Meta What-If: Variables and Victory Conditions for evaluating Eastern Front ATL's

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Meta What-If: Variables and Victory Conditions for evaluating Eastern Front ATL's

#1

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 14 Dec 2019, 08:15

As some of you might have noticed, I'm interested in the question of whether Germany could have beat the SU and whether a Soviet first--strike on Germany later in the war would have succeeded. [yes to both, btw] To that end I've posted a few threads and participated in a few others. I've noticed that it is very difficult for Eastern Front ATL discussions to give adequate treatment to the swirling myriad of variables and potential PoD's essential to analyzing the feasibility of this or that course of action (not unique to Eastern Front of course).

The "History Channel" view is of course that invading the SU was a mistake; it seems to be the majority view here as well. Among historians it's probably the majority view that Soviet victory was inevitable but there are important dissenters (e.g. Overy, Askey, the "Moscow in August '41" gang).

In this thread/post I am not seeking to resolve those arguments though of course I can't control whatever discussion follows. Rather, I'd like to begin a catalog of variables (operational, economic, demographic, etc.) that full consideration of any counterfactual requires, along with beginning an articulation of feasible end-points aside from the OTL crushing Soviet victory. The list of variables should include those relevant to at least most interesting Eastern Front ATL's, including Japanese participation, Stalin attacking first, etc. [I'll confess that I have more interest in, and probably give fuller treatment to, variables related to 1941 Barbarossa ATL's than others].

I'll start by focusing on non-operational factors, by which I mean factors aside from the Ostheer/RKKA wins this or that battle (the usual starting point of ATL's).

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Note on citations: This post is informed by my reading but I've decided that to provide a research agenda on every variable listed below would just take too much time and is not necessary to the project of delineating important variables and victory conditions. I.e. it's self-evident (IMO) that food supply and labor force numbers matter and that operational outcomes influence these variables. That's enough to make this list as I conceive the project. I'm happy to provide cites - can't promise punctuality - regarding specific variables when I slip from description of variables into arguments about the directional valence of variables.
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Non-Operational Variables Impacting RKKA Combat Power.
In any evaluation of alternate Eastern Front scenarios, one must have a dynamic picture of the RKKA’s combat power in relation to the resources of the SU. One must, therefore, continually perform loops of analysis between (1) operational events and their operational outcomes (e.g. destruction of Soviet field forces and map changes) and (2) economic/demographic/agricultural effects of operational outcomes on Soviet ability generate and support field forces. This is a multi-faceted, complex process whose full analysis would address at least each of the following variables:
  • 1. The total population and economic base of the SU. Obviously this impacts how many men RKKA could field and their firepower level.

    a. Further operational losses during/after Barbarossa would have implied further losses of population, industrial plant, and natural resources. Quicker losses would have impeded partial evacuation of human/physical resources.

    b. Migration of Soviets from unoccupied to occupied territory, and from SU to abroad (especially in Central Asia) would increase given different operational outcomes and attendant stress on SU-controlled population.
  • 2. Food supply.

    a. Soviet retention of the most productive agricultural lands was directly related to operational outcomes. Loss of these lands was the most important factor in declining agricultural productivity.

    b. Operations seriously impacted Soviet ability to evacuate/retain harvests during 41/42.

    c. Greater loss of agricultural capital goods would result from quicker/deeper Axis advance, including reduced opportunity to evacuate tractors, horses, etc.

    d. Lend Lease.

    e. Fish. ~2% of 1943 Soviet calories and >10% of protein came from fishing. Operational losses in the Far East, Black Sea, and White Sea could basically end Soviet marine production.
  • 3. Fuel supply.

    a. Later in the period considered, German threats to the Caucasus and Kuibyshev, and Japanese threats to Sakhalin, would seriously endanger fuel supply.

    b. Throughout the period – even before enemy approach to oilfields – manpower strain had serious impact on Soviet oil production, which declined dramatically long before Blau.
  • 4. The quality of the population base.

    a. The labor force’s proportion of men generally and prime-aged men specifically would decline given further Axis operational success, as more young men would move from farm/factory to field. Prime-aged males were more productive in Soviet agriculture, mining, industry, etc. than older males, children, and women.
  • 5. Morale

    a. Morale of the fighting troops. Difficult to quantify/analyze but there is at least some evidence that Soviet soldiers were more likely to surrender tactically (i.e. when not involved in operational encirclements) during the nadirs of Soviet operational fortune than otherwise.

    b. Morale of workers. The Soviet peoples made enormous and heroic sacrifices to defeat Nazism, an indisputable fact that remains a justified point of pride and bitterness (vis a vis the West) even today. There is evidence, however, that the Soviets were no more the supermen of their propaganda than the untermenschen of Nazi lore. I.e. there are indications of productivity drops - especially early in the war - occurring in the midst of general heroism and sacrifice (mentioned by Harrison, to be discussed further). As with military morale, it's difficult to treat this topic analytically.
  • 6. The experience and professionalism of fighting troops.

    a. Soviet tactical combat power per man declined throughout the war, presumably due to lower training times and laxer enlistment standards. Greater Axis operational success would accelerate and deepen this decline, as more well-trained soldiers would be removed earlier in the war.
  • 7. Lend Lease and loss of supply routes. Important sub-variables:

    a. In general, the Northern Russia and Far East routes consumed less shipping than the Persian corridor. The latter was capacity-restricted as well. Operational loss of Vladivostok and/or Murmansk/Russia would imply LL losses incapable of being met by the Persian Corridor.

