An embarrassed Air Ministry promised that it would
remove the missing items from RAF aircraft and send them by rail
on the Orient Express -- within two weeks. 264 Meanwhile, in
Turkey, Qakmak had rebuked his son-in-Iaw, the CAS, for commanding
a laughing-stock and was comparing British methods to poor
advantage with American and German practice. 265

Conclusion:
In January 1940, finally, the Western Allies had been brought
to make a financial arrangement which might, over time, have
permitted the Turks to wage war at their side -- ten months after
the joint guarantee, five months after the outbreak of war, four
months before the possibility of effective cooperation wouId cease
to exist. It is important to note, however, that the cash figures
and repayment schedules and schemes agreed upon remained almost
entirely abstract in our period due to Allied inability and
unwil1ingness to deliver the weapons which the Turks wished to
purchase. Initially, the question of finance had hampered supply~
1atterly, the problem of supply undermined the agreed financial
provisions. In the end, the Service Ministries proved to be as
reluctant to part with material as the Treasury had been to part
with money. Yet, without adequate provision of material assistance,
a financial arrangement to permit purchase, and an economic
arrangement to finance repayment, the alliance could have been
activated only with extreme difficulty whatever the military and
political constellation. without an economic arrangment which would
ensure its survival, Turkey could contemplate the prospect of an
active alliance with much less than complete sang froid. without
armaments it could not consider entering the war at aIl.
Unfortunately for Britain, while some greater effort at economic
assistance may have been possible, provision of military material
remained exceedingly difficult beyond the end of our period. Some
shift might be made to solve the economic question, but the problem
of supply continued to constitute a nearly absolute constraint."

If the Turkish archives were not secret we could read how happy the Turks really were about their "allies"...
It was given of dates of stuff delivered. Not wish lists, promises. Everything above is delivery dates.

Teh Germans just outright cancelled all their promised arms delivery after signing the the soviet pact in 1939. The Turks were miffed. Really miffed.

User avatar
JAG13
Member
Posts: 689
Joined: 23 Mar 2013, 02:50

Re: The ideal Axis strategy

#139

Post by JAG13 » 02 Dec 2019, 17:03

pugsville wrote:
02 Dec 2019, 04:50
JAG13 wrote:
01 Dec 2019, 17:55
pugsville wrote:
01 Dec 2019, 06:47
Turkish Foreign Policy During the Second World War: An 'Active' Neutrality
von Selim Deringil

page 121
" In the course of negotiations von Papen had to convince Ribbentropp that unlimited tranist facilities were a vain dream, and pointed out to his Minister that the Turks refused any obligation aimed against Britain"
...
"Turkish resistance to arms transit exasperated Ribbentrop who felt the Turks should know that Germany was in a position to 'blot out the Turkish state in a few weeks'"

page 129
"Moreover the Turkish side told the Germans that they that would refuse to breach their contract with Britain and no deliveries could be made till 1943"

This is septemeber 1941.
Yeah, and all that had Ribbentrop as its source... you clearly need to read on Ribbentrop.

The Turks were trying to stay out, and the solution was simple, if given a choice, they wouldnt be irrational.
The Turks displayed extreme stubbornness and pushed very negotiation to the limit, the were pretty relentess in teh demands and positions regardless of who they were talking to.,

I see no evidence that supports them just rolling over.,
Sure, besides the fact that they transported weapons for use against their ally through their territory and that they bailed on their alliance in a second when push came to shove... all to avoid war, and your point is that they would go to war, that they were certain to lose, if the Germans asked to let them through.

User avatar
JAG13
Member
Posts: 689
Joined: 23 Mar 2013, 02:50

Re: The ideal Axis strategy

#140

Post by JAG13 » 02 Dec 2019, 17:10

pugsville wrote:
02 Dec 2019, 04:53
JAG13 wrote:
01 Dec 2019, 17:49
pugsville wrote:
01 Dec 2019, 06:35
JAG13 wrote:
30 Nov 2019, 19:01


Lol! You are not serious, are you?

