Allies end the war by Christmas 1944

[Carl Schwamberger]

this is off-topic- a close study of the day to day action does show significant Allied infantry casualties in absorbing these hasty counterattacks June-August.

Which ones? Which days? It has always been my read that the significant Allied infantry casualties were a result of unrelenting Allied infantry attacks. The only divisions I can think off offhand suffering heavy infantry casualties due to German Panzer counterattacks were the 30th ID at Mortain (and that was mostly in two battalions) and the 2 (or was it 3) Canadian Infantry Division in ATLANTIC (and that was mostly in a single brigade). ...

The ratio of losses don't add up in the traditional way for a Allied offensive battle. Using the a common accepted , 6th June to mid August, Allied loss at around 210,000 KiA/MiA/PW it is opposite the expected loss distribution. At the strategic level the Germans were on the defense So the uninformed guess would be fewer losses for the Germans. Zetterling placed total losses June - August at 290,000. Even after stripping out the 50,000 captured in the Falaise pocket. Thats still not the expect attacker/defender loss ratio. If one uses the more recent estimates given by Hastings, Wilmot, & others it gets crazy with loss ratios of 1:2.5 for the attacker/defender. Can anyone point to a in depth analysis of this? Theres the usual remarks about large scale Allied air support, artillery fires far above the German ability, & other items. But examinations connecting clearly causes to the effect I've not seen.

[Carl Schwamberger]

For what it may or may not be worth this works on the game board when the Allies out reach their air cover & logistics. When the Allies corps have artillery ammunition, and air support they grind away any German forces, tactical superiority notwithstanding.

Well historically the Allies in the West never absorbed anything greater than a equivalent two division attack (a few tired, heavily reduced formations combined in the Mortain counteroffensive hastily attacking with a poorly planned attack while in duress in after COBRA). US and CW inf took significant (although not soviet level) losses containing German Pz attacks as well, which were quite small. Triple the forces committed at the II SS PzK counterattack ( a equivalent ~ 1 division counterattack) at the tail end at Epsom or in the first days of the invasion (~1 division counterattack) and that's a very different story.

You are referring to the Normandy battle, June-August? The December offensive was of multiple armored or mechanized corps. Or what passed for such in 1944 German terms.

What was missing historically was the full strength of the PzGruppe West and the follow up formations in that summer, never applied in the intended fashion in a maneuverable environment where the value of vastly superior firepower is lessened. And with sufficient forces to concentrate in force and absorb the losses that were required. It's reasonable to conclude that making the Allied estimate was greatly aided by the irrationality of German strategy to hold onto Caen.

This reminds me of gaming a Korean war back in the 1990s. The NKPA could follow a strategy of using massed mechanized formations vs the ROK infantry army, but only if the US/Allied air power was waived away. They had a strategy & a lot of tactics for trying that, but if they did not succeed the massed ground mechanized formations were broken up by air strikes. What the Red force usually ended up doing was dispersing, digging in, and camouflaging, then searching for the optimal 'dispersal to concentration time/space that would enable viable mobile ops. With that constraint division & corps attacks were the best possible. Any of this sound familiar?

It looks to me that fighting mobile concentrated multi corps size operations on the 'plains' of NW Europe wont work against air power on the scale the Allies had that year. Or in 1943 for that matter. Theres a reason the Germans severely curtained daylight movement and administrative ops in Normandy. How they neutralize Allied air power while fighting a large mobile ground battle on the French or Belgian plains I cant see.

[Richard Anderson]

this is off-topic- a close study of the day to day action does show significant Allied infantry casualties in absorbing these hasty counterattacks June-August.

Which ones? Which days? It has always been my read that the significant Allied infantry casualties were a result of unrelenting Allied infantry attacks. The only divisions I can think off offhand suffering heavy infantry casualties due to German Panzer counterattacks were the 30th ID at Mortain (and that was mostly in two battalions) and the 2 (or was it 3) Canadian Infantry Division in ATLANTIC (and that was mostly in a single brigade). ...