    b. Specific commodities/items supplied by LL for which Soviet substitution was impossible or prohibitive. Foremost among these are explosives, aviation fuel, and technological items like radios.

    c. Food aid.

    d. Commonwealth weapons delivered via North Russia ahead of the Battle of Moscow, which were subject to early operational disruption by Germany (~20% of Soviet medium tanks at OTL Moscow battle were British-built).
  • 8. Soviet industrial capital goods.

    a. The biggest factor here is evacuation during 41/42. Changes to operational outcomes during Barbarossa would have serious impacts on evacuation of capital goods.

    b. LL also figures, as American machine tool deliveries had massive impact on Soviet industrial productivity.
While each of these variables can, with adequate data, be analyzed individually, it’s obvious that there are strong inter-relations between them. The manpower crunch, for example, impacts nearly all the foregoing variables, as does the food supply issue.
The meta-variable of Soviet Combat Power would be dynamically related to the meta-variable of German Combat Power as well: fewer Soviets means fewer dead Germans, which means more Germans and more German Combat Power at the next temporal slice.

Variables impacting German Combat Power
  • 1. Initial forces deployed. For “stronger Ostheer” “What If’s” this is OTL Ostheer strength plus ATL delta. Such an ATL should explain how additional German manpower will be replaced in the economy or state/justify the production foregone, and should explain the production/acquisition path to arming additional Germans.
  • 2. Casualties.

    a. Battle casualties inflicted by RKKA. For any temporal slice, this is proportional to RKKA combat power.

    b. Non-battle casualties. E.g. sickness and frostbite. ATL’s involving better German logistics should save on frostbite casualties, for example.
  • 3. German combat effectiveness. This factor should vary less than Soviet effectiveness but significant ATL deltas should be assumed given lower/higher German casualty rates.
  • 4. Logistics. IMO this factor should be differentiated into two categories: strategic and tactical logistics. IMO the Ostheer gets a bad rap for its tactical logistics, which were quite a bit better than Soviet logistics even if lagging the Americans. On strategic logistics, however, OTL Barbarossa involved a world-historical failure of an industrialized nation to plan for modern warfare’s needs.

    a. Tactical logistics involves general German intra-unit supply distribution practices and resources. ATL’s that alter practices should explain how and why German organization/culture/philosophy would be changed to enable better/worse tactical logistics. A more-straightforward change to tactical German logistics would involve providing greater truck/horse/air lift resources. Any ATL involving such change should explain the production/acquisition path and attendant implications for fuel, fodder, and other resources.

    b. Strategic logistics refers to the high-level movement of resources into operational theaters. For the WW2 Ostheer, this was most importantly a matter of railroads, although long-distance trucking (Grosstransportraum) played an important role as well. The Wehrmacht failed adequately to plan for using railroads to move sufficient supplies deep into the SU. In large part this failure traces to Barbarossa’s inherent and shambolic flaw: assumption of a short campaign. The military professionals largely – with important exceptions – followed Hitler’s lead in assuming no need to support large forces far beyond the border zones. Remedies for this failure were entirely within the scope of German railroad resources, as I will argue (perhaps here, perhaps in other threads with links hopefully placed here for reference). Better railroad planning would also have improved German operational truck logistics: entire German armies frequently supported themselves via truck while several hundred miles from railheads and/or during periods when the hapless railroads weren’t getting sufficient supplies to the forward railheads. This contributed to vehicle attrition.
  • 5. German Fuel Supply. Any ATL involving greater German forces and/or deeper advances during Barbarossa should at least ensure that the proposed additional movements do not exceed Germany’s ability to allot more fuel to the Ostheer. Within reason, feasible ATL’s can draw on German stocks and/or OTL stocks allotted to Luftwaffe, Kriegsmarine, and export. The ATL should consider the likely operational impact on LW/KM of such moves. Given that most fuel consumption is tactical rather than operational, however, one should avoid assuming that deeper advance necessarily means greater overall fuel consumption. It is entirely possible for an army to advance further using less fuel – if it destroys its enemies more quickly and therefore faces a lower burden of tactical maneuver overall. A critical piece of this analysis must be average distance (and terrain) from field units to railheads, as trucks bringing supplies to units burned a significant portion of the Heer's allotment.
A note on German/Soviet variables: For now I am listing more Soviet than German variables because in most ATL’s there is less feedback between operational outcomes and national resources for the Ostheer than for the SU. I.e. most ATL’s feature an attacking Ostheer and war within the SU. There are interesting ATL’s involving SU attack into Axis territory, such as Germany using a Mediterranean Strategy in 1941 instead of Barbarossa. For such ATL’s, I’d suggest a similar approach for Germany as taken here and vice versa.

Victory Conditions

Variables foreseeably causing Soviet collapse and/or surrender of European USSR:

1. Famine and the foreseeable threat thereof if war continues.

a. 1942/3 USSR was at the absolute limit of food restriction. Malnutrition-induced disease was widespread, state rations were below emergency subsistence levels.

b. Soviet food supply difficulties had multiple causes, the most important of which was the loss of much fertile agricultural land. By beginning of 1942 SU had lost Crimea and most of Ukraine. During 1942 it lost the remainder of Ukraine and much of the Black Earth Region (Chernovets) of Southern Russia, including the critical North Caucasus. Although these losses were to varying degrees partial, allowing at least some rescue of harvest, they directly caused a further decline in agricultural productivity.

c. Besides the loss of good land, agricultural productivity suffered from a decline in non-land inputs, specifically fuel, optimal manpower (i.e. military-aged males), farming equipment (e.g. horses and tractors), and fertilizer.

d. Soviet agricultural productivity in 1943 was X% of its 1940 level. [Note to MarcksPlan to fill in this subvariable when he locates his copy of Hunger and War]

2. Internal threat to the survival of the regime.

a. Due to famine and perceptions of military incompetence, it was possible that the Soviet regime would collapse internally. It is extremely difficult to analytically describe the preconditions for such collapse, however, so I will mostly ignore this outcome other than the following remark: Any evaluation of the likelihood of German victory in the East must at least be aware the Communist regime was not internally invincible, as much later events showed (1990). In that spirit, the possibility of internal Soviet collapse should act as a residual factor when judging the overall likelihood of "successful Barbarossa" ATL's.