The UK first refused to take produce as payment for weapons demanding sterling instead, then demanded the Turks stop trading with Germany for weapons while refusing to buy the products they were selling to the Germans... then they finally agreed to give them a loan to buy weapons, but ONLY FROM THE UK, at which point they both, refused to sell them weapons since the UK lacked spare production and also refused to allow them to use the loan to buy from anyone else... cant tell you how thrilled the Turks were about UK support! :lol:

...and that was BEFORE Dunkirk.

Some weapons were promised in the end, mostly French, few arrived before the French collapse ended that particular soap opera.

Yeah, the Turks were very impressed on UK military prowess, kicked out of Norway, France, Greece, Libya and Crete, I am pretty sure the Turks would have been reassured that whatever few stragglers the UK could muster would make German/Soviet defeat a certainty...
Arms deliveries to the Turks. Yes more were promised and not delivered. But they dleeivered a greater percentages than teh German orders which were basically not delivered at all (pre war orders for me109s, submairnes)

Pre war amrs agreement 25 million pounds credit. A lot delivered after the Turks did not stand by the word of their treaty. Britian Delievred isgnificnat amounts of arms despite being desperate need for it;'s own defense.

2 Destroyers March 1941
2 Submarines in April 1942
2 minesweepers in dec 1939
2 minelayers in jan 1941
8 sub chasers in jan1941
10 MTBs june 1941
1000 mines April 1940
120 mines for submaines june 1941
500 depthcharges april 1940
82 torpedoes dec 1941

3 spitfires jan 1941
36 Blenheims may 1940
7 Lysanders april 1940
6 Avro Ansons may 1940
30 Fairly battles apr 1940
30 Hurricanes april 1940
30 Moprane Collenz 406a April 1940
1 Wellington jan 1941

24 240mm guns Aug 1939
190 25m ATG may 1940
24 Boffors AA guns 24 dec 1939
4 3.7 AA gun static may 1940
8 3.7 AA gun mobile April1940
24 155mm howitzers Aug 1939
12 105mm guns Aug 1939
18 pd guns may 1940
100 R,.35 tanks Aprl 1940
50 MkVIB light tanks feb 1940
12 Armored cars may 1940
200 Bots AT rifles sep 1939
5000 Hotchkiss LMGs sep 1939
1250 Vickers MGs feb 1940
25000 lebel rifles may 1940
500,000 grenades spring 1940
200 81mm Mortars spring 1940
400,000 gas marks.
Good, I see you finally looked at the sources I gave you, now put the "required" and "promised" columns as well to see how little it really was in context...

If the Brits didnt provide weapons TUrkey would need to go to the Germans for them, it wasnt "honor"...

Fun extra:

"One last thing needs to be recorded under the rubric 'material
assistance'. Much of the material sent to the Turks, the British
were embarrassed to discover, arrived in non-servicable condition.

There were several reasons for this. One was the British practice
of shipping aIl material of a kind together without reference to
associated items. Thus, British guns would arrive in Turkey on one
ship, with the vessel carrying the tractors required to move them
some distance behind. 259 Even worse, fragile items, such as range
finders, gyroscopes, and vision equipment, arrived in boxes not
marked "fragile" (kolay kiril.ir) and were often broken by Turkish
dockers.

Another problem with shipped material, was that in the haste
to get to the Turks those few things available, items were often
shipped incomplete. This was most catastrophically so in the case
of the Bristol Blenheims shipped to Turkey in 1939. First of all,
these Blenheims did not come with Beaufighter conversion kits. They
were Bombers, not Fighters as the Turks had wished. But even worse,
on arrival, it was discovered that these aircraft were not even
functional Bombers. Eighteen of the thirty lacked bomber seats,
bomb racks, and bomb winches. Twenty-eight had neither 250lb or
500lb bOmb racks. None of the aircraft had gun turrets, bomb
relea&es, sighting mechanism, machine-gun trigger sets, or oxygen
equipments. "It is most illogical and unsatisfactory" noted
Colville, "that when, at some sacrifice, we have agreed to provide
Blenheim aircraft to the Turks, we should risk making them largely
ineffective by refusing to supply part of the essential
equipment. An embarrassed Air Ministry promised that it would
remove the missing items from RAF aircraft and send them by rail
on the Orient Express -- within two weeks. 264 Meanwhile, in
Turkey, Qakmak had rebuked his son-in-Iaw, the CAS, for commanding
a laughing-stock and was comparing British methods to poor
advantage with American and German practice. 265

