The head of the Abwehr was no double agent : he collaborated extensively with the RSHA : you never heard of the Ten Commandments ? :TheMarcksPlan wrote: ↑14 Dec 2019 06:41Lol. Not when the head of the Abwehr is a double agent! https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wilhelm_CanarisHistoryGeek2019 wrote: ↑14 Dec 2019 06:37Just have Goebbels create some prop bombers that look real enough on film, feature them in every propaganda reel, and the Allies will build roughly the same amount of air defenses that they did in the OTL.TheMarcksPlan wrote: ↑14 Dec 2019 05:58Re (2) having bombers is extremely resource-efficient in certain scenarios - some of them mentioned by posters in this thread - and even a small bomber force provokes massive and asymmetric resource expenditure in defense (e.g. heavy flak and all the less-sexy air defense infrastructure such as radar fixtures and communications/control networks).
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HistoryGeek2019 wrote: ↑12 Dec 2019 07:16I've written elsewhere that the Luftewaffe's bomber force was ineffective and overly expensive:
The bombers suffered a ridiculously high casualty rate, were easy prey to enemy fighters, and made little difference in ground engagements. It was the soldiers of the Heer who won Germany's early battles, not the Luftewaffe.
So what if the Luftewaffe were restricted to only making fighters for the entire war?
That would reduce quality of fighter pilots in exchange for quantity. Some pilots are better suited to bombers and transports on account of personality or ability.
If you meant building single-engine fighters only, Luftwaffe maritime operations would be seriously compromised. The ME 109 and FW 190 had insufficient range and lifting capacity. They were less useful than multi-engine types for convoy patrols, anti-shipping strikes, minelaying and U-boat support. For safety reasons many fighter pilots despised any mission that required them to fly long distances over the sea, on a single engine. Also they did not have the benefit of a navigator in case they got disoriented.
There is empirical evidence to suggest that the Luftwaffe should have invested more at dropping mines into the shipping lanes, for this was a relatively inexpensive way to sink cargo vessels. Minelaying was best done at night to reduce aircraft losses and in any case, such work was not practical for single-engine fighters.
More should have been done about Germany's air reconnaissance effort, using single and multi-engine types. Luftwaffe officers sometimes made bad decisions or no decisions based on lack of information. Pre-strike and post-strike pictures were vital tools to estimate results and this was definitely a weakness in the Luftwaffe during the 1940 airwar over England. Another example was the Tip and Run raids of 1942-43. These low altitude fighter-bomber attacks were small in number, but caused far more damage than expected. However the Luftwaffe was not aware of this success because they could not obtain enough air photographs to verify it. The Arado 234 later proved effective in this role being almost immune to interception, but not enough were deployed to make a difference.