The "History Channel" view is of course that invading the SU was a mistake; it seems to be the majority view here as well. Among historians it's probably the majority view that Soviet victory was inevitable but there are important dissenters (e.g. Overy, Askey, the "Moscow in August '41" gang).
In this thread/post I am not seeking to resolve those arguments though of course I can't control whatever discussion follows. Rather, I'd like to begin a catalog of variables (operational, economic, demographic, etc.) that full consideration of any counterfactual requires, along with beginning an articulation of feasible end-points aside from the OTL crushing Soviet victory. The list of variables should include those relevant to at least most interesting Eastern Front ATL's, including Japanese participation, Stalin attacking first, etc. [I'll confess that I have more interest in, and probably give fuller treatment to, variables related to 1941 Barbarossa ATL's than others].
I'll start by focusing on non-operational factors, by which I mean factors aside from the Ostheer/RKKA wins this or that battle (the usual starting point of ATL's).
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Note on citations: This post is informed by my reading but I've decided that to provide a research agenda on every variable listed below would just take too much time and is not necessary to the project of delineating important variables and victory conditions. I.e. it's self-evident (IMO) that food supply and labor force numbers matter and that operational outcomes influence these variables. That's enough to make this list as I conceive the project. I'm happy to provide cites - can't promise punctuality - regarding specific variables when I slip from description of variables into arguments about the directional valence of variables.
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Non-Operational Variables Impacting RKKA Combat Power.
In any evaluation of alternate Eastern Front scenarios, one must have a dynamic picture of the RKKA’s combat power in relation to the resources of the SU. One must, therefore, continually perform loops of analysis between (1) operational events and their operational outcomes (e.g. destruction of Soviet field forces and map changes) and (2) economic/demographic/agricultural effects of operational outcomes on Soviet ability generate and support field forces. This is a multi-faceted, complex process whose full analysis would address at least each of the following variables:
- 1. The total population and economic base of the SU. Obviously this impacts how many men RKKA could field and their firepower level.
a. Further operational losses during/after Barbarossa would have implied further losses of population, industrial plant, and natural resources. Quicker losses would have impeded partial evacuation of human/physical resources.
b. Migration of Soviets from unoccupied to occupied territory, and from SU to abroad (especially in Central Asia) would increase given different operational outcomes and attendant stress on SU-controlled population. - 2. Food supply.
a. Soviet retention of the most productive agricultural lands was directly related to operational outcomes. Loss of these lands was the most important factor in declining agricultural productivity.
b. Operations seriously impacted Soviet ability to evacuate/retain harvests during 41/42.
c. Greater loss of agricultural capital goods would result from quicker/deeper Axis advance, including reduced opportunity to evacuate tractors, horses, etc.
d. Lend Lease.
e. Fish. ~2% of 1943 Soviet calories and >10% of protein came from fishing. Operational losses in the Far East, Black Sea, and White Sea could basically end Soviet marine production. - 3. Fuel supply.
a. Later in the period considered, German threats to the Caucasus and Kuibyshev, and Japanese threats to Sakhalin, would seriously endanger fuel supply.
b. Throughout the period – even before enemy approach to oilfields – manpower strain had serious impact on Soviet oil production, which declined dramatically long before Blau. - 4. The quality of the population base.
a. The labor force’s proportion of men generally and prime-aged men specifically would decline given further Axis operational success, as more young men would move from farm/factory to field. Prime-aged males were more productive in Soviet agriculture, mining, industry, etc. than older males, children, and women. - 5. Morale
a. Morale of the fighting troops. Difficult to quantify/analyze but there is at least some evidence that Soviet soldiers were more likely to surrender tactically (i.e. when not involved in operational encirclements) during the nadirs of Soviet operational fortune than otherwise.
b. Morale of workers. The Soviet peoples made enormous and heroic sacrifices to defeat Nazism, an indisputable fact that remains a justified point of pride and bitterness (vis a vis the West) even today. There is evidence, however, that the Soviets were no more the supermen of their propaganda than the untermenschen of Nazi lore. I.e. there are indications of productivity drops - especially early in the war - occurring in the midst of general heroism and sacrifice (mentioned by Harrison, to be discussed further). As with military morale, it's difficult to treat this topic analytically. - 6. The experience and professionalism of fighting troops.