Conclusion:
In January 1940, finally, the Western Allies had been brought
to make a financial arrangement which might, over time, have
permitted the Turks to wage war at their side -- ten months after
the joint guarantee, five months after the outbreak of war, four
months before the possibility of effective cooperation wouId cease
to exist. It is important to note, however, that the cash figures
and repayment schedules and schemes agreed upon remained almost
entirely abstract in our period due to Allied inability and
unwil1ingness to deliver the weapons which the Turks wished to
purchase. Initially, the question of finance had hampered supply~
1atterly, the problem of supply undermined the agreed financial
provisions. In the end, the Service Ministries proved to be as
reluctant to part with material as the Treasury had been to part
with money. Yet, without adequate provision of material assistance,
a financial arrangement to permit purchase, and an economic
arrangement to finance repayment, the alliance could have been
activated only with extreme difficulty whatever the military and
political constellation. without an economic arrangment which would
ensure its survival, Turkey could contemplate the prospect of an
active alliance with much less than complete sang froid. without
armaments it could not consider entering the war at aIl.
Unfortunately for Britain, while some greater effort at economic
assistance may have been possible, provision of military material
remained exceedingly difficult beyond the end of our period. Some
shift might be made to solve the economic question, but the problem
of supply continued to constitute a nearly absolute constraint."

If the Turkish archives were not secret we could read how happy the Turks really were about their "allies"...
It was given of dates of stuff delivered. Not wish lists, promises. Everything above is delivery dates.

Teh Germans just outright cancelled all their promised arms delivery after signing the the soviet pact in 1939. The Turks were miffed. Really miffed.
The source I gave you includes the whole negotiation process, how the Turkish requests were reduced first, then made, then reduced by what the allies could/were willing to give and THEN what they actually delivered, which in the context of the actual needs was very little.

I am pretty sure the stuff the Germans sent actually worked... seats and all.

pugsville
Member
Posts: 1016
Joined: 17 Aug 2011, 05:40

Re: The ideal Axis strategy

#141

Post by pugsville » 02 Dec 2019, 23:07

JAG13 wrote:
02 Dec 2019, 17:10
pugsville wrote:
02 Dec 2019, 04:53
JAG13 wrote:
01 Dec 2019, 17:49
pugsville wrote:
01 Dec 2019, 06:35
JAG13 wrote:
30 Nov 2019, 19:01


Lol! You are not serious, are you?

The UK first refused to take produce as payment for weapons demanding sterling instead, then demanded the Turks stop trading with Germany for weapons while refusing to buy the products they were selling to the Germans... then they finally agreed to give them a loan to buy weapons, but ONLY FROM THE UK, at which point they both, refused to sell them weapons since the UK lacked spare production and also refused to allow them to use the loan to buy from anyone else... cant tell you how thrilled the Turks were about UK support! :lol:

...and that was BEFORE Dunkirk.

Some weapons were promised in the end, mostly French, few arrived before the French collapse ended that particular soap opera.

Yeah, the Turks were very impressed on UK military prowess, kicked out of Norway, France, Greece, Libya and Crete, I am pretty sure the Turks would have been reassured that whatever few stragglers the UK could muster would make German/Soviet defeat a certainty...
Arms deliveries to the Turks. Yes more were promised and not delivered. But they dleeivered a greater percentages than teh German orders which were basically not delivered at all (pre war orders for me109s, submairnes)

Pre war amrs agreement 25 million pounds credit. A lot delivered after the Turks did not stand by the word of their treaty. Britian Delievred isgnificnat amounts of arms despite being desperate need for it;'s own defense.