3. External threat to the survival of the regime: foreseeable conquest if war continues.

a. While Stalin was no doubt a patriot of the USSR and even of Russia, his overriding concern was the survival of his regime rather than the welfare of his country.

b. Given (a) and given the military/economic state of affairs in feasible ATL's by late-summer 1942, a rational Stalin would rightly conclude that the only way to preserve his regime would be to agree to German demands that the SU disarm and accept a border along the Urals/Ural River. A refusal to do so would commit Germany to another offensive against the SU during 1943, which would predictably overrun the Urals (if still in SU possession), penetrate into Siberia, and detach the Central Asian republics from Soviet control. Combined with Japanese pressure towards Baikal/Irkutsk in the East, this would leave the SU as a ~Romania-sized population and would likely seal the regime’s fate internally. Accordingly, a rational Stalin would accept Hitler’s terms, retreat to the Urals and disarm. He would rationally see that Hitler had little interest in pushing beyond the Urals, that a rump and demilitarized SU was in Hitler’s interests, and that armistice would achieve his goal of regime- and self-preservation.

c. Note that the analysis in (b) is focused on Stalin/SU’s interest only. While it is true that a rump SU’s continued resistance would benefit the Allied cause, there is no reason to believe that Stalin/SU would have weighed Allied interests at all. By Fall 1942, all the SU can do is immolate itself for an eventual Allied victory that would almost certainly preclude Communist rule. We must be careful to analyze the incentives of individual members of the Allied coalition rather than the interests of the coalition as a whole.

4. The prospect of inter-capitalist warfare from which the SU specifically and communism generally would emerge victorious.

a. Stalin was a sincere communist. In every other domain there is practically no cynical analysis of him lacking justification; on his political commitments he was sincere. Joel Kotkin’s books amply demonstrate this, if it needed demonstration.

b. The survival of a rump SU in Asia – still the world’s largest country by land area – would ensure “socialism in one country” for the foreseeable future.

c. Stalin believed, in line with communist orthodoxy, that prolonged war between Axis and Allied capitalist powers presented good chances of worldwide communist revolution emerging. A 1942 retreat to the Urals would recapitulate his 1939 posture, minus a lot of resources.

d. Stalin could have hoped that the Anglosphere would defeat the Axis, after/during which his SU could regain its losses partially or entirely, or even amplify his pre-war holdings in Eastern Europe.
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Re: Meta What-If: Variables and Victory Conditions for evaluating Eastern Front ATL's

#2

Post by HistoryGeek2019 » 17 Dec 2019, 21:30

One variable I don't see listed (forgive me if I overlooked it) is the combat power of the Red Army. You listed a lot of underlying factors that contribute to the combat power of the Red Army, but not that combat power itself.

I don't have precise numbers right now (and am not sure where to find them, since most authors give them in bits and pieces throughout their works), but we can safely say that Germany occupied or destroyed "a significant portion" of the Soviet Union's agriculture, coal, steel and other mines, oil fields, industry and population centers by 1942, and inflicted casualties of 4 million in 1941, 7 million in 1942 and another 7.4 million in 1943, and the Soviet Union was still able to field an army of over 9 million from 1942 through the end of the war, and was outproducing Germany in land weapons every year of the war.


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Re: Meta What-If: Variables and Victory Conditions for evaluating Eastern Front ATL's

#3

Post by HistoryGeek2019 » 17 Dec 2019, 23:44

I'll add some more variables:

Germany's farthest potential line of advance: How far could Germany plausibly advance before it would need to divert the forces necessary to sustain a further advance to another theater? This would be territory that Germany could not only reach (e.g., Stalingrad) but hold (e.g., Orel).

Time of Significant Allied Intervention: At what time would Germany needed to divert forces from the Eastern Front in order to defend against a significant Allied intervention in the west?

Rate of German Advance: What is a plausible sustainable German speed of advance prior to the Time of Significant Allied Intervention?

Value of Potential Territory: What is the value of the territory between Germany's OTL farthest line of advance and the ATL's farthest line of advance? TheMarcksPlan believes the western side of the Ural Mountains was the Farthest Line of Advance, so what is the value of the territory between this and Germany's OTL farthest line of advance (e.g., Voronezh-Stalingrad-Caucasus)? I personally don't see much there - a few cities such as Saratov, Kuibyshev and Kazan, but not enough to warrant a belief that Soviet combat power would be drastically reduced as a result of their loss.

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Re: Meta What-If: Variables and Victory Conditions for evaluating Eastern Front ATL's

#4

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 17 Dec 2019, 23:58

I'll address your points but as i posted in the other thread, first please state directly whether you believe Soviet population (non-occupied) directly relates (within some variation band) to maximum Soviet soldier strength at peak mobilization.