a. Soviet tactical combat power per man declined throughout the war, presumably due to lower training times and laxer enlistment standards. Greater Axis operational success would accelerate and deepen this decline, as more well-trained soldiers would be removed earlier in the war. - 7. Lend Lease and loss of supply routes. Important sub-variables:
a. In general, the Northern Russia and Far East routes consumed less shipping than the Persian corridor. The latter was capacity-restricted as well. Operational loss of Vladivostok and/or Murmansk/Russia would imply LL losses incapable of being met by the Persian Corridor.
b. Specific commodities/items supplied by LL for which Soviet substitution was impossible or prohibitive. Foremost among these are explosives, aviation fuel, and technological items like radios.
c. Food aid.
d. Commonwealth weapons delivered via North Russia ahead of the Battle of Moscow, which were subject to early operational disruption by Germany (~20% of Soviet medium tanks at OTL Moscow battle were British-built). - 8. Soviet industrial capital goods.
a. The biggest factor here is evacuation during 41/42. Changes to operational outcomes during Barbarossa would have serious impacts on evacuation of capital goods.
b. LL also figures, as American machine tool deliveries had massive impact on Soviet industrial productivity.
The meta-variable of Soviet Combat Power would be dynamically related to the meta-variable of German Combat Power as well: fewer Soviets means fewer dead Germans, which means more Germans and more German Combat Power at the next temporal slice.
Variables impacting German Combat Power
- 1. Initial forces deployed. For “stronger Ostheer” “What If’s” this is OTL Ostheer strength plus ATL delta. Such an ATL should explain how additional German manpower will be replaced in the economy or state/justify the production foregone, and should explain the production/acquisition path to arming additional Germans.
- 2. Casualties.
a. Battle casualties inflicted by RKKA. For any temporal slice, this is proportional to RKKA combat power.
b. Non-battle casualties. E.g. sickness and frostbite. ATL’s involving better German logistics should save on frostbite casualties, for example. - 3. German combat effectiveness. This factor should vary less than Soviet effectiveness but significant ATL deltas should be assumed given lower/higher German casualty rates.
- 4. Logistics. IMO this factor should be differentiated into two categories: strategic and tactical logistics. IMO the Ostheer gets a bad rap for its tactical logistics, which were quite a bit better than Soviet logistics even if lagging the Americans. On strategic logistics, however, OTL Barbarossa involved a world-historical failure of an industrialized nation to plan for modern warfare’s needs.
a. Tactical logistics involves general German intra-unit supply distribution practices and resources. ATL’s that alter practices should explain how and why German organization/culture/philosophy would be changed to enable better/worse tactical logistics. A more-straightforward change to tactical German logistics would involve providing greater truck/horse/air lift resources. Any ATL involving such change should explain the production/acquisition path and attendant implications for fuel, fodder, and other resources.
b. Strategic logistics refers to the high-level movement of resources into operational theaters. For the WW2 Ostheer, this was most importantly a matter of railroads, although long-distance trucking (Grosstransportraum) played an important role as well. The Wehrmacht failed adequately to plan for using railroads to move sufficient supplies deep into the SU. In large part this failure traces to Barbarossa’s inherent and shambolic flaw: assumption of a short campaign. The military professionals largely – with important exceptions – followed Hitler’s lead in assuming no need to support large forces far beyond the border zones. Remedies for this failure were entirely within the scope of German railroad resources, as I will argue (perhaps here, perhaps in other threads with links hopefully placed here for reference). Better railroad planning would also have improved German operational truck logistics: entire German armies frequently supported themselves via truck while several hundred miles from railheads and/or during periods when the hapless railroads weren’t getting sufficient supplies to the forward railheads. This contributed to vehicle attrition. - 5. German Fuel Supply. Any ATL involving greater German forces and/or deeper advances during Barbarossa should at least ensure that the proposed additional movements do not exceed Germany’s ability to allot more fuel to the Ostheer. Within reason, feasible ATL’s can draw on German stocks and/or OTL stocks allotted to Luftwaffe, Kriegsmarine, and export. The ATL should consider the likely operational impact on LW/KM of such moves. Given that most fuel consumption is tactical rather than operational, however, one should avoid assuming that deeper advance necessarily means greater overall fuel consumption. It is entirely possible for an army to advance further using less fuel – if it destroys its enemies more quickly and therefore faces a lower burden of tactical maneuver overall. A critical piece of this analysis must be average distance (and terrain) from field units to railheads, as trucks bringing supplies to units burned a significant portion of the Heer's allotment.