2 Destroyers March 1941
2 Submarines in April 1942
2 minesweepers in dec 1939
2 minelayers in jan 1941
8 sub chasers in jan1941
10 MTBs june 1941
1000 mines April 1940
120 mines for submaines june 1941
500 depthcharges april 1940
82 torpedoes dec 1941

3 spitfires jan 1941
36 Blenheims may 1940
7 Lysanders april 1940
6 Avro Ansons may 1940
30 Fairly battles apr 1940
30 Hurricanes april 1940
30 Moprane Collenz 406a April 1940
1 Wellington jan 1941

24 240mm guns Aug 1939
190 25m ATG may 1940
24 Boffors AA guns 24 dec 1939
4 3.7 AA gun static may 1940
8 3.7 AA gun mobile April1940
24 155mm howitzers Aug 1939
12 105mm guns Aug 1939
18 pd guns may 1940
100 R,.35 tanks Aprl 1940
50 MkVIB light tanks feb 1940
12 Armored cars may 1940
200 Bots AT rifles sep 1939
5000 Hotchkiss LMGs sep 1939
1250 Vickers MGs feb 1940
25000 lebel rifles may 1940
500,000 grenades spring 1940
200 81mm Mortars spring 1940
400,000 gas marks.
Good, I see you finally looked at the sources I gave you, now put the "required" and "promised" columns as well to see how little it really was in context...

If the Brits didnt provide weapons TUrkey would need to go to the Germans for them, it wasnt "honor"...

Fun extra:

"One last thing needs to be recorded under the rubric 'material
assistance'. Much of the material sent to the Turks, the British
were embarrassed to discover, arrived in non-servicable condition.

There were several reasons for this. One was the British practice
of shipping aIl material of a kind together without reference to
associated items. Thus, British guns would arrive in Turkey on one
ship, with the vessel carrying the tractors required to move them
some distance behind. 259 Even worse, fragile items, such as range
finders, gyroscopes, and vision equipment, arrived in boxes not
marked "fragile" (kolay kiril.ir) and were often broken by Turkish
dockers.

Another problem with shipped material, was that in the haste
to get to the Turks those few things available, items were often
shipped incomplete. This was most catastrophically so in the case
of the Bristol Blenheims shipped to Turkey in 1939. First of all,
these Blenheims did not come with Beaufighter conversion kits. They
were Bombers, not Fighters as the Turks had wished. But even worse,
on arrival, it was discovered that these aircraft were not even
functional Bombers. Eighteen of the thirty lacked bomber seats,
bomb racks, and bomb winches. Twenty-eight had neither 250lb or
500lb bOmb racks. None of the aircraft had gun turrets, bomb
relea&es, sighting mechanism, machine-gun trigger sets, or oxygen
equipments. "It is most illogical and unsatisfactory" noted
Colville, "that when, at some sacrifice, we have agreed to provide
Blenheim aircraft to the Turks, we should risk making them largely
ineffective by refusing to supply part of the essential
equipment. An embarrassed Air Ministry promised that it would
remove the missing items from RAF aircraft and send them by rail
on the Orient Express -- within two weeks. 264 Meanwhile, in
Turkey, Qakmak had rebuked his son-in-Iaw, the CAS, for commanding
a laughing-stock and was comparing British methods to poor
advantage with American and German practice. 265