The ratio of losses don't add up in the traditional way for a Allied offensive battle. Using the a common accepted , 6th June to mid August, Allied loss at around 210,000 KiA/MiA/PW it is opposite the expected loss distribution. At the strategic level the Germans were on the defense So the uninformed guess would be fewer losses for the Germans. Zetterling placed total losses June - August at 290,000. Even after stripping out the 50,000 captured in the Falaise pocket. Thats still not the expect attacker/defender loss ratio. If one uses the more recent estimates given by Hastings, Wilmot, & others it gets crazy with loss ratios of 1:2.5 for the attacker/defender. Can anyone point to a in depth analysis of this? Theres the usual remarks about large scale Allied air support, artillery fires far above the German ability, & other items. But examinations connecting clearly causes to the effect I've not seen.

Carl. As I understood it, the claim was for significant allied infantry casualties versus German Panzer attacks. So a microcosm, tactical, 1000-foot view. You are addressing the macrocosm, operational-strategic, 20000-foot view.

[Carl Schwamberger]

Of course. If one follows the micro battle it's clear the Germans won the war. Except they did not. So we must be not comprehending correctly what the 300 meter view presents.

[Richard Anderson]

Of course. If one follows the micro battle it's clear the Germans won the war. Except they did not. So we must be not comprehending correctly what the 300 meter view presents.

Not that either, The original claim is that in Normandy the German Panzer attacks caused "significant" allied infantry casualties. I was asking when, where, and who, because I have never formed that impression. For example, in the attack by Leht on the 9th and 30th ID at Le Dezert on 12 July there was no significant difference in casualties from the previous or later days.

[Cult Icon]

On the CW side of the equation (they fought the majority of Pz formations in Normandy). The first book covers June 6-9 1944, largely 12SSHJ against Canadian 3rd Division. The attack was intended to seize a staging area for attack to reach the coast. This book is largely from the Canadian POV. IIRC their casualties were 2,500 from all causes but mainly from the 12.SS HJ. Behind it was assembled the Panzer Lehr division, intended to be the second echelon for the attack on the beaches. However, after Bayeux was seized, the German command gave up the idea of breaking through to the coast and sent Lehr there. The casualties on both sides were roughly the same, with Canadian/CW artillery being quite effective.

The second book is about the fight for the Rauray spur, it's been a while since I read it but also the losses on both sides were about the same. I got the German figures from Normandy 1944, Zetterling. The attackers made some progress into CW defenses and quit. In both cases the battle was not pursued to completion (as I stated in the previous page) and were partial efforts in which the Germans gave up quickly and resumed defense as other priorities took over. They were unwilling to spend the "blood price".

https://www.amazon.com/Stopping-Panzers ... 886&sr=8-1

https://www.amazon.com/Breaking-Panzers ... 622&sr=8-1

[Richard Anderson]

On the CW side of the equation (they fought the majority of Pz formations in Normandy). The first book covers June 6-9 1944, largely 12SSHJ against Canadian 3rd Division. The attack was intended to seize a staging area for attack to reach the coast. This book is largely from the Canadian POV. IIRC their casualties were 2,500 from all causes but mainly from the 12.SS HJ. Behind it was assembled the Panzer Lehr division, intended to be the second echelon for the attack on the beaches. However, after Bayeux was seized, the German command gave up the idea of breaking through to the coast and sent Lehr there. The casualties on both sides were roughly the same, with Canadian/CW artillery being quite effective.

Sorry, but no. 3 CID reported a total of 354 casualties for 8 June and 804 for 9 June, the peak of the 12. SS-Panzerdivision counterattack. For 6 and 7 June the casualties totaled about 642. On 10 June casualties dropped to 205 and by that time at least 22 MIA had RTD.

The second book is about the fight for the Rauray spur, it's been a while since I read it but also the losses on both sides were about the same. I got the German figures from Normandy 1944, Zetterling. The attackers made some progress into CW defenses and quit. In both cases the battle was not pursued to completion (as I stated in the previous page) and were partial efforts in which the Germans gave up quickly and resumed defense as other priorities took over. They were unwilling to spend the "blood price"

I think that is a rather wordy way of saying the German attacks failed.

[glenn239]

Say the Allies land the same way they did on June 6th.

Certain efforts, such as Hürtgenwald would have to be avoided.

What strategic/operational decisions would it take to win the war by Christmas?

Can't be done militarily, IMO. Politically it might be possible if Hitler is assassinated in the July coup attempt?