If you disagree, then please explain how, for example, and SU with, say, 25% fewer people would feed and arm the same number of troops as it could feed/arm absent the negative population delta.
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Re: Meta What-If: Variables and Victory Conditions for evaluating Eastern Front ATL's

#5

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 18 Dec 2019, 00:00

In another thread you answered yes. Thank you for providing clarity.

I'm a bit busy today, will address your points later tonight.
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Re: Meta What-If: Variables and Victory Conditions for evaluating Eastern Front ATL's

#6

Post by HistoryGeek2019 » 18 Dec 2019, 00:04

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
17 Dec 2019, 23:58
I'll address your points but as i posted in the other thread, first please state directly whether you believe Soviet population (non-occupied) directly relates (within some variation band) to maximum Soviet soldier strength at peak mobilization.

If you disagree, then please explain how, for example, and SU with, say, 25% fewer people would feed and arm the same number of troops as it could feed/arm absent the negative population delta.
Relax dude. We're not in court.

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Re: Meta What-If: Variables and Victory Conditions for evaluating Eastern Front ATL's

#7

Post by HistoryGeek2019 » 18 Dec 2019, 00:52

More factors:

Germany's Minimum Defensive Forces: What is the minimum amount of forces that Germany would need to deploy in the east to hold and occupy up to the Line of Farthest Advance? I'm thinking this would be a specified fraction of Soviet front line forces. In the OTL, the OstHeer was roughly half the size of Soviet front line forces for most of 1942-43.

Allied Combat Power in Persia: In any ATL where Germany wins in the east, it conquers all of the Caucasus and is therefore facing Allied forces in Persia. So the ATL needs to take into account the strength of Allied forces in this sector and the minimum German forces needed to either attack them or defend against them.

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Re: Meta What-If: Variables and Victory Conditions for evaluating Eastern Front ATL's

#8

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 18 Dec 2019, 05:32

HistoryGeek2019 wrote:One variable I don't see listed (forgive me if I overlooked it) is the combat power of the Red Army. You listed a lot of underlying factors that contribute to the combat power of the Red Army, but not that combat power itself.
In the spirit of discussion I was holding off on proposing a formula to approximate RKKA strength for given time and ATL until after more fulsome discussion of the contributing variables. I have an sketch of the approximation metric, mostly based on taking an OTL baseline for some point (say May 1942) and then applying ATL adjustments based on Soviet population, farm labor productivity, factory labor productivity, mobilization factor (using 1942 as 100%), etc.

Another thing missing from my model is a baseline RKKA combat power. Quicker German advances won't, for example, reduce the number of trained soldiers, tanks, etc. available on June 22 (it would, however, influence the number of those reservists that could be pulled from factory/farm for a given level of ATL production).
Germany's farthest potential line of advance
I dont think this is a variable in my sense, rather it's an outcome informed by variables:

"Farthest line" means Ostheer can't move forward or, if it moves forward it can't hold. There is of course such a point all the way to Vladivotok (farther given sufficient swim training). But where that point lies depends on at least the variables of relative combat power and logistics, the latter determining whether power to advance is accompanied by power to hold. There are likely other variables to consider (this is a quick reply on my phone during a busy day) but I dont see how any of them are just a matter of "how far from Berlin are we?"

For example: If Halder were correct and 90% of Soviet resistance went poof! when Moscow fell, then low-capacity truck/air logistics are probably sufficient to support the few Germans needed to drive 10% of the OTL RKKA beyond the Volga.

We agree that such planning/logistics is imbecilic but, analyzing the theoretical battles east of Moscow under Halder's absurd political premises, reaching Kuibyshev with small forces supplied by truck and air against just a few Soviet divisions is feasible.

...so I propose sticking to analysis of primary variables rather than fixing some line in the steppe, unless I'm missing some analytical factor about why armies can or cannot advance/hold (like if homesickness craters German efficiency east Ryazan then sure, that's the line).
----------------------

More to come, definitely adding a few of your variables to my mental model already.
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Re: Meta What-If: Variables and Victory Conditions for evaluating Eastern Front ATL's

#9

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 18 Dec 2019, 08:49

HistoryGeek2019 wrote:Time of Significant Allied Intervention: At what time would Germany needed to divert forces from the Eastern Front in order to defend against a significant Allied intervention in the west?
Definitely a constraint. OTL Germany had little to worry about until Spring 1943 IMO. From then on it gets interesting.
Rate of German Advance: What is a plausible sustainable German speed of advance prior to the Time of Significant Allied Intervention?
As with "Farthest Line" this is, IMO, an outcome instead of a variable. It depends on relative combat power for each step along the way of the advance, relative combat power depends in part on logistics and a bunch of other variables mentioned in the OP (and I'm sure others not yet explicated).
Value of Potential Territory:
The value of territory is, IMO, a matter of its population, food production, natural resources, and physical plant (part of which can be evacuated).
It also includes strategic factors: The land north of Lake Onega on the White Sea is mostly worthless, for example, except that it contains the Murmansk Railway.
So I'd say most of "Value" is contained in the variables already listed but it could be helpful to put all those variables under sub-heading "Value of Territory."
Germany's Minimum Defensive Forces: What is the minimum amount of forces that Germany would need to deploy in the east to hold and occupy up to the Line of Farthest Advance? I'm thinking this would be a specified fraction of Soviet front line forces. In the OTL, the OstHeer was roughly half the size of Soviet front line forces for most of 1942-43.
Agreed. If Stalin/successor doesn't sign an armistice, German screening forces in the East partially determine German power in the West, which influences the likelihood of German victory/settlement v. Wallies, which influences the chances of Soviet/successor resurgence from behind the Ostwall.