Conclusion:
In January 1940, finally, the Western Allies had been brought
to make a financial arrangement which might, over time, have
permitted the Turks to wage war at their side -- ten months after
the joint guarantee, five months after the outbreak of war, four
months before the possibility of effective cooperation wouId cease
to exist. It is important to note, however, that the cash figures
and repayment schedules and schemes agreed upon remained almost
entirely abstract in our period due to Allied inability and
unwil1ingness to deliver the weapons which the Turks wished to
purchase. Initially, the question of finance had hampered supply~
1atterly, the problem of supply undermined the agreed financial
provisions. In the end, the Service Ministries proved to be as
reluctant to part with material as the Treasury had been to part
with money. Yet, without adequate provision of material assistance,
a financial arrangement to permit purchase, and an economic
arrangement to finance repayment, the alliance could have been
activated only with extreme difficulty whatever the military and
political constellation. without an economic arrangment which would
ensure its survival, Turkey could contemplate the prospect of an
active alliance with much less than complete sang froid. without
armaments it could not consider entering the war at aIl.
Unfortunately for Britain, while some greater effort at economic
assistance may have been possible, provision of military material
remained exceedingly difficult beyond the end of our period. Some
shift might be made to solve the economic question, but the problem
of supply continued to constitute a nearly absolute constraint."

If the Turkish archives were not secret we could read how happy the Turks really were about their "allies"...
It was given of dates of stuff delivered. Not wish lists, promises. Everything above is delivery dates.

Teh Germans just outright cancelled all their promised arms delivery after signing the the soviet pact in 1939. The Turks were miffed. Really miffed.
The source I gave you includes the whole negotiation process, how the Turkish requests were reduced first, then made, then reduced by what the allies could/were willing to give and THEN what they actually delivered, which in the context of the actual needs was very little.

I am pretty sure the stuff the Germans sent actually worked... seats and all.
YEs I I only provided the final actuall delivers with dates. Not initial demands of promises.

The German orders were just cancelle in 1939

pugsville
Member
Posts: 1016
Joined: 17 Aug 2011, 05:40

Re: The ideal Axis strategy

#142

Post by pugsville » 02 Dec 2019, 23:11

IT
JAG13 wrote:
02 Dec 2019, 17:03
pugsville wrote:
02 Dec 2019, 04:50
JAG13 wrote:
01 Dec 2019, 17:55
pugsville wrote:
01 Dec 2019, 06:47
Turkish Foreign Policy During the Second World War: An 'Active' Neutrality
von Selim Deringil

page 121
" In the course of negotiations von Papen had to convince Ribbentropp that unlimited tranist facilities were a vain dream, and pointed out to his Minister that the Turks refused any obligation aimed against Britain"
...
"Turkish resistance to arms transit exasperated Ribbentrop who felt the Turks should know that Germany was in a position to 'blot out the Turkish state in a few weeks'"

page 129
"Moreover the Turkish side told the Germans that they that would refuse to breach their contract with Britain and no deliveries could be made till 1943"

This is septemeber 1941.
Yeah, and all that had Ribbentrop as its source... you clearly need to read on Ribbentrop.

The Turks were trying to stay out, and the solution was simple, if given a choice, they wouldnt be irrational.
The Turks displayed extreme stubbornness and pushed very negotiation to the limit, the were pretty relentess in teh demands and positions regardless of who they were talking to.,

I see no evidence that supports them just rolling over.,
Sure, besides the fact that they transported weapons for use against their ally through their territory and that they bailed on their alliance in a second when push came to shove... all to avoid war, and your point is that they would go to war, that they were certain to lose, if the Germans asked to let them through.
At over simplistic view, Diplomacy just does not owrk like that. Just because one power has more military strength other nations do no roll over Aand ALWAYS give them EVERYTHING they want.

The Turks were anything but submissive in their dealings with Germany and regularly told them no.

User avatar
JAG13
Member
Posts: 689
Joined: 23 Mar 2013, 02:50

Re: The ideal Axis strategy

#143

Post by JAG13 » 03 Dec 2019, 19:53

pugsville wrote:
02 Dec 2019, 23:07
JAG13 wrote:
02 Dec 2019, 17:10
pugsville wrote:
02 Dec 2019, 04:53
JAG13 wrote:
01 Dec 2019, 17:49
pugsville wrote:
01 Dec 2019, 06:35


Arms deliveries to the Turks. Yes more were promised and not delivered. But they dleeivered a greater percentages than teh German orders which were basically not delivered at all (pre war orders for me109s, submairnes)

Pre war amrs agreement 25 million pounds credit. A lot delivered after the Turks did not stand by the word of their treaty. Britian Delievred isgnificnat amounts of arms despite being desperate need for it;'s own defense.