[Michael Kenny]

The Allied timetable saw victory in June 1945. This is pre D-Day 'Phase Line' planning and it was never expected to end the war by Christmas. They saw a chance and went for it but it did not work out.

[Kingfish]

They would have done it had the British not stop for tea

[Aida1]

On the CW side of the equation (they fought the majority of Pz formations in Normandy). The first book covers June 6-9 1944, largely 12SSHJ against Canadian 3rd Division. The attack was intended to seize a staging area for attack to reach the coast. This book is largely from the Canadian POV. IIRC their casualties were 2,500 from all causes but mainly from the 12.SS HJ. Behind it was assembled the Panzer Lehr division, intended to be the second echelon for the attack on the beaches. However, after Bayeux was seized, the German command gave up the idea of breaking through to the coast and sent Lehr there. The casualties on both sides were roughly the same, with Canadian/CW artillery being quite effective.

The second book is about the fight for the Rauray spur, it's been a while since I read it but also the losses on both sides were about the same. I got the German figures from Normandy 1944, Zetterling. The attackers made some progress into CW defenses and quit. In both cases the battle was not pursued to completion (as I stated in the previous page) and were partial efforts in which the Germans gave up quickly and resumed defense as other priorities took over. They were unwilling to spend the "blood price".

https://www.amazon.com/Stopping-Panzers ... 886&sr=8-1

https://www.amazon.com/Breaking-Panzers ... 622&sr=8-1

I think you are in denial here of how unfunny it was to be attacking while subjected to superior allied firepower “Unwiling to spend the blood price” is a strange way of describing what actually happened.

[Aida1]

The Allied schedule was predicated on Panzer Group West and the mobile formations in France to do the rational action and withdraw into the interior to make operating conditions for counteroffensives. Instead, they were wasted in attritional combat at Caen. Given that the Panzer forces were superior to what was available in the later Nordwind/Ardennes offensives, their potential when grouped together in an offensive operation was greater.

Allowing the allies to land and then defeat them in a battle of maneuver sounds great in theory but allied air superiority makes that impossible. Does not mean that it did not make sense to pull back outside the range of allied naval guns once the landings had succeeded. Another major problem was not enough infantrydivisions to hold the front so Panzerdivisions had to be kept in the line.

[Aida1]

For what it may or may not be worth this works on the game board when the Allies out reach their air cover & logistics. When the Allies corps have artillery ammunition, and air support they grind away any German forces, tactical superiority notwithstanding.

Well historically the Allies in the West never absorbed anything greater than a equivalent two division attack (a few tired, heavily reduced formations combined in the Mortain counteroffensive hastily attacking with a poorly planned attack while in duress in after COBRA). US and CW inf took significant (although not soviet level) losses containing German Pz attacks as well, which were quite small. Triple the forces committed at the II SS PzK counterattack ( a equivalent ~ 1 division counterattack) at the tail end at Epsom or in the first days of the invasion (~1 division counterattack) and that's a very different story.

What was missing historically was the full strength of the PzGruppe West and the follow up formations in that summer, never applied in the intended fashion in a maneuverable environment where the value of vastly superior firepower is lessened. And with sufficient forces to concentrate in force and absorb the losses that were required. It's reasonable to conclude that making the Allied estimate was greatly aided by the irrationality of German strategy to hold onto Caen.

Pure theory which was not practically achievable. And you are in denial about the difficulty of lauching the strong counterattacks that were needed. Allied air superiority made movement and logistical support very difficult and any attack were subjected to devastating firepower. However, this does not mean it was correct for Hitler to refuse a retreat outside the range of allied naval firepower.

[Cult Icon]

They would have done it had the British not stop for tea

An interesting fact of this forum- almost nobody is interested in VE day by Christmas while everybody else is either fanatically for or against Moscow 1941/42, an even more far fetched objective.

[Aida1]

They would have done it had the British not stop for tea

An interesting fact of this forum- almost nobody is interested in VE day by Christmas while everybody else is either fanatically for or against Moscow 1941/42, an even more far fetched objective.

The latter has a lot of importance and was not far fetched at all. It only required a different plan with more focus.See for example General Nehring DIe Geschichte der deutschen Panzerwaffe 1916-1945 Ullstein 1995 pp 240-248.