I like your suggestion of a ratio to RKKA forces (60% if all German?) but we'd also have to figure for Axis allies.
...which reminds that the model should include combat power and its constituent variables for each of those as well. I'd probably do something half-ass for them, as I don't have plans to dive deeply into the wartime economies of Romania, Hungary, and Finland.
Allied Combat Power in Persia: In any ATL where Germany wins in the east, it conquers all of the Caucasus and is therefore facing Allied forces in Persia. So the ATL needs to take into account the strength of Allied forces in this sector and the minimum German forces needed to either attack them or defend against them.
Agreed. And for this meta-variable, there would be all the sub-variables laid out for Soviet combat power, though most would have minor significance (e.g. there's not much "EcDemAg" value in holding/taking Iranian territory until/unless the Germans get to Abadan).

Especially critical in determining Wallie combat power in Persia will be the quality of troops (I.e. British/Dominion/American or colonial) and logistics.
Logistics for Wallies forces in Persia heavily depends on whether LL to SU is continuing or whether Wallies stop sending good money after perceived bad. If LL stops then significant shipping lift is available to support significant forces in Persia. If not, then supply distance is basically the same as to 8th Army in Egypt/Libya, where it took years and finally an emergency shipment personally authorized by FDR to build up a 10-division offensive at El Alamein.
Of course if the analysis isn't limited to Eastern ATL's, then shipping resources of Wallies becomes a dynamic variable.
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Re: Meta What-If: Variables and Victory Conditions for evaluating Eastern Front ATL's

#10

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 18 Dec 2019, 10:26

HistoryGeek2019 wrote:we can safely say that Germany occupied or destroyed "a significant portion" of the Soviet Union's agriculture, coal, steel and other mines, oil fields, industry and population centers by 1942,
Here's a table from Harrison, Accounting for War:

Image

As you can see, basic industry output losses are as high as 60% for 1942 versus 1940 (and higher given upward trajectory during 1941 absent Barbarossa).

This is one reason, btw, that the Soviet evacuation is bit overrated IMO. Oil production declined by over a third in 1942 despite loss of maybe 10% of production by pre-war location (Galicia and Maikop, the latter only briefly). Coal production in *Siberia* plummeted as well. Why? Because the SU simply lacked the labor to maintain production after calling up millions of men from the interior. Clearly labor was the big bottleneck in 1942, not capital stock. Yet the SU devoted half its 1941 railway ton-km's to evacuation, mostly of plant. Aside for saving the few critical specialized items like the Kharkov/Leningrad tank plants, much of that lift capacity would have been better used to improve RKKA logistics (which were abysmal - the Germans were choking on supplies by comparison) and to better supply the factories (many factories laid intermittently idle due to periodic lack of coal and other inputs caused by lack of rail transport capacity). This is a classic example of irrational loss-aversion IMO.

The table also illustrates why I'm so bullish on a ~1944 Soviet intervention in a Wallies-Axis war absent Barbarossa: Just imagine what that ATL SU could have put in the field if mobilized to OTL 1942 levels but retaining all that the Germans destroyed in 41-42, and continuing its upward pre-war trajectory. By contrast, OTL 1944-5 SU had permanently lost >30mil (dead, crippled, captured), was in the midst of rebuilding and not even close to pre-war production, and was ramping down its mobilization (better to let the Wallies do some bleeding for once than to strain as much as in '42). To take the 1944 RKKA and increase it by 50% is conservative in that ATL.
and inflicted casualties of 4 million in 1941, 7 million in 1942 and another 7.4 million in 1943, and the Soviet Union was still able to field an army of over 9 million from 1942 through the end of the war, and was outproducing Germany in land weapons every year of the war.
SU population at start of 1942 was 130mil (Harrison citing a Soviet/Russian author) - down ~65mil or ~33% from 1940. GDP was down ~40%.

Gruesome as it is, your litany of damage describes only ~6% of the personnel damage inflicted by Barbarossa and a smaller portion of economic damage. So you understate your case. [Assuming you're going off Glantz, who went from Krivosheev, scholarly consensus is that K missed at least a million further military losses in 1941, btw. Record-keeping during the frantic Barbarossa period was, unsurprisingly, incomplete].

But IMO the lesson you've drawn (the mainstream lesson) runs in the wrong direction. Yes, the SU was still strong in 42 despite taking a licking.
But does that mean the SU was invincible to damage/defeat? Only if one assumes that Barbarossa didn't dramatically weaken the SU, which I hope we agree is an untenable position.

Recontextualizing Barbarossa as a dramatic weakening of the SU illustrates the trajectory towards German victory:
  • Increase the damage inflicted in '41 (mostly territorial) and the SU is weaker in '42.
  • And/or change the German decision purposely to weaken the Ostheer ahead of 1942
  • A weaker '42 RKKA and/or stronger '42 Ostheer means a redux of Barbarossa-level destruction
  • ...meaning an exponentially weaker SU in '43 (if it hasn't surrendered already).
  • ...repeat re 1944 (if applicable)
The pieces of this puzzle have been available for a couple decades. AFAIK no mainstream historian has published such analysis because the economic historians have one piece of the puzzle and the operational historians another.
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Re: Meta What-If: Variables and Victory Conditions for evaluating Eastern Front ATL's

#11

Post by HistoryGeek2019 » 18 Dec 2019, 20:42

Looking at the end of any such analysis, I can't see the Soviet Union fielding less than 5 million front line soldiers in 1943 and 1944, even if Germany conquers up to the western side of the Urals. The USSR was able to field over 6 million front line soldiers up until the end of the war in the OTL, despite suffering 28 million causalties. Despite enormous losses in territory, raw materials, population and industry, the Red Army numbered over 10 million throughout 1942 and 1943. So even with the loss of territory up to Voronezh and Stalingrad, the Soviet Union still had sufficient manpower for 10 million man any plus millions more to take their place. So even if the USSR lost the Potential Territory (i.e., the Volga cities - Moscow, Gorki, Kazan, Kuibyshev and Saratov), it doesn't seem reasonable to expect the overall size of the Red Army to plummet.