2 Destroyers March 1941
2 Submarines in April 1942
2 minesweepers in dec 1939
2 minelayers in jan 1941
8 sub chasers in jan1941
10 MTBs june 1941
1000 mines April 1940
120 mines for submaines june 1941
500 depthcharges april 1940
82 torpedoes dec 1941

3 spitfires jan 1941
36 Blenheims may 1940
7 Lysanders april 1940
6 Avro Ansons may 1940
30 Fairly battles apr 1940
30 Hurricanes april 1940
30 Moprane Collenz 406a April 1940
1 Wellington jan 1941

24 240mm guns Aug 1939
190 25m ATG may 1940
24 Boffors AA guns 24 dec 1939
4 3.7 AA gun static may 1940
8 3.7 AA gun mobile April1940
24 155mm howitzers Aug 1939
12 105mm guns Aug 1939
18 pd guns may 1940
100 R,.35 tanks Aprl 1940
50 MkVIB light tanks feb 1940
12 Armored cars may 1940
200 Bots AT rifles sep 1939
5000 Hotchkiss LMGs sep 1939
1250 Vickers MGs feb 1940
25000 lebel rifles may 1940
500,000 grenades spring 1940
200 81mm Mortars spring 1940
400,000 gas marks.
Good, I see you finally looked at the sources I gave you, now put the "required" and "promised" columns as well to see how little it really was in context...

If the Brits didnt provide weapons TUrkey would need to go to the Germans for them, it wasnt "honor"...

Fun extra:

"One last thing needs to be recorded under the rubric 'material
assistance'. Much of the material sent to the Turks, the British
were embarrassed to discover, arrived in non-servicable condition.

There were several reasons for this. One was the British practice
of shipping aIl material of a kind together without reference to
associated items. Thus, British guns would arrive in Turkey on one
ship, with the vessel carrying the tractors required to move them
some distance behind. 259 Even worse, fragile items, such as range
finders, gyroscopes, and vision equipment, arrived in boxes not
marked "fragile" (kolay kiril.ir) and were often broken by Turkish
dockers.

Another problem with shipped material, was that in the haste
to get to the Turks those few things available, items were often
shipped incomplete. This was most catastrophically so in the case
of the Bristol Blenheims shipped to Turkey in 1939. First of all,
these Blenheims did not come with Beaufighter conversion kits. They
were Bombers, not Fighters as the Turks had wished. But even worse,
on arrival, it was discovered that these aircraft were not even
functional Bombers. Eighteen of the thirty lacked bomber seats,
bomb racks, and bomb winches. Twenty-eight had neither 250lb or
500lb bOmb racks. None of the aircraft had gun turrets, bomb
relea&es, sighting mechanism, machine-gun trigger sets, or oxygen
equipments. "It is most illogical and unsatisfactory" noted
Colville, "that when, at some sacrifice, we have agreed to provide
Blenheim aircraft to the Turks, we should risk making them largely
ineffective by refusing to supply part of the essential
equipment. An embarrassed Air Ministry promised that it would
remove the missing items from RAF aircraft and send them by rail
on the Orient Express -- within two weeks. 264 Meanwhile, in
Turkey, Qakmak had rebuked his son-in-Iaw, the CAS, for commanding
a laughing-stock and was comparing British methods to poor
advantage with American and German practice. 265