Victory Conditions
Variables foreseeably causing Soviet collapse and/or surrender of European USSR:
1. Famine and the foreseeable threat thereof if war continues.
a. 1942/3 USSR was at the absolute limit of food restriction. Malnutrition-induced disease was widespread, state rations were below emergency subsistence levels.
b. Soviet food supply difficulties had multiple causes, the most important of which was the loss of much fertile agricultural land. By beginning of 1942 SU had lost Crimea and most of Ukraine. During 1942 it lost the remainder of Ukraine and much of the Black Earth Region (Chernovets) of Southern Russia, including the critical North Caucasus. Although these losses were to varying degrees partial, allowing at least some rescue of harvest, they directly caused a further decline in agricultural productivity.
c. Besides the loss of good land, agricultural productivity suffered from a decline in non-land inputs, specifically fuel, optimal manpower (i.e. military-aged males), farming equipment (e.g. horses and tractors), and fertilizer.
d. Soviet agricultural productivity in 1943 was X% of its 1940 level. [Note to MarcksPlan to fill in this subvariable when he locates his copy of Hunger and War]
2. Internal threat to the survival of the regime.
a. Due to famine and perceptions of military incompetence, it was possible that the Soviet regime would collapse internally. It is extremely difficult to analytically describe the preconditions for such collapse, however, so I will mostly ignore this outcome other than the following remark: Any evaluation of the likelihood of German victory in the East must at least be aware the Communist regime was not internally invincible, as much later events showed (1990). In that spirit, the possibility of internal Soviet collapse should act as a residual factor when judging the overall likelihood of "successful Barbarossa" ATL's.
3. External threat to the survival of the regime: foreseeable conquest if war continues.
a. While Stalin was no doubt a patriot of the USSR and even of Russia, his overriding concern was the survival of his regime rather than the welfare of his country.
b. Given (a) and given the military/economic state of affairs in feasible ATL's by late-summer 1942, a rational Stalin would rightly conclude that the only way to preserve his regime would be to agree to German demands that the SU disarm and accept a border along the Urals/Ural River. A refusal to do so would commit Germany to another offensive against the SU during 1943, which would predictably overrun the Urals (if still in SU possession), penetrate into Siberia, and detach the Central Asian republics from Soviet control. Combined with Japanese pressure towards Baikal/Irkutsk in the East, this would leave the SU as a ~Romania-sized population and would likely seal the regime’s fate internally. Accordingly, a rational Stalin would accept Hitler’s terms, retreat to the Urals and disarm. He would rationally see that Hitler had little interest in pushing beyond the Urals, that a rump and demilitarized SU was in Hitler’s interests, and that armistice would achieve his goal of regime- and self-preservation.
c. Note that the analysis in (b) is focused on Stalin/SU’s interest only. While it is true that a rump SU’s continued resistance would benefit the Allied cause, there is no reason to believe that Stalin/SU would have weighed Allied interests at all. By Fall 1942, all the SU can do is immolate itself for an eventual Allied victory that would almost certainly preclude Communist rule. We must be careful to analyze the incentives of individual members of the Allied coalition rather than the interests of the coalition as a whole.
4. The prospect of inter-capitalist warfare from which the SU specifically and communism generally would emerge victorious.
a. Stalin was a sincere communist. In every other domain there is practically no cynical analysis of him lacking justification; on his political commitments he was sincere. Joel Kotkin’s books amply demonstrate this, if it needed demonstration.
b. The survival of a rump SU in Asia – still the world’s largest country by land area – would ensure “socialism in one country” for the foreseeable future.
c. Stalin believed, in line with communist orthodoxy, that prolonged war between Axis and Allied capitalist powers presented good chances of worldwide communist revolution emerging. A 1942 retreat to the Urals would recapitulate his 1939 posture, minus a lot of resources.
d. Stalin could have hoped that the Anglosphere would defeat the Axis, after/during which his SU could regain its losses partially or entirely, or even amplify his pre-war holdings in Eastern Europe.