We also have to factor in the ability of Soviet soldiers and citizens to flee east. In the OTL the Germans were unable to prevent this, and a more rapid advance in an ATL would imply more space between German units and thus more gaps through which the Soviet population could escape to the east.

Similarly, we need to take into account the younger age of the Soviet population than in Germany - the USSR will be getting more new young recruits each year than Germany.

We also need to consider changes in Soviet tactics in response to their situation. Throughout the OTL, Stalin was throwing his men against the Germans without regard for casualties because he was confident that he had sufficient replacements. In an ATL in which Germany is crushing the Red Army in every sector and sustaining a rapid advance, we have to consider that by 1942 or 1943, Stalin will play his forces more conservatively to preserve manpower.

Finally, even if Stalin makes a truce (or is overthrown by someone who makes a truce), we have to assume it is merely a cease fire that both sides are willing to break whenever it suits them. Which means Germany still needs to deploy its minimum defensive ratio in the east.

Finally finally, we have to take into account the much larger occupation zone that Axis soldiers will have to manage if they push and hold significantly farther to east, which will require more soldiers than the smaller occupation zone of the OTL.

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Re: Meta What-If: Variables and Victory Conditions for evaluating Eastern Front ATL's

#12

Post by HistoryGeek2019 » 19 Dec 2019, 01:15

Another variable:

Soviet Mobilization Capacity: What percentage of its population could the Soviet Union mobilize? The USSR's pre-war population was 165 million. It incurred 28 million causalties (Glantz) and finished with roughly 8 million non-hospitalized soldiers. So the Soviet Union mobilized 36 million out of its 165 million people during the war, which is a mobilization percentage of roughly 22%. So if we're talking about the Soviet population being reduced to 70 million or so once the Germans reach the Line of Farthest Advance, the Soviets can still mobilize approximately 14 million soldiers.

This mobilization percentage might be high due to wounded soldiers being recycled into combat, but even if we say only 50% of the wounded were unable to return to combat, that leaves us with 20 million out of 165 million mobilized during the war (which has to be too low because that was their starting soldiers plus reserves), but that's still a mobilization percentage of approximately 13%, which would give a USSR with a population of 70 million a mobilization capacity of approximately 8 million.

If we put 5 million of these on the front line, and assume Germany needs 50% to defend, then Germany needs to commit 2.5 million soldiers to defend the Eastern Front at all times, which is about the same that Germany actually had deployed at all times on the Eastern Front in the OTL after 1941.

I think that paints a pretty grim picture of Germany's prospects in WW2, even if it advanced all the way to the Urals. I don't see how Germany can defend France, Italy, Greece, Norway and the Caucasus/Persia if it has 2.5 million men deployed against the Russians at all times. Germany certainly couldn't defend the west with 2.5 million men deployed against the Russians in the OTL, so I don't see how an ATL with that figure works out any better for Germany.

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Re: Meta What-If: Variables and Victory Conditions for evaluating Eastern Front ATL's

#13

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 19 Dec 2019, 08:14

HistoryGeek2019 wrote:Another variable:

Soviet Mobilization Capacity
Yes, I agree that there should be a variable for "mobilization relative to maximum sustainable level.
On the actual ceiling of mobilization - especially sustainable mobilization - I think the following is deeply misguided:
What percentage of its population could the Soviet Union mobilize? The USSR's pre-war population was 165 million. It incurred 28 million causalties (Glantz) and finished with roughly 8 million non-hospitalized soldiers. So the Soviet Union mobilized 36 million out of its 165 million people during the war, which is a mobilization percentage of roughly 22%.
Just as a check - do we think the SU could have mobilized 14% of its pre-Barbarossa population (say Barbarossa is stopped at the border as planned). That means 27mil men! (.14 * 195). I'm bullish on Soviet strength absent Barbarossa but even for me that's...

As I explain above, the maximum mobilization is a function of:
  • Proportion of economy devoted to war. The maximum is therefore whatever is left above subsistence. As I've said elsewhere, that proportion is lower for poorer countries (less room above subsistence) and therefore is lower for SU than for Germany.
  • Number of Soldiers (S): Each S requires X workers to produce weapons and Y workers to feed (X+S) and to supply the factories.
  • Mobilization should therefore be construed as involving not just S but also X; the sum of these constitutes the total proportion directly devoted to war (unless you want unarmed soldiers or starving factory workers).
  • Per Harrison & Barber's "The Soviet Economy 1941-1945", 1942 was the absolute peak of mobilization.
Military professionals have recognized this constraint for decades. Take, for example, the U.S. Victory Plan of 1941:
Wedemeyer began his calculations by getting statistics
from the relevant government agencies and from the Princeton
University Demographics Center on the number of men essential to
maintain industry, agriculture, and government. He also asked the
Navy for its best estimates of the number of men it would need to
expand to full war strength.47 Once in possession of those figures,
he made some general statements about manpower distribution.
https://history.army.mil/html/books/093 ... _93-10.pdf

...it was for this general reason that Marshall stuck with the "91-division gamble." Likewise, Churchill capped the British land forces at 2mil for most of the war, later rising to 2.5mil, to avoid harming the economy.