Conclusion:
In January 1940, finally, the Western Allies had been brought
to make a financial arrangement which might, over time, have
permitted the Turks to wage war at their side -- ten months after
the joint guarantee, five months after the outbreak of war, four
months before the possibility of effective cooperation wouId cease
to exist. It is important to note, however, that the cash figures
and repayment schedules and schemes agreed upon remained almost
entirely abstract in our period due to Allied inability and
unwil1ingness to deliver the weapons which the Turks wished to
purchase. Initially, the question of finance had hampered supply~
1atterly, the problem of supply undermined the agreed financial
provisions. In the end, the Service Ministries proved to be as
reluctant to part with material as the Treasury had been to part
with money. Yet, without adequate provision of material assistance,
a financial arrangement to permit purchase, and an economic
arrangement to finance repayment, the alliance could have been
activated only with extreme difficulty whatever the military and
political constellation. without an economic arrangment which would
ensure its survival, Turkey could contemplate the prospect of an
active alliance with much less than complete sang froid. without
armaments it could not consider entering the war at aIl.
Unfortunately for Britain, while some greater effort at economic
assistance may have been possible, provision of military material
remained exceedingly difficult beyond the end of our period. Some
shift might be made to solve the economic question, but the problem
of supply continued to constitute a nearly absolute constraint."

If the Turkish archives were not secret we could read how happy the Turks really were about their "allies"...
It was given of dates of stuff delivered. Not wish lists, promises. Everything above is delivery dates.

Teh Germans just outright cancelled all their promised arms delivery after signing the the soviet pact in 1939. The Turks were miffed. Really miffed.
The source I gave you includes the whole negotiation process, how the Turkish requests were reduced first, then made, then reduced by what the allies could/were willing to give and THEN what they actually delivered, which in the context of the actual needs was very little.

I am pretty sure the stuff the Germans sent actually worked... seats and all.
YEs I I only provided the final actuall delivers with dates. Not initial demands of promises.

The German orders were just cancelle in 1939
Which is irrelevant in the context of the actual needs, isnt it? Context is everything.

The Germans were happy to sign a treaty and trade with the Turks again once they ditch the allies, well, what was left of them by then. They sold them quite a bit of weapons...

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JAG13
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Re: The ideal Axis strategy

#144

Post by JAG13 » 03 Dec 2019, 19:57

pugsville wrote:
02 Dec 2019, 23:11
IT
JAG13 wrote:
02 Dec 2019, 17:03
pugsville wrote:
02 Dec 2019, 04:50
JAG13 wrote:
01 Dec 2019, 17:55
pugsville wrote:
01 Dec 2019, 06:47
Turkish Foreign Policy During the Second World War: An 'Active' Neutrality
von Selim Deringil

page 121
" In the course of negotiations von Papen had to convince Ribbentropp that unlimited tranist facilities were a vain dream, and pointed out to his Minister that the Turks refused any obligation aimed against Britain"
...
"Turkish resistance to arms transit exasperated Ribbentrop who felt the Turks should know that Germany was in a position to 'blot out the Turkish state in a few weeks'"

page 129
"Moreover the Turkish side told the Germans that they that would refuse to breach their contract with Britain and no deliveries could be made till 1943"

This is septemeber 1941.
Yeah, and all that had Ribbentrop as its source... you clearly need to read on Ribbentrop.

The Turks were trying to stay out, and the solution was simple, if given a choice, they wouldnt be irrational.
The Turks displayed extreme stubbornness and pushed very negotiation to the limit, the were pretty relentess in teh demands and positions regardless of who they were talking to.,

I see no evidence that supports them just rolling over.,
Sure, besides the fact that they transported weapons for use against their ally through their territory and that they bailed on their alliance in a second when push came to shove... all to avoid war, and your point is that they would go to war, that they were certain to lose, if the Germans asked to let them through.
At over simplistic view, Diplomacy just does not owrk like that. Just because one power has more military strength other nations do no roll over Aand ALWAYS give them EVERYTHING they want.

The Turks were anything but submissive in their dealings with Germany and regularly told them no.
The Turks said no whenever it was SAFE to do so, they were not dumb, when the wind changed they also changed their policies and refused to enter the war breaking their alliance, they werent suicidal...