As you can see, the Wallies recognized the direct relationship between soldiers mobilized (which means need for more weapons) and the amount of weapons produced. While soldiers will constitute a small percentage of overall population in any industrial war, each additional soldier requires additional workers. Think of #soldiers as "demand" and #workers as supply with the former having a positive slope and the latter a (slightly shallower) negative slope. Where those two lines intersect gives you the size of the armed forces for a given level of war mobilization (i.e. when there's no more labor to extract from civilian subsistence).

Likewise Germany faced this same constraint. You may remember for my ATL's the discussion of how to increase Ostheer manpower. It's not as if Germany could not have exceeded the ~7mil men under arms on 6/22/41 - indeed they increased that figure to ~10.5mil later. To have a bigger Ostheer, however, requires more war workers for more weapons but simultaneously decreases the pool of war workers (all else being equal).

If the SU could really have had 14% of its population under arms at maximum mobilization, why didn't they do it in 1942? There were ~130mil persons in the unoccupied SU, 14% is 18.2mil or about 85% higher than OTL.

That would definitely have stopped Blau in its tracks.
...had the extra possessed more than pitchforks, and had their mobilization been possible without condemning the future to starvation and further lack of arms as stocks depleted.

The maximum mobilization level of the SU (soldiers and war workers as a % of population) was reached in 1942. This level actually exceeded the sustainable mobilization level, as cuts to labor and stocks caused the widespread malnutrition and even some outright starvation seen in 1942 (as documented in Hunger and War). Thereafter, the SU cut its mobilization level, which accounts for the fact that SU troop strength (total) rose at a slower rate than the recovery of territory caused its population to rise during '43-'45 (increases that far exceeded the horrifying battlefield casualties which, to repeat, represent a small portion of the overall attrition picture on the Eastern Front).

Applying this mobilization framework to a late-42 or early-43 SU pushed back to the Urals and having a population of 70mil (optimistic but fine for now) gives us a maximum force of ~5.2mil (70/130 * 9.6).

But even assuming 70mil population base (optimistic), assuming 1942 soldier proportion is extremely optimistic. Why? Because agricultural productivity will have declined massively due to the loss of the Volga basin, the only large grain-surplus region never occupied by OTL Ostheer. A conservative estimate of the impact would be a 25% decline in agricultural productivity. That means that if the ATL SU wants to feed its population at the malnutrition-inducing levels of OTL 1943, it has to devote ~33% more labor to agriculture for an equal amount of food (it takes about as much labor to plow, weed, and sickel bad farmland as it does good). That decline in Ag productivity doesn't even account for Soviet fuel supplies - essential for tractors and for moving goods from farms to rails, especially in low-density/productivity Siberia and Central Asia. Even in 1942 - before the Germans approached the Caucasus - SU had significanty cut its fuel allocation to farmers, which inevitably contributed to lower productivity. Furthermore, fertilizer production was cut and, with more demands for military and farm labor, all industries (including the chemical plants that made fertilizer) would have seen further reductions from even their pitiful war-time outputs. In addition, further military losses means losses of young men, who are more productive on farms (physical labor) than boys, older men, and women. All in all, predicting a 25% decrease in agricultural labor productivity is extremely conservative.

What does a 25% Ag productivity loss mean? Soviet agriculture typically employed ~40% of the labor force (collective farms, state farms, agriculture industry e.g. fishing, meat processing, etc.). Taking 40% as the figure, maintaining abysmal 1943 nutrition levels with 25% lower Ag productivity means moving an additional 13% of the labor force out of the army and war factories (again, you can't further cut civilian subsistence activities in 1942 SU). Given a ~4:1 ratio of war workers to soldiers (see Harrison's tables) that means removing ~10.4% of the population out of war work and ~2.6% of the population out of the factories. That means reducing the ~5.2mil army by ~1.8mil (.026 * 70) to ~3.4mil. Now it's starting to look dire for SU isn't it (I mean at 5.2mil it's already screwed but now...).

But the bad news is still just starting:
Per Glantz's Stumbling Colossus, the "non-operating fronts" facing Japan (mostly) and Turkey (only ~6 divisions by 1942) never dipped significantly below 1mil RKKA strength. There was good reason for that: Japan maintained a strong Kwantung Army in Manchuria until 1944 or so; a perception that a strike from Manchuria would end the SU likely would have invited Japanese action and Stalin knew this (he made precisely this point to Zhukov's entreaties to weaken the East - Zhukov knew less about politics and economics than Stalin). So far we've been determining the German-facing fronts as a proportion of total strength but that implies a 60+% cut to in the Far East in this scenario. Such a cut would almost certainly prompt the loss of Vladivostok, Khavarovsk, etc. to Japan in 42/43, which all but ends LL aid (in this ATL, Murmansk and Archangel are gone - or at least cut off from the rest of the SU).

Speaking of LL:
Food aid probably averted mass starvation in 1943. Almost as important were imports of explosives: the Soviet chemicals industry tanked after Barbarossa (thus little fertilizer for ag as mentioned); absent LL aid the RKKA's massive artillery arm is worthless. Sure, the SU could invest in its own production but the reason it relied on LL in this domain so heavily is a lack of comparative advantage: the SU just wasn't good at tech-heavy products like explosives, highly-refined avgas (nearly all came from LL later in the war), and radios (lack of which would have further destroyed RKKA combat power).