...so, if the time had come and the Germans had given them a choice, they would have been rational, not and suicidal.

Is that simple.

ljadw
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Re: The ideal Axis strategy

#145

Post by ljadw » 03 Dec 2019, 21:09

Turkey knew that Germany could not force them to join the war as ally and Turkey would only join the war as ally if Germany not only was winning,but had won . Turkey would not make the mistake Mussolini had made .And if Germany had won, it would not need Turkey .
Spain did the same .

HistoryGeek2019
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Re: The ideal Axis strategy

#146

Post by HistoryGeek2019 » 03 Dec 2019, 22:07

Turkey was Germany's ally in WWI and it didn't get them anywhere, so I don't know why everyone thinks it would make such a difference in WW2.

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JAG13
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Re: The ideal Axis strategy

#147

Post by JAG13 » 03 Dec 2019, 23:52

HistoryGeek2019 wrote:
03 Dec 2019, 22:07
Turkey was Germany's ally in WWI and it didn't get them anywhere, so I don't know why everyone thinks it would make such a difference in WW2.
Tukey destroyed its own army in WW2 in 1914, then scrapped by until the war was decided somewhere else.

In WW2 they were trying to stay out and, at the same time, were the only obstacle to Germany getting to the Brits in the ME, in an scenario were the Germans delay Barbarossa to end the UK, the Germans would get passage to Iraq and eventually kick the Brits out of the Med and, likely, the war.

nota
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Re: The ideal Axis strategy

#148

Post by nota » 04 Dec 2019, 02:45

but the turks are a side issue resulting in this interesting discussion


the axis strategy issue is they DID NOT have one
the axis had no overall goal or plan long term
and very little common cause esp with japan

england was too strong for the german sea power
if japan commits to aid the invasion in late 40 or early 41 with most of it's fleet
that might make it doable costly sure hard to pull off a logistic nightmare
they never thought of or planned any joint action not counting a very few trade trips
that is their BIG problem

just imagine if the allied powers had a similar program of each nation planning a separate war campaign
and not even consulting the other nations

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JAG13
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Re: The ideal Axis strategy

#149

Post by JAG13 » 04 Dec 2019, 02:50

nota wrote:
04 Dec 2019, 02:45
but the turks are a side issue resulting in this interesting discussion


the axis strategy issue is they DID NOT have one
Well, Hitler expected to get away with quartering Poland, he was half right, the allies declared war... just didnt wage it, because they had no strategy either...

Oh, and Hitler knew Ciano was talking and leaking info to the allies so, he COULDNT tell anything to the Italians, ever... told Mussolini, he didnt want to fire his son in law, so that was that.

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Re: The ideal Axis strategy

#150

Post by HistoryGeek2019 » 04 Dec 2019, 04:03

JAG13 wrote:
03 Dec 2019, 23:52
HistoryGeek2019 wrote:
03 Dec 2019, 22:07
Turkey was Germany's ally in WWI and it didn't get them anywhere, so I don't know why everyone thinks it would make such a difference in WW2.
Tukey destroyed its own army in WW2 in 1914, then scrapped by until the war was decided somewhere else.

In WW2 they were trying to stay out and, at the same time, were the only obstacle to Germany getting to the Brits in the ME, in an scenario were the Germans delay Barbarossa to end the UK, the Germans would get passage to Iraq and eventually kick the Brits out of the Med and, likely, the war.
A German-Turkish alliance wouldn't have kicked the British out of the Middle East. It didn't kick the British out in WW1, and there's nothing to suggest the result would have been any different in WW2.

And the Middle East wasn't all that important to the Brits in WW2 anyway. The British merchant fleet sailed the long way around Africa, and that wouldn't have changed. The Brits still would have had the backing of the United States, which is all that mattered. The UK and USA would still obliterate the U-boats in the Atlantic and the Luftewaffe over Europe, and landed in France to destroy the rest of the Werhmacht.

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