So if Japan isn't part of an "Axis victory in the East" ATL, it still has massive impact by tying down ~1mil RKKA to deter an easy economic death blow in the East.

Then there's loss rates:
A smaller RKKA doesn't mean a lower rate of bloody casualties unless, as you suggest above, the military strategy is "run away." That, of course, simply invites more and quicker Economic/Demographic/Ag losses as discussed above (Thus Stalin's "Not a step back" order during Blau - again he knew more about economics and statecraft than his generals; he knew losing the Volga basin would be worse than losing a couple Fronts). Bloody casualties depend primarily on enemy combat strength, not on target strength (guns don't aim at land typically). For the lower total RKKA numbers envisioned, equal (or greater) losses vs. OTL would require a higher percentage of men in training and their trainers (In Glantz's tables, these are most of the men in internal military districts).

...so all in all, an SU pushed back to the Urals would be lucky to have 5mil men total and even luckier to have 2mil facing the Germans.
...Which implies a cakewalk for Germany - my assumption of no winter break-in to the Urals is probably too generous as they're only ~90 miles wide (LW could wreck the big factories at Magnitogorsk as well, ending heavy industry and all steel-based arms production within a couple months thereafter. Yes the LW wasn't great at strategic bombing but this it would be a ~90mi hop over the Urals to Magnitogorsk against a weak VVS).

I can provide cites for all these points but first I want to see whether we're agreed on the analytical framework. If you still think maximum mobilization is a matter of anyone who served at any time then I'll hold off on the citation efforts.
-----------

One last note on the intuition that probably drove your proposed maximum mobilization metric:

I suppose it is true that, in theory, a country could build up a huge stockpile of weapons and food, remove all military-aged men from factory/farm, and field a massive force for a little while (assuming it had the rail/other infrastructure to supply such a force). That's indeed how it worked for many pre-industrial armies: large-scale mobilization then come home for the planting/harvesting seasons. I hope it's obvious that isn't possible in WW2.
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Re: Meta What-If: Variables and Victory Conditions for evaluating Eastern Front ATL's

#14

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 19 Dec 2019, 08:25

HistoryGeek2019 wrote:Similarly, we need to take into account the younger age of the Soviet population than in Germany - the USSR will be getting more new young recruits each year than Germany.
Not to beat the horse too much but, applying our analytical principals, what does this matter to the total level of RKKA strength? At maximum mobilization you still need X war workers and Y others to feed (X+soldiers) and to supply the war factories. Soldiers are a fixed proportion of X+Y+(civilian subsistence workers)+(children and dependents).

It would - I'll concede - reduce the average age of soldiers relative to Germany's, which would be an "average combat power" contributing variable. Given WW2 qualitative factors, however, 40-year old Germans would probably beat 22yo Russians in an even fight (battlefield fight, not brawling - there my money's on the Russian peasant at any age).
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Re: Meta What-If: Variables and Victory Conditions for evaluating Eastern Front ATL's

#15

Post by HistoryGeek2019 » 19 Dec 2019, 21:57

"Soviet Mobilization Capacity" is not the percentage of the population that could be fielded at any one time, but the percentage of the pre-war population that, from 1939-1945, could be called into service. Assuming that the Soviets actually fielded every last soldier they could during the war (probably not true), this gives a capacity of 36 million, or 22%. This doesn't mean the Soviets could field an army of 36 million all at once, but that they had 36 million soldiers who could be called into service.

There are several factors that influence this:

Recycling of wounded soldiers: I have no data on this. If you do, please share.

Population flight to the east: Soviet factories were shipped east of the Urals along with their workers. I don't have data on this amount, but it was clearly enough to sustain industrial output of army weapons, which exceeded that of Germany throughout the war. There would also be eastward migration of refugees and at some point a "July 1942" moment when large segments of the Red Army fled to east.

Length of the war: The longer the war goes on (a certainty in the kind of ATL you're considering), the more fresh young recruits the Soviets will be getting compared to Germany (45% under 20 vs 33% for Germany). To deny this is absurd. 40 something factory workers aren't dying off at the same rate as 20 something soldiers on the front. Germany's replacement forces in 1942 and 1943 came from the new sets of 17-18 year olds.

Sustainability (i.e., production of food, clothing and shelter to enable to population and army to survive) affects Soviet Combat Power, not Soviet Mobilization Capacity. The OTL Red Army reached a maximum combat power of 10 million in 1942, but had the mobilization capacity for 20-36 million soldiers. This is important because even with a significantly reduced combat power, a high mobilization capacity means that the Soviet Union can continue to throw away troops at the OstHeer, inflicting causalties and reducing Germany's manpower available elsewhere.

In terms of analyzing sustainability, it seems what you need is a map that breaks down Soviet population, food and raw material output by zone, and showing what percentage of each lay in the following zones:

1. OTL maximum occupied zone (i.e., up to Voronezh-Stalingrad-Caucasus),
2. Between the OTL maximum occupied zone and the line of maximum advance, and
3. East of the line of maximum advance.

You also need to take into account that in any ATL where Germany "wins" against Russia, the war will go beyond 1945. Which means Japan will have been defeated and the Allies will be occupying Korea and Manchuria, freeing up Soviet manpower and allowing essentially unlimited lend-lease aid into the Soviet Union from the east. You even have to ask whether the Soviet Union would recruit mercenaries from the far eastern countries.

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